22. On the Nature of Sin

1. Stanislaus is accustomed to be harassed by evil thoughts. He indeed rejects them, but immediately they return, and remain in the mind for a rather long delay. He himself always fears concerning consent given. The confessor adds courage to him, saying that fully deliberate consent is required for mortal sin, and that the mere thought of an evil thing, and even its delay in the memory, does not suffice; and that mortal sin is a monster so horrible that he who is stained by it knows this well; nor indeed does anyone sin unknowingly. Stanislaus, thinking these things over, has the thought occur to him that, in order to free himself from the most troublesome anxiety of mind concerning consent given to evil thoughts, he might sometimes consent to them, so that he may experience the different state of mind. But soon he is vexed by a greater anxiety concerning the sin committed by this thought.

Q. 1. What is required for grave sin? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 287-289, 311-314. To the second: Stanislaus is without doubt too much liable to scruples; nevertheless let him be consoled, because he is not to be blamed for grave sin. For sin is not without consent, and consent is not in the thought, nor in the importunate and even long-lasting thought of an evil thing against the will, nor even in the most importunate thought of delectation, or consent, or mortal sin, as when scrupulous persons of this sort, on account of such a thought, then fear concerning delectation, consent, and sin committed. Thought is in the intellect; consent is in the will. But the anxiety itself and the fear by which Stanislaus is continually vexed, lest he have sinned in thoughts of this sort, sufficiently shows that every consent was lacking in him. But in the case of doubt, the presumption favors him, if, as appears, he himself is not accustomed to consent with full advertence; because from things commonly happening a prudent presumption is made. A fortiori, indeed, this very thing must be presumed concerning a scrupulous person, as one whose whole solicitude tends to this, that he not offend God. For from what other cause is he so vehemently distressed and disturbed? Cf. Elbel 226 seqq., 548 seqq.; Reuter, Neoconfess., 267, 8; Scav., 12th ed., Milan, 1874, l. 1, n. 740; G. 141.

But what if Stanislaus deliberately conceived that proposal? Without doubt he would have sinned gravely. But of what species such a sin would have been depends on the nature of those evil thoughts to which he had resolved to consent. For if those evil thoughts occurred to Stanislaus against some determinate virtue, charity, justice, chastity, etc., the evil proposal of Stanislaus would have been in the same species. But if no determinate evil thought was being objected to Stanislaus, that evil proposal of his would have been against no determinate virtue, nor consequently of a determinate species, but would have been of generic malice against that general rule of morality: Turn away from evil and do good. Elbel 548; I. M. 315.

2. Parthenius promised by vow that he would give to the parish church two most beautiful golden candlesticks, so that the Marian month might be celebrated with greater solemnity in honor of the Blessed Virgin Mary. Meanwhile, while he is at home, he often looks at those candlesticks, and is affected by grief and displeasure. Nevertheless, the month of May being near, although with still greater grief and displeasure, he calls a servant, and orders him to carry the candlesticks to the parish church. Seeing them on the altar on the first day of the month of May, furnished with many lit candles, before the statue of the Blessed Virgin Mary, he is affected by great joy and great gladness.

Q. 1. Is grief and sadness over a completed work of virtue a sin? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 392. To the second: "He who, after he has bound himself by a grave vow, then seriously grieves that he has done so, does not sin gravely, provided that he retains the mind of fulfilling it." L. 123. But the displeasure of Parthenius does not seem serious and deliberate; but rather natural displeasure, on account of the beauty of those candlesticks, which, as is gathered from the case, were very dear to him. This is gathered from the prompt mind with which he exactly fulfilled the vow, from the fact that Parthenius appears a very good man and devoted to the Blessed Virgin Mary, and from the joy by which he is then affected. Wherefore from that natural displeasure his vow in no way loses its merit. "If however," says St. Thomas, II-II, q. 88, a. 6, ad 2, "the work itself, considered according to itself, were sad and involuntary after the vow, provided nevertheless that the will of fulfilling the vow remains, it is still more meritorious than if it were done without a vow." Indeed, with that natural repugnance standing, and by conquering and expugning it, acting against it, merit increases. Cf. I. M. 56. Nor indeed is it established from the case that the grief and displeasure of Parthenius were over the vow performed; but merely over a thing dear to him being given up, which is clearly different.

3. Quirinus, desiring to avoid every sin, judges this altogether impossible for himself. For, he says, every act, in the concrete, is either good or evil, since indifferent acts are not given in the individual. Moreover, when I act, I could always indeed do something more perfect. But to omit the more perfect act is not an act of virtue and good. Therefore by choosing the less perfect I sin, and consequently I always sin. Hence Quirinus is agitated by great anguish, and approaches various confessors that they may resolve his doubt, and he acquiesces in the resolution of none.

Q. Is it always a sin, in the concrete, to do what is less perfect?

R. Negatively. This is clear 1. from this very thing, that otherwise it would follow that anyone sins in every act, which is absurd. For no one necessarily sins. 2. Because by the very fact that someone chooses a lesser good, he indeed chooses a good; and therefore he acts honorably. Whence 1 Cor. 7:25-40: "Therefore, he who joins his virgin in marriage does well; and he who does not join her does better.... Let her marry whom she wishes.... But she will be happier if she remains thus." 3. For if someone, by choosing a lesser good, had a will actually contemning the greater good, or delighting itself in the rejection of the greater good, then certainly sin would be present. But this perverse will does not necessarily and always accompany the choice of the lesser good. For often and ordinarily a man leaves behind the greater good by simply pursuing the lesser good, without by a positive act of the will abstaining from the pursuit of the greater good, to which he is not held. And then indeed there is no sin, and no evil act; but the act is only good and virtuous. But if he leaves behind the greater good by a positive act indeed of the will, and pursues the lesser good, because he sees this to be good, and that not to be commanded, nor necessarily to be done, but free; because he sees this at present to be suitable for himself, within the limits of the virtues of prudence, temperance, modesty, etc.; because he wishes to use his own right, to preserve liberty for himself, not to form for himself a too strict conscience, nor to become liable to scruples, etc., certainly choosing the lesser good and leaving behind the greater, he sins in nothing, and acts honorably and virtuously, although less virtuously and less perfectly. - Hence let Quirinus strive always to act from right reason and from the motive of some virtue; and not to be led by sensual inclination or a less right motive; and he will always act honorably and virtuously, without it also being necessary always that by a reflex act he institute that comparison between the greater and lesser good. Let Quirinus acquiesce in this doctrine, reduce it to practice, and he will be freed from all anguish and will avoid every sin.