II. On the Obligations of Children Toward Parents

19. Some children are legitimate and natural, others natural, others legitimate. - Legitimate and natural children are those who are born from a man and his wife. - Those are presumed in law to be legitimate and natural who are born from a mother joined in a just marriage, unless it is juridically certain that their origin is from someone other than the mother's husband. For he is held to be the father whom the nuptials demonstrate. The mother indeed is certain; but the father is presumed. And this presumption also has force in the forum of conscience. C. B. (Cod. Germ.) 1591, 1717, 1720.

20. The fetus is usually brought forth in the ninth month from the time when it was conceived, sometimes at the beginning of the seventh, sometimes at the completion of the tenth, namely not before 180 days, nor after 300 days, C. I. (Cod. Ital.) 161 seqq.; C. G. (Cod. Gall.) 315; C. H. (Cod. Hisp.) 108; C. A. (Cod. Austr.) 138, 163; C. B. 1592, 1717; C. L. (Cod. Lusit.) 101. - Hence of him who is born either after the seventh month from the marriage entered, or before the tenth month from the marriage dissolved, that one is the father whom the nuptials demonstrate, unless something else is most evident; C. L. 103. Nor indeed does it stand in the way that the mother was adulterous, C. I. 165; C. G. 313; C. H. 109; C. A. 158, or that she herself professed the son to be adulterine, C. A. 158, unless she brings forward such indications as would be sufficient in the external forum, Lugo de Iust. d. 12, n. 26, although she be most worthy of faith, and under oath, and dying, asserts it; for no one merits belief when alleging his own turpitude, C. Inter 8, sect. ult. de Donat.; L. 654, 924. - A fetus brought forth before the seventh month from the marriage entered is held legitimate only if the husband either knowingly and willingly married the pregnant woman, or, when he was present, did not wholly repudiate the born child, C. I. 161; C. G. 314; C. H. 110; C. L. 102. A fetus brought forth later, after the tenth month from the dissolution of the marriage, is held as illegitimate, unless the health and morals of the mother and the circumstances of things persuade otherwise, C. I. 169; C. G. 315; C. H. 111; C. L. 102 seqq.

21. Natural or illegitimate children are those who are born outside marriage. These by canon law are irregular; by civil law they are distinguished from legitimate chiefly as regards succession to the paternal inheritance. C. A. 155, 165; C. H. 114, 127, 134, 139. - Natural children, if they are born from a man and woman between whom marriage could not have been entered, whether by natural law or by divine and canon law, by the same canon law are called spurious, or born from a condemned intercourse, C. 3, 10 Qui fil. sint legit.; and they are adulterine, sacrilegious, incestuous, and nefarious; these latter are those who are born from ascendants and descendants. But by civil law all are called illegitimate and cannot be recognized, in various cases nevertheless determined by the various laws, C. I. 180; C. H. 119; C. G. 335; C. B. 1732; C. L. 122, 134. But in other cases not excepted by the laws they can be acknowledged and legitimated. C. I. 179, 195; C. G. 331, 334; C. L. 119. - They are acknowledged by the confession of the parents, by civil law authentic, C. I. 181; C. G. 334; C. H. 131; C. B. 1718; by canon law simple and bare, C. 10 de Probat.; and after they have been acknowledged, they follow the condition of the one acknowledging, whether mother, or father, or both, C. I. 185. - But those acknowledged are legitimated by subsequent marriage, by the law itself, C. 1, 6 Qui fil. sint leg.; C. I. 194; C. G. 331; C. H. 120, 121; C. A. 161; C. B. 1719; C. L. 119; and they can also be acknowledged after the marriage has already been contracted, C. I. 197; C. H. 121. Cf. C. G. 331. - But from the time they have been legitimated they are held just as if they had been brought forth from a just marriage, C. 6 Qui fil. sint leg.; C. I. 194; C. G. 333; C. H. 122; C. A. 161; C. L. 121. Cf. Benedict XIV, de Syn. l. 13, c. 24, n. 16. But one merely acknowledged is understood to be the child only of him who acknowledged him. C. I. 182; C. G. 336; C. H. 129, 134. - From C. B. 1589, 1705, it is established altogether against natural law that a natural son and father are not reputed blood-relations! and, on the contrary, in his relations with his mother he has the juridical condition of a legitimate son! - In doubt whether someone was born from a legitimate marriage, he must be presumed legitimate. C. I. 120. - L. l. 3, n. 951.

22. Legitimate children are legitimated natural children, and adopted children, C. I. 737. Adoption is an act by which someone who is not such by nature is admitted into the place of a child. From more recent laws, the adopted person is held just as the legitimate and natural son only of him who adopted him, and he acquires the right of succession to him, C. I. 202, 204, 210, 737; C. G. 343, 344, 350; C. B. 1741, 1757; C. L. 124, 129. But he is not exempted from the power of his natural father, nor does he pass into the power and family of the adopting father; C. I. 210, 212; C. G. 348, 349. It is otherwise from C. A. 183; C. H. 177; C. B. 1765. This adoption is perpetual and is not dissolved even by mutual consent, C. I. 217. And so also the French Jurisconsults. It is otherwise from C. A. 185; C. B. 1768.

23. Legitimate and natural children, as regards receiving donations and as regards the right of succession, are held such from the time when they were really conceived, provided that afterwards they are born viable, C. I. 724; C. G. 725; C. A. 138. One is born viable who is born after the 180th day from conception, C. I. 160, 162; C. G. 312, 314; C. A. 138, and has been perfectly born. In doubt, one who was brought forth alive is presumed to have been born viable, C. I. 724. Abortive children, if they do not survive, are held as born dead. - Merely natural children, whether legitimated or acknowledged, acquire the right of succession from the marriage of the parents entered, or from that time at which they afterwards were acknowledged, C. I. 197; C. H. 124. - Merely legitimate children acquire the right of succession from that time at which they were adopted, as if then first they had been conceived. C. I. 210, 217; C. B. 1754, 1757. From C. H. 177, an adopted person acquires no right of succession except from a testament or from a prior agreement. From C. B. 1767, the right of succession can be excluded in the contract of adoption. - Therefore a donation can be made to one scarcely conceived, and, when a pregnant widow has been left, the inheritance in the meantime pertains to the son to be born. But, when he is born dead, it devolves to the nearer cognates of the father.

24. Those younger than seven are called infants, as if non-speaking, unable to speak. If they have already attained the use of reason, although they are not held by human laws, nevertheless they are held by natural law. - From the seventh year to the fourteenth, if male; to the twelfth, if female, they are called impubes; but beyond the aforesaid age they are called pubes, namely from the proximate power of generation attained at that age. - Impubes, if they cease to be under the power of the father, by the father's death or by the emancipation of the children, are called pupilli, L. 239 de Verb. sign.; having become pubes, they are called minors up to the twenty-fifth year of age by Roman Law, L. 1 de Minoribus. - By more recent Law, every other distinction having been removed, whoever, male or female, has not yet completed the twenty-first year of age is called a minor; with such age completed, he is called of age, C. I. 323, 240; C. G. 388, 488; C. B. 2; C. L. 97, 311. From C. H. 320, majority is established when the twenty-third year has been completed; C. A. 21, 174, the twenty-fourth year. - A cleric is of age in beneficial and other spiritual causes when he has completed the fourteenth year of age. C. Si annum 3 de Iudic. in 6. - At a minor age the son, unless he is emancipated, is constituted under paternal power. C. I. 220; C. B. 1626. But one of age regularly manages his own affairs. From C. L. 311, he can freely dispose of his person and goods.

25. Since children have existence from parents, therefore, besides love, they owe them piety. For as the love of parents is for doing good, so the love of children is for honoring parents, St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 31, a. 3, ad 3; q. 26, a. 9, ad 1, ad 3. But although love does not import honor, honor includes love, since whom we honor from the soul we also love. Therefore when by a sin of children only charity toward parents is injured, the only malice contained in it is that alone which is against filial piety. But if that sin has another malice against another virtue, then this new species is superadded to the former. - Piety per se requires two things, reverence and service, but per accidens help to be furnished, if they are in need. Hence it is that a sin against piety can injure both love and reverence and service toward parents; as, for example, if a son conceives internal hatred against parents, or externally by words or another action saddens them, he sins against love; if he curses his parents he sins against love and against reverence; if he contemns parents and the precept of parents, he sins against reverence and obedience. Another species can also accede to the species against piety, for example, if a son defames or strikes his father, he sins against piety and against justice. - Even at a greater age children owe parents love, honor, and reverence, because they are always children, those always parents. - St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 26, a. 9, 10; q. 101, a. 7; L. 333; C. I. 220; C. G. 371; C. H. 154; C. A. 144, 154.

26. From Sacred Scripture, in several places under grave penalties, love, honor, and obedience toward parents are prescribed. Eccli. 3:8, 9, 18; 7:29, 30; Prov. 19:26; Deut. 27:16; Exod. 21:15; Eph. 6:1; Col. 3:20. - And this precept is also clear by reason; because parents have a threefold respect to children, namely by reason of cause, by reason of preeminence, and by reason of governance. Consequently children ought to love them as authors of their existence, honor them as Superiors, and obey them as rulers delegated by God. But this precept is grave per se. - "For among neighbors we are most bound to parents." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 122, a. 5. The reason is that, as the same St. Thomas teaches, 2.2, q. 102, a. 3, the persons of parents are more substantially joined to us than any other persons constituted in dignity. For generation and governance, of which parents are the principle, pertain more to substance than exterior governance, of which other persons constituted in dignity are the principle. Besides, "the showing of honor or worship must be proportioned not only to the person to whom it is shown, considered according to himself, but also according as he is compared to those showing it. Therefore although the virtuous considered according to themselves are more worthy of honor than the persons of parents; nevertheless children are more obligated, because of benefits received from the parents themselves and natural conjunction, to show worship and honor to parents than to virtuous strangers." St. Thomas, l. c.

27. Therefore although love, honor, and obedience, as they are shown to other men, pertain precisely to the virtue of charity, observance, and obedience, nevertheless as they are shown to parents they pertain to the virtue of piety, according as it is a certain special virtue which furnishes worship and duty to parents as the chief authors of life after God, and to other blood-relations, in whom, because of communion of blood, parents are in some way represented. But only those sins bear before themselves a special malice against piety which immediately injure their person, or intrinsic personal goods, such as hatred, detraction, striking; not theft. Nevertheless, since a father with respect to a son, and the same is true of a son with respect to a father, retains his own right as regards life, reputation, honor, a son sinning against his father in these things sins at once against piety and justice. But secretly taking away the goods of the father, against the father's will, a son sins per se only against commutative justice, and per se is bound to restitution.

28. For piety, which is between children and their parents, does not exclude strict justice between them. Those duties which are had between children and parents, as also between husband and wife, between brothers and sisters, and between other blood-relations, if they regard only these conditions of these persons, contain a certain deficient just, and pertain only to piety, as, for example, the education of children does. But those duties which regard the same persons among themselves insofar as they are men contain a just strictly such, and look to commutative justice. Therefore theft committed by a son against a father is theft injuring commutative justice, as any other theft. Likewise if a son kills his father, he sins against justice, as any other homicide, but besides there is also added a graver malice against piety. Similarly, if a spouse does not keep conjugal fidelity, he sins against justice, as any other person violating faith given in a bilateral and onerous contract; but besides there is added a graver malice against piety. The reason is that those duties which pertain to piety recede from the perfect distinction and otherness of persons which is properly required by commutative justice.

29. To the point St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 57, a. 4: "Right, or the just, is said by commensuration to another. But another can be said in two ways: in one way, that which is simply another, as that which is altogether distinct, as appears in two men, one of whom is not under the other, but both are under one prince of the city, and between such persons there is the simply just. In another way something is called another not simply, but as existing as something of him; and in this way in human affairs a son is something of the father, because he is in some way part of him, and a servant is something of the master, because he is his instrument. And therefore there is not a comparison of father to son as to one simply other; and on account of this there is not there the simply just, but a certain just, namely paternal; and by the same reason neither between master and servant, but there is between them dominative just. But a wife, although she is something of the husband, because she is compared to him as to his own body, nevertheless is more distinguished from the husband than a son from a father, or a servant from a master; for she is assumed into a certain social life of marriage; and therefore between husband and wife there is more of the account of the just than between father and son, or master and servant: because, since husband and wife have an immediate relation to domestic life, therefore between them there is not even the simply political just, but rather the economic just." But, as the same Angelic Doctor has ibid. ad 2: "A son, insofar as he is a son, is something of the father; and similarly a servant, insofar as he is a servant, is something of the master; nevertheless each, insofar as he is considered as a certain man, is something subsisting according to himself, distinct from others. And therefore, insofar as each is a man, justice is toward them in some way; and on account of this also some laws are given concerning those things which are of father to son, or of master to servant."

Hence it is clear that children under paternal power can well have dominion of things. But this dominion regards things given to them by any translative title of dominion, or acquired by their own industry. For as regards paternal goods, no strict right to paternal goods belongs to children while the father is living. Hence, if children under paternal power steal anything from these goods, they are bound to restitution per se. Per se, namely unless there is question of a thing of lesser moment, and it is prudently presumed that the father remits that obligation.

30. Now as regards love, one does not sin against it if parents are saddened by the manner of acting of children, when a just and grave cause urges that something be done, and it is clear that the offense of the parents arises from their mere moroseness.

But children, whether they are legitimate, that is, born in legitimate marriage from husband and wife, or illegitimate, that is, born outside legitimate marriage; likewise whether they are natural, generated from father and mother, or adopted, not from generation but from adoption, all owe parents love, honor, and obedience. But all owe love both by internal affection and by exterior work, also by furnishing them assistance if they are found in necessity, whether corporal or spiritual. For as love is contained under honor, so also the assistance of necessities is contained under the same honor. St. Thomas, Quodl. 3, a. 16.

31. As regards reverence, every irreverence and contempt toward parents, other things being equal, is graver than toward other neighbors, even relatives, even those constituted in dignity, because of the greater conjunction with them, which obtains the first grade after God, because of their greater dignity. But although, if children have injured the honor of parents, they ought to repair the injured honor to them by asking pardon from them, even before others in whose sight they sinned, nevertheless it can certainly be presumed, at least for the most part, where children refused to do this, that parents remit this obligation to the children, lest the children again incur offense of God and undergo eternal danger to the soul. Cf. St. Alphonsus n. 334.

32. Reverence can be injured by words, gestures, and deeds, namely gravely, even in those things which as regards others are light, provided that they are not altogether light. Therefore children sin gravely: by Words, by everywhere addressing parents harshly; or even by showing them no sign of benevolence; by calling them, when present, by contumelious words; or by cursing them from the soul; by Gestures, by looking at them with fierce eyes, by mocking and deriding them when present; by Deeds, by lifting hands against them with deliberation, as a sign of striking them, by accusing them of crimes, unless there is question of crimes pernicious to the republic, such as heresy, treason, etc. - L. 333, 334.

33. Service likewise is gravely injured by not obeying parents in those things which look to domestic governance and economy, or pertain to good morals, if nevertheless parents command seriously and in a grave matter; except the election of a state, the entering of marriage, the entering of religion, unless nevertheless parents for a just cause contradict children in this matter. Likewise a grave sin is committed by not acknowledging them as parents, unless this is done from a just cause and only by outwardly concealing that one is their son. But they by no means sin by fulfilling the duties of religion against the prohibition of parents. For as regards all those things which pertain to salvation, they "are immediately subject to God, by whom they are instructed through the natural or written law." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 104, a. 5, ad 2. - L. 334, 335; St. Thomas, Quodl. 2, a. 9, 2.2, q. 104, a. 2, 5; C. A. 148; C. L. 142.

34. The obedience to be furnished by children to parents is not unlimited, but has its own boundaries by which it is circumscribed. - The reason is that obedience is to be furnished according to the power of the Superior; namely, in those things to which the right of prelation extends. But paternal power does not exceed the rule and governance of the family, and the right education of the children. Aptly St. Thomas, Quodl. 2, q. 5, a. 9: "It must be said that, since obedience is owed to a prelate, the debt of obedience extends to those things to which the right of prelation extends. But a carnal father has the right of prelation over a son, first indeed as regards domestic conversation. For the father of a family is in the house as the king is in the kingdom; hence, just as subjects of the king are bound to obey the king in those things which pertain to the governance of the kingdom, so also children and others are bound to obey the father of the family in those things which pertain to the dispensation of the house. Secondly as regards discipline of morals, whence the Apostle says at Heb. 12:9: We had fathers of our flesh as instructors and we obeyed them. For the father owes the son not only education, but also discipline, as the Philosopher says. Therefore in these things the son is bound to obey the carnal father, and not in others."

35. And this doctrine is general: any subject whatever ought not obey his superior in all things, but only in those which pertain to his own subjection and to the superior's prelation. Man owes obedience in all things to God alone, because he is subject to God as regards all things; to any other human superior he is subject only according to a certain limited and determinate account. To the point St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 104, a. 5: "In those things which pertain to the disposition of human acts and things, a subject is bound to obey his superior according to the account of superiority; as a soldier obeys the commander of the army in those things which pertain to war, a servant his master in those things which pertain to carrying out servile works, a son his father in those things which pertain to discipline of life and domestic care, and so concerning others... Man is subject to God simply as regards all things, both interior and exterior, and therefore he is bound to obey Him in all things. But subjects are not subject to their superiors as regards all things, but as regards some things determinately, and as regards those things they are intermediaries between God and subjects. But as regards other things they are immediately subject to God, by whom they are instructed through the natural or written law."

36. Ought a son, concerning the election of a state, to consult parents and obey them? - R. 1. If there is question of the conjugal state, theologians more commonly teach that a son per se is bound to consult parents. The reason is that this is required by the service to be furnished by children to parents, that in a matter so grave, and in which they have greater experience, they should hear their counsel. But this obligation per se is light. For first, a grave obligation is not clear, since it is much disputed among the Doctors. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 849. Besides, this obligation cannot be grave, since children are not bound also to follow the counsel of parents, but are free. And they can sufficiently, either by themselves or through other prudent men, know what things occur in such an affair, lest they err in it. - But if there is question of the religious state, it is certain that per se they are not bound, nor is it expedient, commonly speaking, that children await the counsel of parents; because parents in this matter have no knowledge and experience, indeed often in this affair they are not friends, but enemies. St. Thomas, Opusc. 17, Against Those Withdrawing Men from Entrance into Religion, c. 9.

2. As regards the election of a state, children per se are not bound to obey parents. For God calling must be heeded more than men contradicting. Moreover in those things which pertain to the nature of the body, man is not bound to obey man, but God alone, because all men are equal by nature. "According to those things which pertain to the nature of the body, man is not bound to obey man, but only God; because all men are equal by nature; for instance in those things which pertain to the sustenance of the body and the generation of offspring. Hence servants are not bound to obey masters, nor children parents, concerning contracting marriage, or preserving virginity, or some other thing of this kind." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 104, a. 5; Suppl. q. 45, a. 5, ad 1, q. 47, a. 6. - Therefore parents sin gravely who force unwilling children, either directly or even indirectly, to choose a state, whether religious or clerical; or, conversely, if without just cause they prevent them, altogether unwilling, from choosing some state of life. It is said per se; for otherwise it must be said if parents, on account of grave and reasonable causes, contradict children. Cf. nn. seqq.

37. But, generally speaking, it is not to be advised to children of minor age that, without the knowledge of parents or against their will, they embrace the clerical or religious state, as often as the matter does not so urge, or the divine vocation is not sufficiently clear. St. Alphonsus, l. 4, n. 68. Besides, attention must be paid to more recent laws, by which parents, by the help of the secular arm, can take their own children from any place whatever and recall them to themselves. C. I. 221; C. G. 374.

38. When are children bound to obey reasonably unwilling parents as regards entering marriage itself? - The Council of Trent, sess. 24, cap. 1 de R. M., says that "marriages contracted by children of families without the consent of parents are indeed true and valid; but that nevertheless the Holy Church of God has always detested and prohibited them." But since the Church has never detested marriages contracted by children when parents are unreasonably unwilling, it follows that from the Tridentine saying it has detested and prohibited only those which are contracted by children when their parents are reasonably unwilling. - Therefore there are causes by which parents can be reasonably unwilling as regards entering marriage itself. And certainly parents are reasonably unwilling: 1. if a son, with no special reason urging, wishes to enter marriage before due age and an acquired state, so that he is afterwards forced to remain in continual necessity and poverty together with wife and children; for this tends to the harm of the son himself. And the positive law itself favors parents, which prescribes the age at which children are free in order to marriage. Italian Code, art. 63; French Code, art. 148. - 2. If he wishes to marry a dishonest, irreligious, non-Catholic person, etc.; for this tends to the still greater harm of the same son. Again the positive law of the Church favors parents by prohibiting mixed marriages. - 3. If a daughter wishes to marry a man unworthy of herself, with whom, namely, she cannot contract without dishonor to her family, according to the custom of her region, because of disparity in nobility. Yet one who is obscure when his family is considered can be distinguished here by wealth, letters, war, dignity. But for the most part it is more base and unseemly if daughters, than if sons, marry unequals or the unworthy, so that scarcely ever is a daughter joined in marriage with an unworthy man without grave dishonor to the family, and also quarrels and grave enmities, being generated from it. Cf. Ithur. Cas. 14. - 4. "They commonly say... that a son is bound to obey if that marriage would be of great importance for removing grave dissensions or relieving grave necessity of the parents, not now by force of precept, but from the virtue of piety, because a son is bound to assist parents in necessity. And St. Thomas agrees with this in 4 D. 29, q. 1, a. 4, where he teaches: A father cannot force a son to Marriage by precept; but he can induce him from a reasonable cause; and then as the son is related to that cause, so he is related to the precept of the father; but if that cause obliges by necessity or honesty, the precept similarly obliges; otherwise not." St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 850. Besides, the obligation of entering such a marriage "must also be understood as often as there would not be for him a very intolerable horror toward that woman; for charity can oblige no one to so much that he would have to live his whole life with a wife whom he notably abhorred." St. Alphonsus, Hom. Apost. tr. 18, n. 10. - 5. Parents can be reasonably unwilling because of scandals and hatreds of blood-relations that would arise, especially by reason of disparity in wealth. "Then children are bound under mortal sin to obey parents by abstaining from a marriage of this kind, when they can do so without their own grave inconvenience." For charity does not oblige with such inconvenience. St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 851. And it certainly is a grave inconvenience for a son if he is forced to omit marriage with a girl with whom he believes he will lead a quiet life. Nor indeed is it to be omitted that, once the marriage is entered, minds are easily reconciled, dissensions and scandals vanish. L. l. c. Cf. Hom. Apost. tr. 18, n. 16.

39. Can a son enroll for military service against the will of his parents? - He can, from the Italian Civil Code, art. 221. He can also from the French Civil Code, art. 374, provided that he has reached the age of eighteen years. This, however, seems to have force only for the external forum; except unless sufficient causes are present, for example, if the son is altogether badly treated in the paternal house, etc. Thus commonly. Gury 370.

40. Even at a greater age, as has already been said, children owe parents love, honor, reverence, and also help, if they need it; because they are always children, those always parents. But the obligation of obedience ceases when the son is no longer under paternal power. C. L. 142. This paternal power ceases at the son's greater age, or by emancipation. But if the son, although of age or emancipated, continues to dwell in the paternal house, he remains still subject to the father, and is bound to obey him in those things which pertain to domestic order, by reason of domestic power which is in the father over the whole house.

41. Children also owe help to parents in need, and consequently ought to support them; and it is grave even to enter religion by deserting them in want. Likewise it is grave under this head not to care that the sacraments be conferred upon the sick; that the dead be handed over to burial; that some sacrifice be offered for their soul. - St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 101, a. 2, a. 4, ad 4, q. 102, a. 2, q. 123, a. 5, ad 3; L. 333, 335; C. I. 139; C. G. 205; C. A. 154; C. B. 1617.

42. "Whether someone is bound to contract marriage, so that he may sustain his father by the dowry, if otherwise he cannot?" - "It must be said," says the Angelic Doctor, Quodl. 10, a. 9, "that the proposed case does not seem easily possible. For it can scarcely happen that someone cannot sustain parents without the contract of marriage, at least by working with his hands or begging. If nevertheless this should happen, the same judgment would have to be made concerning virginity to be preserved in that article, and concerning other works of perfection, as is made concerning entrance into religion, about which some opine variously. For some say that if someone has a needy father, he ought to leave to him whatever he has for his sustenance, and thus can licitly enter religion, committing the care of his parents to the heavenly Father, who also feeds the birds. But because this opinion seems too harsh, therefore it seems better to say that either this man who has the intention of entering religion sees that he cannot live in the world without mortal sin, or not easily. If he fears for himself the danger of mortal sin, since he is more bound to provide for the salvation of his own soul than for the corporal necessity of his parents, he is not bound to remain in the world. But if he sees that he can live in the world without sin, a distinction seems to be made; because if without his service his parents can in no way live, thus he is bound to serve them and to set aside other works of perfection, and he would sin by leaving them; but if without his service they can in some way be sustained, but not honorably, he is not on this account bound to leave aside works of perfection. But it is otherwise concerning him who has already entered religion, because, since he is already dead to the world through profession, he is loosed from the law by which he was bound to parents in worldly services, according to the doctrine of the Apostle at Rom. 7. But in other spiritual things, for instance prayers and things of this kind, he is bound to serve them."

43. Ought a son to leave the religious state because of the necessity of parents? - "One thing must be said," says St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 101, a. 4, ad 4, "about him who is still constituted in the world, and another about him who is already professed in religion. For he who is constituted in the world, if he has parents who cannot be sustained without him, ought not enter religion, leaving them behind; because he would transgress the precept concerning the honoring of parents: although some say that even in this case he could licitly leave them, committing their care to God; but, if someone rightly considers it, this would be to tempt God, since, having by human counsel what he should do, he would expose his parents to danger under hope of divine assistance. But if without him the parents can pass their life, it would be lawful for him, having left his parents, to enter religion; because children are not bound to the sustenance of parents except by reason of necessity. But he who is already professed in religion is reckoned now as if dead to the world; whence he ought not, on the occasion of sustaining parents, to leave the cloister, in which he is buried together with Christ, and entangle himself again in secular affairs. Nevertheless, with obedience to his Prelate and the state of his religion preserved, he is bound to apply pious zeal as to how his parents may be assisted." And ibid. ad 3: "If our services are necessary to carnal parents, so that without them they cannot be sustained, and they do not lead us to anything against God, we ought not leave them under the view of religion. But if without sin we cannot be occupied in their services, or also if they can be sustained without our service, it is lawful to omit their services, in order that we may be more occupied with religion."

44. Do children owe to parents even their own goods? - R. Negatively. Children owe piety to parents, not works. Therefore, if a son in the paternal house furnishes works, for example, of a craftsman or shoemaker, what is gained from them is his own, with the food which he receives from the father deducted; since now by his own work and labor he is able to be sustained, and no longer needs paternal sustenance. But, if he asks nothing, he seems to remit these things to the father from a grateful soul and piety. The same must be said concerning goods acquired by the son, by donation, testament, etc.; these indeed the son makes his own, but he is bound to refund to the father the expenses of education. C. A. 150, 154;

C. B. 685, 1618. Nor indeed is he bound from his own goods to pay the debts of his father. - These things stand by natural law, and are confirmed by positive law, which, determining the natural obligation, ascribes to parents the usufruct of the goods of their children. - As regards positive law, ownership, or the property of goods, usufruct, and administration must be distinguished. Likewise various goods and various laws must be distinguished: the Common or Roman Law, and the various More Recent Laws, which are in force in various regions. - From the more recent Codes, sons of families, generally, although minors and not emancipated, have direct ownership of all goods which come to them by some just title, of inheritance, donation, their own industry, etc.; certainly they are capable of dominion of property. But the administration of all goods is in the power of the father, or mother, or tutor, who must supply the incapacity or inexperience of the children, until they become of age, or obtain emancipation. Those of age have full administration of their own goods; but emancipated persons have it only limitedly. Finally the usufruct of at least some goods is granted to the father, or to the mother having paternal power, until the children become of age or are emancipated. But it is lost by either parent who, after the death of the spouse, enters other nuptials. Commonly excepted from usufruct are goods left or given to children on the condition that the father not receive the usufruct; goods which children acquire for themselves by their own office, profession, art, labor, or separate industry. Parents, however, must feed and educate children according to their condition and fortune. C. I. 230; C. G. 385; C. L. 148. - Since the right of parents as regards the goods of children constitutes part of those rights whence paternal power is had, we shall soon speak of it more particularly when declaring paternal power. - L. 488; C. B. 1627.