VI. On the Obligations of Spouses

88. The obligations of spouses are derived from marriage.

Therefore it is necessary first to inspect the final cause to which marriage is ordained of itself. For in any thing whatever the final cause is the first and fundamental rule of all the other things which are in it. But the consideration of the moral honesty of any thing depends especially on it. Moreover, "through marriage some are ordained to one generation and education of offspring, and again to one domestic life." Hence marriage is the legitimate conjunction of man and woman for one generation and education of offspring and for one domestic life; and "according to this conjunction they are called husband and wife." St. Thomas, 4 D. 27, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 1. Husband and wife constitute one adequate principle of human generation. Therefore the first and fundamental end of marriage, the principal, the more principal end according to St. Thomas, is the legitimate procreation and education of human offspring. St. Thomas, 4 D. 26, q. 1, a. 1; D. 33, q. 1, a. 2. From this flows the other secondary end of marriage, mutual help, which both presupposes that one undivided principle of human offspring constituted, and is ordained to the suitable receiving and education of human offspring. Whence St. Thomas, from St. Augustine, says in the cited place, sol. 2, that marriage is so called "from this, that the woman ought not marry for another reason, except that she be a mother."

89. Hence between man and woman there is a true society, conjugal society. Aptly St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 41, a. 1: "The secondary end of marriage is the mutual service furnished to each other by the spouses in domestic matters. For just as natural reason dictates that men dwell together, because one is not sufficient for himself in all things which pertain to life itself, by reason of which man is said to be naturally political; so also, of those things which are needed for human life, certain works are fitting to men, certain works to women. Whence nature moves that there be a certain association of man with woman."

90. But this partnership of common life on account of the communication of works, as is clear, cannot be the principal end of marriage, since it presupposes that end, namely offspring. Let the Angelic Doctor be heard, Suppl. q. 49, a. 2, ad 1: "In offspring there is understood not only the procreation of offspring, but also its education, to which, as to an end, is ordained the whole communication of works which is between man and wife, insofar as they are joined in marriage, because fathers naturally store up for children, as is clear from 2 Cor. 12; and thus in offspring, as in the principal end, another as secondary is included."

91. "Marriage has for its principal end the procreation and education of offspring... for its secondary end the communication of works which are necessary in life, and according to this they owe fidelity to each other... It has further another end, insofar as it is among the faithful, namely the signification of Christ and the Church; and thus the good of marriage is called sacrament... The remedy of concupiscence is its secondary end... According as marriage is ordained to its principal end, which is the good of offspring, the wife is joined to the husband by an indissoluble conjunction, or at least a lasting one... But as regards the second end, which is the management of the family and the communication of works, the wife is joined to the husband as an associate." St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 45, a. 1, c. ad 7; a. 5, c.

92. "Moreover, marriage from the intention of nature is ordained to the education of offspring not only for some time, but through the whole life of the offspring. Whence it is of the law of nature that parents store up for children, and that children be the heirs of parents." St. Thomas, 4 D. 33, q. 2, a. 1. "For the inseparability of marriage is not ordained to the good of offspring, which is the principal end of marriage, except insofar as provision must be made for children by parents through their whole life by due preparation of those things which are necessary in life." St. Thomas, l. c., qc. 4, sol. 1.

93. Therefore, since in marriage there is mutually acquired dominion of one over the body of the other, by which man and woman enjoy each other in order to human generation, there arises a mutual strict obligation of the spouses from justice of preserving conjugal fidelity. And, since from the very nature of marriage the conjugal bond is born, even with the other party consenting, the nefarious crime of adultery can never be absent if a spouse breaks the pledged fidelity. There also arises another mutual obligation of cohabitation from the aforesaid dominion and right of possession which one has over the body of the other. Likewise there is had the obligation of mutual love, and the friendship of husband and wife, since they are as it were one thing. Finally, the obligation of parents in the education of children flows from the same source. For it belongs to parents both to give first existence to their own children, and consequently to lead them to due perfection physically and morally, by physical and moral education. For children are something of the father, as the Philosopher says, and as it were one and the same thing with their own parents; and thus parents, in exercising this office of education imposed by nature itself, have a true right, of which they can be deprived only by injury. For as one naturally loves himself, and by this same natural love is inclined by the very force of nature to acquire the perfection due to himself, so also by the same natural love he pursues what is intimately joined to him and pertains to him, and consequently is stirred to promote its perfection. But children are nearest to parents, and naturally joined to them, as is confirmed by natural instinct itself.

94. Against the fidelity of marriage to be preserved, a difficulty can arise from the fact that perhaps the woman is sterile, and marriage is for procreating offspring. - The response which is brought forward by St. Thomas against the inseparability of marriage from the same head has force. - "Marriage is principally ordained to the common good by reason of the principal end, which is the good of offspring, although also by reason of the secondary end it is ordained to the good of the one contracting marriage, insofar as of itself it is a remedy of concupiscence. And therefore in the laws of marriage what is expedient for all is attended to more than what may be fitting for one. Therefore although the inseparability of marriage impedes the good of offspring in some man, nevertheless it is suitable to the good of offspring simply, and on account of this the reason objected does not follow," namely that the inseparability of marriage is contrary to the good of offspring because some man, from a certain accidental cause, cannot receive offspring from some woman, who nevertheless could conceive from another, and who also could be impregnated by another man. St. Thomas, 4 D. 33, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4. Moreover, as is clear, even simple adultery would yield to the gravest detriment of the conjugal state and of offspring. Whence among all peoples it is a detestable crime.

95. Hence marriage is defined in C. 11, de Praesumptionibus and Inst. l. 1, t. 9, sect. 1: The conjunction of male and female retaining an undivided habit of life. It brings an undivided habit of life, "that is, not temporary, but of itself to endure until death. The habit of life signifies both in the first place a mutual right with a relative obligation over the body of the other in order to generating and educating offspring, or the right of coition, as they say; and then the communion of bed, table, and dwelling in union of souls through mutual love and in some union of goods. Hence marriage brings to each party both an exclusive and perpetual right with a relative obligation over the body of the other in order to generating and educating offspring, from 1 Cor. 7:4; and the communion of bed, table, and dwelling in union of wills and goods." Gasparri, de Matrim., n. 205, vol. 1, Paris ed. 1891, p. 119.

And Austrian Code, art. 44: "Family relations are established by the contract of marriage. In the contract of marriage two persons of different sex declare, in the manner willed by law, the will to live in an inseparable partnership, to procreate children and educate them, and to furnish reciprocal assistance." - C. L. 1054.

96. These things having been laid down, the obligations of spouses now appear sufficiently and more than sufficiently. These, generally, are some as regards persons, others as regards goods, others as regards the body. Here we shall speak only of the obligations as regards persons, which properly pertain here, and as regards goods, which rather look to the Treatise on justice, passing over those as regards the body, of which there is treatment in the Commentary on the sixth and ninth Precepts of the Decalogue.

97. The obligations as regards persons are some mutual, others proper to only one or the other. The mutual obligations are: mutual love, mutual help as to body and as to soul, the conjugal debt, and consequently common dwelling, common table, common bed. To the husband belongs marital power over the wife, and the chief paternal power over the children; and he himself is bound to feed the wife according to his own condition. To the wife, as mother, belongs educating the offspring, although dependently on the husband, and having care of the family matter, also dependently on the husband, from whom she has the right of receiving suitable sustenance. - The head of the wife is the man, and thus the wife is under the power of the man in those things which pertain to marriage, that is, which pertain to the undivided habit of life. Eph. 5:22 seqq.; C. A. 91. Wherefore the wife, without the consent of the husband, cannot be obligated by vow, St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 88, a. 8, ad 3; L. l. 3, n. 234; regularly cannot be obligated by contract; cannot travel without the consent of the husband, and regularly ought to follow the domicile of the husband, C. I. 131, 134, 135; C. G. 214, 217, 220, 221, 222; C. H. 58; C. A. 91, 92; C. B. 1554; although the husband changes domicile without cause; provided the wife can follow him without grave detriment either of soul or of body, and, from C. L. 1186, not into a foreign nation. By the same C. L. 1187, the wife cannot publish a writing without the consent of the husband. - C. Pervenit 1, de Coni. lepr.; Sanchez, de Matr. l. 1, d. 41, n. 2, 4; L. 251, l. 6, n. 977; Suppl. q. 64, a. 6, ad 1; Quodl. 4, a. 11.

98. The wife has the administration of the goods of the house; but she must furnish reverence, service, and obedience to the husband in those things which regard the governance of the house and good morals. Nevertheless she is his associate, not his maidservant. Wherefore, if she herself is rich or noble, she is not forced to furnish to the husband those things which are not of her dignity, for example to cook food, sweep the house, etc. Yet if she does not obey the husband in a grave matter, she sins gravely, and a certain moderate coercion is permitted to the husband. 1 Peter 3:5 seqq.; L. 351, 352, 356, l. 6, n. 972; Sanchez, de Matr. l. 6, d. 6, n. 14; C. I. 131; C. G. 313; C. H. 57; C. B. 1354, 1356, 1357; C. L. 1185, 1189; Leo XIII, Enc. Arcanum, Feb. 10, 1886.

99. The man in turn must love and protect the wife, according to Eph. 5:25; C. I. 132; C. H. 57; C. G. 213; C. L. 1185; feed her, dwell with her; and thus it is not lawful for him to be absent from her for a long time, except from a grave cause, Gen. 2:24; C. 1, de Coni. lepr.; C. I. 130, 132; C. G. 212, 214; and not even to enter upon a long pilgrimage, against the woman's will, C. 8, de Voto. Yet for the most part the husband is not bound to lead the wife with him, with great inconvenience and expenses, when it happens that he must travel about for the sake of business. C. 9, sect. In tanta, de Voto. But the husband sins gravely if he afflicts the wife with contumelious or defamatory words; if he impedes her concerning the precepts of God or of the Church without just cause; if he gravely beats the wife; if he neglects the governance of the house and the family matter. Col. 3:18, 19; L. 356. - Sanchez, de Matr. l. 9, d. 5, n. 17; St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 26, a. 11.

100. In those things which pertain to the mutual help of life, man and wife are of equal right, since marriage is entered for the sake of mutual help. Hence they mutually owe to each other love, fidelity, assistance, aid, according to Eph. 5:25; Tit. 2:4; Matt. 19:5; 1 Cor. 7:3 seqq.; C. I. 130; C. G. 212; C. H. 56; C. A. 90; C. L. 1184; and if anything adverse happens to one, the other ought to be a participant. Wherefore a woman must follow the man migrating elsewhere for the sake of health, or as a punishment, and the man must follow the woman, L. 353, l. 6, n. 957, 977; and to the other who is in need, even driven into exile by his own fault, or enclosed in prison, indeed even separated from him, provided it was not by his own fault, if the other has means, he must furnish support; and the man must feed the wife, even if he married her without a dowry, or the dowry perished by chance. C. I. 132, 133, 142; C. G. 214; C. B. 1360, 1361; Sanchez, de Matr. l. 9, d. 4, n. 20; d. 5, n. 8, 14.

It is lawful for neither, against the will of the other, to enter religion, C. un. Extr. de Voto; and one who passes, against the spouse's will, to religion can be recalled, C. 3, 12, de Conv. coni.; nor is it lawful for the man, against the wife's will, to receive orders, indeed not even tonsure, C. 4, de Temp. ord. in 6, except if he has justly and by law departed from her as regards habitation. L. l. 6, n. 969.

101. Note. Children and the wife can receive support from one burdened with debts, who is not solvent, since he is held to feeding them from strict piety, and also from legal justice; nor is he less bound to feed them than to pay other debts. Indeed they can do this even if the father of the family contracts other debts, provided nevertheless they do not have sustenance from elsewhere. Nor indeed after the father's death is a son bound to pay these debts of the father, if the father left no goods to the son: for that obligation was altogether personal to the father. - "Yet the wife cannot use for the sustenance of the family monies given by the husband for paying debts, except in the case in which the family is gravely in need; for then the man is first bound to assist this family, and therefore the wife then uses her own right. Thus Laymann, who adds that wages of workers for the necessary uses of the debtor are to be preferred even to hypothecary creditors." L. 695, 354.

102. Can spouses sometimes depart without the consent of the other? - R. 1. "It is certain that spouses are held from an obligation of justice to cohabit in the same house, table, and bed." St. Alphonsus, l. c., n. 938. Hence it is inferred that one spouse cannot, with the other spouse unwilling, depart elsewhere for a long time, unless just causes are present, namely on account of the public good, for feeding and protecting the family, for avoiding harm to be inflicted by enemies, etc., and unless he cannot bring the other spouse to another place, so that the other may cohabit with him, without grave inconvenience. C. Pervenit 1, De Coniugio Leprosorum; C. Quod super 8, De Voto, in fine. - 2. "The man can undertake a brief pilgrimage for the sake of devotion, even with the wife unwilling; yet the wife cannot do this without the consent of the husband, since she herself is subject to his will, and it does not befit the state of women to go on pilgrimage." St. Alphonsus, l. c. - 3. "By mutual consent spouses can indeed be separated from each other, provided that danger of incontinence and harm to the offspring to be educated are absent, from that saying of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 7: Do not defraud one another, except perhaps by consent for a time, that you may give yourselves to prayer, and return again to the same thing, lest Satan tempt you." St. Alphonsus, l. c. - It is confirmed from the clear doctrine of St. Thomas, Quodl. 4, art. 11, where he moves the question: "Whether a man can take the cross, with his wife unwilling, if there is fear concerning her continence." The Holy Doctor responds: "It must be said that those things which are of necessity are not to be omitted on account of those things which are of one's own will; whence also the Lord, Matt. 15, reproved the Pharisees, who taught that the commandment concerning honoring parents was to be omitted, so that certain voluntary offerings might be offered to God. But from necessity it is incumbent on the man that he bear care for the wife, because the head of the woman is the man, as is said in 1 Cor. 11:3. But that he take the cross for crossing the sea is subject to his own will. Whence if the wife is such that she cannot follow, on account of some legitimate impediment, and there is fear concerning her incontinence, it is not to be counseled to him that he take the cross and dismiss the wife. But it is otherwise if the wife voluntarily proposes to contain, or wills and is able to follow her husband."

103. "The obligation of these acts, by which spouses are bound, is founded in the very conjunction of bodies and the contract of marriage, which by natural and divine law ought to be perpetual and ordained to an undivided society of life and to offspring procreated, fed, and educated. Whence this obligation is grave, and pertains to the virtue of piety, since it is founded in the conjunction of bodies, seed, and blood." Strugll 20. - C. I. 130-133; C. G. 212-214.