Chapter — Bucceroni, Cases of Conscience

34. On Love of Enemies

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Leocadia caught her husband shamefully associating with the maidservant. She, asking pardon, at once drives her from the house, and no longer deigns her with conversation or sight. Indeed, if at any time the maidservant meets her in the street and greets her, she turns her eyes in another direction and does not return the greeting. But she scarcely speaks to her husband for a month, and moreover has resolved that she will no longer render the debt to him.

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Q. 1. Are enemies also to be loved? - 2. What as to the case?

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R. To the first, cf. I. M. 390 seqq. To the second: Leocadia could at once drive the maidservant from the house without wounding justice and charity, since she had so gravely wounded the right of the marriage bed, and more frequent relapses could deservedly be feared. Nor does it matter that, so suddenly cast out of the house, she perhaps undergoes danger to her reputation; for she ought to impute this to herself. Besides, Leocadia could also prosecute her before a judge, and by this very fact defame her before him. Therefore, all the more, she can cast her from the house and permit her defamation, if perhaps it follows. Nor indeed does Leocadia seem therefore to be disturbed, if she neither looks at nor greets in return the maidservant meeting her, provided nevertheless that she does not do this from hatred of enmity toward the person, but from abomination of the crime, or for her own amendment, or lest there be danger that she come into the house and return, or to show more fully the gravity of the injury inflicted on her, or even for a certain just punishment. For nothing prevents that, in things which merit punishment, yet not such that they be referred to the judge, someone, although a private person, by himself punish the person of another with such a punishment as pertains to the private commerce of persons. Therefore, all the more, if there is question of a graver offense, which could be referred to the judge, it will be licit to punish it by privation of conversation or greeting, which are not common but special signs of charity, to which otherwise one is not held. But otherwise it would have to be said, if Leocadia did this from hatred toward the person herself, and from an inordinate affection of revenge, willing and desiring evil to the maidservant. The same seems to have to be said concerning the privation of conversation of Leocadia with her husband. Since from the case it does not seem that she did this beyond a month, from this it can be gathered that she did this only to show her just displeasure, and also to soothe her sorrow, in so grave a matter. But because she resolved to deny the debt perpetually, she sinned nothing against justice. The reason is that the husband, by committing adultery, lost the right of asking the debt. I. M. V. 2, n. 981. But whether she sinned at least against charity, Elbel 253 affirms; since the husband is thus exposed to the danger of incontinence. But this is commonly denied. For charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience, and it is most grave for the wife that she be compelled to keep faith with a husband breaking faith. Besides, if the reason brought forward were valid, never again, neither by private nor by the judge's authority, could divorce be instituted, if not justice, then charity prohibiting it. St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 62. Nevertheless, Leocadia is to be counseled that she fully condone the offense to her husband, and then render the debt, lest she expose her husband to the danger of incontinence and of new adultery, and perpetual discords reign between herself and her husband. Elbel 249-253; G. 216, 217.