87. Suspicion, Detraction, Whispering

1. Anastasius, greatly desiring to think and judge well of all, experiences on the contrary in himself a continual inclination to judging badly of others. And this is altogether vehement when evil indications appear, which, although absolutely they could be taken in a good sense, nevertheless he is inclined to take them in a bad sense from a certain judgment which spontaneously arises in his mind, namely that matters are not to be considered speculatively and in the abstract, but practically and in the concrete, not according to the possibility of the same matters, but according to the depraved nature of men.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. Anastasius does not seem to be accused of grave sin; since he does not form a rash judgment concerning persons, but only has some suspicion, which, with attention to the subjective disposition of Anastasius deliberately to think and judge well of all, is rather indeliberate than at least fully voluntary. Besides, the aforesaid suspicion of Anastasius in particular cases does not seem altogether rash, since it arises from those evil indications. Nor truly, speaking per se, is suspicion a mortal sin.

For “in those things which are mortal sins from their genus, imperfect movements are not mortal sins, but venial. For adultery is mortal, namely when the will is complete, but not when it is incomplete; for not every movement of concupiscence is a mortal sin. But judgment is twofold, concerning things and concerning persons. Judgment concerning things is always a mortal sin, say to say that giving alms is evil. But judgment concerning persons, although sometimes it is false, nevertheless is not always a sin, except when it is altogether rash.... But when from a slight matter a firm judgment proceeds in the heart, sometimes it is a mortal sin, because it is with contempt of neighbor; but suspicion is something imperfect in the genus of judgment, and therefore is an imperfect movement, and therefore it is not mortal from its genus; although if it is done from hatred, it will sometimes be mortal.” S. Th. Quodl. 12. a. 34. But Anastasius is far from hatred. Therefore he is by no means to be disturbed as guilty of grave sin. — S. Th. 2.2. q. 60. a. 3; I. M. 1483.

Nevertheless that judgment of Anastasius, which spontaneously arises in his mind, is certainly not the right rule of judging, in doubt, concerning the malice of others. For from this very thing, that someone has an evil opinion concerning another without sufficient cause, he unduly contemns him, and consequently affects him with injury. But no one ought to contemn another, or inflict any harm whatever, without a sufficient compelling cause. And therefore where manifest indications do not appear concerning the malice of someone, we ought to hold him as good, by interpreting what is doubtful in the better part. But it would be otherwise if there were question of applying a remedy to some evil: for then, in order that the remedy be applied more safely, it is expedient that that which is worse be supposed, because a remedy which is efficacious against a greater evil is much more efficacious against a lesser evil. But to suppose is not determinately and definitively to judge evil concerning others. S. Th. 2.2. q. 60. a. 3, 4; I. M. 1485.

2. Aquilinus, in order often to excite the languishing conversation of friends, narrates the sayings and deeds of some persons, whence grave detraction against the reputation of others follows; but since he himself does not intend that, nor, as he himself says, does he narrate these things from an evil mind, he thinks himself at least immune from grave sin. But he has contracted so strong a habit of detracting from the reputation of others that sometimes he scarcely even adverts that the things which he reports can bring grave harm to others.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. Aquilinus is guilty of detraction at least in cause. For it is evident that he himself sufficiently knows the depraved habit contracted, which he ought to strive efficaciously to uproot. By reason of actual inadvertence he can sometimes be excused from actual grave fault. For detraction can easily be venial not only on account of lightness of matter, or slight damage inflicted on the neighbor, but also on account of defect of sufficient advertence, on account of the sudden impulse of passion.

“Sins of speech,” says S. Th. 2.2. q. 73. a. 3, “have some lightness, insofar as they easily proceed from a slip of the tongue without great premeditation.” But Aquilinus is not to be excused from grave sin from the fact that without the intention of harming others, but from mere lightness of mind, he gravely detracts from others. For it makes no difference that detraction is not directly intended; it suffices that it is implicitly willed, namely if those things are advertently said from which detraction arises.

3. Guido constantly speaks about Iulius, and constantly reports his slight defects, which he sometimes exaggerates, at one time adverting that what he says is not true, at another almost inadvertently from his very slippery loquacity. Nevertheless Guido thinks himself immune at least from mortal sin, because in truth he says and manifests only slight things, and this seems to him to be done by himself without a malicious mind. — Does Guido sin gravely?

R. It can easily happen that Guido sins gravely. For by this very fact, that Guido reflexively considers his manner of speaking, whence he thinks himself at least immune from grave sin, that Iulius, concerning whom he speaks so easily and freely, does not seem to be any common person whatever, but a person of some note, and to whom perhaps grave damage can thereby be brought. Wherefore, for rendering a definitive judgment, it is necessary that Guido expose the personal conditions of Iulius. For if grave harm is brought to Iulius as to reputation, or even as to temporal goods from that manner of speaking, there is no doubt that Guido sins gravely both against charity and against justice. That he himself does not speak thus from a malicious mind does not of itself excuse from grave sin, objectively speaking, just as it does not impede real grave damage. Therefore Guido perhaps could then be excused from grave sin, but only on account of his subjective ignorance and some good faith. Nevertheless, without doubt, if in truth he gravely injures the reputation of Iulius and brings him some other grave damage, he himself is placed in a grave illusion. G. 427, 428; I. M. 1487, 1488.

4. Menander, a servant, was dismissed by his master Balduinus because of a hidden theft. When Lord Martinus wished to take Menander as a servant in his house, he asks Balduinus whether Menander is honest and faithful. Balduinus then opens to him the reason on account of which he dismissed him.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. Balduinus could, without detraction, manifest the theft of Menander to Martinus. There was present a grave and sufficient reason for such manifestation, namely the grave damage of Martinus to be averted. In truth, the grave defects of others and grave sins can generally be manifested to some person, if this is done from a grave reason of averting grave damage, whether temporal or spiritual, from some community, or family, or private person. For then those whose defects and sins are revealed no longer have a right that they not be uncovered with the damage of others. Others also have a right, and a prevailing one, to avert damage of this sort from themselves; to whose right in the Case the right to one’s own reputation yields, for this right cannot exist with the injury of others.

Hence also a maidservant, e.g., who has left a master depraved in morals and dangerous to maids, can warn another maid who, ignorant of the matter and in good faith, is arranging to devote her services to the same master. Hence also generally someone can reveal the defects and sins of another by reason of grave damage of his own or of another to be impeded, although in this way a marriage is impeded, or the obtaining of an inheritance, or the obtaining of another benefice. — I. M. 1494; G. 426, 427.

5. Alexius, whatever evil he hears concerning others, in familiar conversation with his friends and companions, is accustomed at once to report to others. Hence it happens that discords and dissensions arise among friends and companions, and since no one dares to manifest to others the cause of his own displeasure, Alexius easily enjoys the friendship and confidence of all, and dominates all despotically. Alexius, adverting his own malice, often confesses that he has detracted from the reputation of his neighbor, nevertheless adding that the matter was of little importance, and was done rather for the sake of laughter and jest than with a malicious mind. Whence, easily receiving absolution, he frequently receives the sacraments of penance and the Eucharist.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. Alexius is to be numbered among whisperers, an abominable race of men, since secretly they sow discords among brothers and friends. How many evils whisperers cause in families, in colleges, in seminaries, in religious communities, cannot easily be said. A whisperer and a double-tongued man is accursed; for he will disturb many who have peace. Eccli. 28:15. But Alexius, speaking per se, does not sufficiently confess his sin, or rather his continual sins. For the sin is not light, but grave, although perhaps the matter of detraction is light, by reason, namely, of the depraved effect gravely evil and harmful, i.e., of the grave displeasure engendered in the souls of his friends and brothers against friends and brothers, and of grave dissension and discord arisen among them. Alexius perhaps deceives himself in this so grave and delicate matter; but a prudent confessor ought not be content with so superficial a confession. Nor truly does Alexius sufficiently explain his sin by saying that he detracted from the reputation of his neighbor. For whispering is of a diverse species and graver than detraction. S. Th. 2.2. q. 74. a. 2; I. M. 1486.