Case 2. Probabilism Not Condemned

A recent author proves, as it seems to him, that probabilism is opposed to the judgment of the Church given by Alexander VII, Innocent XI, Innocent XII, and Clement XI, and indeed is opposed to reason, insofar as I must sincerely strive for the agreement of my action with the objective morality of that action—something I by no means accomplish when I choose a norm which, in my judgment, is more probably opposed to the aforesaid morality than in agreement with it. He thinks that by these arguments the system of probabilism has been demolished, but that it is still maintained because of men’s inclination toward that which is easier and because of the great influence which the Society of Jesus has exercised upon theological science. Hence it is asked:

1. What is a system of moral theology, and how do probabilism and equiprobabilism differ?

2. What can be answered to the arguments of that recent author?

3. Can probabilism rightly be called the distinctive doctrine of the Society of Jesus?

1. What is meant by a system of moral theology, and how does probabilism differ from equiprobabilism ? By a system of moral theology is meant a body of rules which enables a person to form a certain conscience in cases of doubt where direct certainty as to the lawfulness of an action can not be had. Thus probabilism is that system of moral theology according to which it is lawful to follow a solidly probable opinion even against a more probable opinion in favor of the existence of a law which would forbid the action when the sole question is one about the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the action. Equiprobabilism only allows one to follow an opinion in favor of liberty against such a law when the opinion is equally or almost equally probable with that in favor of the law. Equiprobabilists also add to this a subsidiary rule to the effect that in case of doubt whether a law hitherto in force has ceased to be obligatory, it must be obeyed as long as it is not certain that it has ceased to be of obligation.

2. What answer may be given to the arguments of the recent author alluded to?¹

1 L. Wouters, C.SS.R., De minusprobabilismo.

The recent author alluded to confounds two very different things — the private opinion of a Pope, and a Pope’s authoritative decision, which is the judgment of the Church. As Benedict XIV explains in his classical work De Synodo Dioecesana, the private opinion of a Pope has no more weight than that of another theologian of equal learning and virtue. It is only when he gives an authoritative decision — when he acts as Pope — that he expresses the judgment of the Church. It may be conceded that the Popes mentioned were, as theologians, adverse to probabilism, but they never condemned it authoritatively. Of all the proofs of his contention that the recent author adduces, the strongest, as he confesses, is the decree of Innocent XI, and we will give here the authentic version of that decree to show what it really prescribed.

Wednesday, 26 June 1680

“After Father Laurea had made a report of the contents of the letters of Father Thyrsus Gonzalez of the Society of Jesus directed to our Most Holy Lord, the Most Eminent Lords said that it should be written through the Secretary of State to the Apostolic Nuncio of Spain, so that he may signify to the said Father Thyrsus that His Holiness, having graciously received and read his letters not without praise, commanded that he freely and fearlessly preach, teach, and defend with the pen the more probable opinion, and likewise manfully attack the opinion of those who assert that, in a concurrence of a less probable opinion with a more probable one recognized and judged as such, it is lawful to follow the less probable; and that he should assure him that whatever he shall do and write in favor of the more probable opinion will be pleasing to His Holiness.

“It should be enjoined upon the Father General of the Society of Jesus, by order of His Holiness, that he not only permit the Fathers of the Society to write for the more probable opinion and to attack the opinion of those asserting that, in a concurrence of a less probable opinion with a more probable one recognized and judged as such, it is lawful to follow the less probable; but that he also write to all the Universities of the Society that it is the mind of His Holiness that each one, as he wishes, may freely write for the more probable opinion and attack the aforesaid contrary opinion; and that he command them to submit completely to the command of His Holiness.”¹

1 Lehmkuhl, Probabilism Vindicated, p. 82.

There is obviously no condemnation of probabilism in this decree, neither is there any condemnation in the other documents alluded to by the recent writer.²

2 Compare Lehmkuhl, at the cited place, p. 80 and following.

The recent author’s argument from reason is weaker than his argument from authority. It amounts to this. We are under the obligation of sincerely trying to make our actions agree with the objective rule of morality. Therefore we are under an obligation of following the more probable opinion. The antecedent of this argument is true when the objective rule of morality is known. If there is no known objective rule of morality which binds me in the case in point, I am left to my liberty. The consequent is false. It gratuitously supposes that the opinion which seems to the agent the more probable is more in accordance with the objective rule of morality. What seems more probable to one is often less probable to others, and even to the same person at another time. And even if we grant that a more probable opinion is more in accordance with the objective rule of morality, it does not make that rule certain. And a certain obligation can not arise from an uncertain law else the effect would surpass its cause.

3. Can probabilism be called with truth the peculiar doctrine of the Society of Jesus?

No, it can not. As Fr. Oliva, who was General of the Society when the decree of Innocent XI was issued, asserted, there is no prohibition in the Society against defending probabiliorism or any other recognized system of morals. The long list of authors who have taught probabilism which St. Alphonsus gives in his Dissertation published in 1755 contains names belonging to all schools of theology. Probabilism was first formulated by Medina, a Dominican, and its first chief defenders were also Dominicans.