5. The Involuntary from Ignorance

1. Adalbertus confesses thus: 1. wishing to kill Titius, my enemy, I killed Caius, my friend. 2. By shooting a bullet at a deer, I at the same time pierced my enemy, sought on another occasion for death, standing hidden in a thicket. 3. Ignorant that it was a vigil, I ate meat; but out of laziness on Sunday I had not been present at Mass, in which the obligations occurring in the week are customarily announced.

Q. 1. Does ignorance cause the involuntary? 2. What is to be judged concerning Adalbertus?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 48. To the second: in the first case Adalbertus is not excused from the sin of homicide, since knowingly and willingly he killed a man. But if he used due diligence to guard against the homicide of another besides Titius the enemy, since his external act is not formally injurious to Caius, whom he killed altogether involuntarily, he is not to be bound to any restitution toward his heirs. But otherwise, if he omitted due diligence, or foresaw confusedly the danger of killing Caius. - I. M. 1370, 1372, 1373.

In the second case, either he used due diligence to guard against the damage of another, or he did not. If the former, the act is not voluntary, and consequently not a sin. If the latter, he is guilty of homicide. But since the enemy was standing hidden in a thicket, and Adalbertus thought he was killing nothing except a deer, he seems to be excused from homicide. - Elbel 46.

In the third case, either a thought occurred to him about an obligation perhaps to happen within the week, or no thought occurred. If the former, the ignorance was vincible, and he sinned against the precept of the Church by neglecting to inquire. If the latter, although he sinned by omitting Mass, nevertheless he did not sin by the omission of fasting. I. M. 8, 207, 288. - G. 12, 13, 14, 646 seqq.

2. Abundius, a priest approved for receiving the confessions of the faithful, experiences that his knowledge is slight and insufficient for duly carrying out that office; nevertheless he continues to hear confessions, because he has authentic testimony of the bishop concerning his suitability. Hence, through defect of knowledge and study, he commits various errors concerning the species of sins to be inquired into, and especially concerning the obligation of restoring. Having been rebuked by a confessor and bound to make restitution on behalf of the penitents, he had resolved seriously to apply himself to the studies of Moral Theology, and meanwhile to interrupt the sacred ministry, when behold, suddenly he is called to Titius, who is dying, and, as report has it, liable to various restitutions. He goes on uncertain, absolves the poor man while doubtful, not being able to discern the entangled conscience, and returns sad, muttering that he would again be liable to restitution on behalf of the penitent.

Q. 1. Is there sin in the case from ignorance, or are the aforesaid errors imputable to Abundius? 2. Did he sin gravely in each instance? 3. Is he liable to restitution?

R. To the first: the prior errors are indeed imputable to Abundius in themselves, because he labors under vincible and crass ignorance, and by persisting in it he was sinning gravely. But the errors committed in the confession of the dying Titius are by no means imputable to him; because, with such necessity standing, he could and ought to hear his confession, notwithstanding the defect of the required knowledge; and therefore the errors, not willed but only permitted, are judged in the case. I. M. 35.

To the second, affirmatively, in itself, namely if at least confusedly he adverted to his defect of knowledge, with the case of Titius excepted, however. But if he ever acted entirely inadvertently, then there was indeed sin in the cause, but actual sin was lacking. I. M. 288.

To the third: he is held to nothing if by keeping silent he behaved merely negatively, omitting to urge restitution. But he is held to restitution if he positively imposed the obligation of restitution on the penitent, or positively denied it, against justice, whether toward the penitent or toward others damaged. I. M. 1405 and V. 2, 828, 829. - G. 15, 16; I. M. 50, 51.

3. Antonius, by very often blaspheming, swearing, and detracting from the reputation of his neighbor, has contracted a habit of these sins. He often confesses them; and the confessor, with great care and solicitude, asks about the number of the aforesaid sins, and adds salutary admonitions. But since Antonius has confessed the same sins always throughout an entire year, although always with lesser frequency, his confessor resolved to deny him absolution.

Q. 1. Are sins from a contracted habit and custom truly voluntary and imputable? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, affirmatively, if one adverts to them in himself, as regularly happens. But if in reality due advertence and deliberation are lacking, when someone, for example, blasphemes, swears, etc., from a contracted habit, then there is no sin when someone blasphemes, or swears, etc.; but only in the cause, namely when he posits the cause. Therefore it is then useless in confession to ask the number of these material acts; because, since the whole guilt is in the cause, this is neither increased nor diminished from the greater number of subsequent acts, but depends on prudent foresight. But that cause is, first, the very frequency of acts, from which habit or custom is begotten. Nevertheless in practice it is often not adverted that, through that repetition of acts, a custom is acquired; indeed, often one hopes that he will not relapse again in the future. The cause, secondly, is negligence in removing that custom already acquired; whence the acts are indirectly voluntary. And thus, by adverting to this contracted custom, and nevertheless neglecting to root it out, the following acts are indirectly voluntary, even if actually guilt is lacking by defect of advertence, and by the same defect of advertence guilt was also lacking in the very contracting of the custom. But if one tries to root out the contracted custom, then guilt is no longer in the cause, although perhaps it had been present, since the cause has been retracted. Nor indeed is there voluntary, at least indirectly, if someone really seriously, as is supposed, tries to resist the custom. - If, actual guilt being set aside, sin is had only in the cause or indirectly, then, since the custom must therefore be removed so that the following evil acts may be prevented, if these are gravely evil, the obligation of removing the custom will be grave; if they are lightly evil, the aforesaid obligation will be light. Likewise, if the following acts are gravely evil, and are voluntary only in the cause or indirectly, then there will indeed be grave sin if there is grave negligence in rooting out the custom; but there will be only light sin if the negligence is light. - L. 1, 3, n. 127; l. 5, n. 14; I. M. 35-39.

To the second: whether Antonius, by blaspheming, swearing, detracting, always at least sinned gravely actually, in grave matter, depends on his actual advertence, and then the confessor rightly asks about the number of these sins. But if actual advertence was lacking, which in practice is difficult, then nothing remains except sin from the voluntary in the cause and from the indirectly voluntary. But such voluntary seems to be removed in the case from the fact that Antonius often confesses, and in fact also tries to diminish the frequency of those sins. For this shows that Antonius has retracted the contracted custom of sinning, and effectively strives to root it out. And then there is no reason why the confessor should be painstaking and scrupulous in asking about the exact number of sins. But the confessor acts badly in resolving to deny absolution to Antonius; for Antonius does not lack sufficient sorrow and purpose. - G. 2; I. M. 53 and V. 2, 809.