134. On the Office of the Judge

1. "Gervasius, a confessor, because of haste and some carelessness, sometimes omits one or another question to be asked about the species or number of sins.

It is asked: 1.º Whether, or in what way, there is a grave obligation of interrogating penitents? - 2.º What must be said about Gervasius?

R. To the 1st. Of itself there is a grave obligation in the confessor of interrogating penitents, because the confessor, insofar as he is judge, must take care that, as much as is sufficient, the cause of the sacramental judgment be instructed. Besides, he is constituted so that he may not only hear the penitent, but aid him in duly fulfilling his obligation. Hence:

1.º A confessor sins gravely if from the voluntary omission of some interrogation there ought to follow grave harm of the penitent or of another, and he had foreseen that harm at least confusedly. He also sins gravely if he fails in the obligation of interrogating with regard to a notable part of this obligation, considered in its whole complex; for example, if knowingly and voluntarily, without reasonable cause, he omits most questions about number and species. For then he gravely fails in his office, and inflicts grave irreverence upon confession and the sacrament.

2.º But he does not sin gravely if from slight negligence, or from inadvertence, he omits several things even necessarily to be asked. Billuart, diss. 6, a. 10, § 2, where he speaks thus: "If from slight negligence, from inadvertence, from lapse of memory, human distraction, weariness of spirit, too great attention in hearing confessions, etc., he omits to inquire something even necessary, it will be no sin or only a light sin: for no one is bound with so great difficulty and moral impossibility to supply the defects of others."

3.º There will be greater difficulty if the confessor, without grave reason and voluntarily, or from grave carelessness, omits only one or another necessary interrogation, for example, concerning number or species. On the one hand he seems to sin gravely, because he supplies the place of the penitent; but the penitent, if he adverted to the obligation and did not satisfy it, would sin gravely. Yet on the other hand it does not more probably seem that he sins gravely. The reason is that in this there appears smallness of matter with respect to the whole obligation considered in its complex. Besides, if gravity of matter were admitted, a very great burden would be imposed upon confessors, who would always fluctuate amid anxieties, fearing lest perhaps from grave negligence they had omitted an interrogation to be made, and thence would be driven into the opposite excess with great burden to penitents.

Furthermore, although the confessor supplies the place of the penitent, nevertheless he does not seem to be bound to interrogate with such rigor as the penitent is bound to accuse himself. For the confessor precisely supplies not as taking caution for the penitent, but rather as his helper. Add also that, if a rigorous comparison between the obligation of each were admitted, the burden of the confessor would exceed the debt of the penitent a thousand times; since the penitent is rarely bound to confess, but the confessor must continually and often the whole day fulfill his office.

To the 2nd. Gervasius seems to be excused from grave sin, since from carelessness he omits a few questions to be asked about the species and number of sins, because he is judged to fulfill his office as to its substance." G. 666-668, 671; I. M. 819.

As regards the number of sins, one must not be solicitous beyond measure, and when it is very difficult to know the probable number, it will be better to know the state of the penitent, especially with the unlearned and the habituated, and as regards internal acts. Lig. 466; Sporer 451; Lugo, d. 16, nn. 573, 575, 576.

It must also be noted here that if the confessor has not understood something well, he will be able at the end to interrogate about it, lest he interrupt the penitent. "But if from the conscience of the penitent known to him he can presume that what he did not perceive is something light, and he cannot interrogate without disturbance or annoyance of the penitent, he can be silent and absolve." La-Croix 1716.

2. "Guido, a priest of unhappy memory - whatever may be said of his judgment - lest he disturb penitents, is accustomed to postpone to the end of confession the questions to be asked, the remedies to be prescribed, and the burdens of restitution to be imposed, of abandoning the occasion, etc. But not rarely, when the narration of the penitent has been completed, he has become entirely forgetful of the things to be investigated or imposed, indeed even of the sins themselves. What then, the wretched man? He compels the ruder to repeat the confession in a summary way, but leaves the more cultivated in peace, lest he offend them; and, the matter being dissembled, he immediately absolves, sometimes indeed not knowing what he is absolving.

It is asked: What is to be said to the Case?

R. Guido acted badly, by postponing to the end of confession all questions to be asked and burdens or remedies to be prescribed, because of the danger of forgetfulness. Any other man acting thus would be imprudent; how much more Guido, who knows well that he is of unhappy memory?" Thus Fr. Gury 679.

Guido indeed acted badly, but is he bound before he absolves to demand from his penitent a repeated confession, so that he himself can now ask the questions which he omitted, especially concerning the species and number of sins? Busembaum, apud St. Alphonsus 499, says: "If, when confession has been finished, you understand that the confessor did not perceive some things, whether because of sleep or distraction, but you do not know what those things are, you are bound to repeat the confession if it was short, because you can prudently doubt about each thing. But if it was long, you are not bound because of the contrary reason; and it is enough to confess that you doubt whether the confessor perceived any of your sins." And St. Alphonsus immediately adds: "Thus also hold the Salmanticenses, etc., who say that Christ the Lord is not presumed to have imposed the precept of integrity with so great a burden, namely of repeating all sins in such a Case, and Lugo teaches the same, d. 16, n. 607, with Sanchez, etc., commonly." Hence it is drawn that a confessor who had proposed to himself to interrogate the penitent about the species and number of some grave sin at the end of confession, and then forgets such a sin, if the confession was of only one or another grave sin, seems to be bound to demand a repeated confession; for then he can prudently doubt about each thing, nor otherwise is a grave burden imposed upon the penitent, especially if the confessor does this prudently. And this certainly without scruple is commonly done by confessors, if sometimes they do not hear and understand some sin well, nor are penitents disturbed on that account. But if the confession was long and of several grave sins, then the confessor seems able to abstain from demanding a repeated confession of all, lest he impose so great a burden upon the penitent. I. M. 717.

3. Robertinus abstains from hearing confessions, because he says that from experience itself it is established for him that he often cannot define whether there was mortal or venial sin, since penitents often explain sins in a very doubtful manner, so that they themselves do not know whether they gave consent. Besides, he adds that he is greatly wearied in his head in hearing confessions, both so that he may form a judgment about the lowest species of sins and determine against what virtue precisely they are, and so that he may judge about the number, which often is impossible for him to perceive clearly, since he cannot at once make mentally the addition of all the sins in order to know the entire number of sins.

It is asked: What is to be said to the Case?

R. Robertinus is greatly deceived concerning the nature of the judgment to be formed about sins in the administration of the sacrament of penance. For first, "the confessor is not bound to form a certain judgment about individual sins, but only about the obvious and clear." Lig. 500. "It is not necessary that the confessor judge in all things which sins are grave or light; it is enough if he knows how to judge this in those which commonly occur; but the rest he may hear and absolve." Lig. 627.

Besides, as regards the judgment to be formed by the confessor concerning sins, 1.º with regard to the species of sins, a twofold knowledge of sin must be distinguished. The first knowledge is explicit, reflex, and in the signate act, concerning the nature or species of each sin, against what virtue and what precept it is; and such is the knowledge of guilt in the external judicial forum, when the judge pronouncing punishment explicitly signifies the various laws violated by the guilty person and the punishments already established by law in the diverse articles of the code. The other knowledge is implicit, direct, and in the exercised act, and is had when the confessor apprehends the sin with all its circumstances changing the species, so that if any one of them is lacking, he is prepared to interrogate. Although he himself does not actually say: such a sin is against such virtues and precepts, in such or such lowest species, nevertheless he distinguishes one sin from another very well. Now for hearing confession validly and licitly this latter knowledge of sin is sufficient; for it is sufficient for forming a true judgment about the sin. But it is enough, with regard to the species and circumstances of sins that must necessarily be explained, by reason of restitution of goods and reputation, reservation, censure, irregularity, etc., "if the confessor understands the things which more frequently happen, and knows how to doubt about the others." Lig. 627; I. M. 811. - 2.º With regard to the number of sins, it is not necessary that at the end of the whole confession the confessor make some arithmetical calculation and addition of all the sins. For, for imposing penance, even a confused knowledge of the state of the penitent is sufficient; but once the penance has been imposed, it is not necessary for imparting absolution also to remember even confusedly the sins or the imposed penance, but it is enough to remember that the penitent, rightly disposed, has rightly confessed, and that judgment has been passed upon him. Nor indeed is it necessary to make the same calculation in any part of confession, when the penitent confesses sins of each species, saying, for example, that through several years he committed such a sin about ten or twelve times; and then through several years fell into it more frequently, say about twenty times each week, etc. For that distinct knowledge of the number is sufficient which is had successively by parts: then the confessor, although successively and by parts, truly forms judgment about the number of sins, and from this can sufficiently know at the end of the whole confession at least confusedly the state of the penitent. Besides, that calculation would be an intolerable burden for the confessor. Suarez, d. 22, s. 6 at the end; Lugo, d. 16, n. 636; La-Croix, l. 6, p. 2, n. 1717; Reuter, Neoconf., p. 1, c. 7, n. 28; L. 502; G. 678; I. M. 745, 749.

4. Patutius the confessor asks: Whether he is always bound to absolve a penitent whose confession he has heard, and for this purpose to embrace the more benign probable opinion?

R. 1.º In a Case of grave necessity, for example at the article of death, he is bound. The reason is that in such a Case he cannot, charity being preserved, leave the penitent without a remedy which he can licitly apply. But, according to a morally certain opinion, he can licitly use the more benign probable opinion.

2.º Outside the case of grave necessity, if that probable opinion stands on the part of the penitent, who in his action wishes to embrace a probable opinion favorable to himself, for example, whether the penitent in such a Case is bound to restitution, then the confessor is bound to embrace the probable opinion of the penitent and absolve him. The reason is that, the confession having been heard, the penitent has a certain right to absolution if he is legitimately disposed. But although he wishes to embrace the more benign probable opinion, the penitent can be legitimately disposed; for by embracing that opinion, he can well detest all past sins and have an efficacious purpose of observing all the precepts of God. For he sufficiently observes the divine precept who, by following a probable opinion, prudently judges that he is bound by no precept to perform something, and therefore omits it. Therefore. - But if that probable opinion stands on the part of the confessor, for example, whether in such circumstances the confessor can deny absolution or give it, and each opinion is probable, the confessor can choose the stricter opinion and deny absolution. For 1.º then the confessor acts according to an opinion truly probable and consequently licitly. Therefore, just as the penitent concerning his own obligation can choose a probable opinion, so also the confessor concerning his own obligation can choose a probable opinion. 2.º Because, if there were any reason why the confessor could not do this, it would be because, the confession having been heard, the penitent has a certain right to absolution. But since only the obligation of absolving the penitent is probable, the penitent does not have a certain right to absolution. Therefore. - Lugo, Resp. Mor., l. 1, d. 26; L. I, 6, n. 604; H. A., tr. 16, nn. 118, 119; I. M., vol. 1, n. 119.