Chapter V — On the cessation, invalidation, dispensation, and commutation of vows

I. Question I. Who can make vows? Answer. Those who possess the use of reason, and have dominion over those things which they pledge to God. Wherefore the vows of minors, since they lack dominion, can be invalidated by their parents: nor are they firm except under the tacit condition that they please the parents.

II. Question II. Are vows made by Religious, without the Prelate's license, concerning an honorable matter which disturbs neither jurisdiction nor discipline, valid? Answer. Several deny it; but the more probable opinion affirms it, since they bring no detriment either to the jurisdiction of the Prelates, or to the discipline of the Order, and concern an honorable matter. Prelates can indeed invalidate these vows, once they have come to know of them. But subjects are not bound to manifest them; and so, as long as they remain hidden, they are valid, and those vowing are bound to execute them. But vows of Religious opposed either to the Rule or to the jurisdiction of Superiors are null. Similarly, vows made by Religious to give away in alms anything of the goods granted for their own use, without the license of the Prelates, are altogether null.

III. Question III. Can the Church make laws declaring certain persons unable to make vows? Answer. If the discourse be of solemn vows, which regard the public discipline of the Church, there is no difficulty. For it is plain from the Church's sanction that no monastic profession is valid if made before the completion of the sixteenth year. With respect to simple vows, even internal ones, the Church can prescribe certain conditions, which not being observed, the vows are null; and thus indirectly she can invalidate even internal promises. Bishops cannot, without consulting the supreme Pontiff, vow the abdication of their Episcopate, because such abdication is forbidden to them. Nor can they vow a pilgrimage beyond that interval during which they can rightly be absent from their Churches, without consulting the supreme Pontiff. Parish priests and Beneficiaries, bound by the tie of residence, can vow entrance into Religion without consulting the Bishop. But that the one vowing cannot enter Religion without consulting the Bishop, some grant. But this opinion is destitute of all foundation, since no law exists which prohibits this. Yet by the law of fittingness and courtesy, Parish priests ought to consult their own Bishop.

IV. Question IV. Does a vow cease when the moving cause ceases? Answer. One cause is moving, another impelling. The proximate moving cause ceasing, the vow ceases, as all commonly teach. Because, the final cause altogether ceasing, the matter of the vow ceases. This is plain by an example. You vowed alms to be given to such a poor man: this man has become rich: the end of the alms altogether ceases. The vow, therefore, also ceases. But the impelling cause ceasing, the vow does not cease.

V. Question V. Does a notable change of matter suffice to invalidate a vow? Answer. The common opinion affirms it, with St. Thomas, II-II, q. 110 [recte 88], article 3, ad 3, provided the change of matter be very grave. It is reckoned very grave when the state of the promised thing is varied. This change, moreover, must be evident and manifest. Hence, if, the vow having been made, there occurs in its execution a danger to life, or to honor, or a detriment of another matter of grave moment, the vow ceases.

VI. Supervening difficulties, which can be overcome in the execution of a vow, do not invalidate the vow, although, had the one vowing known of them, he would have abstained from the vow. Since there are few contracts in which grave difficulties do not afterwards occur, which, had they been foreseen, the contracts would not have been entered into.

VII. Question VI. Is some cause required for the invalidation of vows? Answer. Several affirm that no cause is required for the valid invalidation of vows. Invalidation, they say, is the removal of a vow made by one who possesses ruling power, such as fathers have over children, and Superiors over subject Religious. There is a twofold invalidation: one direct, which I have described; the other indirect, which regards the promised matter, and impedes its execution. The opinion which affirms that a cause is required for the invalidation of vows is very probable to me. For invalidation is an act of jurisdiction. An examination, then, ought to precede, so that this act may be judged fitting or not. Finally, he who acts honorably ought to be moved by some right end.

VIII. Question VII. Is the faculty of invalidating vows a matter of natural or of positive law? Answer. Several stand for positive law, saying that the solemn vows of Regulars are indissoluble only by ecclesiastical law. The contrary opinion is more probable to me, which St. Thomas defends, II-II, q. 189, and with him the graver Theologians. Children, by force of natural law, are subject to paternal power. Religious are subject to the will and dominion of their Prelates, by force of solemn profession, or the vow of obedience. Therefore, by natural and divine law, fathers and Superiors hold dominion over children and Religious; and by force of this dominion they can invalidate the vows of their subjects. There is added that although some law be only of ecclesiastical positive law, yet, that being posited, natural and divine law arises. The consecration of a chalice is a matter of ecclesiastical law. But that being posited, by divine law, reverence and homage are owed to the consecrated chalice.

IX. Question VIII. To whom does the power of invalidating vows belong? Answer. Some are Superiors who have ruling power, as parents over children, masters over servants, as has been said; others are those who possess the power of jurisdiction over those vowing. The supreme Pontiff can directly invalidate the vows of Regulars and Nuns, because he is the supreme Prelate of all Religious; likewise the vows of all Ecclesiastics which pertain to ecclesiastical benefices; but he can invalidate the vows of laymen only indirectly, by forbidding the matter.

X. Bishops can directly invalidate the vows of Nuns subject to them; but not of Nuns who are not subject to their jurisdiction, or of exempt Regulars; nay, nor of their own Clerics, and still less of Laymen. Only those, then, can directly invalidate vows who have what is called ruling power over those vowing. Thus the Prelates of Regulars can invalidate the vows of Religious, parents the vows of children, guardians the vows of wards, curators the vows of minors, masters the vows of slaves, husbands the vows of wives: because all these possess ruling power. A Superior can invalidate the vows of subjects, the subjects being unwilling.

XI. The Superiors of Regulars who can invalidate vows are the Generals throughout the whole Order, the Provincials throughout the whole Province, the Superiors of Convents or houses within them. Secondary Superiors, such as Vicars and Sub-priors, cannot invalidate the vows of subjects when the Prelates are present, but can when these Prelates are absent. Now they are not said to be absent when they leave the house to return the same day; but they are understood to be absent when they are away from the Convent for one or two natural days. Abbesses and Prioresses of Nuns can invalidate the vows of subject Nuns, just as Regular Prelates can invalidate the vows of their subjects. Regular Prelates cannot invalidate the vows of Novices before profession, because they have no ruling power over them.

XII. Question IX. Can parents invalidate the vows of minor children? Answer. The infancy of children begins from birth and ends at the completion of the seventh year. The age of wardship, or non-puberty, takes its beginning from the seventh year, and ends, in sons, at the completed fourteenth year; in daughters, likewise at the completed twelfth year. Puberty in women begins at the twelfth year, in men at the fourteenth, and, according to common law, has its end at the completed twenty-fifth year. Within this interval — from the twelfth and fourteenth years up to the twenty-fifth — both daughters and sons are called pubescent and minors, just as from the seventh year up to the twelfth and fourteenth they are called non-pubescent. Now the vows of non-pubescent sons and daughters, made after the use of reason, and so valid, parents can invalidate, whether they be personal vows, real, or mixed. But the vows of pubescent sons and daughters, which do not disturb domestic governance, parents cannot invalidate, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 88, art. 8, ad 2. But vows which disturb domestic governance, since they bring harm to paternal power, parents can invalidate. Vows of non-pubescent children once confirmed by the father cannot afterwards be invalidated by him.

XIII. Question X. Are the real vows of pubescent children subject to paternal invalidation? Answer. So long as children are of minor age, that is, within the time of puberty, they are subject to paternal administration, and can in no way dispose of paternal goods. Null, then, are their real vows by which they pledge paternal goods, the consent of parents not being added. Likewise of mixed vows, as to that part which is real. But the vows of pubescent children which concern castrensian goods cannot be invalidated by the father; nor vows concerning adventitious goods, whose administration the children have. But if the father has the administration of these goods, he can invalidate vows concerning them: because then the vows would be contrary to right administration.

XIV. Question XI. Can guardians and curators invalidate the vows of minors and wards? Answer. Guardians and curators can invalidate the vows of minors and wards in the same way that parents can rescind the vows of children, because they are reckoned as fathers, as it were. A curator given to a major on account of his fault of prodigality can invalidate real vows: because all administration, taken from the major, is subject to the curator's dominion.

XV. Question XII. Can a mother invalidate the vows of minor sons and daughters? Answer. While the father lives and is present, the mother lacks the power of invalidating the vows of sons and daughters: because the father alone is the head of the family, as the more common and more probable opinion teaches. The father having died, the grandfather, guardian, or curator succeeds, and while these exist, the mother cannot invalidate the vows of her children. But grandfathers, guardians, and curators being absent, and the father dead, then the mother can invalidate the vows of her minor children, since by natural law she has care of the children. But the mother of pubescent children cannot invalidate real vows, unless she has been instituted a curatrix. Parents, guardian, and curator being absent, a grandfather and grandmother can invalidate the vows of minor grandchildren: since they succeed in the place of parents. Masters of disciples, lords of servants, employers of hired men, cannot invalidate personal vows made in minority, as the more common opinion teaches.

XVI. Question XIII. Can a husband invalidate the vows made by his wife after marriage? Answer. A husband can invalidate those vows of his wife which concern things subject to his authority. For a wife is not subject to her husband in all things, but only in those which regard marriage, the governance of the family, the administration of goods, and the education of children. Therefore a husband can invalidate only those vows which disturb the aforesaid order; not others which in no way stand in the way of the things I have recounted. A contrary opinion grave and numerous Theologians defend — namely that a husband can invalidate all his wife's vows. This opinion, if the discourse be of real vows which wives can make concerning things and paraphernal goods, is false: for just as they can dispose of these goods without consulting their husbands...

so too they can make vows concerning them. Similarly a husband cannot invalidate his wife's vows of hearing Mass on feast days, of not lying, of not committing adultery, of making confession, and other things already commanded. Nor can a husband invalidate a vow which his wife made, without consulting him, of not asking the debt. Yet the wife would imprudently make this vow, since it diminishes conjugal benevolence and mutual love, at least indirectly. A husband cannot invalidate his wife's vows which he himself has once approved. Similarly, when by mutual consent they have vowed chastity, neither retains the power of withdrawing from the vow. Again, when both by mutual consent vow Religion, they can no longer invalidate such a vow, either by mutual consent or separately. Vows made by a wife before marriage, but to be fulfilled once marriage has been entered upon, a husband cannot invalidate, but can only suspend their execution, if they are absent from the conjugal duty. The same must be said of vows made during the time of a legitimate divorce. A wife too can invalidate her husband's vows which conflict with matrimonial right; just as she can invalidate a vow which her husband might make of adopting the habit of a Hermit or of some Religion, because such a wearing of the habit diminishes conjugal love, and paves the way to separation. A wife can also invalidate her husband's vows of a longer pilgrimage, except a vow of pilgrimage to Jerusalem made for a time on account of the public good. For then the wife is bound to keep continence for the sake of defending some public good, or recovering something lost. This cause being absent, vows are to be dissuaded in married persons which either indirectly oppose conjugal benevolence. Let married persons bear, with Christian patience and a reciprocal love of charity, the most heavy matrimonial yoke, and they will be holy Christians.

XVII. Question XIV. Can masters invalidate the vows of servants? Answer. Domestic servants must be distinguished from slaves. The former serve their masters by a paid agreement, and are their own masters, and can make vows, whose execution alone the masters can suspend, if they impede due domestic service. The latter, namely slaves properly so called, are chattels reduced to servitude, and enjoy no liberty as regards the bodily service to be rendered to their masters. The first opinion defends that masters can invalidate all the vows of slaves. The more probable opinion is that masters can invalidate all the vows of slaves which impede due servitude: since a master has the right that the offices of servitude be rendered to him by the slave. Therefore he can invalidate those things which derogate from this right. But they cannot invalidate vows of keeping the divine precepts, of chastity, of prayers, of giving alms from goods of which the slaves have dominion, nor other similar vows, which in no way impede due servitude.

XVIII. Question XV. Does the faculty of dispensing from the obligation of vows flourish in the Church? Answer. All Catholics say so, alleging Matthew 16: To thee I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven: whatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven. Now this dispensation is the removal of the bond of a vow, made in God's name by one having spiritual jurisdiction in the external forum, for some reasonable cause. This notion of dispensation is by its own nature clear. How this dispensation is made, St. Thomas declares, II-II, q. 88, art. 10, ad 2. Those who can dispense can also commute vows.

XIX. Question XVI. To whom, by ordinary law, does the faculty of dispensing in vows belong? Answer. It belongs first to the supreme Pontiff, Pastor and Head of the universal Church, and Vicar of Christ on earth; then to a general Council, to the supreme Pontiff's Penitentiary, to Legates a latere, to pontifical Nuncios with respect to the whole Province or Kingdom, to Archbishops, Bishops, the cathedral Chapter with the see vacant, Abbots having quasi-episcopal jurisdiction, and all Prelates of Regulars with respect to their own subjects. All these can, by ordinary law, dispense their subjects in vows both personal and real, reserved vows excepted. Cardinal Protectors of Orders cannot, by ordinary law, dispense in vows. The vows of a Community can be dispensed by a Bishop, a just cause occurring.

XX. Question XVII. Those who impart dispensation from a vow to others — can they apply this same privilege to themselves? Answer. Concerning the supreme Pontiff there is no difficulty, since he has no superior from whom he could be dispensed. The Salmanticenses defend that any Prelates who can dispense others can use the same privilege upon themselves, and for their opinion cite Sanchez, Tamburini, Azor, Suárez, and others. The opposite opinion is more probable to me: because no one is a judge in his own cause; therefore these Prelates ought to have recourse to their own Superiors.

XXI. Question XVIII. Can Regular Prelates dispense their subjects in vows made with the license of greater Prelates? Answer. It has already been said that Regular Prelates can do what Bishops can do throughout their whole diocese — namely, the General throughout the whole Order, the Provincial throughout the whole Province, and the Superiors of houses throughout the whole family. To the question proposed some answer, denying this faculty to Prelates. But the common and true opinion teaches that in the case proposed Regular Prelates can dispense. Because although a license granted by a greater Prelate withdraws the vow made from the ruling power of the inferior Prelate, who cannot invalidate it, it does not thereby remove it from spiritual jurisdiction. Therefore the inferior Prelate can dispense from it. Regular Prelates can also dispense their own Novices.

XXII. Question XIX. Can Regular Confessors dispense secular men in vows? Answer. Almost all Casuists commonly affirm it, alleging several privileges; but in Tome 3 of the Christian Theology, book 4, dissertation 3, chapter 11, I made plain that privileges of this kind are fictitious and of no authority; and so that Regular Confessors can in no way dispense secular men from any vows whatsoever, whether reserved or not reserved. And this our opinion Passerini, Martínez de Prado, and Lezana teach, which in the place cited I confirmed by the authority of Benedict XIII, who in his constitution Pretiosus in conspectu Domini imparts to Confessors the faculty of commuting vows, but not of dispensing. Fr. O. P. wrangle over the word "relaxed" [relaxari] contained in the constitution. But I exploded this cavil in the place cited, where I showed that in a matter of jurisdiction, the safer part must be chosen.

XXIII. Question XX. What must be said of vows reserved to the Supreme Pontiff? Answer. The common opinion is that there are five vows reserved to the supreme Pontiff, namely the simple vow of perpetual continence, of Religion, and of a threefold pilgrimage — to Jerusalem, to Rome, and to Compostela. No other vow, besides these five, is reserved to the supreme Pontiff. Except, however, simple vows made in certain Religious Orders of not seeking, nor accepting, dignities. That these vows be reserved to the supreme Pontiff, they must be certain, express, absolute, and perfect. If there be doubt about them, they are not reserved. For this reservation, since it is odious, must be interpreted strictly. Wherefore if someone made one of these five vows with the express intention of binding himself only under venial sin, it would not be a perfect vow, and therefore not reserved either.

XXIV. Bishops, urgent necessity pressing, can dispense in vows of this kind — as when there is danger of violating the vow, of infamy, of scandal, or of another grave harm, either temporal or spiritual, if the dispensation is deferred. You violated a virgin while bound by a vow of chastity. For the reparation of her honor, marriage is necessary. Impediments are feared to be raised, if the marriage is deferred. In this and similar cases, Bishops can dispense, provided the imminent harms cannot be repaired in another way.

XXV. The Salmanticenses grant this same faculty of dispensing from reserved vows to Regular Prelates...

But this opinion is false: because even the privileges admitted, which are commonly alleged, and which we have rejected as apocryphal, grant Regular Prelates no faculty in reserved vows. These privileges being excluded, Regulars have no power even of commuting the vows of Seculars. A vow of not contracting marriage is not reserved, because it is not perfect in this kind. For it does not exclude fornication, pollution, and other acts contrary to chastity. By force of custom a Bishop can grant the faculty of asking the conjugal debt to one who, bound by a vow of chastity, has contracted marriage. A vow of an unapproved Religion is not reserved.

XXVI. Question XXI. How are the reserved vows of the threefold pilgrimage understood? Answer. They are reserved when they were made on account of a peculiar devotion toward the aforesaid places. These vows, made with some circumstance, remain whole and reserved when the circumstance is removed. You vowed a pilgrimage to Rome on foot: the Bishop can dispense in the circumstance of the journey on foot, but not in the vow of pilgrimage, which can be made by carriage. A disjunctive vow is not reserved before one part is chosen by the one vowing. You vowed Religion, or alms; chastity, or fasting, without having chosen either part. In this case a Bishop can dispense. But once a reserved part has been selected by the one vowing — say, perpetual chastity — then it seems to us more probable that it is reserved.

XXVII. These vows: "If I gamble, I vow chastity"; "If my father dies, I will enter Religion" — this second the authors commonly teach to be reserved, because the vow is in very deed absolute, and only expresses an apparent condition: namely, when my father dies, I will enter Religion. This other vow, and similar ones, once the condition is fulfilled, seem more probably to be reserved. Thus this is reserved: "I vow Religion, if I come off unharmed" — once the condition is fulfilled, not before. The opposite opinion the Salmanticenses defend at length, whose reasons I exploded in the place cited.

XXVIII. When the aforesaid five vows, on account of some condition attached, are not reserved, Regular Confessors can relax them by commuting, but not by dispensing, as has been said above. For "to relax" does not include "to dispense," as not a few falsely suppose. For when Pontiffs grant the faculty of dispensing, they expressly use the word "dispense." In the faculty granted of dispensing or commuting all vows, reserved vows are not understood, unless they are expressed.

XXIX. Question XXII. Is a reasonable cause required for a valid and licit dispensation? Answer. The power given to a dispenser is for edification, not for destruction, as the Councils, Canons, Fathers, and Theologians teach. Therefore a dispensation of a vow granted without a reasonable cause is not only illicit, but invalid, because it would be for the destruction, not the edification, of the Church. If it is doubted whether or not there is a cause for dispensing, then the Theologians commonly teach that dispensation has no place. For a vow is certain, and cannot be undone for an uncertain cause. But if some certain cause exists, and it is only doubted whether it is sufficient, then the common opinion teaches that dispensation can be granted. When a dispensation has been given in good faith both on the part of the one asking and on the part of the one granting, if you afterwards discover that the cause which each party judged legitimate at the time of the granting and the asking is false and null, what is to be done? The Salmanticenses, Sanchez, Tamburini, Leander, Sporer, Roncaglia, and others defend that the dispensation is valid. But the contrary opinion is more probable. For even the adversaries cited themselves confess that a just cause is required for valid dispensation. Therefore, as often as this cause is lacking, there is no dispensation. There was good faith both in the one asking and in the one granting; what follows from this? Only this follows: that these did not sin. Did good faith perhaps make a false cause become true? Far from it, you say. Therefore, a false cause existing, there is no dispensation. But it belongs to divine benignity to confirm and ratify what was asked and granted in good faith. Is this so indeed? Will divine benignity, then, confirm an error? This surely does not befit divine benignity. But souls are tortured with scruples, consciences are disturbed. These are trifles. Errors, fictions, and false interpretations do not settle consciences, do not uproot scruples; but the true observance of the Law brings tranquility.

XXX. Question XXIII. What are legitimate causes of dispensation? Answer. Three things must be noted: 1. what is lawful according to equity; 2. what is fitting according to honesty; 3. what is expedient according to utility. The graver the vow, the graver the causes required for dispensation, so that there be a fitting proportion between the vow to be relaxed and the cause of relaxation. Hence it is that in the aforesaid five vows dispensations are rarely granted, but the supreme Pontiffs themselves are wont to mix in something of commutation. Nor is it to be inferred from this that a dispensation is never to be granted; but only that it is to be granted when a legitimate cause occurs. Nor is an evident cause always required, since in moral matters it can often not be had. It suffices that a likely cause appear solid, so that, all things seriously weighed, it be judged expedient, both to the common good and to the honest advantage of the one vowing, that the vow be relaxed.

XXXI. The peculiar causes which can suffice for granting a dispensation are: doubt about the vow having been made, imperfect deliberation in vowing, the very great difficulty of its execution, a moral danger of frequently violating the vow on account of the fragility of the one bound by the vow, even a light fear unjustly inflicted to extort the vow.

XXXII. Imperfect deliberation either was so sudden and weak that it rendered the vow null, and the question ceases; or it was such that it rendered the vow valid, in which case it does not by itself suffice for a dispensation. But when perfect deliberation is doubted, and difficulty of execution is added, then there is room for dispensation. A vehement fear of shipwreck, of a most grave danger, can sometimes so disturb the mind that it impedes perfect deliberation, so that it can sometimes be a sufficient reason for granting a dispensation. Similarly, a most grave difficulty, not foreseen beforehand, but appearing entirely after the vow was made, can be a cause of dispensation. Tamburini, the Salmanticenses, and Sporer contend that even a foreseen difficulty suffices for dispensation; but this opinion is false to me. If to the difficulty is added a grave danger of violating the vow, then there can be room for dispensation. Doubt about a vow having been made is not a sufficient cause for dispensing, but only for commuting.

XXXIII. Question XXIV. What is the commutation of a vow, and who can commute vows? Answer. It is the exchange of one matter for another, under the same obligation of the vow. It differs from dispensation, which takes away the whole obligation, and from invalidation, which can be validly done even without cause. Commutation is an effect of spiritual jurisdiction. Anyone can increase, but not diminish, his own vows. You vowed a hundred gold pieces; you can give two hundred: because this is a more abundant payment, not a commutation. They dispute whether anyone can commute his own vows. Some affirm it; but St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and other ancient writers deny it. For commutation is an act of spiritual jurisdiction. Secular persons lack this spiritual jurisdiction; but ecclesiastical persons cannot exercise spiritual jurisdiction upon themselves; and therefore they cannot commute their own vows. The patrons of the opposite opinion gratuitously assert that this commutation is an act of prudence, not of spiritual jurisdiction: for in a true commutation the prior bond is rescinded, and another substituted. But the rescission of a contract is an act of jurisdiction. It is so, they say, when the commutation is not evidently for the better. Several of the adversaries confuse the state of the question. When...

the promised matter is increased, it is not commutation, but a more abundant payment. True commutation is when, in place of one matter — say a fast — another is substituted, such as alms. Now that jurisdiction is required for this exchange is evident. The adversaries concede this when the matter to be substituted is either inferior or equal: why not also when it is greater, and of a different kind? There is added that no one is a judge in his own cause; and men can with difficulty know what is more pleasing to God. Therefore promises must be stood by, which cannot be broken without falsehood, unless jurisdiction intervenes, which rescinds the bond of the contract. No one, then, can by his own authority commute the matter of his own vow into another matter of a different kind; but spiritual jurisdiction is necessary. Hence he who has vowed one Religion cannot, by his own authority, enter another.

XXXIV. Question XXV. In the commutation of vows, must an equality of matter be kept? Answer. Bonacina, Leander, Diana teach that vows can be commuted into a lesser matter; but the more common and more probable opinion defends that a moral equality must be kept. For commutation is indeed a contract: but in every contract equality must be kept, more or less according to the diversity of contracts. This equality is not to be taken arithmetically and mathematically, but morally — that is, as is prudently judged equivalent to the matter which was previously subject to the vow.

XXXV. Question XXVI. What cause is required for a licit and valid commutation? Answer. When the commutation is made into something evidently better, by a Prelate endowed with legitimate authority, all concede that no cause is required; and they add that the same must be said when the matter to be substituted is evidently equal, and probably better. But when the supreme Pontiff, in a Jubilee or in the Bull of the Crusade, or by some privilege, gives the faculty of commuting vows, no peculiar cause is required, but the execution of the works prescribed in the aforesaid Bulls suffices: because the supreme Pontiff imparts such a faculty for the common good of the whole Church. But when Prelates, by ordinary power, commute vows into matter of a different kind, some just cause is always required; yet a grave one is not always necessary, but sometimes a light one can suffice, that the commutation be licit: for when it is into equal matter, it is valid even if made without cause, though not licit; but if it is made into inferior matter without cause, it is both illicit and invalid, as the more probable opinion teaches. But a Prelate commuting vows without cause sins gravely, because he abuses the faculty granted to him.

XXXVI. Question XXVII. What must be said of the commutation of vows by force of a Jubilee, or of the Bull of the Crusade? Answer. In the Bull of the Jubilee a broader faculty is granted, namely of commuting vows of the threefold pilgrimage — to Rome, to Compostela, and to Jerusalem — and only vows of chastity and of Religion are excepted. In the Bull of the Crusade, besides these two vows, a vow of an overseas pilgrimage is also excepted. The two vows of chastity and of Religion, which are excepted in each Bull, are perfect and absolute. Wherefore vows of not marrying, of not fornicating, of conjugal chastity, of chastity for a limited time, are not excepted, nor vows made by deceit, fear, or error. This commutation can be made both within and outside of confession: because the privileges which grant the faculty of commuting vows do not bind this commutation to sacramental confession, unless Superiors decree otherwise. In this commutation the general rule must be kept: to commute either into something better, or into a good morally and prudently equal.

XXXVII. Question XXVIII. Can a vow of giving alms to such a Church, or to such a poor person, be commuted, after that party's acceptance, by virtue of a Jubilee, or of the Bull of the Crusade? Answer. To me the affirming opinion is false. Since either the poor person, or the Church, after the acceptance of a promise confirmed by a vow, acquires a right to the promised thing. But the aforesaid privileges do not grant the faculty of injuring justice. He who, after receiving the Jubilee, remembers some vow, can take care that it be commuted for him, because his forgetting of it was innocent. But once the year of the Bull of the Crusade has passed, the graces granted in it cannot be obtained. He who, at the beginning of the week of the Jubilee, has his vows commuted with a sincere intention of gaining the Jubilee, has the commutation stand, even if afterwards, through negligence or forgetfulness, he does not fulfill the works of the Jubilee. Since an obligation once extinguished does not revive. He who, at the time of the Jubilee, refuses to commute his vows without just cause, sins more or less according to the variety of circumstances.

XXXVIII. Question XXIX. Is a return to the former matter licit after a legitimate commutation has been made? Answer. If the commutation was made into a lesser obligation, and a dispensation was mixed in, the one vowing can return to the original matter, the substituted matter being abandoned: because no one is compelled to use a privilege of dispensation that favors him, as is commonly taught. But the Theologians dispute whether a return to the prior matter is free, when the commutation was made, by legitimate authority, into something better or equal. The Salmanticenses, Leander, Castropalao, Laymann, and others affirm it. Because, they say, the commutation is made in favor of the one vowing. The contrary opinion is more probable to me: since indeed the commutation is in favor of the one vowing precisely because the prior bond is removed and another substituted. Here the whole favor to the one vowing is concluded. Now when the one vowing has accepted the commutation, or the substituted burden, he has bound himself to it by the bond of Religion. Therefore he cannot free himself from this debt, especially when the commutation was made into something better, since he freely accepted this greater burden, and bound himself to it.

The End of the First Tome.