135. On Relapsers and Those in Occasions

1. Alphonsus, a confessor, does not grant absolution to penitents unless he is altogether certain of their good dispositions. Hence he always grants absolution to relapsers and those in occasions the first, second, and third time; but afterward he always denies absolution to all relapsers and those in occasions, unless first the former abstain from every relapse and the latter remove the occasion. Finally, he always defers absolution for all when he himself is doubtful about the dispositions of the penitents.

It is asked: What is to be said to the Case?

R. The manner of acting of Alphonsus cannot be approved, and he seems not to act well in all things. For first, so that the confessor can grant absolution, it is by no means required that he have complete certainty about the good dispositions of the penitent; but "it is enough that the confessor have a prudent probability concerning the disposition of the penitent, and that on the other side a prudent suspicion of indisposition not stand in the way; otherwise hardly anyone could be absolved, since whatever signs of penitents furnish only probability of disposition." St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 461.

Always to grant absolution to relapsers and those in occasions the first, second, and third time is not right. For the fact that relapsers and those in occasions of this sort have not previously approached confession, or have approached only once and again, certainly is not an argument of the good disposition of those penitents, who can well approach confession without the necessary contrition. Therefore the norm of absolution to be given cannot be that the penitent confesses the first or second or third time, but the prudent judgment in the confessor concerning sorrow and purpose. Indeed, "the penitent must be absolved as often as he seriously proposes to amend in the future and altogether to abstain, provided that the confessor prudently believes that he truly proposes and speaks seriously." Sporer, c. 2, n. 330, cited by St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 463, as handing down the common opinion.

It is also not right always to deny absolution to relapsers, unless first they abstain from every relapse. If it were so, then that would have to be deleted which is contained in the Roman Ritual, Order of Administering the Sacrament of Penance: "But to those confessing more rarely or later, or easily falling back into sins, it will have been most useful to counsel that they confess often, say once in a month, or on certain solemn days, and, if it is expedient, communicate." How will they be able to communicate unless they are first absolved? Nevertheless there is question also of relapsers, and of relapsers easily falling back into sin.

Likewise it is not right always to deny absolution to those in occasions, unless first they remove the occasion. For first, according to the opinion which St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 457 at the end, affirms to be held most commonly, any penitent and always can be absolved who approaches confession with true sorrow and purpose, so that hope of amendment shines forth. Besides, an occasion can be voluntary, from which one can withdraw by his own will; but it can also be necessary, which one cannot remove; nor indeed is he bound to remove it, speaking absolutely, but he is bound only to render it remote from proximate, by using the means which a prudent and discreet confessor will suggest. Therefore if the penitent truly uses these means and tries not to sin, although in fact he has sinned, he can still sincerely grieve and propose; and the very means used and the effort employed can be an argument of that sincere sorrow and purpose. Indeed even still, after experience of no progress, true sorrow and the required purpose can stand, without the will of taking away the occasion with so great a detriment. Therefore the penitent can be absolved. For nothing else is required except confession with sorrow and purpose. Finally, as St. Alphonsus also says, l. 6, n. 454: "The doctors commonly affirm that the penitent is not bound to dismiss the occasion, if otherwise he is going to suffer grave temporal harm, provided meanwhile he is prepared to use the prescribed means ... The reason is that the occasion of sinning is not in itself a sin, nor does it bring a necessity of sinning; wherefore true detestation of sins, and a firm purpose of not relapsing and of using due remedies, can well stand together with it."

It is likewise not right that absolution is always to be deferred when the confessor is doubtful about the dispositions of the penitent. For even in that case of doubt absolution is to be given, although conditionally, if from absolution denied grave spiritual harm of the penitent would follow. Gury, Comp., vol. 2, n. 435.

Therefore it must be said that in this matter of absolution to be granted, deferred, or denied, "a certain rule cannot be established, but the confessor must direct himself from the occurring circumstances." St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 463. And from circumstances of this sort he will easily be able to form a prudent judgment concerning the sufficient disposition of the penitent. And, if the priest, clothed with the bowels of the mercy of Christ, who did not come to call the just but sinners, knows how to act studiously, patiently, meekly with those penitents who seem unprepared, and by every industry of charity to stir them to sorrow and purpose, it will indeed be difficult for them not to exhibit some sufficient sign of their mind. Cf. Commentarium De absolutione danda, differenda, deneganda, ed. 5.

2. Titius, a priest receiving the confessions of the faithful in the church on the day on which the solemn feast of the Blessed Virgin was celebrated with a great concourse of people, among several others imparted absolution to a certain drunken old man, who had abstained from the sacraments for ten years; besides, to a certain young man devoted for about seven years to impurities and self-abuse, although he had been accustomed several times a year to approach the sacrament of penance; finally, to a certain woman who was living after the manner of a prostitute, and who, although with abundant tears she deplored the things admitted by her and detested her most wretched state, nevertheless feared greatly lest from want she would be impelled to relapse again.

Having returned into the sacristy, Titius, exulting with joy, cries out: "Oh, how salutarily these feasts have been instituted! It can scarcely be said what very abundant fruits are perceived from the sacrament of penance!" Then he recounts the three cases reviewed, in general words, to Caius the confessor, who by chance was present. This man greatly wondered at the manner of acting of Titius; for he could not persuade himself how to sinners of this kind, without any intervening delay, and before the habit had been amended and relapse avoided, absolution could be conceded. For he held as certain that there was no truer and safer sign of penance than to abstain from sins, and that he who with a sincere heart proposes that he will sin no more will not relapse so quickly, just as a house solidly built does not fall so quickly. And so a contention arises between them on this matter, to which, that an end may be imposed, both together consult a theologian most distinguished in doctrine and reputation. Having learned the question, he asks within himself:

1.º What comes under the name of customary sinner and relapser? - 2.º What signs of penance must be present in sinners of this sort, so that they can be absolved? - 3.º What must be judged about the manner of thinking and acting of each confessor, as in the Case?

R. To the 1st. Customary sinners are here called those who have contracted the custom of sinning. But this custom, as in all moral matters, is not fixed and determined by such a number of falls; but from greater or lesser frequency it has a certain breadth. He is a customary sinner who blasphemes twenty or ten times in a week, and he also is a customary sinner who blasphemes only five times or once in a week. But relapsers are called those who after confession, although admonished by the confessor, relapse into the same sins, without any or almost any amendment. Wherefore although customary sinners are also relapsers, nevertheless they are not here called relapsers unless after confession they relapse into the same sins, having already been admonished before, and fall back without any or almost any amendment.

To the 2nd. Relapse into sins, whether others or the same, cannot of itself impede absolution. For to the sinner, by the sentence of Jesus Christ himself, not only seven times, but even seventy-seven times, it is forgiven. Hence it is plainly evident that amendment already following, as it is not necessary and essential to true penance, so neither is it necessarily prerequired for absolution. But another thing is plainly evident from this: also with regard to customary sinners and relapsers it is said without any foundation that they can be absolved at least the first time, or once and again, or three times, or three and four times. For if such a relapser could be absolved the first and fourth time, this was because he had contrition and purpose; why therefore could he not have it also the fifth and sixth time? Hence, if a relapser always has it, he can always, speaking absolutely, be absolved. But by what signs is sufficient contrition and sufficient purpose discerned? There are those who require extraordinary signs. But besides the fact that the extraordinary signs which they assign are at least in several things confused with ordinary ones and can also be fallacious, why can ordinary signs not suffice the second time, for example, if they sufficed the first? Why will he who quite seriously affirms and proves by the whole tenor of his confession that he has sorrow and purpose the first time not be able also the second and third and fourth and fifth time quite seriously to affirm and demonstrate the sincere penance of his mind? Wherefore again this is the whole difficulty: to judge prudently about the sincerity of sorrow and purpose, by whatever signs someone may finally be led to a prudent judgment of this sort. Yet it must not be denied that, although absolution can be given, sometimes nevertheless it is expedient to defer it; and this holds both for relapsers and for those in occasions, namely when that delay is judged going to profit the penitent. For if to the office of judge belongs the judgment of absolution to be given or denied, to the office of physician belongs giving it at an opportune time for the greater utility of the penitent. Wherefore, if the confessor judges that delay useful to the spiritual good of the penitent, he can prudently defer it, without being bound to do so, namely if the penitent is sufficiently disposed. Moreover, almost all agree that one must act more mildly both with those who are placed in a necessary occasion, because they are held by a graver difficulty, and with customary sinners and relapsers, because they labor under a greater infirmity. St. Alphonsus also has the doctrine handed down, as to the very substance of the matter, who in Homo Apostolicus, last treatise, n. 13, says: "Whenever some sign is present by which it can prudently be judged that the penitent has changed his will, he can be absolved well." And in the same place the Holy Doctor treats of those in occasions and relapsers.

To the 3rd. Titius acted well by absolving the drunken old man, who had abstained from the sacraments for ten years. For what doubt can there be that that drunken man, approaching the sacraments again of his own accord after ten years, was moved by sincere penance? A sign is certainly present by which the penitent can prudently be judged to have changed his will. The young man devoted to self-abuse could also be absolved, if namely Titius had first suitably stirred him to sorrow and purpose. Spontaneous frequency of the sacraments certainly is a sign of sincere will. It will perhaps also be useful, because that man was accustomed several times a year to approach the sacraments, if Titius frightens him somewhat and shows, as St. Alphonsus says in the place cited, n. 15, as though he could not absolve him. Likewise Titius acted well by absolving the prostitute, who showed not only ordinary signs but also, with abundant tears, extraordinary signs of contrition. Fear of future relapse does not impede the sincerity of present sorrow, and therefore there could be no difficulty of absolving on this account.

But as regards Caius, amendment of life following is certainly the best sign of penance, but true penance can be had also without it. This, from the things just related among others, is plainly established from proposition 36 of the Synod of Pistoia, condemned by Pius VI. Likewise, from the fact that someone relapses quickly after sorrow and purpose and after confession, speaking absolutely, there is no argument of defect of sincere penance. For someone, recalling his mind from worldly things and remembering his last things, with the grace of God aiding, can conceive true and perfect contrition. Once this has been conceived, at once, for example, an occasion of sinning presents itself, placing the matter before the senses, vehemently striking the imagination, more sharply irritating the mind; whence, thinking worldly things again, he adheres to worldly things, and this according to the liberty and mutability of the human will. Wherefore he who just now truly loved God, now loves creatures; as he who just now truly sat, now stands. Nevertheless it must likewise not be denied that some prudent suspicion of defect of sincere penance can be had from the fact that the penitent, admonished and already often admonished, returns without any or almost any amendment. For in reality to what prudent man ought that good faith not to seem suspect, which someone has always disappointed? But, since this is only suspicion, presumption, and conjecture from the very fact of purpose not observed, the matter must be carefully examined with all its circumstances, and then, if the disposition of the penitent still prudently appears doubtful, absolution certainly cannot be given to him, but it is either to be denied, or at least deferred. But that is not understood which D'Annibale has, p. 3, n. 340, ed. 3, namely that it is required that the relapser appear not doubtfully, but sufficiently disposed, and yet absolution is to be denied him when no probable hope of amendment any longer appears. With pardon of the illustrious theologian, these things seem contradictory and practically impossible.

3. To Bertha, a servant girl often sinning with Caius her master, Titius the confessor imposes that she immediately depart from his house. But she refuses to do this, both because Caius had promised amendment, and because for some years he had not paid her the wages of service, which nevertheless she hoped to receive soon, and would receive no longer if she departed. Having heard these things, Titius absolves her, at the same time enjoining that she return to confession each week. But only after six months, with relapse repeated several times, does Bertha return to Titius, bringing forward the same reasons lest she be compelled to leave the house of her master. And since the confessor hears from her that the master in a few days is about to set out for Naples, where it was necessary for him to remain rather long, and at the same time that she wishes to communicate on that day lest she be deprived of a plenary indulgence, he again imparts absolution. In reality it happened that before the master departed from Rome, Bertha committed no sin with him.

Meanwhile Caius, dwelling at Naples, manifests to a confessor that he has at Rome a servant girl as concubine, whom nevertheless he promises that he will dismiss scarcely after he has returned to his native land; from this it happens that he is immediately absolved.

But when afterward he returned to Rome, he interposes conversation about this matter with the servant girl, and lest they be separated from each other, both firmly determine not to fail any more in the future. A whole month passes and they faithfully observe their purpose. Soon, however, the Easter precept urging, they approach a confessor, who, having been made certain about the matter, dismisses them unabsolved until they separate. Therefore they approach another confessor, who, having heard all things, asks within himself:

1.º What and of how many kinds is an occasion of sin? - 2.º Whether and in what occasion a penitent constituted in it can be absolved? - 3.º What must be judged about the manner of acting of the confessors, as to each thing as in the Case?

R. To the 1st. An occasion is a certain exterior circumstance, bringing to us a danger of sinning. This danger comes from the fact that that exterior circumstance is of itself alluring to sinning. Hence it is clear that an occasion is a true moral cause of sin, although by accident and not of itself. If the aforesaid danger of sinning is possible, but not probable, the occasion is remote. But if the danger is truly probable, the occasion is proximate. But just as the probability of danger is not in an indivisible point, but there is lesser and greater probability, and then moral certainty, so a proximate occasion is less or more proximate, and simply proximate. A proximate occasion, if it is such with respect to someone in particular because of his special fragility, is an occasion relatively; but if it is such regularly with respect to all, it is an occasion absolutely. If again it is such that it cannot be taken away, or not except with grave detriment to oneself, or on the contrary can be removed altogether, then the occasion is simply necessary, morally necessary, or voluntary. Finally, if someone has it with himself or otherwise, it is called in esse, or present, or not in esse, or absent.

To the 2nd. In whatever occasion the penitent is constituted, he can indeed be absolved if he sincerely grieves and proposes. And this in reality is the whole difficulty: to judge prudently about the sincerity of contrition and purpose. Wherefore what is said, that one in an occasion can be absolved at least the first time, is said with no reason. If one in an occasion exhibits signs of contrition and purpose neither the first nor the hundredth time, he can never be absolved; and on the contrary, speaking of itself, he can always be absolved, if he always exhibits sincere contrition and sincere purpose. Hence, if he is in a voluntary occasion and does not remove it, and therefore falls into sins, a prudent argument of sincere contrition and purpose certainly is not had, and therefore he cannot be absolved. If he is in a necessary occasion and tries to render it remote by using opportune means, even if sometimes again he falls into sins, on the contrary an argument is had of the sincerity of sorrow and purpose, whence, speaking of itself, he can be absolved.

To the 3rd. Bertha is found in an occasion, if not simply necessary, then certainly morally necessary. Titius the confessor acted well the first time by absolving her. For on one side Caius had promised amendment, and on the other Bertha also promises amendment, and seems to promise seriously, because she willingly accepts approaching confession frequently from the excellent admonition and exhortation of the confessor. Titius the confessor also acts well the second time by absolving Bertha. For the good will of Bertha appears serious from the confession performed spontaneously, although after six months, and from the desire of Communion and of the plenary indulgence. But the occasion meanwhile is physically removed by the journey of the master. And the sincere will of Bertha this time was also proved by the very fact, because no sin was committed after confession and before the departure of the master. Caius also at Naples is rightly absolved by his confessor. For, since he is removed from the occasion and promises that he will take it away, his will of sinning no more appears serious, and consequently his contrition must be called sincere. These things having been premised and presupposed, the will of Caius and Bertha not to sin any more, after the return of the master, also appears serious, which is also confirmed by the experience of a whole month. Hence the later confessor, whom they soon approached while the Easter precept was urging, does not seem to have acted well by denying absolution to them unless they first separated from each other.

And here it must be noted that, since there was question of the Easter precept, absolution was not to be denied for this special reason also without a graver reason. Besides, Bertha and also Caius appear to be persons, although fragile, religious, and who revere the laws of the Church. Hence the confessor ought not by that denial of absolution, made so precisely, rather to keep them away from confession than to allure and invite them to it. Finally, another thing must be attended to in practice with regard to this Case and others like it. Caius will dismiss Bertha; Bertha will leave Caius. But will not Caius, taking on another servant girl, perhaps be able to have for himself a new and worse danger? And will not Bertha, finding another master, perhaps herself be able to find a new and worse occasion? Hence would it not be better to meet the old evil than perhaps to furnish occasion for a new one? But this certainly is the practical difficulty in cases of this sort, and there is need of great consideration of all circumstances so that a truly prudent judgment may be formed.