121. On Contrition

1. Contrition outside the sacrament - "Getulius, having committed a mortal sin, remained for three months in this unhappy state. At last, conscience rebuking him, he throws himself at the feet of the confessor. The confessor asks him whether immediately after the sin had been committed he elicited an act of contrition. Since he answered negatively, he is on that account accused of a new mortal sin. The spiritual father then asks whether at least within the week he had been contrite. The penitent answers that he had delayed penance up to this time. You have acted very badly, says the confessor, for thus you have multiplied mortal sins; since you have sinned gravely as many times as, attending to the state of your soul, or remembering your sin, you omitted to elicit an act of perfect contrition.

It is asked: 1. Whether there is a grave obligation of eliciting an act of contrition immediately after a grave sin has been committed? - 2. What delay induces grave sin?

R. To the 1st. Negatively, more probably, because the precept of contrition is affirmative, or is an obligation of doing penance. Therefore it does not oblige at every moment. Therefore it does not immediately urge after a sin has been committed; otherwise sins would be multiplied according to the number of moments of delay, or as often as the sinner notices the obligation of doing penance, which is contrary to the common sense of the faithful and to the practice of confessors. Lig. 437.

To the 2nd. More probably it is grave to defer an act of contrition, after sin has been committed, beyond a month, because there seems to be a grave obligation of eliciting an act of charity once in a month; but an act of charity cannot be elicited without an act of contrition. In practice, however, many, indeed most sinners, are excused from that sin of delayed penance because of ignorance or inadvertence. Lig. 437; Comp. n. 444." Thus Fr. Gury 398, 399.

But some things in this resolution are not very carefully corrected. For it is not true what is said in the response to the 1st, that if the precept of contrition immediately urged after sins had been committed, they would be multiplied according to the number of moments of delay. For if it immediately urged after a sin had been committed, it follows only that someone would then immediately sin against the precept of contrition, and afterward would persevere in that sin until he elicited that act; otherwise he who stole another's thing and retained it for a year would commit as many sins as there are moments in the year, or at least as often as, noticing the obligation of making restitution, he does not restore, which is not true. And thus Fr. Gury himself, Comp. vol. 1, n. 166, raises the question: "Whether he who long defers restitution commits several sins." And he answers: "Negatively, if he habitually perseveres in the will of retaining another's thing, because the evil will perseveres by way of something continuous with the thing unjustly retained. Nevertheless, if the unjust possessor for a notable time has forgotten that restitution is to be made, and afterward renews the wicked purpose, he will commit a new sin, because his evil will is judged morally interrupted. St. Lig., n. 40, and others commonly, against others who say that the unjust possessor of another's thing sins as often as he attends to the obligation of restoring." Cf. Lig., l. 3, n. 683; Diana, tom. 1, tr. 7, res. 157; I. M. vol. 1, 308.

Moreover, as to the response to the 2nd, the same Fr. Gury, Comp. vol. 1, n. 218, says concerning the obligation of eliciting an act of charity: "The opinion of those who require an act of charity once in a month pleases St. Liguori. Ho. Ap. n. 12. But this opinion has no solid foundation." Likewise Fr. Gury, l. c., Comp. vol. 2, n. 444, raises the question: "What delay of contrition induces grave sin?" And he answers: "Theologians do not agree: it is indeed commonly admitted that there is given a grave delay of contrition independently of the precept of annual confession; but how great this delay must be, so that it may be judged grave, cannot be determined certainly: some extend it to a year; others to six months; others with St. Liguori to a month; nevertheless no reason or authority favors this last opinion. Moreover St. Alphonsus himself adds, n. 437, that sinners, especially rude ones, can for the most part, indeed almost always, be excused from this precept of delayed penance." I. M. vol. 1, n. 381; vol. 2, n. 478.

2. Defect of contrition in the Sacrament - Angelus, accusing only venial sins in sacramental confession, conceives no sorrow for them. For he says that, in order to blot them out in sacramental confession, their confession itself suffices, which is an act of satisfaction and penance.

It is asked: Whether at least attrition is necessary for the confession of venial sins.

R. Affirmatively. The reason is that Trent absolutely declares sorrow and detestation of sin to be the principal act on the part of the penitent, which with the others constitutes as it were the matter of the sacrament of penance. Cf. La-Croix, l. 6, p. 2, n. 682; Lugo, d. 9, s. 2; Suarez, d. 11, s. 3. Therefore confession of venial sins without sorrow can indeed be of itself an act of satisfaction and penance, but not sacramental. Angelus perhaps is indeed excused by good faith, but he acts badly, for, accusing only venial sins without sorrow, he exposes the sacrament to nullity, which is grave. I. M. 685.

3. Claudinus, a good old man, being asked by the confessor how he elicits the act of contrition for sins, answers: Thus I say: I love thee, my God, above all things, because thou art supremely good; spare, my God, spare my sins. The confessor, having heard this response, indeed labors with anxiety concerning the value of this contrition. Yet, thinking it to be a scruple, he absolves Claudinus.

It is asked: 1. Whether for sacramental confession perfect charity toward God suffices in place of an act of sorrow? 2. What is to be said to the Case?

R. To the 1st. Negatively. The reason is that the Council of Trent, sess. 14, cap. 3, asserts that the acts of the penitent are as it were the matter of the sacrament of penance. But among them it by no means enumerates charity, but places contrition, which the Council of Trent itself, in the following chapter, says holds the first place among the acts of the penitent. But it says that this is sorrow or detestation for sin committed. Therefore that contrition required by the Council for penance is formal contrition, by no means merely virtual; it is an act of the virtue of penance, by no means of charity. But the contrition required for penance must be such only as is expressed and prescribed by the Council, loc. cit., where it professedly hands on Catholic doctrine concerning the sacrament of penance. Therefore.

To the 2nd. An act of charity can be understood in two ways: first, as having for its material object God to be loved, and for its formal object the absolute goodness of God; and there that act stops; nor does that formal object advance in any way so far as to excite in us detestation of sins. And thus charity does not suffice without a true and formal act of sorrow or contrition for the sacrament of penance, so as to constitute part of its quasi-matter, although it suffices for the remission of sins outside the sacrament. But if that formal object of charity moves us also to detestation of admitted sins, then there is perfect contrition, formed by charity, as the same Council of Trent speaks, l. c., cap. 4; and it is best, not only for the remission of sins outside confession, but also in sacramental confession. Now indeed such seems to have been the charity of Claudinus, if attention is paid to the act which he elicited after the formal act of charity: spare, my God, spare my sins. For these words, by imploring divine mercy and the mercy of sins, implicitly signify sorrow of soul and detestation or hatred of the sin committed, with the purpose of not sinning henceforth. It is morally impossible that someone, recalling his sins, should elicit an act of love toward God without being sorry for his sins and detesting them, insofar as they are opposed to God supremely loved. Therefore Claudinus's confessor acted rightly.

"Nevertheless in our Case," says Fr. Gury 402, "Claudinus ought to be carefully questioned by the confessor, so that the latter may know whether he really thought about sorrow for sins, or uttered a mere formula, the sense of which perhaps he did not sufficiently understand. Moreover the confessor ought to have taught the penitent about the manner of eliciting an act of contrition before confession." But these things are said rather by divining; for, as is drawn from the exposition of the Case, there is no trace in Claudinus of such alleged ignorance and negligence. From the very fact that Claudinus did not remain only in that act of charity, I love thee, my God, above all things, because thou art supremely good; but further uttered another act of sorrow and detestation of sins, Spare, my God, spare my sins, he certainly did not utter these words materially, by no means understanding them. And indeed who is so stupid that, uttering these words, he does not understand them? Certainly Claudinus is not such, who forms so perfect an act of charity, and then asks from God remission of sins. But who, asking from God remission of sins from a motive of perfect love, does not at the same time have sorrow for them and detestation of them? It is utterly repugnant seriously to implore divine mercy and forgiveness of sins at the same time, and not to be sorry for them, nor to detest them. Moreover contrition consists essentially in detestation of sin. Sorrow is its companion or effect. Roman Catechism n. 23, 24; St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 85, a. 1, ad 3. The object of contrition of this kind is sin, that is, an evil action by which God is offended. St. Thomas, l. c., a. 2. How therefore does someone explicitly asking forgiveness of sins from God out of true love not at the same time detest and reprobate them? Does he not at the same time have displeasure with them? Therefore no obligation appears in the confessor, in the Case, of teaching the penitent the manner of eliciting an act of contrition, since the penitent elicits an act of contrition so perfectly. I. M. 677.

4. Motive of contrition - Albert, after making confession, is asked by the confessor by what motive he is moved to sorrow for sins. The penitent answers: I am sorry for sins, because I fear lest God, who constantly appears in Sacred Scripture indeed merciful, but also just avenger of sins, punish me in this life with miseries or with sudden death. The confessor replies: Surely, my good man, did you sorrow for sins in the same way in the past, when you approached to confess? Albert affirms it. Whence the confessor, judging those confessions to have been invalid, orders him meanwhile to depart without absolution and to prepare himself for instituting a general confession of his whole life.

It is asked: What is to be said to the Case?

R. "The confessor imprudently declared that the aforesaid confessions were invalid by reason of attrition elicited from fear of temporal punishments. The reason is that such attrition is more probably valid if it was had from a supernatural motive. Although in practice it is safer to excite sorrow from the motive of punishments to be undergone after death, nevertheless after the fact, the obligation of repeating confessions is not established. Therefore the penitent is not to be obliged to undergo that burden." Thus Gury 408. Now indeed in the Case it is not to be doubted that Albert's attrition was from a supernatural motive, since the object was for him as it is apprehended by supernatural faith. And in this way attrition of this kind is brought back to attrition from fear of divine judgment begun. For although the punishments are temporal, nevertheless if they are considered as inflicted by God, they indicate to us His wrath, and in a certain way begin divine punishment, unless we amend. Under this aspect, however, they can well move to supernatural attrition, which is very well reduced to that which is from fear of hell. Suarez, d. 5, s. 2, n. 15; Lugo, d. 15, n. 137.

But although grave theologians regard attrition of this kind only as probable, nevertheless several and also grave theologians regard it as morally certain, and even as altogether certain. I. M. 687. And the distinguished Ballerini, in Gury, Comp. 452, says that the opposed reasons detract nothing from the firmness of the common doctrine, which stands for the sufficiency of such attrition, nor can they reconcile any, even slight, probability to the opposed opinion. Hence according to this common doctrine Albert would have been disturbed neither before nor after confession. But since Albert's Case regards confessions already made, and certainly the opinion affirming that the aforesaid attrition suffices for the sacrament of penance is at least probable and most probable, Albert certainly ought altogether to have been absolved by his confessor, and could by no means be obliged to institute a general confession of his whole life.

5. Precedence of contrition - Eleonora, approaching the sacrament of penance for several years, is accustomed to act thus: 1. On Saturday night she institutes an examination of conscience, and is sincerely sorry for all sins. But on Sunday, very early in the morning, she makes confession, without seeing to the eliciting of a new act of contrition, although sometimes she reveals a mortal sin which had not occurred to memory in the examination on the preceding day. 2. On a certain day, when she had fallen into a lethal sin, she at once was contrite for it, yet without ordering it to confession. After three or four hours she goes to the church to pray. But seeing the parish priest coming out of the confessional seat, she runs to meet him, and at once confesses without a new act of contrition. 3. Sometimes, after absolution has been received, she remembers some sin which had not before occurred to memory; she opens it to the confessor, and is absolved of it, without becoming contrite again.

It is asked: What is to be said to the Case?

R. "More probably the contrition of Eleonora, elicited on the day before confession, was valid, because it seems virtually to persevere, especially if it had great intensity; nor does it stand in the way that the woman had forgotten a grave sin, because that sin was implicitly contained in the general contrition for the others. Eleonora is nevertheless to be exhorted that in the future she elicit an act of contrition immediately before confession.

More probably also the contrition of Eleonora was valid, although it was not elicited in order to the sacrament. The reason is that, from Trent, that attrition is said to dispose to justification in the sacrament which excludes the will of sinning with hope of pardon. Now all these things are verified in our Case. Therefore. Moreover, although sorrow was not ordered to confession by an antecedent relation, nevertheless it is ordered by a consequent relation, in that it is still verified that sorrow is laid open through confession. Nevertheless the opposed opinion is not without its probability, and therefore in practice contrition is to be renewed before confession for greater safety. St. Lig., n. 447.

Still more probably in the third Case the contrition of the woman was valid. For it was by no means necessary to elicit a new act of contrition in order to obtain a new absolution, because the prior contrition certainly persevered, which, as universal, was extended to all sins, even those omitted from forgetfulness. Add that it is not required that contrition be explicitly ordered to the sacrament, as has been said. Moreover explicit sorrow seems to be manifested in the very act of accusing that sin. Thus commonly. But since several theologians contradict, although relying on a slight foundation, in practice the opposed opinion, as safer, is to be chosen.

But Eleonora is by no means to be disturbed by reason of defect of contrition, which more probably in every case was sufficient for the value of the sacrament. Before confession indeed the safer opinion is to be followed, because there is question of rendering the value of the sacrament more certain; but after confession has been made, there is no longer question except of the precept of confession, which more probably has been satisfied. Hence this rule can well be applied: "An obligation is not to be imposed, unless it is certainly established." Thus Gury 410-412.

Now indeed Eleonora's contrition in the first Case seems not only more probably, but morally certainly, valid in order to confession. For first, the interval of time inserted from the beginning of Saturday night to very early Sunday morning is very brief, and after the examination of conscience and contrition were made on Saturday night, in approaching confession very early on Sunday morning by force of that examination and contrition, it is most evident that that contrition virtually perseveres, since with so solicitous diligence its effect is placed. Moreover, from the common opinion, even the stricter doctors make no difficulty as to so brief a space of time, since they commonly extend it much more. And Fr. Gury himself in the Compendium affirms that contrition can persevere according to the common opinion for one, or even several days, which St. Alphonsus also admits and approves, l. 6, n. 446; I. M. 682.

Not only more probably, but again with moral certitude, the contrition of Eleonora seems to have been valid in the second Case. For first, Eleonora's contrition has all those things which the Council of Trent requires, sess. 14, cap. 4, where it professedly treats of contrition, which is the principal act on the part of the penitent in the sacrament of penance. And unless we wish to say that the Council handed on imperfect doctrine, this argument is not only probable, but demonstrative. Moreover, if perfect contrition, from the Council of Trent, l. c., does not justify except with the desire of the sacrament, and yet this desire need not necessarily be explicit, but an implicit desire suffices, namely the desire which by its nature is included in contrition itself, so consequently it is that if some ordering to the sacrament is required in contrition, this certainly need not necessarily be explicit, but that implicit ordering suffices, which by its nature is included in contrition itself. Otherwise there would also be that other inconvenience, that more would be required for justification from contrition and the sacrament than from contrition alone, although it is altogether certain that less is required; since even simple attrition suffices for justification with the sacrament. There is added that in the Instruction which is found at the end of the Roman Council, Appendix 29, nothing at all is had about this explicit ordering of contrition to confession. And in the formula of the act of contrition which is proposed there, nothing at all is also had about that explicit ordering. Now who will dare to affirm that contrition duly made according to the aforesaid formula is not sufficient for then receiving the sacrament of penance? I. M. 683.

Likewise in the third Case the confession of Eleonora seems not only more probable, but also morally certain. And, if the opposed opinion, as Fr. Gury himself says, rests only on a slight foundation, it cannot therefore be held as truly and solidly probable, because several theologians contradict. For it is very well known that extrinsic probability has value insofar as it is presumed to rest upon intrinsic probability. Therefore where intrinsic arguments are lacking, it helps little to heap together the names of authors. Cf. I. M. 684. For the rest, the Case of Eleonora is also admitted by several who admit the probability of the opposed opinion. For the sin forgotten in the preceding confession was contained also in the preceding sorrow. Therefore when someone confesses it, in reality he confesses it by force of the preceding sorrow, and that sorrow is evidently extended to this new confession, which is a certain supplement of the former. And if contrition virtually persevering suffices for confession, by what reason can it be said that contrition in the Case does not suffice, when most evidently, as is proved from its very effect, contrition virtually perseveres and moves to confess the forgotten sin at once?

6. Intensity of sorrow - Clodomira, a pious matron, very anxious about the sorrow required for confession, complains to her confessor: 1. That she feels more intense sorrow over the death of her son than over her sins. 2. That she does not seem to herself prepared to suffer all evils, e.g., to be burned alive, rather than commit sin. 3. That she recoils more from a monster, from a fierce beast, from plague, from slaughter, from fire, than from sin. - Wherefore she thinks that she has never made valid confessions; and she asks to make a general confession of her whole life. Yet she affirms that she is sorry and very sorry; but that she is not sorry enough for so many and such great sins by which she offended the divine Majesty.

It is asked: What is to be said to the Case?

R. Clodomira, as to the first, ought not to be disturbed. For the value of contrition there is not required a certain intensity of sorrow; just as neither for sinning is required a certain intensity of will. For the degree of sorrow does not pertain to its essence. Moreover Clodomira confuses sorrow, an act of the will, with sensible sorrow. The former is necessary for true penance, not the latter. For in contrition there is a twofold sorrow. One is in the will itself, and is displeasure over past sin. The other is in the sensitive part, which is caused from the former sorrow, in one way from necessity of nature, according as the lower powers follow the motion of the higher faculties; in another way from choice, according as the penitent man excites this sorrow in himself, so that he may be sorry for sins. That sorrow of the will in contrition exceeds all other sorrows, because as much as something pleases, so much does its contrary displease. But the last end pleases above all things, since all things are desired on account of it; and therefore sin, which turns away from the last end, ought to displease above all things. And thus this sorrow is highest and greatest of all, appreciatively, insofar as man ought by his will to detest nothing else as much as sin. But the other sensible sorrow is not necessarily highest in either of the said ways. For first the lower powers are moved more vehemently by their proper objects than from the overflowing of the higher powers. And therefore the nearer the operation of the higher powers is to the objects of the lower powers, the more they follow their motion. Wherefore the sorrow which overflows from reason deliberating about bodily things is greater than that which overflows from reason considering spiritual things. Hence sorrow in the sensitive part overflowing from the displeasure of reason concerning sin is not greater than other sorrows arising from displeasure over sensible evils. And similarly neither is the sorrow which is voluntarily assumed necessarily greater; because the lower affection does not obey the command of the will so that such and so great a passion follows in the lower appetite as the higher orders. St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 3, a. 1; I. M. 679.

As to the second and third, although such really ought to be the disposition of the contrite person, nevertheless he is not to be tested concerning sensible comparisons of this kind, because a man cannot easily measure his affections. Sometimes that which displeases less seems to displease more, because it is nearer to sensible harm, which becomes more known, and more affects the sensible appetite. Likewise, as delightful things move more when considered in particular than in common or generally, so terrible things terrify more if they are considered in particular. Hence to descend in such matters to individual things is to lead a man into temptation and to furnish an occasion of sinning. But although the contrite person is bound in general to wish to suffer any punishment whatever rather than to sin, nevertheless he is not bound in particular to descend to this punishment or that; indeed he would act foolishly if someone were to solicit himself or another about punishments of this kind. St. Thomas, Suppl., l. c., ad 4; Quodl. 1, a. 9; I. M. 679.

As to that, finally, which Clodomira affirms in the last place, it must be noted that, speaking in itself and abstractly, it is not enough for the required contrition if the penitent is sorry that he is not sorry. For, speaking in itself and abstractly, if someone is sorry that he is not sorry, therefore he is not sorry; nor can sorrow for the defect of sorrow for sins supply this sorrow. But speaking practically, ordinarily penitents who are sorry from the fact that they are not sorry, or not sufficiently sorry, have true sorrow for sins and truly detest them; yet they are sorry that they are not sorry, not because they truly are not sorry, but because they do not experience sensible and intense sorrow in themselves. Therefore for the most part they are not to be disturbed about sorrow, but are to be exhorted to confidence. And this seems to be the Case of Clodomira, since she is a pious matron and is very anxious about sorrow. G. 414; Elbel 80; D'Annib. 312; I. M. 679.