Section II. Concupiscence

In theology concupiscence is used in two distinct senses. It frequently signifies the inclination to evil, which in human nature is a result of the fall of our first parents. In this sense it is called sin by the Apostle.¹ Without any moral or immoral implication the word is used here to denote any passion or any movement of the sensitive appetite towards its proper object. It comprehends, therefore, any movement of love, desire, or hatred, sorrow, anger, or delight.

Concupiscence is antecedent or consequent. The former precedes any action of the will, and so is involuntary. The latter is voluntary, either because it is deliberately and directly excited by the will, or at any rate willed in its cause.

¹ Trent, sess. 5, de pec. orig.

Antecedent concupiscence lessens the malice of an evil action which is done under its impulse. For concupiscence troubles the intellect, so that it cannot dispassionately weigh the moral quality of the object proposed to the will and the motives for rejecting it; moreover, concupiscence paints the object in more than naturally attractive colours, so that it exerts an undue influence on the will. Concupiscence thus disturbs the indifference of the will and renders the act which follows less voluntary and free. It is accordingly less imputable to the agent.

It sometimes happens that antecedent concupiscence renders the subsequent action involuntary, and so in no wise imputable, however wrong it may be. This will be the case when some sudden onslaught of passion deprives the agent of the use of reason and blindly impels him to evil. Strong passions, such as love or anger, especially in impressionable natures, sometimes produce this result, and even when murder or suicide is committed in such circumstances juries are warranted in bringing in a merciful verdict of murder or suicide while temporarily insane. If, however, the passion was not altogether antecedent, but in the early stages of its onslaught there was room for deliberation, the consequent evil will not be altogether involuntary; it will to some extent be voluntary in its cause at least.+

It used to bea matter of dispute among theologians whether a man could be insane and not responsible for his actions in some one category, while he retained his self-control in others. In our days it will hardly be disputed that monomania exists, and if it exists, as, for example, in the matter of intoxicating drink, the monomaniac will not be directly responsible for his actions done under the influence of his madness, although he may be responsible for them in their cause.” ¹ Similarly, those who suffer from illusions may be so demented on the particular point as not to be responsible for actions which they perform under the influence of their illusion. It is a question of fact when this is the case, a fact which it is difficult even for experts to determine.

Natural propensities to evil arising from hereditary taint or from temperament lessen the voluntariness of the action just as passion does, but they are not as a rule so strong as to make what in itself is mortally sinful only venial.

¹ St Thomas, 1-2, q. 77, a. 7, can. 2206.

Consequent concupiscence increases the malice of a bad action if it is wilfully excited, because the tendency of the will to evil is voluntarily made more intense. If the passion is voluntary only in its cause, it is rather a sign of the great intensity of the perverse will from which it flows, but which it does not cause.

The evil motions of anger, impurity, rash judgement which precede all advertence and deliberation of the mind, cannot of course be sinful, as they are not voluntary. They become sinful when consent is yielded to them after advertence to their malice. The question is discussed among theologians, whether it be sinful, and in what degree, to remain neutral under an evil motion of concupiscence, neither giving consent to it nor positively resisting it. If the question is raised concerning a vehement temptation to impurity, it may reasonably be denied that it is ordinarily possible to remain neutral; the danger of consenting would be too great. In such a case there will usually be a grave obligation to resist positively for fear of being drawn into giving consent. Positive resistance does not mean direct and physical effort, which would be worse than useless; but it means that we must, under temptation, avert our minds from the evil suggestion and occupy them with other thoughts. If, however, the question be put, whether sin is committed by remaining neutral under temptation to evil, not deliberating about committing it, but simply neither consenting to it nor rejecting it, the correct answer would seem to be that a venial but not a mortal sin is thereby mortally sinful only venial. The struggle against vice is more difficult for those who are subject to such propensities, but as long as they are in their right senses with the help of God’s grace they can resist, if only they take the necessary means. The same must be said of those who have strengthened their passions and weakened their will by long indulgence in a habit of sin. V. Frins, De Act. Hum. 1, n. 236. ‘“‘ ' There is not, and there never has been, a person who labours under partial delusion only, and is not in other respects insane.” C. Mercier, Criminal Responsibility, 1905, p. 174.

However, on p. 203 the same author writes: ‘‘ The majority of insane persons are sane in a considerable proportion of their conduct; and when in this part of their conduct they commit offences they are rightly punishable.” Perhaps the explanation of this apparent contradiction lies in a sentence which immediately follows the last. It is this: “‘ Since the limits between the sane and the insane areas of conduct of insane persons are ill defined, no insane person should be punished with the same severity that would be awarded to a sane person for the same offence.” committed. There is some sin, because we are commanded to rule the lower appetites and keep them in subjection to reason, which is not done in the case supposed. But the sin cannot be mortal, for there is no consent of the will, by which alone mortal sin can be committed. This is the teaching of St Thomas and of St Alphonsus.¹

¹ Theol. Mor. 5, n. 6.