Section — Bucceroni, Commentaries (1910)
II. On Certain Conscience
12.
- Certain conscience properly is that conscience which rests upon a certain motive; and consequently judges concerning the honesty or turpitude of an action to be done without fear of erring. Less properly, it is that which simply judges concerning the honesty or turpitude of an action without any fear of erring. The latter is certain only subjectively; the former is also certain objectively. Likewise, certain conscience can be certain strictly and broadly, or morally. Strictly certain conscience excludes every doubt, both prudent and imprudent. Broadly or morally certain conscience excludes only every prudent doubt. Its directive force as regards the licitness or illicitness of human acts, commanded or prohibited, is declared in the following propositions.
13.
- Only certain conscience is proximately directive of human acts. - Proof. "The command of one who governs has itself for binding in voluntary matters in that mode of binding which can befall the will, as bodily action has itself for binding bodily things by the necessity of coercion. But the bodily action of an agent never induces necessity in another thing except through the contact of its coercion with the thing upon which it acts. Hence neither is anyone bound by the command of some king or lord unless the command touches the one to whom it is commanded; but it touches him through knowledge. Hence no one is bound by any precept except through the mediation of knowledge of that precept. And therefore he who is not capable of knowledge is not bound by a precept. Nor is someone ignorant of a precept of God bound to doing the precept, except insofar as he is bound to know the precept. But if he is not bound to know, and does not know, he is in no way bound by the precept. As in bodily things, a bodily agent does not act except through contact, so also in spiritual things a precept does not bind except through knowledge." St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 17, a. 3.
14.
- Therefore man is bound through knowledge, or certain knowledge, of the precept by which, however, he is properly bound. Hence the Holy Doctor goes on to say: "And therefore, just as the force by which touch acts and by which the power of the agent acts is the same, since touch does not act except by the power of the agent, and the power of the agent acts only through the mediation of touch; so it is the same power by which the precept binds and by which conscience binds, since the precept does not bind except through the power of knowledge, nor does knowledge bind except through the power of the precept. Hence, since conscience is nothing other than the application of knowledge to an act, it is clear that conscience is said to bind by the force of the divine precept. Therefore it must be said that man does not make a law for himself, but through the act of his cognition, by which he knows the law made by another, he is bound to fulfilling the law." But this act of cognition, according to St. Thomas, is nothing other than knowledge of the law, or certain cognition of the law. Any other uncertain cognition manifests not the law, but a doubt about the law, by which certainly the will cannot be bound.
15.
- According to the same Angelic Doctor, someone is bound by a precept in two ways: either because he has knowledge of it, or because he is bound to know it. But when, with moral diligence applied, the precept is not established, then neither is knowledge of the precept lacking, nor is he bound further to know it, since by hypothesis the diligence necessary for knowing it has already been applied, and it could not be known. Wherefore then knowledge of the law is lacking, and no obligation of the will can be had.
16.
- It is unlawful to act without conscience subjectively certain concerning the honesty of an action. - Proof. He who acts without this conscience wills an action concerning whose honesty or turpitude he is uncertain. But to will an action concerning whose honesty or turpitude one is uncertain is nothing other than to will it whether it be good or evil. But again, to will an action whether it be good or evil is illicit, for this is a will consenting to evil. Therefore. Moreover, the saying of the Apostle to the Romans is well known, 14:23: All that is not of faith is sin. That is, what is not from a certain persuasion that it is licit is sin. - St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, aa. 3, 5; Quodl. 3, a. 27, ad 2; Quodl. 8, a. 13; L. I, n. 3; Suarez, tr. 3, d. 12, s. 3.
17.
- Sin does not have a special malice precisely from this, that it is against conscience, unless it is done in order that conscience may be overcome. The first reason is that this is intrinsic and common to every sin, that it be against conscience. The second reason is that there is then a directly willed contempt of the rule of every good operation, and thus one exposes himself to the danger of all crimes, which, as is clear, is a special and indeed most grave disordering of the will, against the natural inclination of the will toward good. - Lessius on q. 19, a. 6, d. 3; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 14, aa. 1, 4.
18.
- Likewise it is a special sin if someone sins from certain malice through contempt, casting away and removing that which could have impeded the choice of sin; and it is a sin against the Holy Spirit. Six species of this are enumerated: despair, presumption, impenitence or the purpose of not repenting, obstinacy or the purpose of adhering to sin, impugnment of acknowledged truth so that one may sin more licentiously, envy of fraternal grace, by which someone envies not only the person of his brother, but also the grace of God increasing in the world.
19.
- Only conscience subjectively certain is the rule of morals. But morally certain conscience suffices. - Proof of the first part. For, as is clear from the preceding proposition, nn. 13, 16, without this conscience one cannot act. Besides this conscience, no other subjectively more perfect conscience is given. Therefore one can act with this alone; and accordingly this conscience alone is the rule of morals. Proof of the second part. 1. From the common sentence of the doctors and universal practice. 2. Because very often another certainty cannot be had, and no one necessarily sins. 3. Because, with this moral certainty standing, one acts prudently; for moral certainty, although it does not exclude every doubt, both prudent and imprudent, nevertheless excludes every prudent doubt. Therefore. - Rom. 14:23; c. Litteras 13, De Restitutione Spoliatorum; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 47, a. 9 ad 2; q. 70, a. 2.
20.
- It is lawful to act according to certain conscience, even if it is invincibly erroneous. - Proof. He who acts thus wills, as far as lies in him, a good action, and consents only to a good action. But it is right to will this action. Therefore. Proof of the major: for nothing is willed unless it is first known. Therefore, with invincibly erroneous conscience standing, he who acts according to it wills, as far as lies in him, a good action, and consents only to a good action. - L. I, n. 5; Elbel 126.
21.
- Wherefore he who is persuaded in such a way that he ought to tell a lie in order to free his neighbor from a grave evil does not sin by lying; indeed, he places an act formally good. - Although erroneous conscience materially disagrees with the law, nevertheless one is bound by it, because erroneous conscience proposes error as law. Since obligation arises from law, in the aforesaid case of erroneous conscience, obligation does not arise directly from the law that one must lie, which does not exist; but it arises from the more general natural law of doing good and avoiding evil; and the evil to be avoided in the case is apprehended as a good to be done. St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 17, a. 4 ad 3.
22.
- It is unlawful to act against certain conscience, even if it is invincibly erroneous. - Proof. He who would act thus would will an action which he judged prohibited; he would refuse one which he judged commanded. But it is unlawful to have this will, because it is a will consenting to evil. Therefore. "It must be said that, simply, every will disagreeing with reason, whether right or erring, is always evil." St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, a. 5; 2 Sent., d. 39, q. 3, a. 3; Quodl. 3, a. 27; L. loc. cit.; Cajetan on I-II, q. 19, a. 5; Suarez, tr. 3, d. 12, s. 4.
23.
- Wherefore he who believes himself bound to tell a lie in order to free his neighbor from grave evil sins by not lying.
24.
- It is lawful to act according to certain conscience, although it is vincibly erroneous. - Proof. Because when an action is judged honest or base with certainty, the will acting according to this conscience pursues the honest and flees the base, which is wholly lawful. But that this conscience is vincibly erroneous does not make it that, when someone actually acts according to it, he sins; rather this makes it that the fault is only in the cause. Hence also the judgment concerning its gravity or lightness must be made not from the grave or light effect, but from the grave or light negligence in inquiring into the truth. Now when someone actually acts, if in no way does he attend to the erroneous conscience which he has, and has no suspicion concerning it, since by hypothesis there is here and now a certain conscience, he already acts not from a vincibly erroneous conscience, but from an invincible conscience. - La-Croix, l. 1, nn. 42, 43, 757, 760; Kenrick, 2nd ed., Mechlin, 1860, n. 36.
25.
- Wherefore he who here and now judges himself bound to commit theft in order to help a poor person does not sin by stealing. But those who are habitually of lax conscience ordinarily sin gravely by transgressing a grave precept, because ordinarily speaking they have at least some confused knowledge of it.
26.
- It is unlawful to act against certain conscience, even if it is vincibly erroneous. - Proof. Because then one would act against a certain judgment; and he would will the action which he judges prohibited, and would refuse the action which he judges commanded; which will is evil, for it is affected toward evil. Therefore. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, aa. 5, 6; Suarez, tr. 3, d. 12, s. 4; Elbel 122, 137, 138; L. I, n. 4; La-Croix, l. 1, nn. 42, 43, 757. - "And therefore it must be said that every conscience, whether right or erroneous, whether concerning things evil in themselves or concerning indifferent things, is obligatory, so that he who acts against conscience sins." St. Thomas, Quodl. 3, a. 27; Quodl. 8, a. 15.
27.
- "A sin committed against conscience has its species from the particular matter in which it is thought to be concerned, or from order to the particular precept to which it is thought to be opposed. For example, if you think a thing which you take is not yours, although in reality it is yours, it will be the sin of theft; if you think it is against the obligation of a vow, it will be the sin of sacrilege. The reason is that sins receive their species from the object either of the external action or of the will. Nor does it matter whether this object is really evil, but whether it is apprehended as evil; because the will is borne toward it as it is proposed by reason." Lessius on q. 19, a. 6, d. 3; St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, a. 5 ad 3.
28.
- It is no sin to act against certain erroneous conscience if liberty of acting is lacking. - The reason is clear, because where there is no freedom, there is no sin. And thus he does not sin who believes that he sins, while having base thoughts or suffering base movements, which, although he detests them, he nevertheless cannot impede.
29.
- Can someone labor under an invincibly erroneous conscience concerning depraved desires and other merely internal acts, if no external action follows? - Speaking explicitly and generally about desire, Elbel has this, n. 127: "That many, at least among the more unlearned and less educated, can inculpably persuade themselves that desires of this kind are not evil unless they are completed by deed, seems sufficiently certain, and Sanchez, Stoz, and La-Croix expressly teach it." St. Alphonsus says concerning this opinion, I, n. 9: "I could never consider it probable.... With other learned recent authors I consider it little probable." The reason for this sentence is that if someone certainly knows the malice of the external action, and nevertheless wills to execute it, he already knows that he wills evil. How, therefore, will he be excused from sin? But as regards simple delectation, invincible ignorance can more easily be present; for the tendency of the will into evil is not so evident as in a desire that is of itself efficacious. And the same also seems to be said of an inefficacious desire.
30.
- Can there be an invincibly erroneous conscience concerning precepts of natural law? - "It is certain that in the first principles of natural law principles, as also in proximate conclusions and in the certain obligations of one's proper state, invincible ignorance is not given, because by the very light of nature such things are known to all, except to those who close their eyes lest they see them. But on the contrary the unanimous sentence of theologians is... that in conclusions which are mediate and obscure, or remote from the principles, invincible ignorance certainly is given and must be admitted," L. I, n. 8, 170 seqq.; Struggl, tr. 3, q. 1, n. 10-13; St. Thomas, Quodl. 3, q. 36; De Veritate, q. 15, a. 2; ad Rom. 2, 14-18.
31.
- The eternal law, existing in the divine mind, most perfectly exhibits the order of things. The natural law, which is an application of the eternal law, exists in the human mind. Wherefore the natural law, by the very fact that it is manifested through human reason, falls short of the supreme perfection of the eternal law. Hence it happens that what we think and judge, in more difficult matters, does not always answer to the rules of the divine mind, and remains obscure and unknown to us. Hence that thing, although materially and in itself it pertains to natural law, nevertheless does not pertain to it formally and as regards us, since it has not been sufficiently promulgated to us by the natural light.
32.
- Can boys invincibly be ignorant of the malice of pollution? - Reply. Affirmatively, speaking absolutely, at least in some rare case, and at the beginning of a depraved custom. The reason is that the fact that an immodest look or touch, or the seeking of pleasure from pollution procured, or even naturally arisen, etc., is morally evil and illicit, is not made known so evidently from the very comprehension of the first principles; rather, reasoning is needed in order to detect their malice. Therefore their malice can, at least for some time, be inculpably unknown. From this the prudent confessor will easily conclude that, in such a contingency of fact, one must proceed cautiously and prudently; and this caution and prudence, if it is to be observed with all especially in the matter of chastity, is to be observed most of all with boys and girls. - Elbel 128; Struggl, loc. cit., n. 13.