59. On Defense of Oneself

1. Martialis, a soldier, quarreled with his fellow soldiers, and when he had afflicted one of them with insulting words, that one, impatient of the injury, aimed the gun which he held in his hand at him in order to kill him. But Martialis, who had inflicted the insult, forestalled him and killed the assailant with his own gun.

Q. 1. Is it permitted to defend life by the killing even of an unjust aggressor? 2. Was Martialis guilty of homicide?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 726, 727. - To the second. "In his favor the doctrine of those could be brought forward who say that he who provoked another by insults or injuries, if nevertheless he is attacked by him to the point of death, can licitly defend himself and kill the assailant.... Hence an adulterer who, detected by the husband, cannot flee, if he cannot otherwise avoid death, can kill the husband.

Nevertheless, in our case, that doctrine can with difficulty have place, because, according to the narration of the fact, first the adversary, provoked by insults, pulled the trigger of the gun so that it might catch fire, and then this other man pulled the trigger of his gun to the same effect; at which time indeed that defense was useless, by which he could not escape the blow of the adversary, but only strike back. Therefore then it was better either to flee or to avoid the blow, if he could; especially since, although in other cases a soldier attacked is not held to flee, but can defend himself by killing when he cannot otherwise be rescued from the assailant, nevertheless, when he himself gave the unjust cause of the attack, he ought to flee, nor can he licitly kill the assailant if there is place for flight, because he himself unjustly cast the assailant into those straits; wherefore he ought to render him unharmed.... Then... because it cannot be denied that the killing, in our case, was culpable in its cause, with insulting words having been rashly uttered against an angry and armed soldier, in which circumstances the danger of killing him could and ought to have been foreseen, if he wished to avenge himself, as it could be feared almost certainly; which suffices so that he who unjustly gave a culpable cause is guilty of the homicide afterward following." Lugo, Resp. Mor., l. 4, d. 17.

But the question properly is not whether Martialis could and ought to have foreseen homicide, but whether in fact he at least confusedly foresaw it; and this, from the very fact of the homicide afterward following, without Martialis himself being questioned in order to know the truth of the matter, is difficult to assert with certainty. For it was a matter of mere insulting words, which are altogether frequent among soldiers, and nevertheless homicide does not ordinarily follow from this.

Moreover, it is also difficult to assert with certainty that Martialis did not lack another means of defending himself, namely by fleeing. For if the gun, as these arms were in the time of Lugo, was not yet prepared to fire, it can be understood how Martialis truly had time both to flee and to avoid the blow. But if the gun was already altogether prepared to fire, it does not indeed appear how Martialis could otherwise have escaped death or at least a grave wound.

And these things seem not to have escaped Cardinal Lugo himself, since at the end of his discourse, n. 7, he concludes: "These things at least render our case doubtful." Certainly it is not permitted to forestall the aggressor and kill him before the actual aggression; for this is not to defend oneself by repelling force with force. But to defend oneself in an actual aggression does not consist in this: that someone first ought to wait to be killed, or for an action to be placed by which he will soon be certainly killed; for then defense will already be impossible, and it will be impossible to repel force with force. To defend oneself in an actual aggression consists in this: that someone defend himself in an unjust aggression actually, morally speaking, already so impending that he cannot repel it unless force is applied. I. M. 727. Otherwise, not even someone against whom the sword of the aggressor has already been directed with every impetus could kill the aggressor with his own sword unless he himself had first been struck and wounded; and then there would no longer be place for force to be repelled, since force would already have been inflicted. If not with a sword, but with a gun already prepared to fire, someone unjustly attacks another, and has already aimed the gun toward him, so that nothing is lacking except that it fire, what else is required for actual aggression? That it fire, strike, and kill? Therefore the other will be able, by firing first, to defend himself. This is, in the case, the only efficacious mode of defending oneself: by the blow of one's own gun, efficaciously to forestall the lethal blow of the adversary's gun. But it is one thing to forestall a blow in actual aggression, another thing actually to forestall the actual aggression. In this forestalling, there is no actual aggression, but there is an aggressor prepared to attack. And concerning such forestalling, whether it is permitted, St. Alphonsus, 387, brings forward three opinions. The first denies it, because to forestall an enemy only prepared to attack would not be true defense. The second affirms it, because, in order to kill an assailant for one's own defense, it is not necessary that the other already have begun to harm, but it suffices that he be prepared to harm. The third affirms it, if someone from some action has known that the enemy is determined to attack, for instance, if he knows with moral certainty that the enemy has already prepared arms for this, or has given a mandate to a servant; then, if he cannot otherwise escape, he can licitly forestall him. But otherwise it must be said, if he does not know certainly, but has only suspicion or doubtful fear concerning the attack. The Holy Doctor, giving his judgment concerning these three opinions, says: "I judge that the second opinion, even with this distinction supposed (of the third opinion), can scarcely be followed in practice, on account of the danger of hallucination which can be present in a matter of this sort." Wherefore, as regards Martialis, since he did not forestall an actual aggression, but only forestalled the blow of the adversary in an actual aggression, it does not seem that he can be regarded as guilty of homicide.

2. Martialis and Hector, leaders of soldiers, start a quarrel between themselves and contend with harsh words. After words they come to blows. Hector first suddenly inflicts a notable slap on his companion, in the presence of other distinguished men. Immediately Martialis, with incredible dexterity, retorts and augments the argument by inflicting two slaps on Hector. Hence the storm grows, until by other friends the two contestants are separated one from the other.

Q. 1. Is it permitted to defend honor by force? 2. Is it permitted to defend honor even by killing the aggressor? 3. Did Martialis sin by striking Hector back?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 733; E. M. 733, 748. To the second. Cf. St. Alph. 381; I. M. 750. - To the third. "It is not permitted to kill if the injury has already been contracted, or the aggressor has already fled, because this would not be to defend oneself, but to avenge.... But Henry and Navarrus say that, if the injured party would suffer a great loss of honor unless he at once pursued the fleeing one, he can pursue and strike him as much as would be enough for the defense of honor. But the opposite must altogether be held. The reason is that then honor is not recovered in itself, but through the harm of another among wicked men, which is intrinsically evil. And I cannot understand why the contrary opinion ought not be called proscribed from proposition 30 condemned by Innocent XI, which permitted one to strike back at the one striking, who flees, if otherwise ignominy could not be avoided." Therefore Martialis cannot be excused from sin, and from grave sin. St. Alph. 382; I. M. 733; Enchir. Mor. 733; G. 390.

3. Gerardus, a parish priest, was keeping at home the gold and silver furniture of the church and a great sum of gold money pertaining to various pious causes, in a well-locked chest. This became known to three thieves. Behold, at an untimely hour of night, equipped with arms and with face disguised, they burst into the house of the parish priest and threaten that they will take his life from him unless he swiftly hands over to them whatever of gold and silver he has at home. Gerardus, placed in certain danger of life, is compelled to bring out for the thieves all that they require, even his own money and his own silver furniture and other precious objects. The three thieves carry away all things with three chests. But Gerardus, freed from danger, as soon as the thieves have gone out from the house, closes the door well and approaches the window armed with a firearm. As soon as he saw them going out from the door of the palace, lest he afterward be unable to discern them on account of the dense darkness of the night and the copious rain, he fires the firearm at them and kills one. The other two flee. But they leave the chests. And thus Gerardus recovered the whole thing.

Q. 1. Is it permitted to defend goods by force? 2. What must be thought concerning the case of Gerardus?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 731, 732; E. M. 731. - To the second.

"Card. Lugo, Molina, Lessius, etc., with Diana, concede that it is permitted to pierce with a dart or arrow a thief fleeing, for example, with your horse, because the invasion still endures." Thus Busembaum, 382. "We say with Lessius, etc., that it is permitted to kill a thief from a distance with a weapon, if he himself carries off the thing and, having been forewarned of his danger, is unwilling to leave it." Thus St. Alphonsus, 383. But those three thieves, in the case, were now carrying off the thing, nor could it be recovered by another way, and any other warning would have been useless. Moreover, the thing was altogether of great value. Wherefore Gerardus cannot be condemned of the sin of homicide. Nor indeed is it an obstacle that he is a priest, because the right of defense is of natural right and therefore belongs to each one. Hence Gerardus incurred no irregularity, whether from delict, which was absent, or from lenity, which has no place here. For it is incurred by soldiers in a just offensive war and by ministers of justice in the killing of a guilty person. - St. Alph. 183, 184; G. 394, 395; I. M. V. 2, 1330.