Chapter III. The Doubtful Conscience

WHEN we have some knowledge of a matter which does not amount to a certainty, various states of mind may be distinguished with respect to the mind’s inclination to form a judgement about the matter in question. If no reasons are known for either affirming or denying a proposition, or if there are as weighty reasons for one as for the other, the mind suspends judgement, and is said to be in doubt. Doubt, then, is the suspending of judgement about a matter apprehended by the mind. A doubtful conscience, therefore, will be a suspension of judgement about the lawfulness of some action.

If some slight reason draws the mind in one direction, we have then a suspicion about the matter. If there be a good solid reason or reasons for forming a judgement in a particular sense though there is not sufficient ground for certainty, and it is felt that the opposite may be true, the mind then forms an opinion on the matter.¹

Theologians distinguish a negative from a positive doubt. There is negative doubt when the mind suspends judgement for want of reasons on one side or on the other; if there is an apparent equality of reasons on either side, the doubt is positive. In this chapter we confine our attention to negative doubt, the sense in which the term doubt is usually understood in theology. A speculative doubt has reference to some question in the abstract apart from present action, as when I doubt whether it is allowed to fish on Sundays, though I have no intention of actually fishing: a practical doubt has reference to the lawfulness of an action which there is question of performing here and now.

A doubt about law has reference to the law’s existence or its interpretation; a doubt about fact has reference to fact.

¹ St Thomas, 2-2, q. 2, a. 1.

It is not lawful to perform an action with a practically doubtful conscience as to whether the action is right or wrong. The reason is obvious; for, as we saw in the last chapter, we must have a certain conscience that the action is right before performing it, otherwise sin is committed, and one who has a doubtful conscience has not a certain conscience.

The sin which is committed by one who acts with a practically doubtful conscience as to whether the action is right takes its species and gravity from the doubtful conscience. If I eat meat with a practical doubt as to whether it is not forbidden on that day by the Church, I commit a sin of the same kind and malice as if I ate meat knowingly on a day of abstinence. The reason is obvious from what was said about a certain conscience. The species of a sin and its malice depend upon the mind and will of the agent, and when one acts with a doubtful conscience the will is prepared to commit a sin of the kind apprehended, and by that very act it commits the sin.

As long as the conscience is in a state of practical doubt, one may abstain from action altogether, or do what in any case would be licit. There is no danger of sin if, while doubting whether it is allowed to eat meat, one abstains from food altogether, or eats only what is allowed on days of abstinence. The axiom—In dubio pars tutior est sequenda—is to be taken in this sense. An effort may also be made to resolve the doubt by making inquiries of those who know, by consulting authorities, or by making use of certain principles of conduct which are approved by law and right reason. In this manner a certain conscience may frequently be formed.

There are various principles or axioms suitable for the purpose of forming one’s conscience when in doubt. They are for the most part taken from canon law, but they are also used in questions belonging to the forum of conscience.

In dubio melior est conditio possidentis—Possession is properly a physical fact, and consists in the corporal detention of a thing. In a wider sense rights are objects of possession, as a right of way, or the right to one’s liberty; so that if one’s liberty has hitherto been unrestricted, it is said to be in possession. The very fact of possession gives a right to continue in possession unless there is an adverse and stronger claim. There is also in the possessor a presumption of title to possess, for all men are jealous of their rights, and usually do not allow their property or rights to be held by others as owners. If, then, I am in possession of some object or right, and a doubt supervenes as to whether I am entitled to possession in the case or not, the question may be solved in the forum of conscience as it would be in a court of law, by applying the maxim —In dubio melior est conditio possidentis.¹

If, then, a doubt arises as to whether I have said my breviary, I must say it, for the law is in possession; if on the contrary a doubt comes into my mind as to whether I have taken food after midnight, I may go to Holy Communion, because my right to receive is in possession.

¹ Cf. Irish Eccles. Record, Sept. 1899.

In dubio standum est pro eo pro quo stat praesumptio. (In doubt one must stand by that for which the presumption stands.) A presumption is a probable conjecture about an uncertain event. The conjecture is such as would be formed in the circumstances by a man of ordinarily sound judgement and prudence. This is called a praesumptio hominis to distinguish it from a praesumptio juris, which the law itself sanctions in certain circumstances. Thus, according to the old canon law, if the parents of a boy and girl promised them in marriage and they did not express dissent, there was a praesumptio juris that they gave their consent, and they were reputed betrothed to each other. This praesumptio juris admits, indeed, of proof to the contrary; in cases where proof to the contrary is not admitted, there is praesumptio juris et de jure, as it is called.

When in doubt, I can frequently form my conscience by the aid of this axiom. If, for example, I am in the habit of saying my little hours after breakfast, and some evening a doubt occurs to me whether I said them on that day, I need not say them then, the presumption being that I said them in the morning as usual, and—In dubio standum est pro eo pro quo stat praesumptio.

¹ Cap. un., de despon. impub. in’ Sexto.

In dubio factum non praesumitur sed probari debet. Similarly, Nemo praesumitur malus donec probetur. (In doubt a fact is not presumed but must be proved. Similarly, No one is presumed wicked until he is proved so.) These axioms are understood of some principal fact, the fact of baptism, for example, or the commission of a crime, which obviously should not be presumed. If on the contrary the principal fact is certain, and a doubt arises as to some accessory circumstance, then other axioms should be used to guide the conduct: as, In dubio omne factum praesumitur recte factum; or, In dubio praesumitur factum quod de jure faciendum erat; or, In dubio standum est pro valore actus. (as, In doubt every act is presumed to have been rightly done; or, In doubt that is presumed to have been done which by law ought to have been done; or, In doubt one must stand by the validity of the act.) So that if I am certain that I baptized a child, but begin to doubt whether I anointed the head with chrism, according to the ritual, I am not bound to supply the ceremony afterwards.