6. On Concupiscence and Anger

Titius, a fervent Catholic, having received a grave injury from Sempronius, blazing up in anger, considers in his mind killing Sempronius. But, adverting to the grave sin in such a deed, he removes such a thought from himself. But behold, seeing Sempronius again, he again forms the purpose of killing him, and now in his mind devises means for accomplishing the matter, and remains for a long time in this thought. Meanwhile a funeral meets him, and the thought of death, judgment, and hell preoccupies his mind; and thus, as if spontaneously, he dismisses every memory of the injury received and of vengeance.

Q. 1. Do concupiscence and anger render an act involuntary? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first: concupiscence and anger can render an act involuntary only when they are so vehement that they entirely snatch away the use of reason. For then, and then only, can it be verified that the act is against the will, that is, against the rational and deliberate will. Indeed, if the use of reason is not totally snatched away, then, when concupiscence and anger incline to the act, the voluntary is necessarily present, although in that act the voluntary is diminished according to the intensity of concupiscence and anger, if it is antecedent; for if it is consequent, then, on the contrary, it is increased. But this difference intervenes between concupiscence and anger, that anger is accustomed far more easily to snatch away the use of reason, while concupiscence brings this about far more with difficulty. I. M. 54-57.

To the second: a fervent Catholic does not so easily consent to grave sin, and to a sin so grave as homicide. But the thought of homicide arises in Titius from the grave injury received and from the blazing up of anger. Therefore the aforesaid thought can easily be judged involuntary by that defect of advertence and deliberation. And indeed, as is said in the case, Titius, soon adverting to the grave sin, repelled that thought from himself. Therefore before that he had not adverted, or at least had not adverted sufficiently, to the grave sin. But as to the fact that he again conceived the will of killing the enemy, this thought indeed naturally entered his mind from the presence of the enemy; struck by that presence, the purpose formed easily lacked due deliberation. Whence, looking upon the funeral, he spontaneously dismissed every memory of the injury received and of vengeance. Nor indeed is there difficulty from the fact that he remained for a long time in that purpose. For this perhaps happened either from the continued presence and sight of the enemy in the middle of the road until the funeral met him, or from the very passion of anger vehemently stirred up. Elbel 228.