Chapter IV — The times are designated at which this precept of loving God presses

I. Question I. Does this precept oblige at any determinate time? Answer. Some have denied it, who contended that this precept is not special; but this opinion has now been proscribed by the Church.

II. Question II. Is it enough to elicit an act of the love of God once in a lifetime? Answer. The affirming opinion the Venerable Innocent XI proscribed in this thesis: Whether he sins mortally who should elicit an act of the love of God only once in his life, we dare not condemn. This opinion deserves detestation rather than confutation. The greatest and first commandment, imposed by God with such severity and emphasis of words — the precept which is the soul of the Christian life, by which alone we truly live to God — imposes the duty of exercising its vital acts only once?

III. Question III. Does this precept oblige only once in each five-year period? Answer. The affirming opinion certain men formerly championed; but this too the Venerable Innocent XI condemned: It is probable that the precept of charity towards God does not, of itself, rigorously oblige even once in every five years.

IV. Question IV. Does this precept oblige of itself at the first instant of the use of reason? Answer. The graver Theologians commonly affirm it, with St. Thomas. Since at some determinate time of life this precept of loving God obliges of itself, as the Church has defined, therefore this obligation presses above all at the first instant of the use of reason, morally taken. For the light of reason opens to the child his entrance into this world, and shows the way that leads to the harbor. Then, therefore, he must deliberate about himself, and set before himself his last end. This last end is God: therefore he is to be loved, and to be chosen before all. And surely, when that first light of reason shines forth, the young person is bound to do something. And what can he do more apt and better than to salute, to love his Creator, his Redeemer, and the divine Parent of his eternal felicity, and to pant after his embraces? No time, then, can be designated more opportune for loving God than that interval in which deliberation must be made about the way to be taken and the last end to be chosen. And this is that time at which the use of reason is acquired.

V. The opposite opinion the Probabilists commonly defend; and among the many sophisms which they obtrude, one is this: that too heavy a burden is imposed on children; but Christ says: My yoke is sweet and my burden light: Matthew 11. Now they contend that the yoke is sweet when it is accommodated to human appetites and to liberty. As often as some divine commandment imposes a burden hostile to concupiscence, to cupidity, and to the other allurements, so often do they throw back the said oracle: My yoke is sweet, etc.

VI. These authors abuse the aforesaid oracle in a false sense. All the Fathers to a man testify that the yoke of Christ is sweet because it is a yoke of love, of charity, of friendship, and of benevolence. Hard is the buffeting of the flesh, the endurance of persecutions, the crucifixion of concupiscence and cupidity, the guarding of chastity, and very many other things which the Gospel commands. Most hard and most rough are these things — not merely hard and rough. But all things become sweet and pleasant then only when divine charity, when heavenly love, pours out the unction, the sweetness, and the delights of the divine friendship. If the affections of weak women render sweet and pleasant to their lovers the gravest inconveniences which these endure to please them, with what sweetness, with what delights will not God fill his lovers? The benign Casuists make the yoke of Christ most hard and most rough, since they take away from it the frequent exercise of charity, which alone removes roughness and hardness. All the commandments of the divine law are hostile, inimical, and burdensome to flesh and blood. Add charity, friendship, benevolence — and all things grow sweet to lovers. This is the doctrine of all the Fathers.

VII. I adduce a few out of many texts of St. Augustine. On Psalm 67: For whatever is difficult in the precepts is light to him that loveth. Nor for any other reason is that saying of Matthew 11, verse 30 — My burden is light — rightly understood, except because he gives the Holy Spirit, through whom charity is poured forth in our hearts. He speaks at greater length in Sermon 96, chapter 1: Hard it seems, and grievous, what the Lord has commanded, that if anyone will follow him, he must deny himself. But it is neither hard nor grievous which he commands, who helps that what he commands may be done. For both that is true which is said to him in Psalm 16: Because of the words of thy lips, I have kept hard ways; and that is true which he himself said, Matthew 11, verse 30: My yoke is easy and my burden light. For whatever is hard in the precepts, charity makes easy. We know how much love itself accomplishes ... how much men have suffered, how many unworthy and intolerable things they have endured, to arrive at that which they loved. Likewise, in the book On nature and grace, against the Pelagians, chapter 69: Very good, however, are the precepts, if we use them lawfully. For by that very fact by which it is most firmly believed that God, just and good, could not have commanded impossible things, we are admonished both what to do in easy things, and what to ask in difficult ones. For all things become easy to charity, to which the burden of Christ is light; or it alone is that very burden which is light, according to what is said, 1 John 5, verse 3: And his commandments are not heavy. And what is said in Deuteronomy 30: The word is nigh thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart ... Everyone, therefore, being converted, as is there commanded, to the Lord his God with his whole heart and with his whole soul, does not find the commandment of God heavy. For how is it heavy, when it is the commandment of love? For either one does not love, and therefore it is heavy; or he loves, and it cannot be heavy. But he loves, if, as is there admonished, Israel be converted to the Lord his God with his whole heart and with his whole soul. A new commandment (he says) I give unto you: that you love one another: John 13. He that loveth his neighbor hath fulfilled the law; and: Love is the fulfilling of the law. According to this it was said: If they had walked in good paths, they had surely found the paths of justice easy. How then is it said: Because of the words of thy lips, I have kept hard ways (Psalm 16), except because both are true? They are hard to fear, easy to love.

VIII. Thus far it has been shown: 1. that the precept of charity is special, and imposes an express act of love; 2. that it obliges several times in life; 3. that it presses of itself within a five-year period. Other times must now be designated at which this commandment presses.

IX. Question V. Does the precept of charity oblige to frequent acts of the love of God? Answer. If the words in which God commands this love be regarded, the proposed question appears temerarious. Not frequency merely, but even a moral continuation of divine love does the divine commandment enjoin — so perspicuously that it cannot even be called into disputation. Let the words of Deuteronomy 6 be read. In John 15 Christ says: Abide in my love. These words betoken a constant perseverance in the divine love. More clearly St. Peter expresses this, first epistle, chapter 4: But before all things have a constant mutual charity among yourselves: for charity covereth a multitude of sins. And in truth Christians, by force of their own profession, are bound to live the Christian life. What is this Christian life, but the conjunction of the soul with God, just as the bodily life is in the union of the soul with the body?

X. Question VI. Is it enough to elicit acts of charity once in a year? Answer. When I read these and similar questions, unknown to all the Fathers, proposed by the Theologians of this latest age, I am filled with no light astonishment. For this question seems to me most like this one: Whether a living man is bound to produce acts of life once in a year? or: whether it be enough that he elicit acts of life once in a year? Would not the question be utterly ridiculous? But more ridiculous still would the question be, if the disputation were instituted about a dead man.

XI. The proposed question, then, is either about a just man, or about a sinner. If about a just man, it appears too vain. For the just man lives a divine life: therefore he morally continues the offices of charity. For there is no deliberately willed work in the just man which is not either meritorious or demeritorious, as the Angelic Doctor teaches, on the second book [of the Sentences], distinction 40, question 1, article 5: There can be no act proceeding deliberately from the will which is not good or evil — not only according to the Theologian, but also according to the moral Philosopher. And there can be no voluntary act proceeding from a deliberate will, in one having grace, which is not meritorious. But in one not having grace there can be some deliberate act which is neither meritorious nor demeritorious. And a little below: Yet an act perfect with civil goodness is not susceptible of the efficacy of merit, except in him who has grace; and therefore in him who lacks grace it is indifferent to merit and demerit; but in him who has grace it must be either meritorious or demeritorious: for as an evil act will be demeritorious, so also a good one will be meritorious. For since charity commands all the virtues, as the will commands all the powers, whatever is ordered to the end of any virtue must be ordered to the end of charity. And since every good act is ordered to the end of charity, it will remain ordered to the end of charity, and so will be meritorious. And thus to eat and to drink, the measure of temperance being kept, and to play for recreation, the measure of eutrapelia being kept — which holds the mean in games, as is said in the second [recte fourth] book of the Ethics — will be meritorious in him who has charity, through which he has established God as the last end of his life. This same he teaches in several other places. Question XI On evil, article 5 [recte question 2, article 5], ad 11: For an act to be meritorious in one having charity, it is not required that it be actually referred to God; but it suffices that it be actually referred to some fitting end, which is habitually referred to God. Just as if someone, wishing to make a pilgrimage for God's sake, should buy a horse, thinking actually nothing of God, but only of the journey which he had already ordered unto God — this too is meritorious. But it is evident that he who has charity has ordered himself and all his things unto God, to whom he cleaves as to his last end. Therefore whatever he shall have ordered either to himself or to anything of his, he does meritoriously, even if he think not actually of God — unless he be impeded by some inordination of the act, which is not referable to God. But this cannot be, unless it be a sin, at least venial. Therefore every act of one having charity is either meritorious, or is a sin. The same he has in question XIV, article 5 [recte On charity, article 11, ad 2]: It must be said that in one having charity there can be no act of virtue except formed by charity: for either that act will be ordered to the due end — and this cannot be, in one having charity, except through charity; or it is not ordered to the due end — and so it will not be an act of virtue.

XII. The act of charity is the efficacious love of the last end, namely of God: therefore it directs all things unto God — and above all the just man himself, and his will and free choice. For this is to love God with the whole heart, with the whole soul, and with the whole mind: namely, to offer the whole soul as a victim to God. If it gives the whole plant, then also the fruits — namely, all the acts and offices which proceed from that same will. The Theologians dispute how long that act of charity, by which the just man directs himself and all his things unto God, endures in the impression left in the will and in the other virtues. The Salmanticenses answer that it endures through the whole of life, unless it be retracted. Be it so. But it will quickly be retracted, unless it be fostered by a frequent repetition of acts. From this negligence in breaking forth often into these acts of love proceed the most frequent relapses of the Just into sins. Who would say that the love of friendship burns between two men present to one another, if they exchanged the offices of love once in a year?

XIII. Add to this that the love of charity in the just soul suffers perpetually the tumult of carnal appetites. Continually the demon sends in specters and paints illusions, kindles lust, that he may extinguish this heavenly love. We can, not undeservedly, compare the fire of divine love, which burns in the will of the just man in this state of corrupted nature, with the heat of fire which clings to heated water. Heated water quickly grows cold, on account of the continual conflict by which the coldness of the water fights against the heat inimical to it; and unless that heat received in the water be strengthened by continual flames, the water falls back into its native coldness. By the same reason, proportion being preserved, the heat of divine love burning in the will of the just man gradually grows lukewarm, and loses its strength in the continual fight against the most impure flames of concupiscence, and against the enticements and illusions of the world and of the demon, and grows utterly cold, unless it be restored with opportune nourishment, unless it be inflamed by the frequent heat of acts.

XIV. Hence it is ascertained and established that that question is vain — whether the Faithful ought to elicit an act of love once in a year, or on each Lord's day. For if the discourse be of the just, these, since they live a divine life, perform the offices of charity every day. And if they should elicit an act of love only once — I do not say in a year or in a month, but in a week — they will gradually become lukewarm, then cold, and at last sinners. What? Amid so many floods of tempests, against so many assaults of temptations, will they come off victors, unless the divine love be fervent and glowing? At the first sight of the enemy, at the first allurement of a seducing woman, they will fall, unless they be strong and robust in the heavenly friendship. If the discourse be of sinners, these cannot fulfill the divine precept unless they be reconciled to God, and, their faults blotted out, restore themselves to grace. And they sin by deferring their conversion long, from day to day. The question, therefore, is not of sinners, but of the just. Now if we say that the just ought to elicit acts of charity several times in a week or a month, do we impose any burden or rigor beyond what the just in fact perform in practice? For who of the just will neglect, even for a single day, to salute his most loving God, and to recite the Lord's prayer — which he cannot pronounce with a sincere heart without loving God his Father? But if they neglect this, they will easily relapse into sins, and those most grave. The Faithful, then, are to be exhorted and urged to pursue God continually with ardent love — not to be made the subject of disputes whether they ought to exercise this love once in a year, in a month, in a week. Those disputations proceed from the brain of men, not from the holy Scriptures, which command a continued and perennial love.

XV. Question VII. Are all bound, by the precept of charity, to direct their works unto God? Answer. The disputation is of virtual, not actual, direction. That the precept of charity commands this direction of all works unto God, the last end, is evident from the words of the precept itself: Thou shalt love thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul. If God demands the whole heart, the whole soul, by the same right he requires all its offspring, fruits, and works, as St. Thomas interprets, I-II, q. 100, art. 10: Under the precept of charity is contained that God be loved with the whole heart, to which it pertains that all things be referred unto God. This precept St. Paul expresses more luminously, 1 Corinthians 10: Therefore, whether you eat or drink, or whatsoever else you do, do all to the glory of God. Again, in chapter 16 he adds: Let all your things be done in charity. To this doctrine all the Fathers subscribe, whose testimonies I have given in Tome I on the Decalogue, book 1, dissertation 4, chapter 12.

XVI. Into the extreme error fell Baius and Jansenius. Baius taught this proposition, which is the 25th: The works of Infidels are sins; and the virtues of the Philosophers are vices. Baius defended the view that all works must be referred unto God by force of theological charity, properly so called — which surely is not found in Infidels. Hence he inferred that all the works of Infidels are sins; which error all Catholics condemn. Not a few Theologians of the Catholics — above all Cardinal Noris, Francesco Macedo, Vincent Contenson, and many others — teach that without theological faith and charity properly so called there can be found morally good works; but not without an actual, special aid, or charity generally and commonly so called. They teach that some works of Infidels are good and honorable from their office and object; but that whenever, by force of the special divine aid, they are not referred unto God, a sin of omission occurs, which does not infect the operation, provided the one acting halt in the honesty of an operation good by its own nature, and do not twist it to a depraved end: for then all confess that the work is depraved. Take the matter in few words. All confess that the works of Infidels are for the most part sins, because in practice they commonly refer them to a depraved end. All likewise confess that Infidels sometimes work certain moral goods — either by force of a special aid, as many contend, or by the powers of nature with a general aid, as others more commonly maintain. The authors of the former opinion teach that the precept of referring all works unto God, either actually or virtually, obliges only under venial sin. The whole disagreement, then, comes down to this: whether Infidels sometimes commit a venial sin of omission, for the reason that they neglect to refer the work unto God.

XVII. Since these things stand thus, who can sufficiently marvel at certain Theologians who are carried away with so unbridled an assault against the former opinion, which the whole school of the Augustinians and other most grave Theologians defend? The opinion, on the one side, is of lighter moment; on the other, it enjoys its own great probability. Nevertheless certain Theologians, patrons of the more benign Ethics, are not afraid to brand the said opinion with the mark of heresy, and to bring its authors under suspicion of heresy.