Chapter II — What is hatred of God, and of the Neighbor. On discord, contention, schism, and sedition

I. Hatred of God is twofold: one which is included in every sin; the other peculiar, which is described as an aversion from God, by which the will detests God insofar as he prohibits sins and inflicts punishments. This hatred of God is the gravest of all crimes, since it is opposed to the most excellent virtue of charity according to its primary act, namely the divine love. It is by its kind mortal, nor does it admit the excuse of parvity of matter; but it can turn out venial only from imperfect deliberation.

II. Hatred of the neighbor is an expressed malevolence, by which we wish him evil. It is by its kind deadly; yet it can become venial, both by parvity of matter and by imperfect deliberation — as if you wish a light evil to your neighbor, or if with imperfect deliberation you desire it for him.

III. It is licit to abominate the sinner, as sinner, according to Proverbs 29: The just abominate a wicked man. For then the sin is hated, not the man. For it is never licit to wish evil to a man, insofar as it is his evil, even with an inefficacious affection; nor is it licit to be saddened over his good, or to rejoice over his evil, as is plain from the proscribed thesis of Innocent XI recounted in the preceding chapter.

IV. Although it is never licit either to desire or to rejoice over the neighbor's evil, it is nevertheless licit, with an inefficacious affection, to wish some temporal evil to another, and to rejoice over it, insofar as this temporal evil conduces to his spiritual good — for instance, that he desist from sin, that he be called back to a better way — as St. Thomas teaches, on the third book, distinction 30, article 1, ad 4. For charity has an order, and each one ought to love himself more than another, and his kin more than strangers, and friends more than enemies, and the common good of many more than the good of one.

One can, without violating charity, wish some temporal evil to another, or rejoice if it should happen — not insofar as it is his evil, but insofar as it is an impediment of evils to another whom one is more bound to love, or to the Community, or to the Church. Similarly of his temporal evil, according as by the evil of punishment the evil of fault is frequently prevented. Hence it is licit to wish for victory in a just war, for the destruction of the Turks, for the common good of the Church or of the Principality; it is licit to wish that a punishment be inflicted by the judge on a malefactor, that he desist from inflicting harm on the Community or on a neighbor. Yet the utmost vigilance is needed in desires of this kind, however inefficacious, lest under the appearance of the common good the cupidity of private vengeance lie hidden. Similarly it is never licit to wish a lesser evil to oneself or to others in order to avoid a greater. Wherefore they gravely sin who deliberately desire death for themselves in order to avoid other troubles.

V. Question I. Is it a sin to speak ill of one's neighbor? Answer. He who with deliberate mind imprecates a grave evil upon his neighbor sins mortally. Weak women, and base men, frequently burst forth into these imprecations, and, to excuse themselves, allege the impulse of anger, as though anger were not a sin. That anger can at times forestall reason is true; but frequently, from a depraved habit and from grave negligence in restraining anger, women and men break forth into such curses. They often say, when their anger has cooled, that they are displeased at having hurled such curses; but this is not a sign that they did not sin: for when the anger has been poured out, the mind perceives the evil it has committed, and therefore is then displeased. Parish priests and Confessors, then, should instruct such persons, and show them the necessity of curbing the savage beast of anger: since their frequent curses flow from a depraved habit of becoming angry. But this wicked habituation does not excuse them, but accuses them. That Confessors may be able to discern whether they have offended gravely or lightly, let them weigh all the circumstances, the deliberation of mind, the scandal, the gravity of the evil wished, and the rest of that kind.

VI. Question II. What is discord? Answer. It is a dissension of wills from the divine good and the good of the neighbor, in which they ought to agree. It is opposed to concord, which unites hearts and wills. By its kind it is a mortal sin. For God, Proverbs 6, detests him who sows discord among brethren. It is required, however, that someone knowingly dissent from the good of God or of the Neighbor, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 37, art. 1. Wherefore there is no discord when one, in good faith, judges that this pertains to the honor of God and the utility of the Neighbor, and another judges otherwise. For this frequently happens even among the holier men themselves.

VII. Question III. What is contention? Answer. It is an altercation of words for impugning the truth; or it is an impugning of the truth with a confidence of clamor, as the Angelic Doctor says, II-II, q. 38, art. 1, where he opportunely adds: But if contention is called an impugning of falsity with a due measure of acrimony, then contention is praiseworthy. Acrimony must never be poured out upon persons, but only, with due sparingness, upon errors. This acrimony is like a seasoning, which must be used with great prudence and moderation, especially in vocal disputations. For when men dispute with mutual words, if they clamor with an immoderate outcry of voices, if they rub each other with mutual wit, the disputation easily ends in criminal contention, because the persons are present. But when errors are refuted in writing, often the authors of the errors are either dead or absent; therefore there is no danger of culpable contention. Hence it is that the mildest Fathers — Augustine, Bernard, and others — often used a style sprinkled with wit. For the reader is wearied by a cold reading; but, on the contrary, writing seasoned with a moderate pepper of acrimony sharpens his palate.

VIII. Question IV. What is Schism? Answer. It is a deliberate separation from the unity of the Church. Now he is separated from the Church who refuses either to communicate with her members, or to render due obedience to the Roman Pontiff, her visible head. Not every disobedient man is a schismatic, because pertinacity can be lacking. But every schismatic is disobedient; just as every heretic is a schismatic, but not conversely. Yet in practice these two crimes, schism and heresy, are scarcely separated, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 39, art. 1, ad 3.

IX. Question V. What is sedition? Answer. It is an aggressive war of one part of the Commonwealth against another part, or against its own Prince. It is by its kind a mortal sin, because it is gravely adverse to peace, to unity, and to the common good. Of war and duel I shall treat in explaining the fifth precept.