Chapter — Bucceroni, Cases of Conscience

146. Impotence and Bond

1.
  1. Sabinus, wishing to contract marriage, asks the confessor whether he can effect this. The reason for his doubting is his natural debility, by force of which, although he himself can pour forth seed, nevertheless he experiences no erection. Without any hesitation the confessor responds affirmatively, because, he says, on the authority of many and grave theologians, it suffices that seed can be poured forth at the mouth of the vagina, which Sabinus can certainly accomplish.
1.

It is asked: What is to be said to the case?

1.

R. The confessor's undoubting response does not seem to be approved. For Sabinus first does not seem able licitly to contract marriage. For the wife could be wholly unwilling as to that imperfect mode of coming together. Then also, once marriage has been contracted, scandals can easily arise. For, with that imperfect mode of coitus standing, if dissensions arise between the spouses, they will immediately seek divorce, and will institute a lawsuit, and will introduce the cause from the head of the impotence of the man, as is evident from the fact itself. But neither does he seem able validly to enter marriage. For Sabinus labors under the impediment of impotence, which is called the impediment of frigidity. For this impediment, in impotence, is not in the impotence of generation, nor is it in the impotence of pouring forth seed, but it is in the impotence of coition, as is to be seen through almost the whole title de Frigidis et Maleficiatis. The impediment of impotence surely exists when there is impotence for consummating marriage. But then marriage is properly said to be consummated when it is established that copula sufficient for generation has intervened, as the S. C. C. teaches in the Nuscana marriage case, Sept. 11, 1880. Where, therefore, impotence is had for accomplishing that copula, an impediment is had to the marriage itself. Most clear on this matter is the doctrine of St. Thomas: "Although the act of carnal copula is not of the essence of marriage, nevertheless potency for this is of its essence, because through marriage there is given to each spouse power over the body of the other with respect to carnal copula." 4, D. 34, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1. Hence the Angelic Doctor then concludes, ibid. ad 6, that with respect to the impediment of marriage "the same judgment is to be made concerning the narrowness of the woman and the frigidity of the man," namely, because of impotence of coition in both cases.

2.
  1. Fabia, wishing to contract marriage with Fabius, asks her confessor whether she can; for she has purposely undergone the excision of an ovary, namely, so that, after marriage is then entered into, she may not have children. There is no difficulty, says the confessor. And he responds thus because he judges that marriage pertains also to the mutual assistance of life and to restraining concupiscence. D'Annib., p. 3, n. 431, note 9, ed. 3. Nevertheless the parish priest raises a difficulty, and requires the attestation of a surgeon, by which it may be established that generation is not physically impossible, with attention to the manner in which that excision of the ovary was accomplished. And when Fabia did not acquiesce in this decision, the matter was brought to the bishop, who wholly approved the decision of the parish priest.
2.

It is asked: What is to be said to the case?

2.

R. Certainly the most prudent manner of acting of the parish priest and the decision of the bishop are to be approved. For if it is established that the ovaries were altogether perfectly excised, so that generation is physically impossible, marriage is impossible. But otherwise, if that excision was wholly imperfect, of part of an ovary or of only one ovary. Likewise it is impossible that marriage be also for mutual assistance of life and for quieting concupiscence, unless it is marriage. But marriage is essentially a conjunction in order to offspring. Hence Augustine, praised by the Angelic Doctor, "says against Faustus that a woman ought not to marry for any other thing, except that she be a mother." But where offspring is physically impossible, conjunction in order to that offspring is impossible. S. Th., 3 p., q. 75, a. 2, apud Cajetan. Likewise from the same Angelic Doctor, apud the same Cajetan, q. 76, a. 1, the conjunction which is the sacrament in marriage is a conjunction which is for the office of nature. A conjunction which would not be for the office of nature cannot be marriage as a sacrament, and therefore neither a remedy of concupiscence. And once the office of nature has been excluded, neither can the assistance of life be had in a wife, namely such as nature itself intends. "Woman was made principally for this, that she might be a help to man for offspring; but man was not made for this." S. Th., ib., q. 75, a. 2, ad 1. And in the Council of Florence, Decree for the Armenians, marriage as sacrament is said to have been instituted by Christ Our Lord so that the Church may be CORPOREALLY INCREASED through it. Once the physical possibility of offspring has been excluded, and, on the contrary, the physical impossibility of offspring established, how can it any longer be true that this sacrament IS ORDERED TO THE MULTIPLICATION OF THE CHURCH, as the same Council of Florence has it? I. M. 994, 995.

3.
  1. "1. A certain woman, after she had waited in vain for two or three years for the return of her husband, was united in marriage to another man, notwithstanding the admonitions which the missionary made to both; now the second husband of this woman, repenting of the deed, would wish to leave her and pass to other vows. - 2. Another woman, since she also had waited in vain for the return of her husband, after three years, judging that he was already dead, in good faith joined herself in marriage to another man; and since it is now impossible to investigate whether the first husband is still living or is in reality dead, it is asked whether she herself can be left in the use of the second marriage contracted until certainty is had concerning the life of the first husband?"
3.

R. The Holy Office, March 24, 1865, responded: "As to the first, that the spouses are to be separated, and that the man cannot enter second nuptials until it is morally certain that, at the time when he himself entered marriage with the woman in question, the first husband of that same woman had already died. As to the second, that they are to be left in good faith." Cf. E. M. 996.

4.
  1. There is a husband who, after 14 years, has not yet been able to have information concerning his wife. Can he enter other nuptials?
4.

R. Negatively. "A lapse of time, of whatever length, is not sufficient for spouses to be permitted to enter new nuptials, unless first it has been established with moral certainty that the former spouse has died, as from c. In praesentia 19, de Sponsalibus." S. C. de P. F., Apr. 21, 1788; Collect. n. 1365, 1366, 1368; I. M. 996.