25. On Capital Vices

1. Augustus, a veteran soldier, desires to be placed over the remaining fellow-soldiers, because he has firmly persuaded himself that he surpasses all of them both in strength of mind and in skill of war, already proved by deeds many times, or at least is second to none. But since he is a fervent Catholic, he has persuaded himself that no other of his fellow-soldiers will be able to benefit the spiritual good of the soldiers as he himself will, if he is placed over them. Wherefore, by efficacious but honest means, through the intercession of friends, he tries to obtain the aforesaid prefecture.

Q. 1. What is pride and what kind of sin is it? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 321. To the second: that Augustus judges that he excels others in the military art, and is pleased in himself in this his excellence, is not grave sin in itself. Indeed it is not even a light sin if, without contempt of God and of others, he neither extols himself more than is fitting, nor is excessively pleased with his own excellence. - If Augustus in reality is a strong and capable soldier, and worthy of a higher public office, he did not sin by desiring promotion to it moderately. The reason is that to seek one's own promotion to nobler offices, and one's own excellence, is a thing of itself altogether indifferent, free from all fault, and if it is done from a good end and with due moderation, it becomes praiseworthy. For only an inordinate appetite of one's own excellence is vicious. But Augustus, by hypothesis, is in reality worthy of further promotion, procures it by honest and licit means, and is led by the best end; nor from elsewhere does excessive desire of it appear. Wherefore he does not seem to be disturbed. Elbel 611.

2. Angelus, a doctor in philosophy and theology, canon of the cathedral church, famous in the whole diocese both for knowledge and for holiness of life, is agitated by great anguish of conscience. For when he sees that the present bishop does not rightly govern the diocese, whence many detractions and many rumors pervade the whole diocese against the bishop, he is very saddened by this, and prays God for the diocese, that after the death of the bishop, now octogenarian and infirm, a prudent pastor may be placed over it. For there are many discords in the clergy on account of various candidates who are proposed for the episcopal see. Yet often he thinks that, if he himself in reality were chosen, he would govern all things wholly in a holy and just way, would extirpate these or those abuses, would promote these or those pious works. While he turns these things over in his mind, he experiences in himself a desire of the episcopate. But immediately he fears that he has wished for the episcopate by culpable ambition. Meanwhile the bishop dies, and without Angelus doing anything, by unanimous vote of the canons he is named capitular vicar, and then is announced as bishop by the Supreme Pontiff, beyond every opinion and expectation of his. But Angelus is uncertain whether he ought to renounce or accept the episcopate.

Q. Has Angelus sinned in a desire of this sort, and does he sin by not renouncing the episcopate?

R. The desire of Angelus was rather will as nature than will as reason, I. M. 80, and therefore no sin was present. This is clear from all the circumstances of the case; from which it indeed appears that Angelus is not ambitious. But if it is supposed that perhaps that desire was semi-voluntary, or altogether voluntary, then it also does not seem that Angelus sinned by ambition. For "in the episcopate three things can be considered. Of these one is principal and final, namely episcopal operation, by which the utility of neighbors is intended.... Another is the height of the grade, because a bishop is constituted over others.... But the third is what consequently has itself to these, namely reverence and honor, and sufficiency of temporal things. Therefore to seek the episcopate by reason of goods of circumstances of this sort is manifestly illicit and pertains to cupidity or ambition.... But as regards the second, namely the loftiness of grade, to seek the episcopate is presumptuous.... But to seek to benefit neighbors is in itself praiseworthy and virtuous." St. Thomas, II-II, q. 185, a. 1. But Angelus certainly does not seem to seek the episcopate on account of the loftiness of grade, but on account of the utility of his neighbor. Therefore his desire, speaking in itself, is praiseworthy and virtuous. Speaking in itself; for, as the same St. Thomas continues in the cited place, "because, according as it is an episcopal act, it has the loftiness of grade annexed, it seems presumptuous that someone should seek to preside for this, that he may benefit subjects, unless manifest necessity is imminent..., especially when someone by the zeal of charity is divinely urged to this. Yet without presumption anyone can desire to do such works, if it should happen to him to be in such an office, or even that he be worthy of executing such works; so that the good work falls under the desire, but not the primacy of dignity." Moreover Angelus does not seem to desire to benefit subjects without some grave and manifest necessity existing. For since the clergy, and consequently also the seculars, are already being split into various factions, it is certainly to be feared lest by secular protection someone less suitable perhaps be chosen to the still greater harm of the diocese. But Angelus, since in the whole diocese he already enjoys the reputation of a learned and holy priest, seems suitable, as is also gathered from the very fact of the election, who by his authority can restore peace and tranquility and the right order of things. Whence it also is that it now happens that he is in such a dignity, and that Angelus is worthy of it. Nor indeed does Angelus seem in any way to seek anything else than the good work itself, so that it truly seems possible to say of him that, desiring the episcopate, he desires a good work, 1 Tim. 3:1; because in it he desires nothing except the good work. For this reason also, absolutely speaking, it does not seem that Angelus ought to fear concerning presumption of himself. - Lig. l. 6, n. 804.

Finally the doubt of Angelus, whether he ought to renounce the episcopate or accept it, the Angelic Doctor himself resolves thus, in the cited place, a. 2: "It must be said that in the assumption of the episcopate two things are to be considered. First indeed, what it is fitting for a man to seek according to his own will. Second, what it is fitting for a man to do according to the will of another. Therefore, as regards one's own will, it is fitting for a man principally to insist upon his own salvation; but that he attend to the salvation of others, this is fitting for a man from the disposition of another having power. Whence, just as it pertains to the disorder of the will that someone by his own motion be carried into this, that he be placed over the government of others, so also it pertains to the disorder of the will that someone altogether, against the injunction of a superior, finally refuse the aforesaid office of government, for two reasons: first indeed, because this is repugnant to the charity of neighbors, for whose utility someone ought to expose himself according to place and time.... Second, because this is repugnant to humility, by which someone subjects himself to the commands of superiors." Wherefore, since Angelus himself did nothing to obtain the episcopate, of which he himself had no ambition, he is not held to renounce the episcopate. And, if the command of the Supreme Pontiff accedes, on the contrary he is held to accept it. But if no command of the Supreme Pontiff and no injunction accedes, then let Angelus make the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius, and according to the most wise rules which St. Ignatius hands down there for the election of a state of life, he himself will be able, under the direction of a spiritual master, better to define what is to be done by him in the case for the greater glory of God, and the salvation of his own soul and of neighbors. - St. Thomas, Quodl. 2, a. 11; Quodl. 3, a. 9; Quodl. 5, a. 22, 24; Quodl. 12, a. 17; Lugo, Resp. Mor., l. 2, d. 5; M. E. v. 11, p. 74.

3. Maximus, a very rich and most noble man and very pious and religious, seeing the Franciscan Fathers in public ways clothed with rough and coarse clothing, is disturbed in mind. For he thinks that he continually sins venially, because he does not imitate that vileness and roughness of garments. Hence he manifests to the confessor his anxiety and his purpose of changing the garments which he himself wears, proper to a noble man, into cheaper garments. He himself indeed would have done this immediately; but a difficulty occurs to him, that then perhaps he could no longer appear in the company of friends of equal condition, and that from this all his blood relatives would take grave displeasure.

Q. Is it always a sin to use costly garments?

R. To the proposed question St. Thomas responds thus, Quodl. 10, a. 14: "It must be said that here one must speak otherwise concerning a private person. For in a public person both the state of dignity and the condition of the proper person are considered; concerning these two he ought so to bear himself that the authority of the dignity not come into contempt, and that he himself not be carried away into pride. Therefore each can be praiseworthy: both that he use costly things to induce reverence for authority, and that he use cheap things by reason of his own humility; only thus, lest the things which are done for conserving authority degenerate into pride; and lest, while the humility of the ruler is too much preserved, authority be broken.... But in him who is a private person, it is virtuous if, on account of humility, he uses more abject clothing even than his own state requires.... But it is licit that he use costly things according to the measure of his own person; but it is a sin if he exceeds his own measure. And because costly is said relatively, as also great, since that which is costly to one is not costly to another, costliness of garments always sounds in excess of one's own measure. And according to this, it is always a sin to use costly garments."

But since Maximus, from the case, does not seem to exceed this proper measure, let him altogether acquiesce, and persuade himself that he is not for this reason in continual venial sin. Let him avoid every immoderation, with attention to the custom of those who are of equal condition, and with whom he himself must converse. Let him furthermore avoid every inordinate affection of vain glory, delights, excessive solicitude, and then there will be no sin. Indeed, even in this matter disorder can also be from "the negligence of a man who does not apply study or labor to this, that he use exterior adornment according as he ought." St. Thomas, II-II, q. 169, a. 1.

Nor indeed do the Franciscan Fathers therefore sin, but on the contrary they use more abject garments virtuously and praiseworthily. "Yet he who uses cheaper garments than others does not always sin. For if he does this on account of boasting or pride, so that he may prefer himself to others, it is a vice of superstition. But if he does this on account of maceration of the flesh, or humiliation of the spirit, it pertains to the virtue of temperance.... But especially it befits those to use cheap garments who exhort others both by word and by example to penance." St. Thomas, II-II, q. 169, a. 1, ad 1.

4. Leopoldus, professor of a certain faculty, seems in a certain way born for contentions. He is accustomed to attack most sharply the opinions of his colleague Modestinus, although he himself holds them as true. He does this so that he may be held by the students in the Lyceum as wiser than Modestinus. And in reality he obtained this shortly and easily, both on account of a certain subtle manner of arguing, and on account of facility of eloquence, and also on account of a clear and sonorous voice, in which he prevails over his colleague not a little.

Q. 1. What are discord and contention? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 322. To the second: Leopoldus without doubt incurs the sin of discord, because he does not consent with his colleague in the good of truth, but rather, from mere forwardness or pride, is accustomed to attack recognized truth for this end, that he may seem more learned. Yet discord of this sort is not a grave sin unless it turns upon the matter of faith and morals, unless it is done with notable injury of honor or some other grave damage of the adversary, and unless it is done with grave scandal of others, which will have to be judged from the various circumstances. - He also incurs the sin of contention, because he attacks truth with confidence of clamor, as also the sin of pride, because he contends for this end, that he may extol his own authority and diminish that of the other. If the truth of which there is question is merely philosophical, it will not be a grave sin by reason of the matter, because then it is precisely against truth, whose violation is not gravely sinful from its own genus. But if there is question of certain theological truth, speaking in itself, it is a grave sin. Likewise the circumstances must be attended to, so that it may be defined whether contention of this sort, by reason of them, is a grave sin. - Elbel 346, 347.

5. Lucretius, a rich man, very solicitous about increasing his little fortune, neglects no occasion of acquiring gain. Hence, with great vigilance and great labor, he attends to the business of his workshop. He rises very early in the morning, goes to bed very late, and very fatigued. Furthermore he repels almost all poor persons who meet him, and gives alms only rather rarely. Likewise, he does not deny to his wife and children the things necessary for food, clothing, habitation, and education, but he uses great parsimony with respect to other less necessary things, and denies them almost every recreation and other honest amusements.

Q. 1. What is avarice and what kind of sin is it? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 323. To the second: Lucretius certainly cannot be excused from venial sin because of his altogether excessive solicitude for temporal things. But whether Lucretius is to be charged with mortal sin or not is not established. For from the case it does not appear that he commits some grave injustice or gravely injures charity. G. 173.

6. Livonius, a physician, is altogether saddened by the knowledge and talents of other physicians, because before others he appears more abject and cannot show his own knowledge and his own talents. Likewise he grieves vehemently when he sees other physicians, his friends and companions, being called by more clients, but himself being summoned only by a few, and by persons of the lowest class.

Q. 1. What is envy and what kind of sin is it? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, I. M. 327. To the second: Livonius, speaking in itself, sins gravely from envy, since he is saddened by the good of others as impeding his own good, excellence, honor, and advantage. Speaking in itself; for perhaps practically he will be able to be excused, at least from grave sin, if either he does not sufficiently attend to the malice of the matter, or in reality is not saddened by the good of others, but only by his own evil, that he is held abject and is deserted by all. G. 168 seqq.

7. Gaudiosus, powerful in sustaining wine, never casts off the use of reason; but he experiences heaviness of the head, and sometimes walks with wavering feet. Hence he is altogether vigorous in emptying cups, and conquers all his companions in taverns, provoking his fellow-drinkers to equal draughts.

8. Gaudentius is made drunk by a moderate cup of wine. Yet he by no means abstains from wine when he is stirred up by companions to drinking in taverns. Otherwise, he says, those companions begin to ridicule me as scrupulous and at the same time ridicule religion and priests.

9. Esculapius, a physician, counsels his client Albinus to drink generous wine, and in sufficient quantity for sustaining and strengthening his weakened powers. But since Albinus is not accustomed to wine, lest he become drunk, he first begins to drink wine in moderate quantity; then, with habit now contracted and the stomach accustomed, he drinks wine also in greater quantity, and very generous wine, without feeling any inconvenience. And now he is so accustomed to drinking wine that he can no longer abstain from it without feeling languor of the stomach and experiencing difficult digestion of food.

Q. 1. What is drunkenness and what kind of sin is it? 2. What as to the various cases?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 352 seqq. To the second: Gaudiosus does not commit mortal sin by reason of drunkenness, although he drinks much. The reason is that in him there is not a voluntary and perfect privation of reason. But he sins gravely by reason of scandal and cooperation, by efficaciously provoking and inducing others to drunkenness. - G. 176.

Gaudentius is not excused from the grave sin of drunkenness. For this is not in the fact that someone drinks much or little; but in the fact that someone voluntarily, without any necessity, by an intoxicating drink deprives himself of the use of reason. Nor can grave fault, in the case, cease from the fact that other companions ridicule him, or even begin to ridicule religion and sacred things; for one must not sin so that another may be removed from sin. The sin is altogether voluntary to the others, and depends only on their malice. Abstaining from drunkenness, Gaudentius commends religion, and on the contrary induces others by his example, so that they also abstain from sin, whether of drunkenness or of blasphemy. - G. 178.

Albinus seems to sin in nothing. For he himself takes precaution against drunkenness, and has a sufficient reason for drinking wine, even generous wine, and in a certain greater quantity. But he has by no means exceeded the limits of temperance, since he feels no inconvenience from this; indeed on the contrary he receives the great advantage of more robust health. - G. 181.

10. Ignatius, of an inflamed mind and incapable of restraining anger, often moved by grave anger, utters blasphemies against God and imprecations against men. But he often rebukes and scolds his wife, children, and other domestics, assailing them with insults and disgraceful names. When he is alone, he also becomes angry at himself, and devotes inanimate things to all the devils.

Q. 1. What is anger and what kind of sin is it? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 341. To the second: Ignatius, as he is often angry, so also often becomes guilty of mortal sin, not only because of blasphemies, and grave imprecations and contumelies against men and blood relatives, but also because of grave inflaming and disturbance of mind, provided sufficient advertence is present. And, although in the act of the grave movement of anger this sometimes is lacking, for that reason he is not excused from grave sin at least in the cause, unless he retracts the evil habit and seriously tries to extinguish it. - G. 175.

11. Robertinus, a son of the family, very obedient to his parents, indeed fulfills all religious duties. But since his parents besides compel him to perform many other works of devotion and virtues to which he is not held, he himself is somewhat saddened by this, and in executing them often experiences this sadness in himself.

Q. 1. What is sloth? 2. Is Robertinus guilty of sloth?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 343. To the second: Robertinus indeed commits sloth, a general vice, fleeing spiritual good insofar as it is laborious and troublesome; since "every vice flees the spiritual good of the opposite virtue." But he by no means commits sloth, the special vice, to which it belongs "to be saddened by divine good." Indeed, "sloth is not a withdrawal of the mind from just any spiritual good, but from divine good, to which the mind must cling by necessity. Whence, if someone is saddened by this, that someone compels him to fulfill works of virtue which he is not held to do, it is not the sin of sloth; but when he is saddened in those things which are incumbent on him to be done on account of God." St. Thomas, II-II, q. 35, a. 2, 3.