65. On Acts Against Nature

1. Lubanus is accustomed to ride horseback, either for the sake of utility or also not rarely for the sake of recreation. But often while riding, he experiences carnal motions, indeed sometimes even pollution itself. Although he detests depraved effects of this sort from his soul, nevertheless he fears lest he gravely stain his conscience, and again, anxious, asks the confessor whether he ought to form the proposal of riding no more.

Q. 1. Is pollution voluntary in the cause ever a grave sin? 2. Has Lubanus sinned?

R. To the first. Affirmatively, namely when the cause placed influences pollution per se, proximately, and gravely, and is placed without a just reason of necessity, or utility, or convenience. Now actions or causes influencing pollution per se, proximately, and gravely are those which directly, by their nature, of themselves tend to pollution, in almost the same way in which the infliction of a lethal wound is said to be a cause per se of death; and for this reason they constitute grave fault in the genus of lust. Such are, for example, morose thoughts about venereal things, voluntary sight of human intercourse, conversations openly too immodest, the reading or hearing of very shameful things, shameful touches in the private parts. I. M. 35-37, 40; Scav., 12th ed., Milan, 1874, l. 1, n. 780.

But it is permitted, from a just reason and notwithstanding the depraved effect, to place the aforesaid causes.

The reason is that no artisan ought to omit the beginning or prosecution of a work because of defects following from the necessity of the matter. For someone would foolishly omit the construction of a saw or sword because they will contract rust, since they are made from iron, and so concerning other things. But pollutions and stings of the flesh in the proposed matter happen from the necessity of the matter, from the fact that venereal matter is matter to be cleansed, washed, disputed about, preached about, thought about; from this, by natural sequence, there follows commotion of the flesh, etc. Therefore man ought not, because of defects occurring from the necessity of venereal matter, to omit not only necessary, but useful thoughts, speakings, hearings, etc. For otherwise it would be necessary either that angels or very privileged men only dispute, hear, etc., concerning things of this sort, the opposite of which ecclesiastical custom holds and reason teaches. Thus Cajetan, tom. 1, Opusc., tr. 22, q. un.; Billuart, De Temper., dissert. 6, art. 12, par. Confirmatur Conclusio.

And Lessius, l. 4, c. 3, d. 14, n. 102: "If that action or cause is of itself a proximate disposition to pollution, such as contact with and sight of immodest parts, etc., we are held by reason of pollution to avoid it under mortal sin, unless some necessity compels us to that action. The reason is that, speaking per se, to consent to the effect and to its proximate cause is of the same moral character. Nevertheless, when another just cause of that action underlies it, then that effect is not judged willed, but only permitted, as coming beyond the intention. It is confirmed in the proposed matter. For that contact does not move except as apprehended by the imagination. But apprehended by the imagination, for example, as a necessary means for curing, it does not have the power of stirring up lust. But if, with that apprehension, another also creeps in at the same time, as of a pleasurable thing, and this moves, that is per accidens, from the misery of nature and beyond the intention of the agent, not from the nature of the object considered under the aspect of a means to health. Hence, on account of such an effect, we are not held to deprive ourselves of that convenience. But it is called a per se disposition, or proximate cause, because when it is apprehended according to itself, not as a means to another end, it is such."

To the second. Lubanus must not be disturbed. The reason is that this cause is remote and per accidens; whence in such and a similar case, "man rather suffers than acts, since pollution proceeds not from his malice, but from the infirmity of nature.... To this is added that, when a cause has two effects, one good, the other evil, it can be placed from the intention of the good effect alone, conducting oneself permissively toward the evil." L. 483; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 64, a. 7; G. 11.

2. Marchantius once had shameful pleasure, but doubts whether sleeping or awake. Often in sleep he suffers pollution. But in the morning he rejoices because for this reason he is well and free from temptations. Finally, having awakened during pollution begun in sleep, he does not try to impede it. Often he also suffers distillation, concerning which he is very uncertain whether it is a sin.

Q. 1. Is distillation a grave sin? 2. Has Marchantius sinned?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 809, 811. To the second. Marchantius, in the first case, can be excused from sin. For the presumption stands for the state of sleep, since things which are done in the state of waking are adverted to and known. Voit 37.

In the second case he is still more to be excused from sin because of the defect of the voluntary. Nevertheless it could have been voluntary in the cause, if, foreseeing that depraved effect at least in a confused way, he placed its cause by shameful readings, conversations, thoughts, etc. Cf. Sanch., l. 9, d. 45, n. 28.

In the third case he is to be excused at least from grave sin, if he rejoices only concerning the good effect which followed. I. M. 292, 294; G. 23. - In the fourth case, "nor is he held to restrain its actual flow, because, from the fact that the motion of the flesh has been excited while sleeping, it is no further subject to the will of one awake; and although it were subject, it could not be restrained without notable burden of the body and danger of infirmities. Wherefore he can permit it as the effect of a natural cause which can no longer be impeded.... The same seems to be said concerning any involuntary pollution, whether it happens in sleep or in waking, since the reason of each is the same as to this." Billuart, De Temper., dissert. 6, art. 13, at the end; Scav., 12th ed., Milan, 1874, l. 1, n. 782; Lig. 479.

Physicians indeed deny the aforesaid danger of infirmity in the case. And thus Dr. C. Capellmann, Medicina Pastoralis, 11th ed., Aachen, 1896, p. 79, openly says: "There is no such corrupted seed which can in some way bring disease to the body." But even prescinding from a danger of this sort, the reason brought forward holds, namely that in that pollution naturally begun the will conducts itself merely permissively, not impeding it, since it does not arise from any influence of the will and any efficacy of the will, but by force of nature itself; whence it is that, as it begins naturally, so consequently it is also completed merely naturally. Hence St. Alphonsus says in the cited place: "When emission began in sleep, but afterward is consummated in full waking, in that case, provided consent in the pleasure or proximate danger of consent from past experience is absent, man is not held to restrain it.... For then he does not will the pollution, but merely suffers it.... Then it is expedient to fortify oneself with the sign of the cross, and by averting the mind from that shameful pleasure, and by invoking the Most Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, fervently to pray them not to permit any fall."

Finally, as regards distillation, this first must be noted: that distillation properly differs from pollution. For pollution is the outpouring of human seed without congress with another. But distillation is a certain flow of humor intermediate between urine and true seed, which falls drop by drop in small quantity. Then indeed it must be adverted that, if distillation happens beyond the intention, without voluntary sense of the flesh and without voluntary commotion of the genital spirits, it is not a sin, nor is it necessary to be disturbed about it more than about any other simple sweat of the body.

But if it happens with voluntary carnal sense and with voluntary commotion of the spirits serving generation, for example, from shameful touch, from shameful conversation, from shameful sight, it is a grave sin. Wherefore it is mortal deliberately to procure even light distillation which carries with itself some commotion of the flesh and the outpouring of a little true seed, or certainly contains proximate danger of it. The same must be said a fortiori if the voluntary distillation is in great quantity, which is with notable venereal pleasure and notable commotion, or with some outpouring of true seed. Scav., 12th ed., Milan, 1874, l. 1, n. 778, 783; Lig. 477.

Hence St. Alphonsus, l. c., says: "Just as he sins gravely who procures a notable commotion (which is incipient pollution), so also he who procures great distillation." And Sanchez, l. 9, d. 45, n. 32, says: "Whenever it is a mortal sin to give a cause to foreseen pollution, by not removing causes notably influencing it, it is similarly mortal to give a cause to notable distillation or to commotion of the vital spirits serving generation through similar causes. Because this distillation and commotion of the spirits is notably shameful and as it were incipient pollution." Ballerini has the same, Op. Theol. Mor., 1st ed., v. 2, p. 725, where he asserts that distillation "frequently itself also happens with commotion and pleasure of the genitals; for it is joined to some outpouring of seed, or disposes to it. But again and again it has place without any pleasure. If therefore it happens in the former way, moral malice will be placed in the venereal pleasure procured either in itself or in the cause, and also in pollution or outpouring of seed, or in the proximate danger of this. But if it happens in the other way, without pleasure, although with a certain natural commotion, theologians say that it is not to be cared about, just as concerning any other excretion, nor ought we to avoid its cause." And from these things it is abundantly clear what must be thought concerning Marchantius in the fifth case.

Now, progressing further in this matter, that must be noted which the praised Sanchez, l. c., has concerning married persons. For after the words just reported, he immediately adds: "Whether this holds true in married persons, we shall say in the last number." But in this number, namely 43, he says: "I do not think that it is mortal in married persons, through touches, sights, and shameful words, and through venereal pleasure arising from intercourse thought about, to give a cause to commotion of the members serving generation and to incur foreseen distillations." And Fr. Gury, Comp., v. 2, n. 919. 3°, says: "Spouses do not sin gravely, even if, from touches had even without the intention of intercourse, there arises commotion of the spirits or members serving generation, or distillation follows.... The reason is that, the crime of voluntary pollution outside the vessel or of sodomy being set aside, nothing is done against the good of marriage." But this conclusion of Sanchez and Gury, as regards distillation, does not seem able to be admitted absolutely of itself, as is easily gathered even from the very reason brought forward by Gury. For it can indeed be admitted concerning distillation which is without outpouring of seed. Nor indeed is distillation always with outpouring of seed, which indeed is opposed to the very definition of distillation.

But as regards that distillation which is in reality joined with an outpouring of seed, even if only partial, the aforesaid acts seem to be prohibited for the same reason, by reason of distillation as by reason of pollution. Wherefore, just as from the aforesaid acts which can be exercised by spouses, at least without grave fault, those acts must altogether be excluded which by their nature are an inchoate pollution, or of themselves proximately dispose to pollution, so consequently those acts seem to have to be excluded which of themselves proximately dispose to distillation joined with the outpouring of seed, and which consequently, by reason of this sort of joined distillation, are by their nature an inchoate pollution. Cf. I. M. V. 2, n. 1079-1083.