126. On Satisfaction

1. Theophilus, a confessor, if at some time he absolves a penitent again because, for example, the latter immediately confesses a sin of which he had been forgetful in the preceding confession, imposes no new penance for the new absolution, but the same already imposed before.

It is asked: What is to be said to the Case?

R. Theophilus does not act rightly. For although a work otherwise commanded can well be imposed as penance under the title of sacramental satisfaction, nevertheless a work already commanded under this same title of sacramental satisfaction cannot be imposed. L. 513; G. 511; I. M. 733.

2. Ubaldus, after confession had been made, was ordered as salutary penance to hear Mass once. He attends the sacred rite; but, since meanwhile he was involuntarily distracted, he decides now to hear it from mere devotion, and to hear another Mass on the following day in order to fulfill the penance.

It is asked: Whether Ubaldus is truly bound to hear another Mass?

R. Fr. Gury 520 affirms it. "For," he says, "someone unmindful of the obligation satisfies, because he is considered to have the habitual intention of satisfying. Therefore, if he excludes this intention, he no longer satisfies, because he does not wish to satisfy. Besides, the satisfactory work imposed by the confessor is held as in the place of a debt. Moreover, if someone bestows a gift, unmindful of a debt, he is considered more probably to have satisfied the obligation of justice. But it is otherwise if he positively excludes the will of satisfying. Therefore, by parity, he does not satisfy who excludes the intention of fulfilling the penance." But several think the contrary, as Fr. Gury himself notes in the cited place. And indeed also for a penance imposed by the confessor, which is a certain private law, the general principle holds, that precepts do not oblige to formal obedience, that is, that the thing be done because it is commanded, but only to material obedience, that is, that what is commanded be done. That is to say, the law does not oblige except to the substance of the work enjoined. Therefore, once this is posited, it is no longer in the power of the one acting that the law be said not to be fulfilled.

"Nor does it stand in the way, 1.º that an act does not operate beyond the intention of the agent; for that proceeds only in those things which depend on the sole power of the one acting himself. Nor 2.º that he who owes another one hundred does not satisfy the obligation if by a free donation he gives two hundred. Nor 3.º that one bound by vow to recite the rosary, if he recites it with the mind of not fulfilling, does not satisfy. The reason is that these and similar obligations proceed from the will of the one promising, who, just as from the beginning he freely constituted himself a debtor, so also can freely remain in the debt. But the obligation of obeying law proceeds from the will of the legislator, and therefore is not extended beyond his intention and will, namely beyond the substance of the work commanded. Indeed even in those things which proceed from one's own power, the one acting would satisfy without the said intention, provided he has not deliberately destined his work here and now to another particular end; for anyone, from a general intention, first intends to satisfy a debt before those things which he has imposed on himself by his own free will. This holds, by parity of reason, also concerning sacramental satisfaction, if the penitent does the work imposed by the confessor, yet not intending to fulfill the penance. By this doctrine," says Roncaglia, "the confessor will often be able to meet the conscience of the scrupulous; for example, they recite the canonical hours or sacramental penance, and, since this does not seem to them to be recited as is fitting, they do not have the intention of satisfying, but intend to repeat them: let him forbid a new recitation. The same should be said of one who hears Mass on a feast day; since it does not seem to him that he hears it as he ought, he intends to hear a new Mass; this must be prohibited." Scavini ed. Mediolanensis 1874, l. 1, n. 366; Ferraris, v. Lex, art. 4, n. 1-10; I. M. vol. 1, n. 215.

3. Felicitas, after making a general confession with a certain missionary, is ordered as salutary penance to perform three fasts. But when the missionary had gone away, she cannot perform the prescribed fasts, because of weak health and also because of the strict prohibition of the physician. Hence she goes to Geraldus the confessor for the sake of obtaining a change of penance. Geraldus commands her to repeat the general confession from the beginning, and to receive absolution again, because a sacramental sentence can be changed only in the sacrament.

It is asked: What is to be said to the Case?

R. Geraldus did not act rightly. For first, since the penance, from a legitimate impediment, has become impossible, it is not necessarily to be commuted into another. For the penitent is then no longer bound to the execution of a penance which has become impossible. Besides, although the penance had to be commuted in the Case, nevertheless there was no need to repeat the general confession from the beginning; but either a certain summary confession sufficed, so that the confessor might acquire only a confused knowledge of the state of the penitent, or even only the knowledge of the prior penance sufficed, so that he might impose another approximately equivalent one. Nor indeed is it necessary that the penance be commuted in the sacrament itself, or that the penitent be absolved in that confession; because confession is truly sacramental even when the sacrament is lacking, provided it is made in order to the sacrament, otherwise or soon to be received, if the confessor has judged this opportune. But it suffices that the penitent be constituted in the sacramental forum, nor is it required that he receive absolution. G. 523, 526; I. M. 745, 746.

But it must be noted here what St. Alphonsus has, l. 6, n. 529, namely: "Navarrus, Sporer, and Tamburini probably add that if the confessor notices that the penitent has not fulfilled the penance, nor will easily fulfill it, even if the penitent is not asking, he will be able to commute it for him."

4. Martha, a woman of ungrateful memory, not rarely forgets the penances enjoined upon her by the confessor, and therefore is troubled by many perplexities. Among other cases take the following:

1.º Once Martha, forgetful of the sacramental penance, returned to the confessor, who, himself also no longer remembering the work enjoined, substituted another.

2.º The same case of forgetfulness recurring, the woman resolved to recur again to the confessor, but he had gone away and now could no longer be approached by the penitent. What therefore will the poor woman do? She goes to another priest, by whom she is ordered to repeat the confession, so that a new penance can be prescribed.

3.º At another time Martha, affected with weariness and sadness because of the recurrence still of forgetfulness of this sort, herself imposes upon herself a substituted work, and, for greater safety, repeats the penance enjoined upon her in the preceding confession.

4.º At another time she is tortured by a new anxiety: for after she had withdrawn from the confessor, she notices that this time he forgot to prescribe a penance. But in order that she may be freed from the inconvenience of approaching him again, she herself chooses some work to be fulfilled.

5.º Often also Martha sends her maidservant to the confessor, asking him to be willing, through the maidservant, to indicate to her the penance imposed. The confessor in such a Case responds to the maidservant: tell your mistress that she should recite three Hail Marys in honor of the Blessed Virgin Mary.

It is asked: 1.º If the penitent has forgotten the penance enjoined, is he bound to approach the confessor, that he may learn it again? - 2.º Is he bound to repeat the confession, that he may receive another? - 3.º If the confessor does not remember the penance enjoined, must he substitute another? - 4.º What is to be said of Martha in the various Cases?

R. To the 1st. Affirmatively, in a twofold Case, namely if the confessor is rightly presumed still to remember the penance imposed on such a penitent, and if the confessor can easily, or without notable inconvenience, be approached. The reason is that then ignorance of the penance is neither physically nor morally invincible; and besides, there is not a sufficient reason excusing from the obligation. But the penitent is much more easily excused from that obligation of approaching the confessor to learn the penance again if there is question of light matter. Hence pious penitents, who are not accustomed to sin gravely, are generally not bound to approach the confessor for this cause, unless, the confession just made, they still remain near the confessional seat. - Negatively, however, in other Cases, at least more probably, with the common opinion against several. The reason is that the penance which has fallen from memory has by that very fact become impossible.

To the 2nd. Negatively, at least with the common opinion. The reason is: 1.º Because where the penance is unknown both by the penitent and by the confessor, it has become impossible and cannot oblige. 2.º Because there can be no obligation that sins once accused and directly absolved be again subjected to the keys. Nor say that the confession must be repeated so that a penance may be enjoined by reason of completing the sacrament, for the precept of completing the sacrament cannot oblige with so great an inconvenience, as authors commonly note. St. Lig. 520.

To the 3rd. By no means. It follows from what has been said. For the penance in that Case has become impossible, and therefore its obligation falls. Nor is the confessor bound, more probably, to substitute a new penance for another given to oblivion, even if he sufficiently remembered the state of the penitent, because of the same reason. Yet in practice it is expedient that he impose at least some light work, to satisfy the devotion of the penitent, or to calm his anxieties.

To the 4th. In the first and second Case, Martha was not obliged to fulfill the new penance, nor, a fortiori, to repeat the confession. - In the third Case, she had to approach the confessor if she easily could, and presumed that he was mindful of the prescribed penance; otherwise in the other cases. But the work undertaken by herself can never have the force of sacramental satisfaction. Yet Martha acts altogether well if the confessor, considering her slippery memory, is accustomed always to impose the same penance on her. - In the fourth Case, Martha is not bound to approach the confessor with notable inconvenience to herself. Indeed, according to several, the obligation of returning to the confessor is not established if she absolutely withdrew from him; because then the sacramental judgment is completed, and the moral union between that judgment and the enjoined penance is lacking. - In the fifth Case the confessor acts rightly, to satisfy the devotion of the penitent and to quiet her anxiety. Nor is there had from this, as appears, any violation of the sacramental seal, nor any indiscretion, since he orders only through the maidservant that the mistress recite the angelic salutation three times in honor of the Blessed Virgin Mary. G. 527, 530; I. M. 743.

5. Titius, a wealthy merchant wholly given to business, abstained for many years from participation in the sacraments. But then, at last aided by divine grace, he approaches a confessor having faculty over reserved cases, and sincerely and sorrowfully discloses to him all the things admitted, even the reserved ones. The confessor, all things having been heard and duly weighed, tries to set forth to him in words the gravity of his crimes, and shows what punishment he had deserved on account of them; then, as sacramental satisfaction, he imposes on him that he distribute one hundred scudi coins to the needy, that on each Sabbath day for an entire year he fast in the manner in which fasting is prescribed by the Church, and finally that, the obligation of a vow having been interposed, he participate in the sacraments each month. But Titius, persuaded that he deserves such things, immediately after receiving absolution emits the vow and resolves to perform the rest. Now indeed, some days later, a merchant friend meets him who, with fortune adverse, having been reduced to poverty, manifests his misfortune to him; moved by mercy toward him, Titius gives him two hundred scudi coins, altogether unmindful of the satisfaction imposed on him by the confessor; afterward, remembering this obligation, he intends that by that largess he has satisfied sacramental penance for that part. The burden of fasting and of receiving the sacraments he carries out for two months according to the prescription of the confessor; afterward, however, he neglects to fulfill it. Finally, at Easter time he approaches Caius the confessor, who has faculty of commuting vows, but not of absolving from reserved cases, and discloses all things to him. This confessor, moreover, reckoning in his mind that Titius, because of his condition and weakness, is situated in grave danger both of transgressing the vow and of not observing the fast, at once, without any inquiry about the sins on account of which such a penalty had been given, commutes both burdens into daily recitation of the Rosary, judging that he had more than abundantly satisfied the obligation of almsgiving by the largess mentioned. But shortly afterward, doubtful about this manner of acting, he approaches a theologian and asks:

1.º How sacramental satisfaction is to be imposed, fulfilled, and commuted? - 2.º What is to be thought about the several points in the Case, and whether in the several points he conducted himself well?

R. To the 1st. Satisfaction to be imposed is indeed to be imposed by the confessor according to his judgment, but it must be fitting and salutary; namely, such as at the same time is punitive for the sins committed and medicinal for guarding against future relapses, and at the same time corresponds to the strength and dispositions of the penitent. But generally speaking, commonly satisfactions are disapproved which are complicated and various, too long-lasting, or too grave. The former and the latter because of the danger that they may not then be fulfilled; but the last also because not only does ordered charity require this, but also because this sacrament was instituted for reconciling sinners to God, not for making satisfaction to God. Cf. Suarez, De Poenit., d. 38, s. 6, n. 5.

But satisfaction to be fulfilled is to be fulfilled in the manner of laws, since in reality it is a certain particular law, or particular precept. Wherefore the satisfaction imposed by the confessor is to be fulfilled, not another at one's own pleasure. Likewise it is to be fulfilled at the time prescribed by the confessor; and, if no time has been defined, it is to be fulfilled as soon as possible, lest it be given to oblivion, and so that it may immediately obtain its effect of satisfying God and of guarding against relapse.

Likewise its various circumstances imposed also by the confessor are to be fulfilled. And although someone fulfills it in the state of mortal sin, he still satisfies, although he lacks the fruit ex opere operato, because in reality for that reason it does not cease to be a penal work. Nevertheless he sins lightly against charity toward himself by thus deferring it.

Satisfaction is to be commuted by a confessor, either by the same or by another; for each has the same power. But it can be commuted if something supervenes which renders it more grave, or no longer fitting and salutary. Yet satisfactions imposed by a superior on account of reserved cases cannot be commuted by an inferior, since the inferior cannot change his sentence. Others, however, deny this. For, the reservation having been removed, the power of the inferior and the superior confessor is of itself the same. St. Alph., l. 6, n. 529, dub. 2. Since the new satisfaction must be sacramental, it cannot be made outside the sacrament; and, of itself, there is need of a new absolution, or at least confession, unless the prior judgment still morally perseveres. Indeed there are not lacking those who hold that there is no need of repeated confession, even summary or in confused form, since the judgment to be rendered is not about faults, but about the satisfaction imposed.

To the 2nd. It does not first seem that the confessor conducted himself well. The satisfaction imposed by him not only is not ordinary, and is altogether extraordinary and contrary to common practice, especially as to the imposed alms of one hundred scudi, and as to the vow; but also it is altogether grave, and so little fitting and salutary, that it exposes the penitent, as in fact it did expose him, to the danger of transgressing it. The satisfaction imposed by the confessor in the Case gathers in itself those three things which are commonly disapproved: namely, that it is complicated and various, is too long-lasting, and is too grave. But Titius, as to the alms of one hundred scudi to be given, since he gave two hundred, satisfied the imposed obligation, although he gave unmindful of an obligation of this sort. For one always has the general will first of fulfilling one's own obligation, and then of carrying out a work of supererogation. Hence Titius could well afterward, mindful of the matter, explicitly ratify this implicit and general will. But since Titius did not fulfill the prescribed satisfaction in another notable part, and since there is in reality danger lest he again transgress the imposed satisfaction, another confessor rightly commutes it. It does not seem able to be an obstacle in the Case that he himself lacks faculty in reserved matters. For there is no question of absolution from reserved cases. But that that satisfaction was imposed on account of reserved sins also cannot be an obstacle, in the Case, to commutation. For first, there are those who hold, as has already been noted, that even an inferior confessor can commute a penance imposed by a superior on account of reserved matters. Then in reality, in the Case, the confessor who imposed that satisfaction was not a superior, but only a privileged confessor, or one having faculty in reserved matters. Hence the reason does not hold that an inferior cannot change the sentence of a superior, which indeed would hold when the Superior was truly such, who could impose a precept altogether, and imposed that satisfaction both as confessor and as superior. But because the new confessor did not require a repeated confession of the sins which already had rightly been absolved, he does not for this reason seem to be disquieted. For the cause at present is no longer about the number and gravity of those sins which have already been absolved, but about the difficulty of fulfilling the satisfaction, which is sufficiently known even without a new confession. As to the fact that the commutation of that double burden, the weekly fast for a year and monthly confession, was made into daily recitation of the Rosary, if by Rosary an entire Rosary is understood in the obvious sense, cf. Collectanea S. C. de P. F. n. 1926, a satisfaction of this sort still seems too grave. But if it is understood only of the third part of the Rosary, then it would also have to be seen whether a satisfaction of this sort could easily be fulfilled by Titius; for example, if it is recited daily in his family, as is the custom in Christian families, if Titius willingly accepts such a satisfaction, etc. Otherwise an even smaller satisfaction would still have to be imposed. One day, when I was in the church, a certain rustic asked me whether I would be willing to hear his confession. I answered that I would gladly do this. Then he said: Have patience with me, and pardon me, because now for twelve years I have no longer gone to confession. I encouraged him, so that he might then confess his sins with every confidence. But, notwithstanding every question made by me, I could find in him no other grave sin except confession omitted for twelve years. And indeed that rustic was an altogether good and honest man. Then I asked him why therefore for so many years he had omitted to frequent the sacraments of the Church; and he immediately answered: because the last time when I confessed, the confessor imposed on me that I recite twelve Rosaries. I could not recite those, and I did not wish to confess again before I recited them. And even when today I entered the church, I did not have the intention of confessing; but seeing you, the thought at the same time arose in me of making confession; and now I am content. But, returning to the proposed Case, there would indeed be difficulty in the vow emitted from the precept of the confessor, or from the imposed penance, namely if the new confessor did not have faculty of dispensing in vows or of commuting them. But in the Case it is openly said that, although the new confessor did not have power in reserved matters, nevertheless he had faculty of commuting vows. Hence, since in the Case there was question not only of an unfulfilled penance, but also of violation of a vow, there was certainly a still more urgent reason for making the commutation. But if the confessor himself had no faculty over vows, he could ask it from the Ordinary at least for the particular Case.