dissertation — Concina, Compendium
Dissertation II — On Probabilism, and its consequences
Probabilism runs through the whole of Theology. It is a leaven which infects the whole mass of doctrine. Whether it corrupts that mass, or renders it more useful to souls, is called into dispute. To my weakness it appears so evident that Probabilism corrupts the whole doctrine of morals, and perverts all the rules of Christian doctrine, and undermines them from their deepest foundations, that words fail me to express it as its importance deserves. But lest the Probabilists be able in any way to carp at this sincere and ingenuous manner of writing of mine, I recall to their memory what the most learned Jesuit Fr. Ignacio de Camargo writes in the Preface to his Rule of Morals, § 12. Let no one, he says, justly reprehend me, that in disputing against the benign opinion I have drawn from it very many consequences which he may affirm, or prove, to be by far most horrendous, or heretical, or blasphemous ... Otherwise the argument from the absurd, as they call it, or from the impossible — than which none is more frequent in Theology — will have to be done away with. And this most celebrated Jesuit adds in the same place: But I see that there are many Probabilists truly most delicate, who, while they themselves most audaciously say and write whatever they please, not only about our opinion, but even about its Patrons, yet cannot bear their own benign opinion to be even lightly touched. But whether they will or not, they must needs endure and patiently bear that we, according to our small measure, despising all human respect, vindicate the evangelical doctrine of morals from vain inventions and pernicious opinions.
Within this division
- Chapter I — Opinions condemned by the Holy See in the controversy of Probabilism
- Chapter II — What, and of how many kinds, is the probable, the more probable, the safe, and the safer opinion. The genuine sense of the question is proposed
- Chapter III — By an evident and ineluctable argument it is proved that the doctrine of the licit use of the less probable opinion in view of the more probable is false and antievangelical
- Chapter IV — By the authority of the Supreme Pontiff Alexander VII it is proved that the probabilistic system wars against the evangelical Law
- Chapter V — By the authority of the Venerable Innocent XI, Supreme Pontiff, Probabilism is proved to stand condemned
- Chapter VI — By other weights of reasons Probabilism is overthrown
- Chapter VII — The paradoxes of the Probabilists are weighed
- Chapter VIII — Most grave absurdities which necessarily follow upon Probabilism
- Chapter IX — By the authority of the Theologians Probabilism is condemned
- Chapter X — It is licit to embrace an opinion evidently more probable for liberty, the less probable and safer opinion for the law being left aside
- Chapter XI — An exhortation to Confessors