127. Form of Penance

1. Pamphilus, a confessor, hearing the confessions of clerics in the seminary, does not know whether he ought to add or omit the word suspensionis, since the aforesaid clerics are constituted only in minor orders. For the Ritual says that the aforesaid word is to be omitted if the penitent is a layman.

It is asked: What is to be said to the Case?

R. The aforesaid word, suspensionis, can be omitted in the Case, since in reality there is no such suspension in force. "If the penitent is a layman," says Reuter, Neo-confess., p. 1, c. 7, n. 22, "or, as Gobat and Stoz hold, only in minor orders, the word suspensionis is omitted." I. M. 748.

2. Nicasius, imparting absolution to a dying man, and fearing about his own intention, in order to drive out that fear, says: I wish to minister to thee the sacrament of absolution. This form having been pronounced, the sick man dies.

It is asked: What is to be said to the Case?

R. Nicasius indeed acts badly, perverting the form of the Church which is had in the Roman Ritual. But he acts very badly in the most grave Case of a dying man. For the absolution given is not only illicit, but also invalid. The will of doing something is not the same as doing that thing. Hence, I wish to minister, or I wish to absolve, is not the same as, I minister, or, I absolve. St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 84, a. 3, ad 5, explaining the form of the sacrament of penance, explains it thus: "I absolve thee, that is, I bestow upon thee the sacrament of absolution." But again, it is one thing to bestow the sacrament of absolution, another thing to wish to bestow the sacrament of absolution. Hence the Holy Office, June 23, 1840, declared invalid a baptism conferred with this form: I wish to minister to thee the sacrament of baptism of sins in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, Acta S. Sed., vol. 25, p. 246. In this form, besides that word I wish, that other added word of sins disturbs the whole sense of the form.

3. Presence of the penitent. Remigius the confessor, after hearing the confession of Fugatius, while he was piously exhorting him and was asking whether he was prepared not to sin, notices, astonished, that he gives no response. He looks back, but sees no one; for the penitent had gone away, thinking himself absolved. Then looking again, he saw Fugatius in the middle of the crowd, kneeling and praying, and joyfully absolved him at once.

It is asked: What is to be said to the Case?

R. Remigius acted rightly, because since the penitent was morally present, the absolution was valid. Indeed the absolution would have been valid although the confessor had not seen the penitent in the midst of the crowd of the faithful, because for that reason he would not have ceased to be morally present. Yet he would have acted more rightly if, without scandal, under some pretext, he had been able to call the penitent back to himself, so that he might absolve him more fittingly. But it does not seem, in the Case, that grave inconvenience was really lacking in calling the penitent again to himself from the middle of the crowd.

4. Titius, formerly a fervent Catholic, afterward ensnared by the seductions of a friend, gives his name to a certain perverse sect. The members of this sect mutually bind themselves to reject the sacraments even at the article of death; indeed they promise that they will also give diligent effort that the access of a Catholic priest to sick companions be altogether prevented. After a most wicked life carried on through many years, Titius falls sick unto death. At once some of the sectarians come to him, indeed under the pretext of furnishing assistance, but in reality so that, according to the prescription of the sect, they may prohibit the parish priest, if perhaps he is called, from approaching.

Titius, who had not renounced the Catholic faith in his mind, fearing the divine judgments, would wish to provide for his own salvation and to call a confessor. But he knows very well that this cannot easily be done because of the perversity of the companions who stand by. But it came opportunely into his mind that he could communicate by telephone with a very Catholic friend. Hence, pretending that he wished to rest for a little while, he sends the associates out of his room, and at once manifests his state to his friend, and at the same time earnestly asks him to call the parish priest to hear his confession by telephone. The parish priest who is called is seized by the novelty of the matter; nevertheless he at once hastens there, and, the confession by telephone having been completed, since he doubts whether this manner of confessing is valid, yet so that he may provide for the sick man in some way, he absolves him under condition. A little while afterward Titius dies.

Soon the parish priest, the matter having been considered more maturely, begins to doubt whether he conducted himself rightly; hence he consults a theologian, asking him:

1.º Whether and how the penitent must be present to the confessor absolving? - 2.º Whether the presence of the penitent to the confessor, required for the value of the sacrament, is had in the Case? - 3.º Whether he himself conducted himself rightly?

R. To the 1st. There can be no doubt that the penitent must be present to the confessor absolving. This is established, 1.º from the most common doctrine of theologians. It is established, 2.º from the Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 2, where, explaining the proper nature of this sacrament from Christ's institution, it says that Christ so instituted this sacrament that he willed penitents to stand before this tribunal as accused persons, and to be freed from sins by the sentence of priests. For an accused person to stand before this tribunal certainly signifies the presence of the accused before the judge, since this tribunal is constituted only by the confessor and at the same time the penitent. This is established, 3.º from the decree of Clement VIII and Paul V, by which it was forbidden to teach that either confession made to an absent priest, or absolution imparted to an absent penitent, is licit. Cf. Enchiridion Morale, 3rd ed., n. 696. This is established, 4.º from the fact that the form of this sacrament consists in words, namely in the words of absolution, which are directed to one present.

But the presence required must be moral presence. Yet, if from the very form of this sacrament it is established that the presence of the penitent before the confessor is altogether required, from the same form it is established that that presence is required by which men are accustomed to converse among themselves with human voice. For the confessor, while he pronounces the form, seems to converse with the penitent himself. Fittingly St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 429, explaining this moral presence, says: "This moral presence is reputed to be that within which men can and are accustomed to speak with a common voice, although higher... Elbel with Sporer and others adds that such presence can be extended to about twenty paces, especially where the penitent has not yet gone out from the sight of the confessor... But Tamburini deservedly does not approve Leander, who says that it is enough for moral presence if the priest sees the penitent, or perceives him by another sense; for presence for absolution requires greater nearness than for hearing a sermon or Mass."

To the 2nd. The presence of the penitent to the confessor required for the value of the sacrament is certainly not had in the Case, prescinding from the telephone; since certainly the sick penitent in his own house is neither physically nor morally present to the confessor in the house of his friend. Therefore the question can be raised only about that circumstance of communication by telephone. But communication by telephone does not remove distance, nor consequently render mutually present to themselves those who are distant from one another, but is only an efficacious medium of communication between those distant or not present. But from the mere fact of communication of two persons between themselves, the presence of the persons themselves is not had, as is seen in communication by a messenger, by a letter, or by any other medium whatever; for example, by lights of diverse color lit at night, or by flags also of diverse color displayed upon a pole, or by sound and explosion produced by some instrument, or finally by telegraph. Nor indeed does it avail to object that communication in the Case is had through the very human voice of the one speaking, whence it is that the one hearing is one hearing the speaker. For first, that voice which is transmitted and heard through the telephone is not in reality the human voice of the speaker, but is a certain physical reproduction of this voice, or rather the physical effect of that voice. Wherefore the one hearing in reality does not hear the speaker, namely the voice of the speaker, but hears the sound of a metallic plate by its vibrations imitating and reproducing the sound of the voice, which impresses its vibrations of air upon another metallic plate, whence then the sound of the other plate, which is heard, is determined. Wherefore a human voice is not had, nor consequently are words had, but only a certain perfect imitation of the human voice, by a mechanical sound physically produced by the human voice. Hence from the telephone, which is here brought forward in place of the telegraph, not only is the difficulty from the impediment of distance in the Case not removed, but even that difficulty is not diminished. Perhaps it would be diminished, but certainly it would not be removed, if not the telephone but a voice-duct, commonly called a portavoce, were used; for then the speaker's own voice would in reality be heard. Nevertheless even in this Case moral presence would not be had, and because distance is had, therefore such a medium of communication is used.

To the 3rd. The parish priest does not seem to have conducted himself well in the Case. For indeed, in extreme necessity, it is licit to administer the sacraments conditionally, even with a slight probability concerning their value, as St. Alphonsus teaches, and theologians commonly teach. But that slight probability which the doctors here bring into the matter is not a true slight probability, which is not true probability, as slight, from the slight motive on which it rests, but it is a slight probability which nevertheless is true probability, since it is slight from a slight degree, that is, constituted in the lowest degree of probability. And indeed, even in doubt of baptism, which is most necessary, baptism cannot be repeated unless there is at least a probable doubt of the preceding baptism, as is had in the Roman Ritual, De Bapt. adult., or, what is the same thing, unless there is a probable doubt about the validity of the first baptism, as is had in the Decision of the Holy Office, May 27, 1671, A. S. S., vol. 25, p. 256. Moreover, in the Case there can indeed perhaps be had some slight motive for the validity of that absolution, but a truly prudent, grave, and probable motive, although in the lowest degree, is not had. Wherefore it does not seem that the parish priest conducted himself well, even by absolving only under condition.

But the parish priest ought, after the confession heard by telephone, to have stirred the penitent to an act of perfect contrition, consulting for his eternal salvation by this means, in the best way in which it could be done. Then, if time allowed, he ought at once to go to the house of the sick man, and by some pretext, and even employing some simulation of some very grave business to be treated, penetrate into the room of that sick man, and then, a summary confession having been made by him, he could beyond doubt absolve him absolutely. But what if the sectarians present in every way prevented the aforesaid summary confession? If the parish priest then noticed in Titius some other sign of confession, as the thing would be easy, a sign of this sort would still suffice, and he could absolve Titius absolutely. But if, coming to the house of Titius after his confession heard by telephone, he had found him destitute of senses, then indeed the difficulty would be serious, but as it seems, he could have absolved Titius under condition. For in the Roman Ritual it is said absolutely of a sick man who, destitute of senses, could not confess: if he has shown the desire of confessing either by himself or through others, he is to be absolved. Moreover Titius altogether showed the desire of confessing, and by himself, namely through that confession previously made by him by telephone. The defect of presence in that confession indeed stands in the way; from it, however, the excellent dispositions of Titius can well be gathered, dispositions in which Titius certainly perseveres, and which, as ordinarily happens, he signified by some external effect and act; so that it can well be presumed that Titius both has and perhaps still shows the desire of confessing, although it is not noticed. For indeed we have been so constituted by nature that that interior contrition of soul, when it is true and sincere, regularly speaking, is betrayed outwardly at least by sadness and by lowering of the eyes and countenance. And if Titius could be absolved if his servant, for example, by his mandate had called the parish priest, and then, the sick man being present, had testified to the parish priest the desire of his confession, or even if he had previously testified a desire of this sort to him, and had gone away on account of other business, as several theologians teach, could the same be done in the proposed Case? But it is not necessary to define this speculative question, which we leave at present undecided and altogether doubtful, to be decided by wiser men, because in reality practically no difficulty can seem to be present in giving that conditional absolution. For in reality, as formerly, so also today, this is the practice of all confessors: that finding sick persons destitute of senses, unless their positive and actual unworthiness is established from some other source, they absolve them under condition. Confer the Commentary on the Absolution and Assistance of the Dying.

5. Conditional absolution. 1.º Claudinus, a confessor, absolves those doubtfully disposed under condition in the following Cases: 1.º the sick gravely endangered as to life, especially the dying, although much more probably indisposed; 2.º soldiers about to go into the army or battle, and sailors and others about to undertake a sea voyage; 3.º habitual betrothed persons now about to be joined in marriage; 4.º strangers, men who scarcely or hardly at all will be able to return to his tribunal, and are immediately about to depart; 5.º penitents who certainly or probably are foreseen not to return, although they can return; indeed also young men who threaten that they will not return unless they are absolved; 6.º boys of seven years, and even of ten years, and half-witted persons, who probably sinned gravely, and furnish only doubtful signs of reason and disposition; 7.º from a bridge he absolves sailors and the others contained in a ship who, by an unexpected shipwreck, were being submerged in the waters of a river; 8.º a soldier who, pierced in a duel, was lying dying and destitute of senses; 9.º a heretic in a hospital, dying, destitute of senses, and struggling with death.

It is asked: What is to be said to the Case?

R. Claudinus acted rightly in the first four Cases, because on the one hand there is no positive evidence of the indisposition of the penitents, and on the other hand, since they are found in danger of salvation and in a case of necessity, he provides for their spiritual good in the best way he can. But he acted badly by absolving the men or young men in the fifth Case from the fact that they threatened that they would not return, although they could easily return. For this seems an undoubted sign of indisposition. But as to those who, threats being excluded, were in reality foreseen not to return if they had been dismissed without absolution, the solution depends on the various circumstances of particular cases. In the sixth Case, he ought first to have disposed them insofar as could be done; but, the doubt persevering, he could absolve the same persons under condition, especially with the precept of annual confession urging. G. 395, 396.

In the seventh Case he could and ought out of charity to absolve those miserable shipwrecked persons under condition. The reason is that those dying persons were morally present, and they could be supposed to wish to confess and to give signs of sorrow, in the Case in which they were seen by the priest. At least among all, one or another could have been truly disposed, and could furnish all the conditions required so that the sacrament of penance, in so great an extremity, could be valid and applied. But the priest ought to have called out to them in a loud voice, and in one word exhorted them to contrition, and suggested it to them. Moreover he ought to have used the form in the plural number: I absolve you from your sins, etc. Elbel 37. But what if the priest immediately after the shipwreck had no longer seen any of those submerged? Nevertheless he could still have imparted conditional absolution to them, provided he prudently judged them still morally present, because in that Case there could still appear hope of validity and of fruit to be received from it. But otherwise it must be said if, because of the force of the river, they had slipped away so far that they could no longer perceive the priest calling out to them. G. 391.

In the eighth Case Claudinus seems praiseworthy, since, insofar as he could, he helped the miserable sinner. For it absolutely could have happened that he was disposed and wished in some way to confess. But he ought first to have called out to him, so that he might exhort him, if perhaps he was heard by him, to contrition disposedly, and also to confessing in whatever way. G. 486. Cf. Commentary on the Absolution and Assistance of the Dying.

In the ninth Case Claudinus also seems praiseworthy. The reason is that, if the contrary is not positively established, it can be presumed that here and now he wishes to die in the Catholic Religion, and consequently to confess and to be absolved. For this can absolutely happen. Certainly at least one such person among a hundred thousand can be found. But in a case of necessity it is licit to use even a slightly probable opinion in favor of a man in danger. It is surely certain that there are merely material heretics, and those who do not have hatred of confession. But it was not established in the Case that the aforesaid dying man was a formal heretic, and some hope could be had, although most slight, of the value of the absolution to be conferred. - La-Croix 1866; Elbel 212, 214; Reuter, Neo-confessar. 203; G. 488-491; Gennari, Consultaz. Mor. Can. Lit., p. 1, Cons. 58; M. E. vol. 6, p. 2, p. 107 seqq.; I. M. 751-754.

6. Titius, a foreign youth from the sect of Protestants, who nevertheless was endowed with good morals and who seemed to err only materially in faith, while he was staying at Rome together with his widowed mother during the winter season, as he was accustomed, was seized by a most grave disease which the physician judged incurable. Caius, a Catholic priest of the same nation, who frequented his house, at once approached him, that he might consult for his eternal salvation. When they were conversing together, Titius declared himself to be a sinner, at the same time asking Caius to pour forth prayers to God, to obtain from Him pardon of his sins. Having obtained this good occasion, Caius desired gently to lead him, after heresy had been abjured, to the Catholic faith and to rebaptize him under condition; he secretly manifested this desire of his to the mother. But the mother, who pertinaciously adhered to the same sect, strongly resisted, adding at the same time both that there was no doubt about the validity of the baptism, and giving permission only that he should have conversation with him about those things alone which are common to heretics with Catholics; and from that time she sat constantly at the side of the sick man.

But when the disease grew worse, Caius, to whom nothing else remained, addressed Titius in this way: Do you believe all things whatsoever that have been revealed by God through Christ? Are you sincerely sorry for your sins? Do you confirm what you have already declared before God and me, namely, that you are a sinner? Does it please you that, through my help, toward attaining eternal life better, insofar as I can, you yourself be helped? When the sick man had nodded assent to each of these things, "Therefore trust in God," Caius says, "and He Himself will pardon your sins." These things having been said, he secretly absolved him under condition. A little while afterward Titius dies, and, by order of the mother, he is led to burial by the rite of the Protestants.

It is asked: 1.º Whether, at the article of death, a material heretic, enjoying the use of reason, can be absolved unless first, having been convinced concerning the Catholic faith, he embraces it and makes confession? - 2.º Whether Caius conducted himself rightly in all things?

R. To the 1st. St. Alphonsus, speaking of a dying man, destitute of senses, in the act of sin, to be absolved, altogether excludes heretics, saying, l. 6, n. 483: "For heretics, even if in that Case they give signs of penance, ought not to be absolved unless they expressly ask absolution, because such persons can never prudently be presumed to furnish those signs in order to confession, from which they exceedingly abhor." This is certainly a presumption, and a general presumption, which ought to yield to truth, and also to a contrary presumption in a particular case. Indeed there would be a contrary presumption if the heretic were altogether material and in good faith, with his mind altogether disposed and prepared for fulfilling all those things which have been ordained by God in His divine Providence for the eternal salvation of men.

Fr. Gury, Cas., vol. 2, n. 488, distinguishes between a formal and material heretic, and concerning a material heretic dying and destitute of senses says that absolution under condition is to be granted to him. And the Most Reverend Gennari, Consultaz., etc., p. 255, extends this even to a formal heretic. Moreover, if absolution can be given at least conditionally to a heretic of this sort dying and destitute of senses, it can also be given to the same if he enjoys the use of reason and the danger of death is imminent.

The question here about absolution to be given to such a heretic can exist only because of its invalidity from defect of intention and of the acts of the penitent. Moreover, such a defect does not seem really to be present. For first, as to intention, if implicit intention suffices in baptism, even in penance implicit intention can suffice, since penance is not of greater necessity, nor does it bring greater obligations, than baptism. Now indeed implicit intention is sufficiently had by the sincere and explicit will of admitting and employing all things necessary for salvation, ordained by God. But as to the acts of the penitent, since confession made only in general suffices for the validity of absolution, this can well be suggested to a dying heretic, so that he duly confess himself a sinner, or that he has sinned, and then ask pardon of his sins from God with hope of pardon; and then neither the necessary confession nor contrition is lacking for the validity of absolution.

As is had in the Instruction of the Sacred Congregation, January 30, 1833, Collectanea S. C. de P. F. n. 650: "Theologians everywhere teach that for the value of the sacrament there is not necessary in the minister that intention which they call express or determinate, but that only a generic intention suffices, namely of doing what the Church does, or of doing what Christ instituted, or what Christians do." And, as is added there immediately, an express and distinct intention of making a sacrament is not required, but a confused, implicit, general intention of doing what is done in the true Church of Christ suffices. But if an implicit and general intention of this sort suffices in the minister, it seems consequently and much more to suffice in the subject: that general will and intention of fulfilling and employing all the means instituted by Christ for one's own sanctification and eternal salvation.

Nor indeed can there be difficulty on the part of defect of Catholic faith. For a material heretic and one in good faith can well have supernatural faith necessary for justification. Nor likewise can there be defect from the fact that the aforesaid acts of the penitent, namely confession and contrition, were not ordered by him to absolution; for at least implicit ordering is not lacking by that general will just mentioned. And this holds insofar as that ordering is affirmed necessary. For if no necessity of such ordering is maintained, then there will be no difficulty from this head.

Besides, theologians almost commonly admit, as to a material heretic and one destitute of senses, that he can be absolved under condition. Come now, why indeed can such a heretic be absolved at least conditionally? Certainly not because such a heretic, who never had any suspicion of the sacrament of penance, now destitute of senses thinks about such a sacrament and elicits an express desire of confession and an act of contrition. This in reality is naturally absurd. Nor also because, during that state, he is supernaturally enlightened by God so as to know the necessity of the sacrament of penance, and, recovering the use of reason at least for some very brief space of time, duly disposes himself for it by his acts. This surely pertains not to probability, but to possibility; not to the natural order of things, but to miracles; and therefore for this reason it cannot be affirmed that the aforesaid heretic can be absolved at least conditionally. Therefore there can be no other reason except that in such a heretic those said acts can prudently be presumed, which, absolutely speaking, could suffice for the validity of the sacrament.

Wherefore to the proposed Question the response seems to be affirmative, namely that the aforesaid heretic can be absolved under condition. Fittingly La-Croix, l. 6, p. 2, n. 1866: "If a Catholic priest understands that a non-Catholic man has been brought to extremities, he acts prudently, unless something else stands in the way, if he approaches him... elicits with him acts of faith, hope, and charity, and of perfect contrition for sins... But if the circumstances allow, he can afterward ask whether, if he knew that he was not in the true faith, he would wish to embrace another, and to do all things necessary for salvation; whether he would wish to confess and to be absolved, if this were necessary for salvation. If he nods assent to these things... he can be absolved under condition."

To the 2nd. From what has been said, Caius seems to have conducted himself rightly, disposing Titius for a holy death insofar as it was in him and the circumstances allowed, and absolving him under condition. As to the fact that, by order of the mother, the body of Titius was led to burial by the rite of the Protestants, it surely did not pertain to Caius, a private priest, to prevent that; and for avoiding greater evils and sins and scandals he conducted himself well by concealing that he had absolved Titius under condition, and by keeping secret the absolution given. Yet there seems to be another thing which Caius ought to have done first. Caius is of the same nation as Titius. Wherefore Caius ought to have known well the manner of conferring baptism among Protestants; and therefore, doubting about its value, he wished to rebaptize Titius under condition, and was prevented only by the obstinate Protestant mother. Hence, while such a doubt stood concerning the validity of the baptism received, as Caius secretly absolved Titius under condition, so also he ought previously to have baptized him secretly under condition, which he could easily have done, for example with a little cloth wetted with water, applied to the forehead and lightly pressed, so that a little water would flow.

7. Albinus, a confessor, for a just cause conditionally absolves Jacob, doubtfully disposed. But the latter, now about to depart, by I know not what fate, asks the confessor whether he has been absolved. Astonished, the confessor, hesitating, answers affirmatively, not daring to declare that he had given only conditional absolution. Can I therefore communicate? the penitent asks again. Behold a new difficulty; and again, hesitating, Albinus answers negatively. Jacob marvels, and indignantly asks the reason for the denial. But the confessor, so that he may extricate himself from such great difficulties, consents that the penitent receive the sacred Synaxis, kindly exhorting the penitent that before Communion he repeat from the heart acts of faith, hope, charity, and contrition.

It is asked: 1.º Whether it is necessary or fitting that penitents absolved under condition be warned? - 2.º Whether the confessor in such a Case ought to prohibit them from Communion, or can permit it positively or negatively? - 3.º What is to be said of Albinus?

R. To the 1st. It is neither necessary nor expedient that the confessor warn the penitent that he was absolved only conditionally, because from this warning no good and many inconveniences can follow. For from it anxiety and disturbance of the penitent arise, and ambiguities for the confessor. Nor indeed is there any harm present for the penitent. For, if afterward he confesses at another time, these sins will be remitted indirectly in that confession itself, if they truly were not remitted. If he does not confess, and the sins in reality were not remitted, and danger is present for the penitent, that is certainly from his negligence and evil will in omitting confession, and by no means from the conditional absolution. On the contrary, if this is not given, if perhaps he is disposed, since the matter is doubtful, the penitent is exposed to danger of salvation.

To the 2nd. The confessor who conditionally absolves the penitent ought neither to impel him to Communion nor to draw him back from it. Let the confessor himself be silent, and let the penitent do whatever pleases him. For if he approaches the Eucharist in good faith, he can even receive first grace by communicating; if in bad faith, namely because he feels himself indisposed, he himself voluntarily casts himself into danger.

To the 3rd. To the first question of the penitent Albinus ought to have answered affirmatively, without any hesitation, since in reality he absolved insofar as the dispositions of the penitent allowed. To the second question he ought to have answered the penitent that the whole matter was left to his own judgment. But since Albinus positively furnished consent for Communion, he indeed did well by exhorting the penitent to acts of charity and contrition, lest perhaps he receive Communion sacrilegiously. G. 392-394.