3. On Intention

1. Titius, a priest, determines to celebrate Mass on the following day for Sempronius, who asked that it be celebrated according to his intention, an alms having been given, but with no determined time. But on the following day Titius is asked in the sacristy by Caius that he be willing soon to celebrate Mass, and to sing it for his father, who died that very night. Forgetful of the prior intention, Titius celebrates and sings the Mass for Caius's father. Still forgetful of the Mass to be celebrated for Sempronius, he celebrates on the third day for himself, since he thinks he has no other obligation which he must satisfy. But behold, after some days the same Sempronius asked several other Masses from Titius, and then Titius remembered that prior Mass to be celebrated according to the intention of Sempronius.

Q. 1. What is intention; and can several things be intended? 2. Which intention of Titius prevailed in the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 17-19. To the second: the Mass which Titius celebrated and sang on the following day was celebrated for Caius's deceased father. For this was the predominant intention, which prevails over the other, which was incompatible with it. This can be confirmed even from that circumstance, that he sang the Mass.

The Mass which Titius celebrated on the third day was celebrated according to the intention of Sempronius. For this intention, although habitual, was evidently predominant over the intention of celebrating for himself, although this latter was actual. For the predominant intention is that which would actually be chosen, once its incompatibility with the other were known. But, once each intention was known, the intention which would have been chosen by Titius would have been the intention of celebrating for Sempronius, because he celebrated for himself only insofar as he was persuaded that he had no obligation which he had to satisfy. Therefore. And this must be asserted a fortiori if Titius had had no intention specially on that day. "If it is applied to no one, or to one incapable, the fruit remains in the treasury of the Church, or yields to the priest himself, or to those for whom he is specially held to offer, since he is thus judged implicitly to have intended." St. Alph. l. 6, n. 336. Cf. n. 335, q. 1. Moreover, in practice, when a doubt stands, it would be safer to celebrate the Mass another time for the one for whom the application did not avail. - G. 5, 6; v. 2, 335; Elbel 403.

2. Franciscus, administering the sacrament of baptism, is distracted by a sudden noise made in the church, and pronounces the form of baptism without attending to it in any way. A little later, he hears confession, and, finding the penitent little disposed, resolves not to absolve him. But again he is distracted, thinking of the cause of that noise, and, distracted, pronounces the form of absolution.

Q. 1. What is actual and virtual intention? 2. Do baptism and absolution avail in the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 17, 18, 41, 42. To the second: Franciscus administers baptism validly and licitly. Validly, because, although there is no actual intention and voluntary; nevertheless there is virtual intention and voluntary, which suffices in the administration of the sacraments. Licitly, because that distraction, since it was voluntary neither in itself nor in its cause, can be attributed to Franciscus as no fault. S. Th. 3 p., q. 64, a. 8, ad 3.

The absolution given by Franciscus was invalid, nor in giving it did Franciscus sin in any way. It was invalid because, of two intentions simultaneously incompatible, the predominant intention always prevails, and this in the case is the intention of not absolving. Indeed, it was the only one, since he absolved while distracted. But Franciscus sinned in no way, because that wandering of mind was altogether natural and involuntary. - G. 5.