Chapter III — Works performed from an invincibly erroneous conscience, though they lack formal malice, are nevertheless endowed with no goodness or merit

I. The Probabilists commonly all defend the contrary. La-Croix, book 1, question 5, number 14 and following, deceived by the authority of Terillus, cites St. Thomas for this opinion; but this is a most manifest falsehood. For St. Thomas most powerfully overthrows this opinion, as is evident from his following doctrine. Behold his doctrine, I-II, question 19, article 6: Good, he says, is caused by an integral cause, but evil by single defects. And therefore, for that to be called evil toward which the will is borne, it suffices either that it be evil according to its nature, or that it be apprehended as evil. But for it to be good, it is required that it be good in both ways. What could be more luminous? And what of that which is carried about in the common proverb: Good comes from an integral cause; evil from any defect whatsoever.

II. The doctrine of the Angelic Doctor is illustrated. The will cannot be right unless it be conformed to the eternal Law of God, which is the fountain of all goodness. This is the first rule, the first exemplar, of every created will that is good and right. But a created will directed by a reason erring invincibly, which proposes lying, theft, perjury, and other crimes as good, cannot be traced back to the divine will and to His eternal Law — unless we wish to pour the crimes back upon God.

III. Fr. Claude La-Croix answers, book 1, number 24: The will of lying is not traced back to God, nor is it approved by God per se — I concede; per accidens — I deny. Have you heard? Lying, then, is approved by God per accidens. God confers a reward per accidens upon liars. That you may perceive more clearly the horror of this doctrine, recall to mind the doctrine of invincible ignorance of the natural law, which the Probabilists defend — who consequently maintain, with better right, invincible ignorance of the positive law, divine and human, and of the true Religion. This being posited as certain fact, the wills of Infidelity, of Heathenism, of Mahometanism, the wills of the followers of Arianism, of Nestorianism, of Lutheranism, of Calvinism — these wills, I say, of so many peoples, directed by invincible ignorance, are approved by God per accidens. What more? Atheism itself must be traced back to God. For God himself, according to Molina, Arriaga, and Platel, the champions of philosophical sin, can be invincibly unknown. According to these authors there can be given an invincibly erroneous conscience which reputes fornication, pollution, lying, and similar crimes to be licit. Therefore these horrendous crimes will be crowned with an eternal reward.

IV. All this is confirmed. No action is meritorious of eternal life without the benefit of divine grace. If fornication, if softness, if lying, if other similar crimes, reputed honorable through invincible ignorance, were meritorious, then divine grace would flow into these crimes. Do you shudder to hear these things? Yet the Probabilists cannot escape hence. Either they must needs confess works worthy of eternal glory without divine grace — and this is manifest heresy; or they are compelled to concede that man is aided by divine grace to fornicate, to commit adultery, to lie, and to perjure himself, whenever a man with an invincibly erroneous conscience judges it good to lie, to fornicate, to perjure himself, to commit adultery, and the rest.

V. Fr. La-Croix answers, in the place cited, number 29: Every will (he says) good per se is from God as its author — I concede; good per accidens — I deny. More than excellent! A will good per accidens is not from God? A will good per accidens signifies that the will is good not absolutely, but on account of invincible ignorance: for this is the meaning of the phrase per accidens. But this will is truly and really good: since this goodness merits, as the adversaries confess, the reward of eternal life. Therefore there is given a moral goodness, and a reward of eternal life, which is not from God. But hear Fr. Carlo Casnedi, who in Tome I, Disputation 6, section 1, § 3, number 25, page 167, writes as follows: Whenever to a morally invincible ignorance of the prohibition and of the malice there is joined an invincible error concerning the honesty of the object, or concerning a precept of the action, then the work elicited under that ignorance and error is honorable and meritorious. And more openly, in the same place, page 192, he adds: So too there is nothing absurd in Christ the Lord saying: Come, thou blessed one, receive the kingdom, because thou didst lie, invincibly thinking that in such a case I had commanded lying. Do not these things, even barely stated, instill a certain horror?

VI. The Adversaries are pressed in another way. If error possessed this prodigious efficacy, that it could fashion the form of virtue upon vices and crimes, and set round them the laurel of merit, then works honorable, directed by the light of truth, would be of the same dignity as works flagitious, covered over with the darkness of errors. If an erroneous persuasion poured goodness into a depraved operation, in the same way as true knowledge into an honorable work, then enlightenment would be superfluous — superfluous the sermons and exhortations. Finally, no work is good which is not directed by the virtue of prudence. Now between conscience and prudence there is this difference: that conscience, since it is not a virtue, is now true, now false, now right, now criminal; whereas prudence, since by its nature it is a practical intellectual virtue, either is true, or is not prudence — but a mask and specter of prudence. This prudence can never be deceived, although the prudent are sometimes deceived: for if it were deceived, it would not itself be a virtue.

VII. They object, first: he who, erring, judges a feigned pauper to be a true pauper, and succors him, truly exercises a good and meritorious act of mercy. Therefore a work proceeding from invincible ignorance is good. Peter, reputing this man to be his father, is bound to honor him; the Faithful hearing Mass are bound to adore the host, even though it were not consecrated. These and similar examples the Probabilists bring forward to throw dust in the eyes of the unskilled, though they are trifles vainer than Sicilian tales.

VIII. That you may straightway detect the sophism, distinguish the will of succoring the pauper from the will of lying, of perjuring, and the rest. What judgment, then, do you pronounce upon each? Is it not this: the first can be good; not so the second? A man, whether he be poor or rich, carries with him by his nature nothing that impedes the goodness and merit of the alms. For both the rich man, and any man whatever, can beg alms for a good end, and can make himself poor for the sake of Christ. Just as in an indifferent object, so much less in almsgiving is there any malice which impedes the goodness and merit of the act. In lying, on the contrary, in perjury, and in any action depraved by its nature, malice resides intrinsically, which wars as an enemy against goodness and merit. Now the judgment directing the will in the aforesaid case is that dictate which prescribes that the pauper must be succored; and this judgment is true. Furthermore, an act of beneficence towards a man, whoever he be, commanded by charity, is always good and meritorious; but the judgment by which this man, who is in reality rich, is judged poor, is false. Yet this judgment does not direct the will of the alms. Just as in the will there are often evils mixed with goods — not that the same act is both good and evil, for that is chimerical, but because there are found acts good and acts evil, mutually disparate — so also in the intellect false things are mingled with true; but never can a false judgment direct a right will, or an act of virtue. They press on with their quibbling: The matter of almsgiving is poverty; this removed, the virtue of almsgiving collapses. Answer: You are deceived. The object of almsgiving is a man to be relieved; that is, almsgiving looks to this, that it succor a man. If this man is truly poor, the almsgiving is altogether perfect. If this man feigns himself poor, then the almsgiving lacks this prerogative of relieving a pauper. Does it on that account cease to be a good act commanded by charity? He who honors a feigned father does not exercise filial honor, because the object — namely, paternity — is wanting; but he exercises a good act, for he honors a neighbor and an elder. He who adores an unconsecrated host commits an act of material idolatry, which is not imputed to fault, on account of invincible ignorance. But the intention of adoring God is good, nor is it infected by the materially depraved election; for only formal malice infects the act of intention.

IX. They object, secondly: When reason proposes to me anything as a precept, I am bound to execute it. Reason in this case proposes to me that I must lie, or perjure myself, for the salvation of my Neighbor. Therefore I am bound to fulfill this. Answer. All this is true, when the reason, or conscience, is invincibly erring. But whence is it inferred that acts of this kind are good? These acts are in very deed depraved; but they are not imputed to fault, on account of the invincible ignorance.

X. They insist. The lie in this hypothesis is not good. But neither is it evil. Therefore it is an indifferent work. Acts indifferent in the individual are not given: therefore they are either evil or good. Answer. That lie, that perjury, that theft, and the other works depraved by their nature, are always evil, even while they are represented as good; but they are not imputed to fault, as has been said so often, in the hypothesis that the ignorance is invincible. There are no works indifferent in the individual which flow from deliberate reason; but those are indifferent which proceed from necessity.

XI. I pass over many other sophisms, because they are all inept and vain. Read, if you will, Tome 2 of the Apparatus, Dissertation 1, chapter 5, § 2, etc., where you will find all the quibblings of Terillus overthrown.

XII. Sole Question. What is a perplexed conscience? Answer. It is a judgment by which you judge that you sin, whether you choose this part or the other. If the ignorance be vincible, you sin whichever part you choose; and, that sin may be avoided, the judgment must be laid aside, since it is erroneous. But if the ignorance be invincible, and the judgment cannot be laid aside, then that must be chosen which seems the lesser evil, and which less favors one's own liberty and appetites. But these cases are rare, and scarcely ever occur; therefore they need not be discussed at greater length.