Chapter II — The notion of the vow, and its conditions

I. Question I. What is a vow, and what its conditions? Answer. It is a deliberate and spontaneous promise made to God concerning a better thing. Five conditions are assigned: 1. deliberation; 2. the will of promising and of executing the promise; 3. the promise itself; 4. that this promise be made to God; 5. that it be concerning a better thing, or one pleasing to God. Each condition must be explained.

II. For a vow, full deliberation is required, which consists in this: that the one vowing be master of himself, and advert to and know what he promises. Not to say more: that liberty which suffices for committing a sin, for perfecting a contract, suffices for a vow. Wherefore vows, even sudden ones, can be valid, when they proceed from a deliberate will. Vows of this kind, however, suffer from imprudence, which, on account of such a precipitate emission, according to the variety of circumstances, can be dispensed with or commuted. A virtual deliberation suffices, however, as in all other actions, contained in other preceding actions, provided the one vowing be master of himself. A mere purpose does not suffice for a vow, since a purpose is nothing other than a will of doing something. A promise, then, is necessary. Often the unlearned confuse a purpose with a promise, and conversely. Wherefore a prudent director of souls will gather from the circumstances whether a vow has been made or not. If someone should vow with the mind of promising and binding himself, but with the will of not fulfilling the promise, he would elicit and constitute the vow: because the latter purpose of not fulfilling is inefficacious and inept.

III. The other clause, promise made to God, indicates that vows are made to God alone. When someone pledges that he will do some work in honor of some Saint, this is not a vow properly so called, but the matter of a vow. Wherefore vows which are made in honor of some Saint are called vows in a broader signification, which nevertheless have the force of binding. These vows are not acts of latria, owed to God alone, but of dulia, or hyperdulia. Catholics, then, vowing to the Blessed Virgin, to SS. Augustine, Benedict, Dominic, etc., vow to God before these Saints as witnesses, patrons, and helpers.

IV. Question II. What does the other clause, "concerning a better good," signify? Answer. The matter of a vow must be honorable, possible, free, not indifferent, and not impeding a greater good. Things which are commanded by divine or ecclesiastical law can be the matter of a vow, as the common opinion teaches. The clause "concerning a better good" has a twofold sense: first, compared to another good — as it is better to succor an endangered girl than another poor person exposed to no danger of soul. Secondly, with respect to the omission of that same good — as it is better to give alms than not to give. For fitting matter of a vow it suffices that it be a better good in this second way. Matter opposed to the evangelical counsels is in no way fit for a vow. Hence a vow of contracting marriage is invalid, because it is opposed to the evangelical counsel. If marriage were necessary for preserving the Commonwealth, for confirming peace between Princes — which scarcely, or not even scarcely, happens — they say that then the vow would be valid: because the matter of the vow is not so much the marriage, as the common good of the Commonwealth and of the Church. A vow of marrying, in order to bridle and restrain concupiscence, is null.

V. If a married person, impeded by a vow made from asking the debt, is troubled by stimuli of concupiscence, can he ask the debt? Fr. Sporer affirms it, citing Fr. Gobat. But this opinion is lax and false. Even laxer is the other opinion of Leander, denying that a vow of chastity, of religion, or of not marrying is valid when made by one for whom marriage is more wholesome, and who suffers grave rebellions of concupiscence. Nay, the same most benign Leander adds that supervening temptations and anxieties of the flesh render a vow of not marrying null. Read Tome 3 on the Decalogue, book 4, dissertation 1, chapter 4, number 12 and following. A vow of not vowing is invalid. That a vow of not seeking a dispensation is valid, if it is more useful to the soul not to seek a dispensation; on the contrary, that it is null, if it is more wholesome to the soul to request a dispensation, St. Antoninus and Richard teach.

VI. Question III. Are indifferent, useless, or vicious things the matter of a vow? Answer. All deny it. Yet if a thing which is by its own nature indifferent should, on account of some circumstance, put on honesty, it is fit matter for a vow. A vow whose execution is a sin is null. Wherefore Jephthah sinned in killing his daughter. Similarly, a vow made concerning a good thing for a depraved end is null: since then the vow is taken as an instrument for procuring a depraved end. Invalid too are vows of offering God gifts, of celebrating Masses, of laying out alms, which certain Christians are wont to make, this condition being added: if they come off victors in a duel, or in an unjust war. Likewise a vow made in thanksgiving to God for a shameful act already committed is invalid, and unbefitting God — as for a gain procured from unjust gambling. But valid is a vow made to obtain the safety of a son begotten of a concubine: because the health of the son is a good, although sin has preceded it. Equally valid are vows of punishing one's own crimes. Vows of a good thing for an indifferent end are null. A vow concerning an impossible thing is null.

VII. Question IV. If one who cannot fulfill the whole vow is bound to fulfill a part? Answer. You vowed to build a Church: unable to build the whole, are you bound to a part? That this one vowing is bound to nothing, Tamburini, Leander, Castropalao, and others teach. But a distinction must be made. If the separated part redounds to the honor of God, then the one vowing must execute it; but not if the separated part would be useless. But in this case the one vowing should build a Chapel in another Church, or something else in some temple, which would redound to God's honor. When the matter of a vow is mixed, partly good and partly evil, or vain, the good part must be fulfilled, the other neglected. Hence a vow of coming to Rome with a naked body is valid as regards the making of the journey; only the manner of nakedness must be omitted.

VIII. Question V. Is a vow of not gaming valid? Answer. The true and common opinion affirms it, because it concerns a better good. For gaming is something fortuitous in order to gain, or loss, and a source of evils. Therefore abstinence from gaming concerns a better good.

IX. Fr. Claude La-Croix teaches lax opinions on this argument, book 3, part 1, number 453 and following. An error crept into my Tome 3 on the Decalogue, page 117, number 8, where, in editing the lax opinion of this author, in place of "you wished" [voluisti], by an error certainly of the printers, "you vowed" [vovisti] was printed. This material error, although trivial and of no moment, I now correct, that I may satisfy my censors, and give thanks, since by objecting such very light blemishes to me they make plain to the whole World that Christian Theology is free both from Rigorism and from Laxism.

X. "If you vowed to this end" ("vowed" here, not "wished," says Fr. La-Croix, place cited, number 454) "that you would avoid quarrels, blasphemies, oaths ... it will be licit to play through another, even though these inconveniences are feared, because in very deed you are not playing." You are not playing, indeed, under your own name, but under another's; so neither do you blaspheme, quarrel, or swear with your own mouth, but with another's mouth. How lax these things are, and others which La-Croix teaches in the same place, let others judge.

XI. Question VI. Is a vow of never sinning valid? Answer. If the vow is of abstaining from every mortal sin, it is most valid. But if the vow is of avoiding all faults, even venial ones, taken collectively, the vow is null, inasmuch as it concerns a matter humanly...

impossible to human weakness. Valid, however, is a vow of avoiding this or that determinate deliberate venial sin — for instance, of not lying. But there is no need to dwell on unraveling these vows, since Christians must be persuaded to abstain in very deed from sins, not to burden themselves with a load of vows.