50. On a Vow

1. "A Protestant emitted a vow of chastity, and also of poverty and obedience, by voice and in writing before an Anglican minister. It is asked whether it has at least the force of a simple and private vow, or whether it must be held as altogether void in the case of conversion to the Catholic religion?

R. The vow of which there is question in the prayers is simple, and the one vowing is held to observance of the vow, if he had a true intention of vowing." Sacred Penitentiary, 29 Nov. 1842; Collectan. S. C. de P. F., n. 2086; I. M. 570-574.

2. Benedictus, having a depraved habit of speaking badly about everyone, in order that he may be corrected efficaciously, emits a vow of speaking well about everyone, insofar as this can be done from prudence and from rightly ordered charity. Fearing nevertheless lest he transgress the vow and sin, he does not bind himself by that vow under sin, but only under imperfection.

Q. 1. Is a vow of this sort valid? 2. Does it have at least some effect?

R. To the first. The aforesaid vow is in no way valid. For a vow is essentially a promise made to God. But a promise essentially contains an obligation from fidelity. Therefore a vow without any obligation is a vow without a promise; namely, it is a vow without a vow, or it is not a vow. Therefore a vow of this sort can be nothing else than a mere proposal of not speaking badly about others, but well, according nevertheless to prudence and due charity. I. M. 570, 572, 573; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 88, a. 1.

To the second. Moral imperfection, as it is distinguished from mortal and venial sin, is nothing else than the privation or mere negation of a more perfect act, which ought to be placed for the better, or could only be placed. Now the aforesaid proposal does not have this effect, that it renders the act itself more perfect; for the act has this from the object and from the circumstances. And thus, if to speak well of neighbor in these or those circumstances is a more perfect act, this indeed does not arise from the proposal made, as a grave or light obligation arises from the vow itself; but because that act of speaking well about others is more perfect in itself by reason of the object and circumstances about which it is concerned. Hence, choosing not to speak, even independently of the proposal made, would be less perfect. But the aforesaid proposal has only this effect, and one proper to itself: that by not choosing at some time to speak well about others, when one can do this according to prudence and charity, someone incurs the mark of inconstancy and instability, which in the genus of morals is at least a not light imperfection. Hence it is that, although someone does not propose under imperfection, or under the penalty of imperfection, thinking nothing about it, nevertheless he still incurs that mark of imperfection and of inconstancy and instability. And, if someone firmly proposes and repeats the proposal, by failing in it he incurs not only the common imperfection from the lack of a more perfect act, but still incurs a special imperfection from the lack of constancy and stability in the proposal firmly established before and often confirmed before God; whence by force of a proposal of this sort the more perfect act not only could, but also ought to be done, and the lack of it is not a mere lack and negation, but a privation, namely in relation to the proposal made. - Lugo, Resp. Mor., l. 6, d. 8; I. M. 572, 573.

3. Bibiana, a very religious woman, vowed that on Sunday, in the evening after visiting the church according to her pious custom, and after reciting the rosary there, she would be free for pious reading for half an hour, and then for mental prayer for an hour. But forgetful of this vow, on the occasion of the first communion of some poor little girls, she vows that she will teach them the rudiments of the Christian Faith at those same hours.

Q. Which vow of those incompatible ones must be observed?

R. Fr. Gury, 313, says: "the prior vow must be observed. For that vow, affecting a determined time, binds the will of the one vowing, and prevents her from being able to take up another obligation affixed to this same time. Therefore the second vow by this very fact is void, since it regards a will already obliged in a diverse way. For it is made concerning a thing no longer free, and therefore concerning an impossible thing." - But Scavini, 12th ed., Milan, 1874, l. 2, n. 220, says: "She ought to observe what is more worthy, even if made later. For the vow is judged to have been commuted into something better.... If they are nearly equal, or if there is doubt, let her prefer the prior to the posterior vow; for the former possesses." But that presumption of commutation is not in fact commutation. But presumption yields to truth. Wherefore, when the memory of the prior vow occurs, someone can indeed commute it into something better; but, if then in fact she is unwilling, the prior vow remains, since no commutation of it had been present, and that preceding will, in the case, was predominant and prevailing. For the rest, cf. I. M. 627. And Scavini himself, n. 228, ibid., raises the question concerning an oath: "Does an oath made against a first oath oblige?" and responds: If the second oath is opposed to the first in matter already sworn, it does not bind, as if you swore marriage to Caia, and afterward swear it to Titia; because it would be concerning something illicit."

4. Ludentius, addicted to play and accustomed to sin against chastity, vows that he will never, through his whole life, apply himself to play, if for a whole year he abstains from every sin of impurity. The matter succeeds very well for the greater part of the year. But toward the end of the year, bearing the vow made with difficulty, in order to be freed from it, he sins against chastity by design.

Q. Has Ludentius violated the vow, and is he still held by the vow?

R. Negatively to both. For first, by sinning against chastity he did not properly violate the vow; for the vow was not about preserving chastity. Nevertheless he sinned gravely by the sin of sacrilege, or against religion, by impeding by design and fraud lest he afterward be held by the vow; since from the same virtue of religion he was held to do nothing directly for impeding the vow. But although chastity was violated by design and fraud, nevertheless in fact the condition was not fulfilled. The condition not being fulfilled, the conditioned thing does not subsist. Besides, since the condition had been added generally, if for a whole year he abstains from every sin of impurity, this very thing had to be verified: that he not sin against chastity even by design and fraud in order to be freed from the vow, since evidently Ludentius ought especially to have intended this implicitly in his vow, lest the vow which he wished to apply as a means for not sinning become for him an occasion of sin, although from his malice. - Suarez, de Voto, l. 4, c. 17, n. 11, 14; Laymann, l. 4, t. 4, c. 6, n. 4; St. Alph., l. 2, n. 218; G. 320; Scav., 12th ed., Milan, 1874, l. 2, n. 218; D'Annib., ed. 3, v. 2, n. 309.

5. Aurelius, seized by a grave infirmity, emitted a vow in honor of the Blessed Virgin Mary, that, if he were restored to health, through his whole life on each Saturday he would either fast or give alms to some poor person. Fully convalescing from the infirmity, he began to fast on each Saturday, and faithfully furnished this for three years. These having passed, he was affected with such pain of the head and weakness of the stomach that he could no longer fast. Hence, anxious, he asked of his confessor whether he was held at least to give alms on each Saturday, since he could no longer fast.

Q. What as to the case?

R. If a disjunctive vow has been made of furnishing one of two things, the vow is null if someone disjunctively vows a good or evil thing, or a vain or impossible thing. But if each part is apt matter, as in the case, the vow will be valid; and the choice is made by the will, which reserved it to itself. But whichever part is chosen will have to be furnished, even if after the choice the other part perishes or becomes impossible; for the vow is now determined by the choice. Conversely, if one part perishes or is rendered impossible before the choice, you are not held to the other, unless the thing perishes by your fault, or you were in culpable delay; for then, from your manner of conducting yourself, you are tacitly judged to have wished to determine your obligation to that part. Wherefore, all the more, if the very thing chosen perishes or becomes impossible after its choice, altogether independently of the will, as in the case, one is not held to the other. Lig. 224.

6. Trepidantius, doubting about a vow of perfect chastity emitted, seeks and obtains dispensation from the bishop. Then, weighing the matter better, he becomes altogether certain concerning the vow made.

Q. Must he seek dispensation again from the Supreme Pontiff?

R. Negatively. The reason: for a doubtful vow of chastity is not reserved. Therefore the bishop could dispense from it, who legitimately used the power which he had of dispensing in doubtful vows. "This," says Lugo, "seems to me most true: because otherwise the dispensation would have been vain; for dispensation is not made under the condition, if there was not a vow; but rather under the condition, if it was truly a vow; for if it was not a vow, it is not dispensable. Therefore, if the bishop can then dispense, he can remove the obligation, in the case in which it existed." De Poenit., d. 20, s. 2, n. 22. Cf. also Sanchez, who holds the same doctrine, In Decal., l. 4, c. 44, n. 3, 11; I. M. 620.

7. Chrysophilax, addicted to play, with great detriment to his affairs and immense loss of money, in order to meet these evils, emits a vow of not playing for a whole year. But, while it is running, more than once he gives money to a friend, with which the friend may play while he himself sits by and rejoices with him. Sometimes also he plays in another's name, but twice in his own name for about an hour, but with only a few obols exposed.

Q. Has Chrysophilax gravely violated the vow in these cases?

R. Negatively. For in the first case, although Chrysophilax plays through another and what someone does through another he does through himself in the moral estimation of things, nevertheless in fact he himself does not play, but another for him. But vows are proper and to be understood by strict interpretation. Besides, the thing is evident, that the mind of Chrysophilax in that vow regarded play through himself, since another case of playing through another is altogether extraordinary, which perhaps first occurred to his mind then, when he had already made the vow. And this is confirmed from the fact that Chrysophilax in fact played thus through another and not through himself because he thought that he would not thus transgress the vow; and therefore in that vow he intended only personal play; for otherwise he would not have used this art and contrivance. For the rest, "in doubt," says Busembaum, "concerning the mind of one vowing, interpretation ought to be made according to the propriety of the words which he used, or rather their common and usual acceptance." And St. Alph. says: "it must be noted that vows are always to be interpreted according to the more benign part." L. 2, n. 222, 224.

In the other case, when Chrysophilax played in another's name, and consequently with another's gain or loss, he did not violate the vow. For vows are to be understood according to the intention of the one vowing. Now the thing is evident from the case, that Chrysophilax did not regard play, materially such, or mere recreation for him, but regarded play as gainful or harmful for him, for averting detriment to his own affairs. Wherefore, just as he would not have transgressed the vow by playing for the sake of mere recreation, no wager of money having been added for the victor, so neither did he transgress the vow by playing in another's name, that is, with another's gain or harm.

Finally, in the third case, when for about an hour he played in his own name, he transgressed the vow. But, if the time is inspected, the matter is not grave. Wherefore from this head he sinned only lightly. But if the quantity of money which he exposed is inspected, since this also was not grave, not even from this head did he sin gravely.

8. Ioannes, in the twelfth year of his age, emitted a vow of approaching a certain sanctuary of the Blessed Virgin Mary. His father impeded the fulfillment of the vow, saying that the vow was null. Ioannes again emitted the same vow in the seventeenth year of his age; but again his father was unwilling that Ioannes fulfill the vow, declaring that the vow was altogether invalid. His father finally having died, Ioannes asks of his confessor whether he is held by the obligation of the vow emitted.

Q. What as to the case?

R. Since the father, on the one hand, did not speak clearly, and seems to have spoken rather historically or doctrinally, for instructing his son about his obligation, the obligation of the vow could seem still to persist. But, since, on the other hand, he altogether prohibits the son from the execution of the vow, which the son certainly would not licitly do in that hypothesis in which the father would not use his power; and according to the theological rule, sins are not to be presumed, but proved, the father seems in fact to have spoken altogether authoritatively. Hence, since

Ioannes is in the twelfth year of his age, and consequently has not reached puberty, the vow was directly annulled; and therefore, the father having died, its obligation, as not reviving, does not subsist. But since Ioannes in the seventeenth year of his age again emitted the same vow, he must be asked whether he wished to ratify that former vow emitted by him; or wished to bind himself by vow altogether independently from that prior vow. If the first is verified, he is free from every obligation for a twofold reason. The first is because, since the prior vow does not subsist, the ratification of a null vow is null. The other is because the father still directly annuls the vows of pubescent children which they emitted during impuberty, although they had ratified them after puberty had now been attained. For that which did not subsist from the beginning is not made firm, and therefore is not made firmer, by the passage of time. Chap. 18, de R. I. in 6. If the second is verified, then since the vows of the pubescent are annulled by the father only indirectly, the father having died, the vows revive, and therefore Ioannes is bound by the obligation of the vow. But D'Annib., ed. 3, p. 3, n. 206, thinks that by more recent law the father could still directly annul the vow of a pubescent son; wherefore then Ioannes would not be held by the vow. For by more recent law the distinction between the pubescent and the impubescent is not acknowledged, and paternal power is acknowledged in parents up to the greater age of the children or emancipation. Neither is verified in Ioannes. - I. M. 599 seqq.; G. 328, 329; La-Croix, l. 3, p. 1, n. 488, 489.

9. Claudina, in order to refuse a marriage offered to her by her father, emitted a vow of entering a certain Congregation of Sisters, and of never seeking and accepting dispensation from such a vow. But after three months, another marriage having been offered to her, in good faith she seeks and obtains dispensation from the vow of entering the aforesaid Congregation, not attending to the other vow of neither seeking nor accepting dispensation. After the betrothal had been entered upon, on the day immediately preceding the marriage, attending to that second vow, she manifests the matter to the confessor.

Q. 1. Was each vow of Claudina valid? 2. Is there need of a new dispensation for entering marriage?

R. To the first. The vow of entering the Congregation of Sisters was valid. For due intention and deliberation was not lacking on the part of Claudina; for nothing is had in the case from which the contrary could be gathered. The matter of the vow is certainly of a better good; indeed this good is best. Nor indeed does that circumstance render the vow null, namely, that she might more efficaciously and firmly reject the marriage offered by her father, less pleasing to her. For this circumstance in itself is not evil, but good: for a marriage contracted not from one's own inclination but from the inclination of the father will have difficulty having a good outcome. Nor indeed was the vow made by Claudina as by motive on account of this end alone, so that it could be said that, this end ceasing, the vow ceases, as though a vow either conditioned, namely if the father persists in offering that marriage, or a disjunctive vow, namely either of entering a Religious Congregation, or of abstaining from that marriage. Nothing of this sort appears from the case. Claudina simply and absolutely emitted the vow, indeed impelled by repelling from herself that marriage very disagreeable to her; choosing that it was better to enter religion than to enter that marriage; but at the same time choosing religion simply and absolutely; whence she emitted another vow of never seeking and accepting dispensation; and, another marriage having been offered to her, she simply sought dispensation of the vow emitted, raising no question about the value of the vow itself. Wherefore that vow was altogether valid, and was still so when another marriage was offered to her.

Concerning the other vow of Claudina, of never seeking and accepting dispensation, there is a question, says St. Alph., l. 3, n. 208, "whether the vow of not seeking dispensation, commutation, or annulment of a vow is valid, even with just cause; for without just cause it is certain that it is valid. The first opinion denies.... But the second affirms.... And this seems more probable; noting that in the case in which it is more useful on account of spiritual good to seek dispensation, the vow does not oblige, although it was valid. Yet this vow can always be relaxed by a superior, for whom his power is always saved.... But it must be noted that one vowing not to seek dispensation can seek commutation; and conversely." Thomas Sanchez, in Decal., l. 4, c. 8, n. 21, says: "I judge it more probable that that vow or oath furnished to God is not valid, and therefore obliges in no event.... I am led, because vows emitted generally, which in certain cases are apt for inducing obligation and are useful, but in others are inept and useless, by no means oblige, unless when, either by law or by the common understanding of men, they have a tacit condition, that they be extended to useful cases alone, such as the vow of obeying a superior in all things has included. And the reason is that those vows are emitted by way of one thing, and equally comprehend useful and useless cases."

To the second. There is no need of a new dispensation; wherefore, especially if there is danger in delay, Claudina will be able with a quiet conscience to enter marriage. The reason is: 1. because that vow made absolutely and universally of never seeking and accepting dispensation is at least probably null. 2. Because, although it was valid, it has now become impossible. For in good faith dispensation has already been sought and accepted. 3. Because the vow which alone can stand in the way of marriage is the vow of entering religion, not the vow of never seeking and never accepting dispensation. Now although Claudina had even sinned by seeking and accepting dispensation, the dispensation obtained and accepted would be valid. Therefore at most she would have to do penance for the other vow violated, but would by no means be prohibited from entering marriage. For her other vow neither takes away in any way from the superior the faculty of dispensing, nor makes it the case that there was not a just cause of seeking dispensation, if this in fact was present, and therefore the dispensation given and accepted was and is altogether valid. Cf. Sanchez, l. c., n. 26. 4. Finally, if she had adverted to her other vow, she could still have sought not simple dispensation, but commutation of the prior vow; for she had made a vow concerning not seeking dispensation, and, ignorant of the distinction, perhaps she had not even thought about commutation.

10. Antonius, a parish priest, is accustomed to dispense and commute the vows of the faithful of his parish, whether within or outside sacramental confession, judging that this power belongs to him, both on account of the jurisdiction which he himself has in his parish, and on account of the equal power with which he is endowed, from the common doctrine of theologians, of dispensing with subjects for particular cases in fasts, in abstinence, in works prohibited on a feast day, and in other similar things. I. M. 245. But, a doubt having arisen concerning this manner of acting, he asks whether he can persist in it.

Q. What as to the case?

R. Antonius cannot persist in that practice. The reason is that the power of dispensing from vows, special privilege or legitimate custom being excluded, belongs only to prelates who have jurisdiction in the external forum. The parish priest does not have this jurisdiction, nor in this matter is there present a special privilege or legitimate custom favoring him. Let Busembaum be heard, whom St. Alphonsus tacitly approves: "The power of dispensing belongs to all prelates who have jurisdiction in the external forum or privilege.... Hence a bishop can dispense with respect to his subjects; but not a parish priest, because he has only jurisdiction of the internal forum," l. 4, n. 456. But the distinguished Doctor has these things concerning this matter: "A parish priest or proper priest does not have ordinary power for dispensing or commuting vows. It is the certain and common opinion of theologians.... The reason a priori is that this dispensation is an act of ecclesiastical jurisdiction distinct from the jurisdiction of the sacrament of penance; but in a parish priest and similar persons there is no such jurisdiction; for by no law is it conceded to them, nor can it be gathered from the nature of the thing or custom.... Hence the argument taken from dispensation of law can be turned back, because a parish priest cannot dispense in laws; but if in some law he could by special custom, it is not to be extended to other laws, much less to vows." T. 9, de Relig., l. 6, c. 10, n. 11, 12. Hence the response to the twofold reason of Antonius the parish priest is clear. To the first it is responded that the parish priest indeed has jurisdiction in his parish in the administration of the sacraments, but by no means ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the external forum, the act of which is dispensation of vows. To the second it is responded that the parish priest can indeed dispense in those ecclesiastical laws for particular cases only; but he can do this from custom, which custom is not present also for dispensation of vows. - I. M. 615.

11. Theotimus emitted a vow of perpetual chastity. An occasion of an excellent marriage having been offered, he sought dispensation from the Holy See for entering marriage, which he obtained. After a year his wife dies, and another marriage to be entered is offered to him. Hence Theotimus, uncertain, asks of his confessor whether he needs a new dispensation, and from whom it is to be sought, in the affirmative case.

Q. Does the vow of chastity remain reserved to the Supreme Pontiff after dispensation has been obtained for the effect of contracting marriage?

R. Affirmatively. Thus Card. de Lugo, Resp. Mor., l. 6, c. 1; G., v. 2, n. 331; and others. The reason is that, when, on account of various causes which are customarily alleged, dispensation is conceded for the effect of contracting marriage, the preceding vow of chastity, just as it is not annulled, so neither is it commuted according to its whole self into other pious works. For, just as the matter of that vow was divisible, so also its obligation was divisible. Through the aforesaid dispensation only the obligation of not contracting this first marriage is taken away, and is commuted into a new obligation to other pious works. Although, therefore, this new obligation according to a probable opinion is not reserved, that other part of the preceding obligation prohibiting a second marriage, and all other things which are opposed to chastity except the first marriage, is not a new obligation, but is altogether the same one which was before, and which was never taken away. Therefore this part of the obligation retains the same nature and quality of reservation which it had from the beginning. But that, from the intention of the Supreme Pontiff dispensing, the same vow in fact remains, and is dispensed only as regards the effect of contracting marriage, but by no means as regards the remaining effects, is gathered from the express clause added to the dispensation, that, if the spouse dies, he who had emitted the vow must remain celibate. Cf. Lugo, l. c., n. 1 and 8; G., l. c. The same is signified still more by those words which are customarily added in the commission of dispensing directed to a discreet confessor. For at the end of the commission the penitent is again said to be admonished concerning the perseverance of the vow in these words: If he should again contract and consummate marriage, or ever fornicate outside marriage, let him know that he will act against a vow of this sort. Cf. Lugo, l. c., n. 8. Whence adultery committed during that first marriage contracted by dispensation is also against a vow of this sort.

12. Carolina emits a vow of entering a more recent Congregation of Sisters. But, an occasion of a good marriage having been offered to her, she sought from the bishop dispensation from the aforesaid vow, which the bishop conceded without difficulty.

Q. What as to the case?

R. Carolina could not be dispensed from her vow except only by the Supreme Pontiff, if there were question of a Religious Order properly so called. But since there is question only of a more recent Congregation of Sisters, she can be released from her vow either by the bishop, or even by a regular confessor having privilege. G. 333; I. M. 620.

13. Polidorus emitted a vow of entering a religious order, and in fact enters the Order of St. Francis. But after six months of novitiate, he departs from it, since he had been judged by the master of novices by no means suitable for religious life. Thinking of entering marriage, he sought dispensation of the vow from his confessor, who denied that this could be done by him, and remitted Polidorus to the Holy See.

Q. What as to the case?

R. Polidorus seems altogether free from any obligation of the vow; and therefore seems to need no dispensation. The reason is that he made a vow of entering religion, and in fact he entered it. But otherwise it would have to be said that, if he enters another religion, and departs from that also because he is unequal to that kind of life, he ought to enter a third religion, and so on, which is foreign to the ordinary mode of entrance into religion, and to the intention of the one vowing. For indeed ordinarily religions are not accustomed to receive those who have departed from another religion; and those who enter religion after due consideration enter it with this intention, that in it they live out life perpetually, not that after some time they leave it and enter another. Therefore this is also the intention of him who emits a vow of entering religion, unless he explicitly thinks of his departure in some determined case. Finally, Polidorus, since he departs from the Order of St. Francis because he is unfit for embracing religious life, by entering another order would depart from that one also. And thus he does not seem to be held to doing a useless thing for the scope and end of that vow. And this holds not only if Polidorus was dismissed because from human frailty, from depraved custom, from weakness of powers, he was altogether unequal to fulfilling the obligations of religious life and of the monastery; but also if he himself, of his own accord, had to depart on account of causes of this sort, or on account of another rational motive. But it by no means holds if he directly or indirectly procured that he be cast out; for then, departing without legitimate motive and rational cause, he acts against the vow and violates it. - G. 320, 321; D'Annib., ed. 3, p. 3, n. 215.

14. Ferdinandus, a religious bound by simple vows, having lost his former fervor, and falling into a tepid life gradually, but daily more and more, is now affected by weariness of religious life. Hence he sought dismissal from his superior, who, when he had in vain applied all means from his charity, so that he might recall Ferdinandus to good counsels, finally dismisses him, obstinate and dispensed from vows, from religion. After a year Ferdinandus marries; but he is agitated by many stings of conscience on account of the lost religious vocation, and especially because, since he had no grave cause for obtaining dispensation from vows, except his tepid life, he judges it void and himself still obliged by religious vows.

Q. What as to the case?

R. Ferdinandus is agitated under a twofold head; first indeed on account of the religious vocation lost by his fault. And Ferdinandus truly lost a great good. For it would have been very easy for him not only to save his own soul, but also to arrive at an eminent degree of sanctity. "The state of religion," says the Angelic Doctor, 2. 2, q. 186, a. 3, "is a certain exercise and discipline through which one arrives at the perfection of charity." Therefore let Ferdinandus return, if this is still whole for him, either to the same or at least to another religion, and let him make a firm proposal that he will exactly observe the rules and religious vows, lest so great an evil befall him again. But if either the thing is impossible for him, or certainly he does not yet experience such a desire, but on the contrary is rather content to live in the world: let him not despair. Divine grace, which is not lacking to sinners even blinded, hardened, and obstinate, will not be lacking to him, so that he can work the salvation of his soul by cooperating with divine grace.

But Ferdinandus is chiefly agitated on account of the nullity of the dispensation of religious vows from defect of sufficient cause. Ferdinandus can be altogether at peace; for that dispensation conceded to him by the superior, if nevertheless he had such power, was altogether valid on the part of the grave cause required. For a grave and proportionate cause was not lacking. His very tepid and little religious life could furnish this cause, not only on account of his private good, if now, for example, in religion he was sinning constantly, and it was hoped that, marriage having been entered, a remedy would be brought to his perverse life, but also on account of the common good, lest he be a scandal to others, and induce relaxation by his depraved example into the monastery and into the order. Wherefore, excluding the case that he obtained dispensation of vows in bad faith and by fraud and deceit, if, after by tepid life he had lost the vocation, or had already fallen into grave lapses, or had been placed in continual danger of sinning, he manifested the whole matter in good faith to his prelate, and the prelate had this special power of dismissing him and dispensing from vows, he can be safe in conscience as regards the validity of the dispensation. Cf. Epitome Instituti Soc. Iesu, Prato, 1882, p. 245, n. 123, 125; p. 251, n. 142, 143; Compend. Privileg. Soc. Iesu, n. 160; S. C. EE. et RR., 19 Apr. 1893. Benedict XIV, de Syn., l. 13, c. 11, n. 17, speaking of religious of the Society of Jesus, says: "The cause of dismissal is usually taken from this, that the religious is by no means able laudably to pursue the course begun, and to conduct his life according to the Institute of the Society." S. C. EE. et RR., 15 March 1892; A. S. S., v. 26, p. 320; Lugo, Resp. Mor., l. 4, d. 3.

It is said: If the prelate has this special faculty. For by common law, as regards more recent Institutes already approved by the Holy See, dispensation of vows, whether temporary or perpetual, is reserved to the same Holy See. Thus from the constant practice of the S. C. EE. et RR. Likewise, as regards religious orders properly such, "the simple vows of which there is question are perpetual on the part of the one vowing, as being those which tend to the subsequent emitting of solemn vows, in which they receive perfection and completion. The dispensation of the same simple vows is reserved to the Roman Pontiff, to whom professed members, when grave causes urge, can offer prayers. But the same simple vows can also be dissolved on the part of the order in the act of dismissal of the professed; so that, dismissal having been given, the professed by this very fact become free from every bond and obligation of the said vows. Nevertheless superiors ought to proceed with the greatest charity, prudence, and from just and reasonable causes, every human affection being removed; otherwise their conscience remains gravely burdened. But no one can be dismissed on account of infirmity supervening after the profession of simple vows." S. C. EE. et RR., 12 June 1858. Nay indeed, not even as regards more recent Institutes will a professed member be able to be dismissed after only temporary vows on account of supervening infirmity. Thus from the practice of the same Sacred Congregation. Besides, a judicial process is required if there is question of a professed member to be dismissed who has emitted simple perpetual vows or simple temporary vows and besides has been constituted in sacred orders. S. C. EE. et RR., 4 Nov. 1892. - Cf. A. S. S., v. 26, p. 320.

From these things which precede, the resolution of the case given by the aforesaid S. C. EE. et RR., 19 Nov. 1886, is easily understood:

"Sometimes it happens that one simply professed seeks his dismissal, asserting that he does not have, or has lost, the spirit and vocation to religious life. It is now asked whether this assertion of his, pertinaciously retained, even if no other cause of dismissal is present, can be judged a sufficient, just, and reasonable cause for this end, that one bound by simple vow can be dismissed from the order? - R. Negatively, since the simple vows of which there is question are perpetual on the part of the one vowing, and their dispensation is reserved to the Supreme Pontiff."

15. Cunegunda, having departed from a more recent Congregation of Sisters, obtained from the bishop dispensation from the religious vows, the vow of chastity nevertheless remaining. Desiring to enter marriage, she seeks dispensation from that vow and obtains it from a confessor having privilege of dispensing from vows.

Q. What as to the case?

Cunegunda could indeed be dispensed by the bishop from religious vows if that more recent Congregation of Sisters was merely diocesan, approved only by the Ordinary of the place, "provided that a right acquired by a third party from an onerous contract is not harmed when he is reasonably unwilling." Holy Office, 2 Aug. 1876; and therefore "the petition of the superior having been had beforehand and her counselors consenting," S. C. de P. F., 24 Aug. 1885, Collectan., n. 2088, 2091. But if that more recent congregation had already been approved by the Apostolic See, then Cunegunda could not be dispensed by the bishop. For vows, in such a case, whether they are perpetual or temporary, remain reserved to the Holy See. Bizzarri, Collect. Meth., at the end; G., v. 2, n. 130, 134-136, 140. But since the bishop in fact dispensed Cunegunda from the vows, it must be said that that congregation is merely diocesan, merely dependent on the Ordinary of the place, and that it has not yet obtained any approval from the Holy See.

But as regards the other dispensation, the case of Cunegunda does not seem to lack some difficulty. For a vow of chastity, although joined with the other vows of religion, can well be from an affection absolutely such toward chastity itself; and then the vow is reserved, and cannot be dispensed except by the Supreme Pontiff. But if the vow of chastity is not emitted except insofar as it is joined with the other vows of religion, not from an affection absolutely such of chastity itself, but only from love of religion and religious profession: then the vow is not reserved, the other vows having been dispensed.

But, unless it is established that the vow was not perpetual and absolute, it cannot be dispensed. S. O., 2 Aug. 1876. Wherefore Cunegunda must be questioned whether, for example, she emitted the vow of chastity in Religion, not precisely from affection toward chastity itself, but because, for example, since she could not or would not enter marriage, nevertheless she did not wish to remain in the world in the state of celibacy. For then she vowed for Religion alone, and, unless she were freed from the vow outside Religion, she would be compelled to remain in celibacy, from which she was always averse. G. V. 2, n. 132, 133. - Cf. Enchiridion Morale, 2nd ed., n. 180.