Chapter VII — On the necessity of love, or of inchoate charity, for the sacrament of Penance

The prejudices being overthrown and the opinion of fear-born attrition rejected, it now remains that I make plain the necessity of inchoate charity. Which, that I may perform it clearly and evidently, I divide the matter into the following sections.

I. Christ the Lord, Matthew 22: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind. This is the greatest and the first commandment. St. Paul, 1 Corinthians 16: If any man love not our Lord Jesus Christ, let him be anathema. And John: He that loveth not, abideth in death.

II. Trent, session 14, chapter 4, condemned the errors of the innovators, as has been indicated. Moreover, session 6, chapter 6, concerning which our adversaries are silent, explains the dispositions necessary for the sacraments. It lays down these things: But they are disposed to that justice itself when, excited and helped by divine grace, conceiving faith from hearing, they are freely moved toward God, believing those things to be true which have been divinely revealed and promised: and this above all, that the wicked man is justified by God through his grace, and the redemption which is in Christ Jesus; and when, understanding themselves to be sinners, they, from the fear of divine justice by which they are… … struck, turning themselves to the consideration of God's mercy, are raised up into hope, trusting that God will be propitious to them for Christ's sake; AND THEY BEGIN TO LOVE HIM AS THE FOUNTAIN OF ALL JUSTICE, and are therefore moved against sins by a certain hatred and detestation, that is, by that penance which must be performed BEFORE Baptism.

III. First of all observe that Trent here does not condemn any error of the innovators, as it does at session 14, chapter 4, but instructs Catholics and explains the dispositions necessary for receiving the sacraments, or for obtaining justification. Various are the interpretations which the defenders of servile attrition have devised. Some say: the Council explains the dispositions necessary for justification outside Baptism. This interpretation fights directly with the decree, in which it is said: by that penance which must be performed before Baptism. Others assert that the Council recounts all those acts not because they are necessary, but because they are regularly always had. The Council therefore treats not of necessary but of arbitrary dispositions. In this fashion all the canons can be eluded.

IV. Turnely, page 158, confesses that the Council besides faith and hope demands a love of God, but does not openly explain of what sort that love is. That theologian confesses that this love which the Council requires is distinct from the love of hope; but it is unknown whether it be distinct as thing from thing, or as effect from cause. What of this? Do philosophers and theologians acknowledge only two loves, of concupiscence and of friendship, that is, of benevolence or of charity? Our adversaries confess that the Council, besides the love of concupiscence which accompanies hope and precedes it as the foundation upon which it rests, demands another love. Therefore this love is distinct from the love of hope, and is the love of charity, or of friendship and benevolence. There is here no lurking-place for escape.

V. The Fathers of Trent go on, chapter 7, where they teach these things: Upon this disposition or preparation there follows justification itself, which is not the remission of sins alone, but also the sanctification and renewal of the interior man through the voluntary reception of grace and of the gifts, whence a man from unjust becomes just, from an enemy a friend.

VI. In justification there is made a renewal of the interior man. In what manner is this renewal made? Through the voluntary reception of grace. These words betray a free and actual consent of the will. What do the other later words betray? Whence a man from unjust becomes just, from an enemy a friend. Two enemies cannot pass from enmity into a sincere and mutual friendship unless both follow one another with a sincere and reciprocal love of friendship. What is friendship between God and us? Charity. Into this friendship, says the Council, a man freely consents. Therefore that consent is of charity. These things are clear.

VII. Will they cavil that these things are to be understood of a priority of nature and not of time; of a consent accompanying or consequent, not antecedent to justification? But these little distinctions most ineptly suited to this argument the Council itself overthrows, declaring the free consent to be toward a future justification. Besides, in the same place, chapter 5, it premises this: That the beginning of this justification in adults is to be taken from the preventing grace of God through Jesus Christ, that is, from his vocation, by which, no merits of theirs existing, they are called; so that those who by sins were turned away from God, through his exciting and helping grace may be disposed to convert themselves to their own justification, by freely assenting to and cooperating with that same grace: so that, God touching the heart of man by the illumination of the Holy Ghost, neither does the man himself do nothing at all, receiving that inspiration, since he can also cast it away; nor yet without the grace of God can he by his own free will move himself to justice before him.

VIII. Freely does a man move, dispose, and prepare himself for his own future justification; freely does he assent to it, and he can reject it, and he ought to cooperate with it. At last the Council in the same place, canon 3, defines this: If anyone shall say that without the preventing inspiration of the Holy Ghost and his help a man can believe, hope, love, or repent as he ought, that the grace of justification may be conferred upon him, let him be anathema. The whole doctrine of the Council is set forth under a single glance of the eyes in this canon. In a distinct order there is first proposed faith; afterwards hope, and therefore the love of concupiscence, without which hope is not given; and at last charity. Therefore the Council, besides the love of hope — which love, as has been said, necessarily precedes hope — requires an incipient charity, by which, as the Council says, we begin to love God as the fountain of all justice. The most wise BOSSUET, On the Doctrine of the Council of Trent, part 1, no. 14, testifies that this doctrine was drawn from St. Thomas, nay woven out of his very words.

IX. Will they reply that this doctrine of Trent was handed down for Baptism, but not for the sacrament of Penance? Is less required for this sacrament than for that? The first Baptism is of cold water; the second, of Penance, is more laborious, is of boiling water which scalds the skin. Is not Penance a sacrament of the dead, as is Baptism? Hence the most learned Bossuet in the place cited, page 52, rightly cries out: Wherefore let the gravity and authority of the School send these mockeries of opinions far away and keep them off: and indeed it is certain that this answer is, not to say something graver, improbable and rash. Deservedly with episcopal gravity does Bossuet disapprove these opinings of certain men as mockeries of opinions.

X. The doctrine of Trent its own Catechism declares, part 2, chapter 5, § 9, in these words: It is also to be said by what DEGREES it is permitted to ascend to this divine virtue. First therefore the mercy of God prevents us, and turns our hearts to himself. … Then, illuminated by this light, we tend toward God in mind through faith. Moreover there follows a motion of fear, and, the bitterness of punishments being set before it, the soul is called back from sins. … And then there comes hope of obtaining mercy from God, raised by which we determine to amend our life and morals. Lastly OUR HEARTS ARE KINDLED WITH CHARITY, whence arises that liberal fear worthy of upright and ingenuous sons: and so, fearing lest in anything we offend the majesty of God, we utterly forsake the habit of sinning. By these DEGREES therefore, as it were, one arrives at this most excellent virtue of penance.

I. St. Augustine, epistle 45 to Anastasius, writes these things: He vainly reckons himself a conqueror of sin who does not sin from fear of punishment; because, although the business of evil desire is not fulfilled without, yet the evil desire itself is within an enemy. … He therefore is an enemy of justice who does not sin from fear of punishment; but he will be a friend if he do not sin from love of it: for then will he truly fear to sin. For he who dreads hell does not fear to sin, but to burn; but he fears to sin who hates sin itself as he hates hell. Likewise, tract 5 on John: The sons of God are discerned from the sons of the devil by love and charity alone. Again in his exposition of the epistle to the Galatians: Sins are not taken away save by the grace of faith which works through love. Six hundred other testimonies of the holy Doctor I could transcribe, which I pass over.

II. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 107, art. 1, reply 2, writes these things: The old law is said to restrain the hand, not the soul: because he who from FEAR OF PUNISHMENT abstains from some sin does NOT SIMPLY withdraw his will from sin, AS the will of him withdraws who from LOVE OF JUSTICE abstains from sin: and on this account the NEW LAW, WHICH IS THE LAW OF LOVE, is said to restrain the soul. Again, Book 4 Against the Gentiles, chapter 72, he teaches this: The first thing which is required in Penance is the ordering of the mind, namely that the mind be converted to God and turned away from sin, grieving for what has been committed and purposing that it is not to be committed, which is of the character of contrition. But this reordering of the mind cannot be without grace: for our mind cannot be duly converted to God WITHOUT CHARITY.

III. At last, very many other testimonies being omitted, at 3, question 85, article 5, he most clearly sets forth the necessity of charity for the sacrament of Penance, where he discusses the controversy of set purpose. For he inquires whether the first principle of penance be from fear. And he answers in these words: The first principle is the operation of God converting the heart, according to that of Lamentations: Convert us, O Lord, to thee, and we shall be converted. The second act is a motion of faith. The third is a motion of servile fear, by which one is drawn back from sins through fear of punishments. The fourth act is a motion of hope, by which a man under the hope of obtaining pardon takes up the purpose of amending. The fifth act is A MOTION OF CHARITY, by which sin displeases a man ACCORDING TO ITSELF, and not now on account of punishments. The sixth act is a motion of filial fear, by which for reverence of God a man voluntarily offers amendment to God. So therefore it is plain that the act of penance proceeds from servile fear as from the first motion of the affection ordained to this; but from filial fear as from the immediate and proximate principle. This doctrine he repeats in the Supplement, question 3, article 1, reply 4: But the malice in a mortal fault is measured from him against whom the sin is committed, inasmuch as it is unworthy of him; and from him who sins, inasmuch as it is harmful to him. And because a man ought to love God more than himself, therefore he ought to grieve more for the fault inasmuch as it is an offence of God, than inasmuch as it is harmful to him. Thus far he.

IV. This is the most splendid picture of Christian penance, which St. Thomas delineated with vivid colours, and to whose exemplar the Council of Trent formed the decree of session 6, chapter 6, on the testimony of Dominic Soto. But I pass over Soto the Dominican; BOSSUET testifies this, writing these things in the place cited, page 90: Not therefore undeservedly have we said that so great is the consent of the most holy Synod of Trent with the doctrine of St. Thomas, that from the latter the former seems in a certain manner to have been woven.

V. Further, St. Thomas confirms and declares the aforesaid doctrine in a marvellous manner, 1-2, question 113, article 10, in these words: This is the COMMON AND ACCUSTOMED COURSE OF JUSTIFICATION, that, God moving the soul inwardly, a man be converted to God, first indeed by an imperfect conversion, that afterwards he may come to a perfect one. Because INCHOATE CHARITY MERITS TO BE INCREASED, THAT, BEING INCREASED, IT MAY MERIT TO BE PERFECTED, as Augustine says: but sometimes God moves the soul so vehemently that it AT ONCE attains a certain perfection of justice, as was in the conversion of Paul, and so forth.

VI. This same doctrine he had premised in the same place, article 4, reply 1, saying: It must therefore be said that it belongs to the same virtue to pursue one of two opposites and to flee the other: and therefore, just as it belongs to charity to love God, SO ALSO TO DETEST SINS, by which the soul is separated from God.

VII. Again in the same place, article 7, reply 1, he subjoins: Free will can be moved to two things at once, according as one is ordained to the other. But the motion of free will into sin is ordained to THE MOTION OF FREE WILL INTO GOD. For on this account a man detests sin, BECAUSE IT IS AGAINST GOD, to whom he wills to cleave (namely by love). Therefore free will (in the justification of the wicked) AT ONCE DETESTS SIN AND CONVERTS ITSELF INTO GOD, JUST AS ALSO A BODY, BY WITHDRAWING FROM ONE PLACE, AT THE SAME TIME APPROACHES ANOTHER.

VIII. Either our adversaries must send back word to the Council of Trent, to Sts. Augustine and Thomas, and to the Tridentine Catechism; or they must submit the sickle to this doctrine and give their conquered hands. Very many other testimonies of the holy Fathers I omit for brevity's sake.

I. The first and greatest mandate imposes the love of God. No time can be assigned in which that precept presses more than when there is question of recovering by penance the friendship of God. For therefore did a Christian sin, because he did not love God. Therefore he is chiefly bound to burn with divine love when he grieves for the friendship of God lost, and busies himself with his whole strength to restore it.

II. It pleases me to confirm this doctrine by an opportune example. Hear the prodigal son addressing his father. I grieve, father, and, so far as I am able, I grieve vehemently that I have sinned. Earnestly do I beg and demand pardon for my past outrageous and wicked life. I burn with love of entering upon thy vast inheritance, and I conceive a firm hope of obtaining the same. But because I have so often sinned against thy commandments, I fear vehemently lest I be about to lose it: and on account of this fear of undergoing so grave a loss, it vehemently repents me to have sinned. Yet I would have thee know, my father, that what lies hidden within my heart is not love toward thee and toward thy goodness — of which I experience not even a slight and inchoate spark — but only fear of the loss to be sustained, only hope of obtaining an opulent patrimony. I have not one cause of returning to thee: I do not love thee loving me, but I fear thee threatening penalties and punishments. I do not love thy goodness most lavish toward me; but I dread my disinheriting most pernicious to me. This inheritance I covet; from this love of concupiscence toward thy riches, hope arises in me of obtaining the same. Love therefore, father, a son not loving thee, but greatly fearing thee.

Ah, wicked and most unworthy son! Dost thou so address a father? Away to the gallows with thee.

Ah, most clement father! Temper, I beseech thee, thy indignation a little. If my speech has stirred thee, I suppliantly beg and demand that thou disdain not to hear the cause why I have so spoken. Those theologians, those masters whom thou thyself, O father, didst assign to me for the government of my conscience, taught me this doctrine. They endeavoured to imprint the aforesaid discourse more deeply upon my soul. They, I say, they by no means persuaded me that it was necessary that in this my penance and reconciliation I should follow thee with a love of even inchoate charity and of initial friendship; but that it sufficed that from fear of disasters and punishments I should grieve for my sins, and burn with a love of concupiscence toward thy infinite inheritance to come to me. This servile doctrine, O father, I myself, even by that very light with which thou in thy great clemency didst suffuse me, reputed false and adverse to common sense. What? I said to myself. I have become the enemy and offender of my most loving father: shall I establish a new covenant of friendship with him, without loving him in return with sincere charity and sweet benevolence? What? He loves me with a lavish charity; and shall I covet him only for the inheritance to be possessed? When thy theologians heard me speak such things, straightway crying out they charged me with gloomy rigour and with folly, and reproved me as a favourer of a heretical opinion: terrified by the din of which voices, I at last hearkened to their decisions. They added only this — lest I should seem to burden them — that I should beware, after I should have been restored to the right of taking the inheritance and fully reconciled by an absolution granted, that I ought afterwards at the time of death, and once at least every five or two years, to follow thee with the love of charity. Those men therefore, most excellent father, reprove, chide; upon them, not upon me, take vengeance.

This is the living image of a sinner who, shaken by fear of hell alone and by hope of obtaining eternal beatitude and grief for losing it, returns to God that he may be reconciled with him, all love, even initial, toward his goodness being taken away. Does he set store by becoming a friend from an enemy? Does he not study, does he not care, does he not strive to love his friend and father?

III. The second reason is thus proposed. The life of the heart is love. By love a sinner is converted to a creature and withdraws from God. This aversion from God and conversion to the creature can be taken away only by an aversion from the creature and a conversion to God. For love toward the creature cannot be taken away save by love toward the Creator.

IV. An adult, as soon as he morally attains the use of reason, is bound to follow God with love, and to subject himself and all things to him as to his last end, as all the Thomists and other theologians teach. Therefore by a stronger right, when after sins perpetrated he has become a rebel from God, he ought by love to convert himself to God.

V. He who burns with hatred toward his neighbour is not capable of absolution, unless, the hatred being laid aside, he kindle love toward his neighbour. Christians sinning mortally crucify again the Son of God, and contract enmity with God. How can this enmity be taken away save by love? Is Peter bound to love Paul whom he has offended, that he may enter a new covenant of friendship with him; and shall Sempronius, who by sin threatened death to the Son of God, enter upon a reconciliation with him without loving him? Shall he restore that divine covenant of friendship by fear of hell alone and by love of concupiscence alone? Will that common axiom, If thou wouldst be loved, love, have no place in respect of divine friendship? God testifies: I love them that love me. The heart is what God asks: My son, give me thy heart. How can that heart be given to God save by the love of friendship?

VI. He who has not a deliberate will of keeping all the commandments is not capable of absolution: but no one can keep all the commandments without initial charity: therefore for the worthy receiving of the sacrament of Penance inchoate charity is necessary. The first proposition all admit. The second I prove. A constant and firm will of keeping all the commandments includes the will of keeping the first and greatest commandment of charity, which is the head of the whole law, and to which all the other commandments are ordained. But it is implicative in terms, as they say, to have an efficacious and deliberate purpose of loving God without the love of God. For what is it to will sincerely to keep the commandment of charity, save in fact to follow God with love? Wherefore wisely does St. Augustine write, tract 74 on John: How therefore does the Lord say: If you love me, keep my commandments: and I will ask the Father, and he shall give you another Paraclete? — since he says this of the Holy Ghost, whom unless we have, we can neither love God nor keep his commandments. How do we love, that we may receive him whom unless we have we cannot love? Or how shall we keep the commandments, that we may receive him whom unless we have we cannot keep the commandments?

VII. It is not hidden from me that, the opinion of servile attrition having arisen together with Probabilism at Salamanca, as I have shown at large in Vol. IX, very many probabilists have almost evacuated the mandate of charity. But their doctrine has been proscribed, as I have related elsewhere.

I. They object first: The grief which is required for the sacrament of Penance ought to dispose, not to destroy the sacrament. But grief formed by inchoate charity blots out all sins. Therefore nothing remains for the sacrament to destroy; and yet it is a sacrament of the dead, which ought to blot out sins.

II. This is the chief argument of our adversaries, than which nothing more efficaciously lays open the falsity of the opinion of fear-born attrition. Nothing is falser than that inchoate charity blots out sins. What do the attritionists say to these things? Let our learned adversaries publish for us whether through thirteen centuries they have found in any of the holy Fathers that charity destroys the sacrament of Penance. This doctrine was unknown to all antiquity, and to Trent, and to its Catechism. I say therefore that Penance is a sacrament of the dead, and produces the first habitual and vivifying grace, which is poured forth through the Holy Ghost indwelling in those who are disposed by inchoate charity through the Holy Ghost moving and not yet indwelling. And without this actual grace and initial love no one can believe, hope, love, and do penance as he ought, for the obtaining of the gift of justification, as the Council of Trent defined. Before all habitual virtues there go imperfect acts of the same species, as all theologians confess. Let our adversaries read St. Augustine, in his book On Nature and Grace, the last chapter, where he says: Inchoate charity is inchoate justice; advanced charity is advanced justice; great charity is great justice; perfect charity is perfect justice. Rightly were the Baian propositions 61 and 63 proscribed, because they denied this distinction of a twofold vivification and of a twofold charity, imperfect and perfect, as other propositions similarly denied this twofold charity. Wherefore only by those who are ignorant of the Baian errors can these things be obtruded against the opinion maintaining the necessity of initial charity for the worthy receiving of the sacrament of Penance.

III. They object secondly: St. Thomas, III, q. 79, teaches: The least grace can resist any concupiscence whatsoever, and avoid every mortal sin. … The least charity loves God more than concupiscence loves thousands of gold and silver.

IV. ANSWER. There St. Thomas speaks of circumcision, which prefigured Baptism. I have transcribed the entire article in Vol. IX, Book 1, dissertation 2, chapter 9, § 2, and have made plain there that the Angelic speaks expressly of sanctifying grace which is infused in Baptism, and therefore of habitual charity. What of this, that St. Thomas objects to himself this very argument of our adversaries at 3, question 84, article 5, argument 2: Charity covereth all sins. … Therefore, having charity and faith and mercy, anyone can obtain salvation even without the sacrament of Penance. Let them now hear St. Thomas's answer: To the second it must be said that, from the time that a man incurs sin, CHARITY, faith, and mercy do NOT free a man from sin without penance. For CHARITY REQUIRES that a man SHOULD GRIEVE FOR THE OFFENCE COMMITTED AGAINST A FRIEND, and that he should study to satisfy his friend. Faith itself also requires that through the power of Christ's passion, which works IN THE SACRAMENTS of the Church, he should SEEK TO BE JUSTIFIED FROM SINS. Ordered mercy itself also requires that a man should by repenting succour his own misery, which he incurred through sin, according to that of Proverbs 14: Sin maketh nations miserable. Whence it is said, Ecclesiasticus 30: Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God. Behold the principle of our adversaries shattered by St. Thomas. Inchoate actual charity takes away the affection and will of sinning; but sanctifying grace blots out the stain of sin.

V. What they object from the Roman Appendix added to the Council under Benedict XIII proves nothing against our opinion, as I shall presently show, but rather presses against our adversaries.

It is not unlawful in conferring the sacraments to follow a probable opinion concerning the validity of the sacrament, the safer being left aside, unless law, agreement, or the danger of incurring grave loss forbid it. Hence a merely probable opinion is not to be used in the conferring of Baptism, of priestly Orders, or of the episcopate.

I. With a full pen in Vol. IX, Book 1, dissertation 1, chapter 10, I recounted the interpretations by which our adversaries study to preserve their opinion from the aforesaid condemned thesis. They confess with one mouth that if the opinion concerning servile attrition were only probable, or more probable, or most probable, it would be contained in the condemned thesis. But they say that this their opinion passes beyond the confines of probability and is morally certain.

II. Hear Fr. Cardenas, who in his Crisis, dissertation 2, chapter 6, article 2, question 1, no. 6, says: “The decree speaks of probable opinions. But this doctrine is not merely probable, but altogether certain and indubitable, on account of the definition of the Council of Trent.”

III. Fr. Dominic Viva, on proposition 1 of Innocent XI, no. 21, writes these things: “That the opinion concerning the sufficiency of attrition … is not merely probable, or most probable, but practically and morally certain.” And again in his Course, question 3, article 2, no. 11, he teaches these things: “To assert that attrition is not sufficient, and so forth. This opinion after Trent is most commonly rejected as improbable. … After Trent it lost all probability.” Again upon proposition 14 of Alexander VIII he adds these things: “But that prohibition of Alexander VII, that neither of these opinions be censured, does not infer that each opinion is probable.” And at no. 31 he adds: “Since prohibitions of this kind are OFTEN made FOR THE GOOD OF PEACE.” With these few words he eludes the decree of Alexander VII.

IV. Similar things the probabilist defenders of fear-born attrition commonly teach. Moreover this vaunted moral certitude is a falsity of fact clearer than the noonday light, is a figment, an imagining, and a manifest chimera, disapproved by Alexander VII when he forbade that either opinion be noted with a censure.

V. More than a hundred theologians from the whole Catholic world, more celebrated than the casuist defenders of fear-born attrition, who shine but little in the literary commonwealth, whom I recounted in Vol. IX; the most learned Cardinals Denhoff, Aguirre, Le Camus, and Montalto; very many archbishops and bishops, among whom the most learned BOSSUET, who alone outweighs a hundred casuists; the more celebrated universities of Paris and Louvain; and almost all the theologians of the Augustinian Religion, today of the Dominican. What if I should recount the theologians of the most celebrated BENEDICTINE Order, what if of other Orders? Let this suffice: that scarcely today is a theologian of any name found, void of prejudices, who does not refute the opinion concerning servile attrition.

VI. Is this whole most numerous multitude of distinguished Cardinals, Bishops, and Universities not enough to constitute a probable opinion among the probabilists, who defend that four casuists — nay one, according to Fr. Viva, if he be most learned — effect a probable opinion? What of this, that the probabilists defend that servile attrition is certain, because they contend that it was defined in the Council of Trent? But, the History of Cardinal Pallavicino being published, not even the defenders of servile attrition confess that Trent defined anything on this matter.

VII. Therefore it is most evident that the vaunted moral certitude is most false and a vain figment, injurious to the decree of Alexander VII, to so many Cardinals, Archbishops, and Bishops, to so many most grave theologians, and most pernicious to unskilled readers who are deceived by such an asserted certitude. Therefore this moral certitude is to be retracted and eliminated. Whence I form this argumentation.

VIII. If the opinion of servile attrition were only probable, or more probable, or most probable, it would, by our adversaries' own confession, be condemned by Innocent XI. But the truth of the fact is most evident and most clear to the whole literary world, that such an opinion is not morally certain so as to strike out the probability of the contrary opinion. Therefore it is as evident that the opinion concerning servile attrition is contained in the Innocentian decree, as it is evident and well known that the said moral certitude is an arbitrary figment and an unheard-of paradox.

IX. That is called morally certain which is defended by the unanimous consent of theologians. That is called probable, or more probable, which is disputed on either side by grave theologians. But it is certain that this controversy is disputed on either side, so that Alexander VII forbade that either opinion be noted with a censure, until something should be defined by the Holy See. After twelve years the Venerable Innocent XI defined that in performing the sacraments, out of controverted opinions the safer is to be embraced. After this decree the defenders of servile attrition published that their opinion, which under Alexander VII was only probable and more common among the probabilists, had become certain and beyond controversy. But this is certain, that after the Alexandrine decree the opinion of servile attrition was restrained among the casuists, and that, the Innocentian decree being published, the contrary doctrine prevailed among the graver theologians.

X. The most celebrated Salmanticenses Scholastici, Vol. II, part 2, tract 14, disputation 4, doubt 1, § 6, no. 51, although defenders of servile attrition, candidly confess that the reported moral certitude is a pure and mere figment. Behold their words: “This answer does not satisfy, and can be refuted in this manner. For our attrition lacks all certitude founded in the definition of the Council of Trent. … Philalethes reports a hundred authors, their names being produced, establishing the opinion contrary to us. And whatever be the case of this, that attrition was not defined in the Council of Trent is evidently gathered from the decree of Alexander VII. … For since he forbids censures on the one or the other part, until, he says, something shall have been defined by this Holy See, he openly supposes that nothing has hitherto been defined by the Church concerning that controversy.”

XI. Behold a new and unshakeable confirmation of a chimerical moral and indubitable certitude. The attritionists offer another answer, namely that the Innocentian decree forbids the use of a probable opinion, the safer being left aside, in conferring the sacraments, but not in receiving them. This answer, say the Salmanticenses, is a mere speculative flight, repugnant to the mind of the Pontiff in that proposition. Similar things teach Tournely and other maintainers of servile attrition. It is therefore evident, even by the confession of the more celebrated of our adversaries, that the moral certitude, upon which the casuists commonly alone rely, is a chimera; and that the Innocentian decree forbids the use of a probable opinion, the safer being left aside, both in conferring and in receiving the sacraments.

I. The Salmanticenses answer therefore at no. 55 in these words: “But that we may not seem to flee or to fear difficulty even in those things which pertain to practice, it is answered by admitting the whole syllogism. … For our opinion is not only more probable and more common, but also SAFER than the contrary.”

II. The legions of the Scholastics never turn their backs, but would rather be cut down. Since the founding of the world a like paradox, as it seems to me, has not been heard. This doctrine is against all Catholics, and utterly overturns the kingdom of Christ brought forth by charity, increased by charity, perfected by charity.

III. But let us indicate the reasons why those theologians maintain that the opinion of servile attrition is safer and most safe. This is their argumentation. The love of the charity of God above all things cannot be conjoined with mortal sin. For this is the error of Baius. Therefore, that this error may be declined, we must say that servile attrition void of all charity is far safer, nay uniquely safe, because it defends the practice of the sacrament.

IV. It is a wonder that men so exceedingly learned could object so gross and erroneous a sophism. They themselves confess that Alexander VII forbade that either opinion be noted with a censure, and that Trent defined nothing: and on the same page are they not ashamed to burn our opinion with the censure of Baianism? Are these most learned men ignorant that Baius erred because he conjoined habitual charity with sin? Baius erred besides, because he did not distinguish imperfect actual charity from habitual. We say that imperfect actual charity can be conjoined with a sin proximately to be expelled through sanctifying grace. We say with St. Thomas that contrition formed by imperfect charity is the matter of the sacrament of Penance; that it may become a sacrament expelling sin, a form is required. The most vain sophism of the Salmanticenses therefore falls to pieces on every side.

V. How unheard-of the recounted paradox is, take in few words. If the doctrine of fear-born attrition is far safer, then all theologians, all preachers ought to cry out: Christians, beware of the charity of Christ, even imperfect! Far more beware of a more fervent and most fervent love of God! Beware, I pray, of this divine charity when you approach the sacrament of Penance: beware, I say, beware of this divine charity, because that charity destroys and exterminates the sacrament of Penance! Beware: because if you approach the tribunal of penance with charity, you are heretics and Baianists. Approach only terrified with fear of the punishments of hell, kindled with love of concupiscence for your own beatitude. For the rest, let the love of God above all things be far from you, let it be an exile from your souls: because that love of God above all things fights in hostile fashion with the sacrament of Penance, and exterminates it. In receiving the sacraments you ought by the definition of the Church to follow the safer things. It is far safer if you approach the sacrament of Penance struck by servile fear alone, than if you come burning with divine charity. Those blasphemies are, unless all things deceive me, the legitimate and necessary corollaries of the doctrine of the Salmanticenses.

VI. Hence gather that our opinion is certain, and that our adversaries' opinion, as it seems to me, is contained in the Innocentian decree. The vaunted moral certitude is a mere chimera, as the more learned of our adversaries confess. That the condemned proposition comprehends only ministers conferring the sacrament, not the faithful receiving it, is, say the Salmanticenses, a mere speculative flight, repugnant to the mind of the Pontiff. At last, that the opinion of servile attrition should be safer is a paradox which overturns the whole Gospel of Christ and the Christian religion. Our adversaries themselves, no otherwise than the builders of the tower of Babel, tear, destroy, and condemn their own opinion. For while one asks for a trowel, another holds out mortar. If you desire more on this argument, consult Vol. IX, Book 1, dissertation 2, where you will find all the sophisms of our adversaries shattered, and many things which pertain to the history of this controversy.