Chapter I — Condemned and lax propositions are recounted which regard the remaining three sacraments of extreme unction, order, and matrimony

Alexander VII condemned the following.

I. It is not against justice not to confer ecclesiastical benefices gratis: because a collator conferring those ecclesiastical benefices, money intervening, does not exact it for the collation of the benefice, but as it were for a temporal emolument which he was not bound to confer upon you. This is the 22nd.

II. That opinion is probable which says that a kiss had for the sake of the carnal and sensible delight which arises from the kiss is only venial, the danger of further consent and of pollution being excluded. This is the 40th.

Innocent XI proscribed the following.

III. The work of marriage exercised for pleasure alone is utterly free from all fault and venial defect. This is the 9th.

IV. To give a temporal thing for a spiritual is not simony, when the temporal is not given as a price, but only as a motive for conferring or effecting the spiritual; or even when the temporal is only a gratuitous compensation for the spiritual, or contrariwise. This is the 45th.

V. And this also has place, even if the temporal be the principal motive of giving the spiritual; nay, even if it be the end of the spiritual thing itself, so that it be esteemed of more worth than the spiritual thing. This is the 46th.

VI. When the Council of Trent said that those communicating in others' sins sin mortally, who promote to churches any others than those whom they have themselves judged worthier and more useful to the Church, the Council either first seems by this to wish to signify by "worthier" nothing else than the worthiness of those to be elected, the comparative being taken for the positive; or secondly, by a less proper locution it sets down "worthier," that it may exclude the unworthy, but not the worthy; or lastly it speaks thirdly, when there is a competition. This is the 47th.

VII. Copulation with a married woman, her husband consenting, is not adultery; and so it suffices in confession to say that one has fornicated. This is the 50th.

I had determined to transcribe no lax opinions concerning matrimony, because they are so foul and horrid that they can scarcely be read without scandal. But because the heretics reproach us that many shameful things are defended by Catholic casuists — and chiefly the impious Peter Bayle exaggerates several of the things which Thomas Sánchez teaches in this kind — therefore I shall transcribe a few, that I may stop the mouths of the calumniating heretics, and that they may understand that the paradoxes of the laxity of certain casuists are by no means approved by the graver theologians.

I. Fr. Claude La Croix, Book 3, part 2, no. 1000: “Gobat, no. 10, thinks that in Germany it is lawful in monasteries to sell wine and bread through servants: for this is not properly to keep a tavern or to trade, but to sell one's own to passers-by.”

II. The Fathers of Salamanca, tract 19, chapter 1, point 4, no. 55: “It must therefore be said that it is necessary to the contract of buying and selling that the delivery of money, or of another temporal thing, be made from a will of giving it as a price, or of commensurating it with the spiritual thing and esteeming it at so much, so that it be through an onerous contract. This depraved will nevertheless being excluded, if a temporal thing be given with the mind of obtaining a spiritual thing, not as an onerous price but gratis, or out of gratitude or benevolence, even with the imposition of some antidoral obligation, no simony is committed — whether the gift be conferred before the collation of the spiritual thing, or after it, or at the same time with it.”

III. The same Salmanticenses in the same place, no. 56: “If someone should resign a benefice into the hands of a prelate, or in favour of another, but with this mind, hope, and intention that the other out of gratitude and antidoral obligation should correspond with presents, gifts, and services — otherwise not being about to resign without such hope; but neither intending to oblige him by another obligation besides the antidoral, nor by another onerous agreement, or convention intervening, by which he intends rigorously to oblige him — it will not be simony.”

IV. The same Salmanticenses in the same place: “The same is of him who resigns a benefice into the hand of a prelate, or in favour of another, with this hope and intention that another fatter one be conferred upon him by the bishop, otherwise not being about to resign; if he does not intend to leave the superior bound by another obligation besides the antidoral. The same is in like cases. Valentia, § 3; Soto, article 2; Rodríguez, chapter 58; Palaus, point 4; Suárez; Ugolinus; Sánchez; Diana; Lessius; Layman in the place cited; who also add that this is true even if he express the said hope in words or in writing to the superior: because what it is lawful to desire, it is lawful also to express in words; and because it is lawful to ask from another that which he is held to by natural obligation.”

V. The same Salmanticenses in the same place, chapter 2, point 7, no. 49: “Hence also it is made honourable that monasteries of noble nuns exact a fatter dowry and a greater sum for entrance and sustenance: because the more celebrated the monasteries are, the greater expenses they have, and a greater sum is assigned as dowry for entrance.”

VI. The same Salmanticenses in the same place, no. 50: “For the rest, if besides the dowry of sustenance the nuns should receive or ask more, either because the entrant is less noble, or deformed, or of some other infamy, they can scarcely be excused from simony, says Sánchez, Book 3, chapter 3, doubt 11, no. 7; which we judge true, unless perchance (N.B.) some detriment thence befall the monastery, either in honour or in other temporal things: because this can lawfully be compensated by an increase of the dowry; just as in matrimony we said above that an equality of nobility, or of another thing, between spouses is compensated by an increment of the assigned dowry.”

VII. The same Salmanticenses in the same place: “Hence there is freed from simony that which frequently happens among our nuns, namely that in order that a twenty-first be received — which among us is called la veinte y una — a greater dowry is exacted; or that two or three sisters be received in the same monastery, in which case a greater sum is required, unless they be adorned with other surpassing qualities; and that widows be admitted, it is exacted also that the dowry be increased. For in the former case it is intended to render entrance difficult: because from the most holy virgin our mother St. Teresa our nuns have it that only twenty be made, and so forth. … In the other two cases for the same reason a greater dowry is exacted, that such entrance may be more difficult, and so forth.”

VIII. The same Salmanticenses in the same place, no. 51: “If a monastery, even a most wealthy one, should exact by agreement money from those to be received for their sustenance, it commits simony neither by divine nor by positive right.”

IX. Fr. Nicholas Mazzotta, tract 3, disputation 5, chapter 3, page 253: “But if you give something to an intercessor, whether mediate or immediate, not indeed for the intercession, but for the labour, for ceasing gain, for emerging loss, for the expenditure of time, and so forth, in going and returning, it is not simony, because these are something temporal altogether extrinsic.” So La Croix, no. 91, and others commonly.

X. The Fathers of Salamanca, tract 19, chapter 4, point 5, no. 22: “He who buys a benefice does not do an injustice, but suffers it: for he ought to have received gratis that which, a price being given, he receives; he sins only against religion, the transgression of which does not oblige to restitution. Nor does he who confers the benefice sin against justice, or by divine right make the collation invalid.”

XI. Fr. Thomas Tamburini, Book 8, chapter 4, § 4, no. 5: “I assert secondly that all benefices — whether greater, as a cardinalate and a bishopric, or lesser, as a canonry and a chaplaincy; whether having the care of souls, as an abbacy and a parish, or not having it, as the aforesaid canonry and chaplaincy, and the other benefices which are named simple — abstracting from those which are given in competition (of which presently at no. 14) — I assert, I say, that it is enough for avoiding mortal sin if they be conferred upon the worthy and fit, although the worthier or the most worthy be passed over.”

XII. Fr. Filliucci, tract 41, in the Appendix, chapter 4, no. 18: “I say fifthly that the opinion which reckons it enough to elect the worthy to benefices which are not given in competition is probable from Trent, session 7, chapter 5 On Reformation, saying: Let them be conferred upon the worthy; and from the universal estimation in the creation of beneficiaries, cardinals, bishops, abbots, and so forth, who, if they be held among the worthy, the elector is praised and the election is not blamed: but it would not commonly be praised, if it were evil and a mortal sin.”

XIII. Fr. Tamburini in the place cited, no. 8: “Since immediately before the Council seems to be content with the worthy, either first it seems by this to wish to signify by "worthier" nothing else than the worthiness of those to be elected, the comparative being taken for the positive; or secondly by a less proper locution it sets down "worthier," that it may exclude the unworthy … or lastly it speaks thirdly, when there is a competition.”

XIV. Fr. Thomas Sánchez, Book 2, disputation 15, no. 5: “It is probable that a dispensation of the Pontiff in a ratified marriage granted without a just cause is valid. … And the reason is because it is probable that the indissolubility of such a marriage is of human right.”

XV. The Salmanticenses, tract 9, chapter 1, point 6, no. 85: “Betrothals make kisses and embraces lawful between the betrothed.”

XVI. Fr. Thomas Sánchez, Book 3, disputation 18, no. 19: “Some limit this opinion, unless they should go to those places in fraud of the decree of Trent, that there they might be able freely to be joined in matrimony without a parish priest and witnesses: for then, they say, it is invalid. … For the rest this limitation displeases me, and I believe that, even if they should go thither with the end that they might be able freely to contract without a parish priest and witnesses, the marriage is ratified. First: for he who uses his own right cannot be said to commit fraud, so that for that reason the effect be hindered.”

XVII. The same Sánchez in the place cited, disputation 38, no. 3: “I conclude thirdly. It is a venial fault to omit those words (I join you together, and so forth). … It is proved: because the matter is not grave, since those words are not the form of the sacrament, nor pertain to a solemnity of great moment, nor include a mystery of great signification. Moreover because, although Trent uses preceptive words, yet under that precept there is contained not only that the parish priest bring forth those words, but other things of great moment, namely that the banns be sent before, and that the marriage be celebrated before the parish priest and witnesses, that he have a register, and so forth.”

XVIII. Fr. Viva, question 4, article 4, no. 6: “The blessing of nuptials does not seem to be a grave matter, nor greatly conducing to the progress of matrimony. For the nuptial blessing is not a sacrament, but a certain sacramental, nor of so great moment as the sacramentals which are sent before Baptism. But although it is not free from venial fault simply to omit it without any cause against the use and custom of the Church, nevertheless it is probable that there is no fault, from a just cause — namely by reason of a forbidden season, in Advent or Lent — to consummate the marriage before the blessing of the Church, since it seems to be a counsel, not a precept, to send it before.”

XIX. The Fathers of Salamanca, tract 9, chapter 19, point 5, no. 41: “Whence almost all the Doctors of our opinion infer, and Sánchez, Book 8, disputation 25, from no. 12, and Palaus in the place just cited testify that it is inferred from it, that if such a dispensation be remitted to the bishop, and he, before he despatch it, should question the contracting parties whether an incestuous copulation has been had between them, they can themselves deny it, even if he question with an oath exacted: and because such a questioning is superfluous, and juridically in such a matter he does not question, they are not bound to answer according to it; and they can assert that there was no copulation between them, and, lest they contravene the truth, retain in mind, lest we tell it to you. Nay, even if in the rescript of the Pontiff there come that clause, Unless copulation has been had between them — because it is understood of public, not of secret copulation.”

XX. Fr. Patrick Sporer, part 4, chapter 1, section 1, no. 428: “It is one thing to consent and take complacency in a copulation thought of as present, and an actual venereal delight from such copulation thought of and actual in the sensitive appetite and in the venereal parts consequent thereupon; which to the betrothed de futuro, and to widows regarding the past, is mortally unlawful, and is lawful to spouses alone. It is another thing to consent and take complacency in a copulation thought of as future, and in the venereal delight to follow at some time from such future copulation; which to the betrothed is not unlawful. For since from the betrothal itself contracted, and as it were by an inchoate right, such copulation and delight is to be at some time in the future, they ought not to be saddened by it or to turn away from it; but they can lawfully consent to it, take complacency in it, or rejoice over it, since it is nothing else than to rejoice over the hope of a future good, which hope is present and lawful. So with very many Sánchez, Diana, and so forth.”

XXI. Fr. Thomas Sánchez, Book 1, disputation 2, no. 5: “According to the common opinion embraces and kisses between the betrothed de futuro are lawful, on the ground that betrothals are a certain beginning of matrimony, and consequently grant a right of using the pleasure of matrimonial copulation. Therefore through betrothals a right in the body is acquired, otherwise no use of it would be granted; and consequently he who violates this right by fornication will be guilty of an injustice committed through fornication, necessarily to be opened in confession.” And this opinion is very probable.

XXII. The Salmanticenses, tract 9, chapter 15, point 6, no. 91: “Whether between the betrothed de futuro kisses, embraces, touches, amatory words, and so forth are lawful, outside the danger of pollution? It is answered that if such acts be done for the capturing of pleasure, they will be venial sins. … But if for a sign of love, there will be no sin, provided the betrothals between them be absolute and not conditioned. … The reason is because, just as betrothals are a certain inchoation of matrimony, so also those acts are lawful in that state which are in some manner an inchoation and beginning of copulation. Sánchez, Book 9, disputation 46; Aversa; Diana; Bonacina; Azor.”

XXIII. Tamburini, Book 7, chapter 5, no. 61, page 193 in my copy: “To the betrothed de futuro it is very probably lawful without sin to have certain signs of love, such as kisses, touches, modest looks, and amatory conversations — even on account of the delight residing in them, but without danger of pollution, or of consent to it, or to copulation; but by no means immodest ones. So Thomas Sánchez. … I find one excuse for betrothed persons exercising these unchaste actions with a foreseen but not intended danger of pollution, and without danger of consent to it. For if he were in an occasion in which he would be held UNMANNERLY if he abstained from them, he could usurp them: because there is already present a reasonable excuse.”

XXIV. Fr. George Gobat, tract 10, no. 641: “It is certain among all Doctors that kisses, touches, and embraces not immodest are lawfully done between the betrothed, when they are done according to the custom of the country as a sign of benevolence, for conciliating and fostering mutual love in order to matrimony. So speaks Perez. And indeed for the aforesaid end these acts are lawful, although there be present a danger of pollution, provided there be no danger of consent to venereal delight.”

XXV. Fr. Thomas Sánchez, Book 9, disputation 46, no. 48: “Kisses and embraces and other touches not immodest are excused from mortal fault between the betrothed de futuro by reason of the contract of betrothals entered upon between them. The reason is, because just as matrimony itself makes copulation honourable, so betrothals, which are a certain beginning of matrimony, ought to make honourable touches of this kind, which are a certain inchoation of copulation: chiefly because thus love is the more fostered in order to matrimony (no. 49). And this conclusion is true … although the betrothed intend that delight which arises from those embraces and kisses. Because betrothals, which are the beginning of matrimony, excuse from mortal sin this delight, which is an inchoation of copulation; and it would otherwise altogether be a mortal fault.”

XXVI. Fr. Gobat, tract 10, no. 672: “Sánchez in the place cited, no. 49, uses the name of sensitive delight, but by this he certainly understands venereal delight, as is plain. I confess nevertheless that it not rarely happens that a confessor is compelled in practice to suppose the opinion of Sánchez, unless he wish to dismiss such betrothed persons without absolution, as being those to whom he will with difficulty persuade that those embraces, kisses, and so forth are mortal, or, acknowledging them to be mortal, that they should form a purpose of amending themselves.”

XXVII. The Salmanticenses, tract 9, chapter 5, point 4, no. 41: “Which is true, adds Sánchez, no. 7, with Aversa and Navarrus, even before the marriage contracted, if he should see invincible ignorance and should not believe that he will acquiesce in his admonition, but with a wounded conscience would contract; or that she who would contract in good faith would with great difficulty and with scandal withdraw from such a marriage. Prudently therefore let the confessor then keep silence — nay, he is bound to keep silence, says Sánchez, no. 7, even if the ignorance be of divine right, for the same reason.”

XXVIII. Fr. Claude La Croix with Gobat goes further, Book 6, part 3, no. 541: “Although it be foreseen that the admonition will profit, yet if it be conjoined with a most grave inconvenience of the other party — for example of the proximate one — the confessor is not bound to admonish, but can permit them in good faith. So Gobat, chapter 2, no. 57; and again no. 3, Sporer.”

XXIX. Fr. George Gobat, tract 7, no. 315: “What is a confessor to do if he sees a penitent from invincible ignorance obnoxious, for example, to softness, whose gravity being taught he will scarcely abstain from on account of a depraved habit? By these words that question was proposed and applied to this peculiar vice, when it could be to several. But I answered from writings, in that title, chapter 57, no. 61; and, rightly considering the circumstances of that penitent, if it be altogether judged that the admonition will profit nothing at all, but that, the grave crime being known by him to be committed, he will nevertheless perpetrate it more rarely than he did when ignorant of its baseness — THE MANIFESTATION OF THE TRUTH IS TO BE DISSEMBLED BEFORE GOD.”

XXX. The same Gobat in the same place, no. 317: “And indeed more than once I have learned that certain men who are inculpably ignorant of the malice of this outrage sin mortally. Therefore, practically speaking, the question is not so much of him who will plainly never omit that sin on account of its known baseness, as of him alone who will scarcely omit it, or, as they say, will scarcely abstain from it, who now and then, even if most rarely, will abstain: whence — alas for the grief! — confessors groan that they know several of this most foul and at the same time most fetid bran. Concerning this also I reckon that opinion of St. Augustine on Morals is to be understood. For an admonition does not so much profit which would only hinder six, eight, or ten formally mortal sins, but will cause two hundred, three hundred, likewise mortal.”

XXXI. Fr. Claude La Croix, Book 6, part 3, no. 299: “He who probably thinks a marriage to be valid lawfully asks the debt: both because there is possession for it, and also because someone can here use a probable opinion. … Aversa adds that this holds even if the opinion for invalidity were MORE PROBABLE; and this is conformable to what is said in Book 1, no. 268, concerning the lawful use of a probable opinion.”

XXXII. Fr. Dominic Viva, On the Sacrament of Matrimony, question 7, article 3, no. 9, page 153 in my copy: “Lastly, if one party have a probable opinion concerning the nullity of the marriage, and at the same time have a probable opinion concerning its validity, he can lawfully ask and render; since he can embrace whichever probable opinion he prefers, even if one be more probable than the other.”

XXXIII. Fr. Claude La Croix, Book 3, part 3, no. 302: “If a doubt concerning the validity supervene upon a marriage contracted in good faith, and after inquiry nothing be discovered, nor can the doubt be laid aside, the first opinion, which St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, St. Antoninus, Soto, Ledesma, Valentia, Vásquez, Azor, Rebello, Pontius, Hurtado, Turrianus, Arriaga, Aversa, and 17 others with Schildius hold, says that one can indeed render the debt but not ask it, because this seems to be decided in the chapter Inquisitioni, under the title On Sentences of Excommunication. The second opinion, which Veracruz, Ledesma, Soto, Vitoria, Suárez, Coninck, Layman, Bonacina, Reginald, Lessius, Lorca, Brissius, de Lugo, Bosius, Bardi, Sánchez, Diana, Dicastillo, Terill, Cardenas hold, says that one can even ask the debt. … And this second opinion seems, at least the reason being regarded, to be more probable.”

XXXIV. Fr. Dominic Viva, question 7, article 1, no. 3: “It is asked secondly, at what time the conjugal act is unlawful? I answer that it is not unlawful on feast days, or on fast days, nor on the day of communion, nor at the time when the wife is pregnant, or suckles offspring, or suffers menstruation, nor before the nuptial blessings — although it is a counsel to abstain at those times.”

XXXV. Fr. Patrick Sporer, part 4, chapter 1, section 3, § 3, no. 490, page 246: “And indeed if a wife should know that her husband is wont to break off the copulation and to pour out the seed, she nevertheless does not sin either by asking or by rendering, provided she herself do not consent nor cooperate: because it does not follow from the wife's action, but precisely from the husband's malice.”

XXXVI. Fr. Antoninus Diana, part 3, resolution 57: “A certain man began copulation with his wife, and afterwards on account of the danger of disease withdrew with her consent; but from this a pollution sometimes followed. It was asked of me whether such an act were lawful? I answered in the affirmative.”

XXXVII. Fr. Sporer in the place cited above: “Moreover, all danger of pollution ceasing in either spouse, that spouses by mutual consent breaking off a begun copulation, lest offspring be generated, whether on account of want or on account of another cause, do not sin mortally, the Doctors sufficiently commonly teach.”

XXXVIII. The same Sporer in the same place: “Who also excuse this from all fault when a just cause underlies it — for example on account of poverty, lest offspring be multiplied on the one part; and on the other part for the allaying in some manner of concupiscence, and for the avoiding of incontinence.”

XXXIX. Fr. Thomas Sánchez, Book 9, disputation 17, no. 5: “But if a man should rub his own private parts only on the surface of the preposterous vessel of his wife, or introduce them into her mouth, all danger of pollution ceasing, I should not believe it to be mortal.”

XL. The Fathers of Salamanca, tract 10, chapter 8, point 4, no. 52: “But since we have used this distinction, we answer to the difficulty, and explain the condemned proposition so far as it pertains to us. That if flight be neither dangerous nor ignominious to the one assailed, he will incur irregularity by killing the assailant, if by fleeing he could avoid his own loss: because in this it is not enough, and so forth, as the Pontiff says. But if it be ignominious to him — as if he were a noble or a soldier, to whom it is unbecoming to take flight — he can resist the invader, and it is lawful to kill him, not exceeding the moderation of a blameless defence.”

XLI. The same Salmanticenses in the same place, no. 54: “We know moreover that Diana and Filliucci, tract 29, chapter 5, no. 133, assert that if flight were in any way ignominious to a cleric or a religious, he could defend himself, nor would he incur irregularity if he killed the invader. And Leander adds, tract 2, disputation 12, question 58, that clerics or religious regularly and absolutely are in no way bound to flee, that they may avoid the attempt of one unjustly invading; and therefore if they kill in defending themselves, they do not become irregular: because, regularly speaking, flight cannot be found in them which is not either unbecoming, or harmful, or dangerous. We know also that Filliucci, no. 133, felt that even he who by his own fault gave cause to the invader, if he did not foresee the future harm, could resist the invader without incurring irregularity by killing him, even though by fleeing he could free himself. We know also that Fagundez, and out of him Leander, tract 2, disputation 12, question 36, said that nobles or soldiers, who even without a mark could flee, can lawfully resist the invader: because of itself flight is always ignominious to nobles or soldiers, and it is by accident that in such a case it does not follow. The same Leander adds, with several cited, question 37, that even ignoble men or mechanics, who could take flight without danger, would lawfully resist the invader, nor would they become irregular by killing: because in every kind of persons to flee is an infamy, which all are bound to avoid.”

These things out of the Salmanticenses I have willed to transcribe, that it may always appear more clearly how putrid and unheard-of is that imposture which certain fabulists spread among the unskilled vulgar, that I transcribe less sincerely and in truncated fashion the lax opinions of certain casuists. Are the Salmanticenses about to say that I have narrated less sincerely, or fraudulently, the aforesaid paradoxes of laxity, which nevertheless they do not all themselves approve? But I willed to transcribe them out of those same men, that I might stop the mouths of those who turn it to their own glory to maintain all casuistical figments. Further, if the cited modern Doctors with not a few others have not feared to defend that even nobles and mechanics and religious, those very men who profess the evangelical counsels, ought not to take flight in order to avoid homicides — because in every kind of persons to flee is an infamy, which all are bound to avoid — but can by resisting kill men: if, I say, they have dared to publish these anti-evangelical figments of laxity, evidently contradicting the Gospel crying out, Luke 6, And him that striketh thee on the one cheek, offer also the other — let each man gather with how much greater liberty and facility they will have relaxed, tempered, and disturbed the other laws which are not so clear and manifest.

XLII. Fr. Hermann Busembaum, Book 3, chapter 3, doubt 5, in Fr. Claude La Croix, no. 193, page 43: “Hence it is probable what Navarrus, Toletus, and others teach, and Layman does not gainsay, scandal and other things being excluded, that it is only venial to fill oneself with food and drink even to vomiting; and this also IF A MAN VOMIT, THAT HE MAY BE ABLE TO DRINK AGAIN.”

XLIII. Fr. Claude La Croix, Book 3, no. 213: “That for the curing or the guarding against of a grave disease, even one not deadly, inebriation is lawful, many teach with Gobat, no. 15, if it cannot otherwise be cured or guarded against.”

XLIV. Fr. Busembaum, Book 3, chapter 3, article 1: “If a man after drinking can still discern between good and evil, although his fancy be somewhat disturbed, or vomiting follow, or his tongue falter, his feet waver, his eyes see double, or the house seem to whirl, drunkenness is not yet full; and therefore it is only a venial sin, although among the graver ones, if it be committed deliberately.” See Layman in the place cited.

XLV. Tamburini, Book 5, On the Decalogue, chapter 1, § 3, no. 37: “When I grieve for another's good as it is diminutive of my own excellence, I do not grieve for another's good absolutely, but formally for my own evil, or for the diminution of my own excellence, which is evil to me. For just as I should rejoice over another's evil — for example over the death of my father — as immediately causing my own good, namely an inheritance and succession, it would not be a sin according to all, as we have seen above; so on the contrary, if I grieve for another's good as immediately causing my own evil, there will be no fault.”

XLVI. The same Tamburini in the same place, no. 40: “And indeed St. Thomas and the other Doctors cited under letter H, when they suppose as certain that envy is a sadness by which a man grieves for another's good as it is diminutive of his own excellence, ARE TO BE UNDERSTOOD to have described envy from its effect.”