49. On an Oath

1. Rusticus, a rude man, often swears from anger, saying: By my soul; may God punish me. At Easter time he confesses, and the confessor vehemently reproves him, saying: Do you not know that this is grave perjury and grave sin? Rusticus, terrified, on that day of confession indeed abstains from that perjury, but afterward goes on swearing as he did before.

Q. 1. What concerning the custom of swearing? - 2. What concerning an oath uttered in anger? - 3. What as to the case?

R. To the first: the custom of swearing in itself seems to wound only the judgment required in an oath, and therefore regularly and in itself must be called a light sin, insofar as it is voluntary. But by reason of the danger which it contains of perjuring, it is not without grave sin. Perrone § 253. Hence in Ecclus. 23:9 it is said: Let not your mouth become accustomed to swearing; for there are many falls in it.

To the second. An oath uttered in anger is often free from grave fault. Thus Busemb. and St. Alph., l. 3, n. 146: "Those uttering words from anger, namely, by God, by Christ, I will kill you, commonly do not sin gravely, because for the most part they are excused by ignorance or indeliberation."

To the third. The proposed case can easily be resolved by the very words of St. Alph., l. 3, n. 150: "Some simple persons seem sometimes able to be excused from mortal perjury by reason of inconsideration, when they use certain sworn formulas, such as by my soul; may God punish me. For although they know that this is called an oath, nevertheless they do not apprehend that to swear and to invoke God as witness is something grave; but only apprehend some confused notion of an evil not of so great moment. Indeed it must be noted that commonly rustics do not apprehend the gravity of perjury; while, confessing themselves about oaths, they little or not at all distinguish true oaths from false; and this I have long since understood from practice in Missions. Wherefore for those who have the custom thus of perjuring, I judge that confessors rather ought to abstain from instructing such persons about the grave sin which in fact is in perjury, lest material sins in them, on account of the bad habit which they have, become formal; from the general rule.... Nevertheless such habitual persons are to be strongly warned that thereafter they cease swearing falsely. For the rest, it is not always expedient to warn a rude penitent of this sort concerning the gravity of perjury, if the admonition is foreseen not easily to be profitable." G. 296; I. M. 549, 551.

2. Candidus, a priest, since, by applying himself to a game of cards, on a certain day he had inadvertently prolonged it beyond midnight, and consequently had omitted on that day to recite vespers and compline, noticing this on the following day, emitted an oath of no longer playing, lest he again be exposed to a similar danger. But it is very difficult for Candidus to keep his oath; since his two brothers and two other priest friends, who come together toward nightfall, are accustomed to play cards together for the sake of recreation, a moderate quantity of money having been exposed. And since Candidus no longer appears and remains alone in his own separate room, pretending that he must prepare Lenten sermons, both his brothers and the priest friends strongly urge him that at least sometimes, or for a shorter time, by his presence he be willing to make the conversation of brothers and friends more cheerful, and to be present at the game as before. So that he may do this more willingly, his brothers propose to him that they themselves will pay for him that moderate quantity of money, if he himself is defeated in the game, and that they themselves will give him all the money which as victors in the game they obtain.

Q. 1. What concerning an oath of not playing? - 2. What concerning the oath of Candidus?

R. To the first: "If an oath has been made of not playing in general, all agree that it does not oblige one to abstain from an honest and moderate game." For an oath of this sort is understood to have been made lest someone spend notable time, expose a grave sum of money in a game, squander goods, etc.; unless something else must be judged from particular circumstances, for example, "if the one swearing expressly intended a greater good in abstaining from play, as that he might be free for God, mortify himself, etc." For then he is held to abstain even from licit and small-quantity play. "But in this play there can well be smallness of matter, which is to be measured according to the end intended by the one swearing. Such a one swearing can also give money to another for playing, and watch him, and also assist him; because this properly is not to play." Lig. 178; I. M. 562.

To the second. If Candidus, asked by his brothers and friends, merely assists at the game without playing, he does not break the oath of not playing. If Candidus recites all the canonical hours in the morning and evening; nay indeed, if in the evening he also anticipates matins and lauds of the following day, neither, by playing late with friends and brothers for the sake of urbanity, does he violate the oath. For in cases of this sort, for defining sin and grave sin, attention must be paid both to the quantity of matter and especially to the end which someone proposed to himself in swearing. - I. M. 562, 566; G. 298.

3. Thomas, leader of an army, in a war altogether unjust on the opposite side, captured by enemies and cast into prison, is then sent as an envoy to his own people, so that he may negotiate concerning concluding peace, with an oath nevertheless that, whatever may be the outcome of the negotiation, he return to the city and prison of the enemies.

Q. Is Thomas held to return?

R. "He who promises with an oath to return to prison, according to others, is not held to return with probable danger of most grave unjust harm; for it would be to offer himself to it spontaneously. But much more probably he can, because, the promise having been placed, to return is an act of virtue." Scav., 12th ed., Milan, 1874, l. 2, n. 229.

4. Ambrosius, a servant, having known the fornication of the son of the household, swears to him that he will manifest it to no one.

Q. Does such an oath bind?

R. "The oath binds; unless silence gives occasion of another fornication; or unless there is present the necessity of correction, or the just interrogation of a superior intervenes." Scav., 12th ed., Milan, 1874, l. 4, n. 229.

5. Minantius often swears, saying in a rather raised voice: I swear by this Cross, and showing with his hand whatever object first occurs to him. Nay indeed, he often swears, saying: By God, by Christ, I will kill you, I will cut off your head. At other times also he swears, saying: May as many Angels take my soul as the times I have done this; So may God favor me, as I....

Q. What is to be thought concerning formulas of this sort?

R. It is not a true oath, "regularly speaking, to say: May as many Angels take my soul as the times I have done this.... Nor is it an oath to say: I swear by this Cross, the Cross nevertheless not having been shown or signed." Lig. 143. But, speaking in itself, it is a comminatory oath to say: By God, by Christ, I will kill you, I will cut off your head; and it is a grave sin. For God is expressly named there, and invocation of him is added to confirm a grave and unjust threat. Lig. 143, 146; I. M. 554.

6. Sisinius in court affirmed by oath that the one hundred gold pieces which Caius owed to Sempronius had already been restored by the former to the latter. Yet Sisinius had known this only from the assertion of Caius himself, his friend, of whose truthfulness he was firmly persuaded, and could have no suspicion of falsity.

7. The same Sisinius in court affirmed a falsehood by oath. But he swore according to the form introduced into the courts on account of those who refuse to invoke the holy name of God, namely: I swear to tell the whole truth, and nothing other than the truth.

Q. Was Sisinius perjured in either case?

R. Affirmatively, in the first case. The reason is that for an oath in judgment, knowledge of the matter is required, which he does not have who hears the matter from others related to him, and all the more related by one having an interest in that cause himself. To the point, St. Alph., l. 3, n. 148: "They say that what has been heard from a person so worthy of trust that he makes us morally certain can indeed be affirmed with an oath. Yet this does not run in judgment." - I. M. 556.

Affirmatively also in the second case. The reason is that that formula contains a true oath. "To say," says St. Alph., l. 3, n. 136, "I swear it is so, is not truly an oath, because then divine testimony is invoked neither explicitly nor implicitly.... Unless an interrogation concerning an oath preceded, because then, through the preceding interrogation, that I swear is sufficiently determined to a true oath." Now that formula, from the very interrogation and admonition of the judge, is determined to a true oath. For in the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, after in art. 297 that form has been established in art. 299 it is said: "The oath shall be furnished by witnesses or experts, standing on their feet, in the presence of the judges, after a serious admonition which will be made to them by the president or by the praetor concerning the moral importance of such an act, concerning the religious bond which believers contract by it before God, and concerning the penalties established against those guilty of false testimony or expert opinion," etc. - I. M. 550, 551.

8. When a ship had come to the port of Marseilles from the Canary Islands, the captain of the ship was asked by the harbor master whether he had touched at those islands, which were altogether falsely asserted in the public newspapers to be infected by plague. The captain of the ship immediately responded negatively, since those islands in fact were infected by no contagious disease.

Q. 1. Is it licit in an oath to use mental restriction? - Who regularly can use mental restriction? What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. n. 557. To the second: "Regularly public persons can use broadly mental restriction when asked about matters committed to their faith, such as secretaries, parish priests, captains, magistrates, advocates, physicians, midwives, etc. For if things committed to persons of this sort were violated, most grave inconveniences would certainly follow. For the rest, we do not deny that the present question is difficult, in which we can be deceived, both in assigning a legitimate cause and in using legitimate formulas of speaking; for easily a broadly mental restriction can be a purely mental one. Wherefore one must proceed cautiously, lest we harm human society, lest we introduce confusion, lest we derogate from Christian simplicity." Scav., 12th ed., Milan, 1874, l. 2, n. 231.

To the third: "He who comes from a place which is falsely thought to be infected by disease can deny that he comes from there, namely, as infected with pestilence, such as is and ought to be the mind of those asking." Scav., l. c.

And thus also "he who was compelled to marriage can assert that he did not contract it, namely freely. He who is not held to customs duties can say that he bears nothing, so that he is held to pay." Scav., ibid.

"Invited to table, and asked whether the food is good, he can affirm that it is such, although in fact it is tasteless, understanding, for mortification and penance; and otherwise all know that from urbanity, in that case, it is customary to respond thus, however the food may have been prepared." Scav., l. c.