A Testament and Legacy for Pious Causes

Under the name of a pious cause come: 1° every thing which by its nature is ordered to a supernatural end, such as Masses and processions. To these, from the sense of the Church, are reduced the poor and miserable persons, at least collectively; 2° every institute erected by ecclesiastical Authority for a religious or charitable end, such as churches, monasteries, episcopal hospitals, and so forth; but not those charitable institutes which have not been approved by ecclesiastical Authority, such as civil hospitals. There are some, however, who count dispositions made in favor of institutes of this kind, or even other dispositions made for public utility, among dispositions for a pious cause, provided they are made in view of a supernatural end.¹ They would say the same concerning a disposition in favor of some poor person.

I. Governance of a testament for a pious cause. A testament, likewise a clause and a legacy, for a pious cause is subject to ecclesiastical power alone. Hence per se - that is, unless the Church itself establishes it - the capacity of testating and the mode of testating required by law are not required. This follows from the fact that the Church is a perfect society in its own sphere, independent of the civil State, and indirectly superior to it.²

II. Capacity of testating for a pious cause. One who by natural and ecclesiastical law is freely able to establish concerning his own goods can leave goods to pious causes, whether by an act inter vivos or by an act mortis causa, that is, by testament (can. 1513, § 1). Therefore it can happen that someone is able to make a testament for a pious cause who, considered according to civil law, lacks the capacity of testating. Practically, however, that will not so easily have place, because most who are incapable by civil law, for example minors, are also incapable by canon law (can. 89).

III. Mode of testating for a pious cause. Those things suffice which are required by natural law for a valid testament, that is, the free, manifested, and not revoked will of the testator.

A few indeed judge that civil formalities also must be observed;³ but authors almost universally and deservedly deny this. For a testament for a pious cause, as subject to the Church alone, must be held as immune from civil form, unless it is proved that the said form has been assumed by the Church. But this is clear from no source. Then Canon Law, considered in can. 1513, § 1, for the very faculty of testating in favor of a pious cause, does not admit the requisites of civil law; and this brings in a presumption that the requisites imposed by civil law in the use of that faculty are also not accepted by the Church. Then can. 1513, § 2 requires that the aforesaid solemnities be observed if it can be done; but by the words if it can be done absolute necessity is excluded. Finally the cited canon declares that the heirs are to be admonished to fulfill the will of the testator, even if civil solemnities have been omitted; but the word are to be admonished is not only exhortative but preceptive.⁴ Therefore an admonition to be made - otherwise if there were discussion only of persuasion - argues that an obligation is had. Moreover, in doubt, if any remains for someone, one must not depart from the old law (can. 6, 4°).⁵ Nevertheless, the Sacred Penitentiary, to the question whether heirs who, because of a defect of legal formality, refuse to pay a pious legacy can be absolved, responded on February 10, 1901: "the practice of this sacred tribunal in similar causes is that generally pious legacies are to be held valid and obligatory in the forum of conscience; nevertheless heirs are readily admitted to composition with the Church or the pious cause to which the legacy has been made."

Although civil formalities are not required in a testament and legacy for a pious cause, nevertheless they are usefully observed, so that the dispositions made may certainly be able to obtain their due effect also in the civil forum (cf. can. 1301).

Corollary I. The legal heir, if he is also executor of a testament for a pious cause, is bound to execute the testament if the will of the testator is clear to him, for example by writing, by words, or by nods of the deceased given to him, that is, to the heir (St. Alphonsus, III, 923). But he is not bound to acquiesce in the testimony of only one witness, however approved, for example of the pastor alone or confessor alone (St. Alphonsus, III, 924; cf. can. 1791).⁶

Corollary II. Another executor, not the legal heir, can and is bound to execute a testament for a pious cause to which the legal heir does not object, even if the will of the testator is clear to him, that is, to the executor, only through the testimony of one approved witness.

Corollary III. A testament void with respect to profane causes has force with respect to pious legacies inserted into it. Some deny this, "because when the principal falls, the accessory falls; ... but a special reason is found in the accessory which is not in the principal, namely the favor of religion; and therefore there only canon law is attended to" (St. Alphonsus, III, 924).

Corollary IV. If profane legacies are inserted into a non-solemn testament for a pious cause, these must be handed over or not handed over according to the norm of civil law.

IV. The execution of pious wills is governed by these points:

1. Ordinaries, namely for the different cases the Ordinary of the place or the major Superior of an exempt clerical religious institute, are executors of all pious wills, both mortis causa and inter vivos. By this right, Ordinaries can and must watch, even through visitation, that pious wills be fulfilled, and other delegated executors, when they have performed their office, must render an account to them. Clauses contrary to this right of Ordinaries, added to last wills, are to be held as not added (can. 1515).

2. A cleric or religious who has received goods for pious causes in trust, whether by an act inter vivos or from a testament,⁷ must make the Ordinary certain concerning his fiduciary commission and indicate to him all goods of this kind, whether movable or immovable, with the burdens attached. But if the donor has expressly and altogether forbidden this, let him not accept the fiduciary commission (can. 1516, § 1). The Ordinary must require that fiduciary goods be placed safely and watch over the execution of the pious will according to the norm of can. 1515 (can. 1516, § 2). When fiduciary goods have been committed to some religious, if indeed the goods have been assigned for helping the churches, inhabitants, or pious causes of a place or diocese, the Ordinary mentioned in §§ 1-2 is the Ordinary of the place; otherwise, the Ordinary is the proper Ordinary of the same religious (can. 1516).

"To exercise its power the Holy See uses, in the internal forum, for occult cases, the Sacred Penitentiary; in the external forum, the Sacred Congregation of the Council and the Fabric of St. Peter; for mission places, the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda Fide; for religious, the Sacred Congregation for Religious; and, unless we are mistaken, after the declaration of December 7, 1922 (Periodica XII, 43 ff.), which decrees this about alienations, the Sacred Consistorial Congregation for the episcopal mensa, and the Sacred Congregation of Seminaries and Universities, for Seminaries."⁸

V. Change of last wills. The reduction, moderation, and commutation of last wills, which must be done only from a just and necessary cause, are reserved to the Apostolic See, unless the founder has expressly granted this power also to the Ordinary of the place. But if, because of diminished revenues or another cause, without any fault of the administrators, the execution of the burdens imposed has become impossible, then the Ordinary also, after hearing those whose interest is involved, and preserving the will of the founder in the better way in which it can be done, will be able likewise to diminish the same burdens equitably, with the exception of the reduction of Masses, which always belongs solely to the Apostolic See (can. 1517).

¹ Schmalzgrueber, Ius ecclesiasticum, t. I, p. III, tit. XXVI, n. 43, 2 and 3.

² Sacred Penitentiary, June 23, 1844, and January 10, 1901.

³ Thus Retzbach, Die Verbindlichkeit formloser letztwilliger Verfuegungen zu frommen Zwecken nach dem alten und neuen Kirchenrecht.

⁴ Pontifical Commission, February 17, 1930 (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 1930, p. 176). The Code uses a prudent word when it says that heirs are to be admonished, lest by too great insistence good faith be uselessly disturbed, or difficulties be raised in the civil forum (Vermeersch, Epitome, II, 835).

⁵ The things to be said concerning donation, or rather concerning disposition in favor of a pious cause, should be consulted.

⁶ Cap. Relatum, II, De Test. (III, 26).

⁷ For example, a sum of money donated or bequeathed with the obligation of handing it over to a pious institute.

⁸ Vermeersch, Epitome, II, 836.

818. • It is asked, 5. Whether testaments for pious causes are valid if they lack legal forms?

I reply affirmatively, and this sentence is most common and certain: 1. because it is clear from Canon Law, Decret., book 3, title 26, ch. 2, etc.; 2. because pious causes pertain to the Church and are subject to her jurisdiction. But the Church is free and immune from civil power in all those things which are directly subject to her jurisdiction. Wherefore it was thus established by the Council of Trent: "Let Bishops, also as delegates of the Apostolic See, in cases conceded by law, be executors of all pious dispositions, both in last will and among the living." Sess. 22, ch. 8, De Ref. - Thus St. Lig. - Less. - Ronc. and others. - The Sacred Penitentiary, being questioned several times, replied that this sentence must be adhered to.

Therefore the probability of the other opinion does not appear, which otherwise even its patrons reduce almost to nothing in practice. For they think that pious legacies of this kind are valid if it is reasonably presumed that they had been destined both for fulfilling restitution and for prayers for the soul of the deceased.

Nevertheless I add that the Confessor, having regard for the ignorance of the faithful, who often with difficulty persuade themselves that the aforesaid assertion is true, for the most part ought to leave them in good faith ⁵. But if he is asked, as was said above, he will reply. - See Cases, n. 1859 and following.

⁵ This doctrine rests on the common principles concerning the opportunity of warning or not warning penitents, even when obligations of justice are at issue.

501. Legal reservation of hereditary goods (wettig voorbehoud) is that part which devolves to the natural heirs by the law itself according to the proportion defined by law. It is opposed to the disposable part or quota (beschikbaar deel), concerning which the owner can dispose at will, while concerning the reserved or legitimate part (voorbehouden of onbeschikbaar deel) he cannot dispose gratuitously, but only by onerous title.

In England, with the exception of the transmission of certain estates, and in the United States of America, generally full liberty of making a testament is in force; but in many regions of Europe it is limited: thus in Italy (a. 805 sq.) and Austria (a. 765 sq.), one half of the inheritance is owed to descendants, one third to ascendants in default of descendants; in Germany (a. 2303), one half of the goods is disposable and the other is reserved to children, parents, and spouse; in Spain, one third part of the goods is disposable, one third part is to be distributed equally among the children, but the last may be freely donated to any of the children, though not to strangers (a. 808 sq.).

But by French-Belgian law (a. 913-914), and Dutch law (a. 960 sq.):

1. The disposable part depends on the number of children: if there is one child, the parents can freely dispose of one half of the goods; if two children survive, they can dispose of one third part; if three or more, the fourth part is disposable. Under the name of children there come also legitimated and adopted children and grandchildren (kleinkinderen) and their descendants, yet in the sense that all those born of one child are counted for only one child, whom they represent.

If natural children legally recognized survive, but not legitimated, a quota part is reserved to them, but smaller than if they were legitimate.

According to Belgian law, they are only heirs of the father and mother (a. 756): to them is given 1/3 of the portion which legitimate children would have obtained, if other legitimate children are present; 1/2 if the deceased has brothers, sisters, or ascendants; 3/4 if he has at least other heirs (a. 757). They do not succeed to the entire inheritance unless no other heir survives (a. 758). - In France, from the law of March 25, 1896, they receive 1/2 of the portion of a legitimate child if others are legitimate; 3/4 if the deceased has brothers, sisters, or ascendants; otherwise the whole inheritance.

2. In default of descendants, if ascendants survive in both lines, paternal and maternal, one half of the goods is reserved to them; if in one line, one fourth part is reserved (a. 915).

3. There is no reservation in favor of collaterals;¹ in practice, however, if poor collaterals complain that several legacies have been made to their excessive detriment, the public authority is wont to reduce these legacies; and rightly: for piety demands that something be left to relatives in necessity, especially brothers and sisters.

¹ It is proper to Swiss law that brothers and sisters are necessary heirs (a. 470-471).

4. To the surviving spouse there is not conceded reservation properly so called, but the right to the usufruct of a certain part of the goods (a. 767); this varies according to different laws.

From the Belgian law of November 20, 1896, a spouse not separated from bed has the right to the usufruct either of the portion of a legitimate child (which does not exceed the fourth part of the goods), if the deceased has children from another marriage; or of the totality, if the deceased does not have heirs except collaterals other than brothers or sisters or their descendants; or of one half of the goods, in other cases. In France, from the law of March 9, 1896, the usufruct of 1/4 part of the goods is attributed to the spouse if legitimate children are present; of 1/2 part if there are other heirs.

It should be noted that donations inter vivos or testamentary donations exceeding the disposable part are not absolutely void, but can be reduced (a. 920) if the reserved heirs or their successors or those having cause from them petition this (a. 921). In this case, first the testamentary dispositions are reduced according to the proportional part of the value; then, if the legacies do not suffice for paying the reserved part, donations are reduced, not indeed according to proportional part, but in chronological order, beginning from the most recent and going back as far as the first (a. 923 sq.).

502. What force does legal reservation have for the forum of conscience? - Resp. Civil law proceeds further than natural law; and since it establishes a matter not sufficiently determined by natural law alone, it in itself obligates in conscience. But it can be asked what kind and what quantity of obligation of conscience it produces. Therefore those who by donations or testaments injure the legal portion of necessary heirs:

1. Do not seem to sin against commutative justice, because the testator disposes of his own thing and the heir only after the death of the testator has a strict right in that thing. The case is excepted in which someone would use unjust and fraudulent means, for example, a fictitious sale, to prevent the necessary heir from prosecuting his right.

2. Generally they sin against legal justice or obedience, since they violate a just law and one almost necessary for the common good, for example, lest legitimate children born of first nuptials afterward, on account of the excessive love of the father toward a second wife and her children, be excluded from the whole inheritance. This sin in itself is light; by accident it can be grave, if the necessary heir were thereby cast into at least relative poverty.

3. Sometimes such a testator does not sin in any way, especially a) if he favors one child for a just cause, namely to procure a greater good or to avoid a greater evil; for example, if only by violating the legal part of the children someone could fulfill an office of piety, charity, or justice, such as providing for the education of an illegitimate child or sustaining parents in grave necessity: for then the natural law prevails. Likewise b) if observance of the law which was enacted for the good of the family would turn to its detriment: for then the law ceases contrariwise, because it becomes harmful; as if, because legal equality were preserved, none of the children could any longer carry on the paternal business or agriculture; or if one son is foreseen shortly to dissipate all things while the brother, to whom more is attributed than the law permits, is deservedly hoped also to provide for the prodigal brother and his children. This can easily occur in our regions, in which the liberty belonging to a prudent father of a family is narrowly restricted.

503. Questions. - I. Whether it is licit to injure the legitimate portions of necessary heirs by donations or legacies for pious causes, for example, foundations?

Resp. This is probably licit, or at least is not unjust, provided the necessary heirs obtain that which belongs to them by the law of nature for honorable sustenance and state. Nevertheless heirs whose legitimate part was injured do not seem to sin if with just means they make a claim before a tribunal, because civil law has the right of determining the legitimate part. For in the case it does not directly declare null a legacy made to the Church (which it would not be able to do), but directly establishes the legitimate portion of the children, from which then indirectly follows the nullity of the other legacy.² It would have to be said otherwise concerning pious donations and legacies made outside the legitimate part, because civil law does not have the right to impede directly or generally all pious donations, just as neither does it have the right to impede the Church's right of possessing goods.

² It should be noted that already formerly under Roman law a probable opinion conceded this; which holds a fortiori now, because the disposable part is much smaller. Besides, many, even older theologians, teach that inofficious donations can probably be reduced to the disposable part.

II. What if someone, from hatred or inordinate affection, wished to leave only the legitimate part to his children; or if without just cause he favors one child from the disposable part?

R. He is bound under grave obligation to put aside hatred or inordinate affection, and he is to be exhorted to leave something more to his children. Hatred and gravely inordinate affection of partiality being set aside, if he favors one child before the others without just cause, such as can be if he merits more by virtue or service, if he has done more, if he seems to be in greater need, for example for sustenance or for study, he does not sin gravely, unless perhaps by accident if for this reason grave hatreds and dissensions arise, and these are not rather to be attributed to the malice and avarice of the heirs than to the father who uses his own right. This is especially true if the father acquired the goods by his own labors; but if he had not acquired them by his own labor, it is better that they be divided equally among all the children, unless there are special circumstances concerning which it was said above. Cf. also n. 502, 3).

III. Whether a testator is bound to provide also for certain heirs who are not necessary?

R. 1. There is a grave obligation that there be left to brothers and sisters that which suffices to relieve their grave want; civil law also recognizes this to some extent. Thus Civil Code, a. 767, modified by Belgian law.

2. There is a light obligation that provision be made for the necessity of other relatives gravely in need.

All these are obligations of piety, obligating under grave or under light obligation according to the degree of necessity and the degree of nearness of kinship; these obligations indirectly affect the goods of the deceased, and therefore pass with them to the heirs.

Question. Are testaments valid, whether for profane causes or for pious causes, if they lack legal forms?

Resp. If it is a question of profane causes, it is sharply disputed, and a threefold probable opinion is had: the first holds that testaments of this sort are valid from natural law and in the forum of conscience; another teaches that by force of positive law they are to be held utterly void; finally the third establishes that favor must be shown to the possessor until the matter is settled by the judge. But if the discussion is of testaments in favor of pious causes, the certain, most common, and altogether to be held opinion teaches that testaments of this sort are valid, and that no one can with a safe conscience, under pretext of lacking these formalities, retain an inheritance which has been assigned to some pious cause. - The reason is that causes of this sort pertain to the Church and are subject to her jurisdiction; but the Church is free and immune from civil power in all those things which are directly subject to her jurisdiction.

§2. In last wills for the good of the Church, the solemnities of civil law are to be observed if it can be done; if these have been omitted, the heirs are to be admonished to fulfill the will of the testator (Can. 1513).

§1. The reduction, moderation, and commutation of last wills, which must be made only from a just and necessary cause, are reserved to the Apostolic See, unless the founder has expressly conceded this power also to the Ordinary of the place.

§2. If nevertheless the execution of imposed burdens, because of diminished revenues or another cause, with no fault of the administrators, has become impossible, then the Ordinary also, after hearing those whose interest is involved, and with the will of the founder preserved in the better way by which it can be done, will be able equitably to diminish the same burdens, except the reduction of Masses, which always belongs uniquely to the Apostolic See (Can. 1517).

V. QUESTION III. What solemnities does a testament for pious causes demand? ANSWER. Testaments which destine an inheritance to the poor, to churches, monasteries, hospitals, maidens, or widows are called for pious causes. If a legacy be left in a testament to the aforesaid, the testament is not called for pious causes. As often as the testator's consent is established either from his private writing or from two witnesses, whether men or women, a testament for pious causes is valid, the solemnities prescribed by common law being removed.

A PIOUS bequest is that which is judged made in respect of piety, and which in very fact contains something for a pious use. The laws have fortified this bequest with various privileges; for it was fitting that the piety of the testator not be so entangled with forensic litigations that it would not the sooner and more certainly have its effect; therefore we name this bequest Privileged, being exempt from the ambages and conditions required for profane bequests; but of this a little below.

IN the first place, however, care must be taken of the testator about to bequeath, that he be conscious of no mortal sin, lest that pious action, done outside grace, profit others only, not himself: for the state of grace is necessary for the merit of piety, outside which, whatever is done will be reckoned as no act, being dead, as we discussed in treating of Grace.

If, however, being conscious of a mortal fault he has confirmed such his will in a last instrument, and afterwards has obtained grace by repenting, the best counsel will be to ratify his bequest anew, which will be equivalent to its first institution as to merit; for as he could revoke it up to death, so he can approve it anew. So warns Bonacina cited above §. 2. propos. 2., with others related by him: these things, however, are to be understood in order to the legator himself.

AS TO pious bequests in order to the persons to whom they are made, it must be asserted that whatever is left in honor of God or the Saints; whatever also is bequeathed for the salvation of one's own soul, for the poor, widows, orphans, pilgrims, Monasteries of Mendicants, hospitals, and Churches, breathes this piety; so commonly all.

NOR is it necessary that the poor, of whatever sort they be, be so needy that they are compelled to beg from door to door; but it suffices that there not be available to them that from which they can live according to the exigency of their station; whether to pay their debts or to procure other necessaries; as the holy Doctor notes in the Apologeticum of the Order of Minors, quaest. 9.

But if this bequest left to them is specified for their aliments, and afterwards they, or some of them, have attained a more fortunate state or fortune, it will no longer be owed to them, since the final cause ceasing, those things cease which are ordained to it; if, however, they afterwards fall back into their former indigence, the bequest will return with its cause to be paid to them. So Surdus, De Alimentis, quaestione 7, numero 38, and others.

By some, that which is left to virgins to be married, or to be made fit for the state of religion, is also reduced to a pious bequest; provided that it not be owed to them under another title of justice. Likewise that which is destined for the repair of fountains, roads, bridges, and the like; likewise that which is bequeathed for painting the images of Saints, or for promoting the uses of studies: these things, however, we shall not willingly admit among pious bequests, unless it be established that they were made in respect of poverty or piety: since not rarely these and the like are wont to be carried out on account of other motives.

HENCE one can discern what kind of bequest is that made to a poor kinsman; for often not poverty but, on the contrary, kinship prevails in the affection of the testator; wherefore, to discern this, the chief rule is, whether in his testament he first named the poor man or the kinsman. For if the poor man is first mentioned, the bequest is judged pious, to which two conditions are always required: the first is piety in the person to whom it is made: the second is piety in the person, or in the motive, by which it is made. For if a bequest is made to a rich man, it will not be judged pious, since in him is not that piety founded in poverty: let the same judgment be, if it is made to a poor man, but not in respect of poverty.

FINALLY, bequests made to Confraternities to be erected with Pontifical authority, for withdrawing sinners from an evil state, for burying the dead, and for celebrating Masses, are reckoned among things piously left by the Doctors, as is seen in Bonacina cited. All which the Confessor and the penitent must take note of on account of the reserved case, which is incurred in many places on account of the deferral of the payment of a pious bequest beyond two years; which reservation is observed at Milan, by the report of Bonacina above. Nor does it stand in the way that sometimes pious bequests are made to Mendicants, who are capable of dominion; for although they cannot vindicate the dominion of the bequeathed thing, nevertheless the executors of testaments are bound to convert it to their use. So D. Bonaventure cited.

Nor does it follow that a definite thing bequeathed is meanwhile in the goods of no one. For it is in the goods of the heir, to be expended, not to be reserved, as the holy Doctor cited says expressly.

CONCERNING the privileges of a pious bequest, this must be known: that the Falcidian portion, or the Trebellianica, usually deducted from a profane bequest, has no place here; because it is a disposition of the civil law, to which a pious cause is not subject. So Tiraquell. privileg. 26, Tuscus verb. legata, conclus. 111, and all the rest.

SECOND, it can always be sustained by whatever means it can stand; and if it cannot accrue to one cause, it is applicable to another; so the aforesaid, Tiraquell. privil. 33, and Tuscus, concl. 109, after D. Bonaventure in Reg. Min. cap. 4.

THIRD, all the solemnities of the civil law are driven away from this, on account of the reason already given; whence the various conditions of witnesses, as of the testator, are not required in so many dispositions; wherefore it is all the same, whether the witnesses are requested or not; whether men or women; more or fewer; whether the testator be blind, mute, and Deaf or not, wholly testate or in part, capable of profane bequests or not; and it suffices that he have sufficiently expressed himself by naming the heir or legatee loftily. So it stands from Bonacina and others whom he cites. There can be added to the privileges of a pious bequest, that if it is left indefinitely, or in perpetuum, it is not prescribed with any term of time prefixed, as Alexander VII defined for a bequest left annually pro anima, as we saw in treating of Human Acts, disput. 17, quaest. 10, sect. 41.

Titia consulted a priest concerning her obligations in these circumstances. Recently her husband died, who by his will left her two hundred pounds annually, one hundred to the parish priest for the parish schools, but a much larger part of his property to his brother for the use of a most beloved nephew. Titia, however, since she knew that the witnesses to the will had signed it separately and in different places, contested its validity and won the case. She then obtained letters of administration and, being about to distribute the goods of her husband, wishes to know whether in conscience she is bound to pay the hundred pounds to the parish priest. Hence:

1. What formalities are required by English law in making a will?

2. Does a defect of those formalities render a will invalid in conscience?

3. What is required for the validity of a will for pious causes?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. What formalities are required by English law in making a will?

Those formalities are laid down in the Wills Act¹: “No will shall be valid unless it shall be in writing and... signed at the foot or end thereof by the testator or by some other person in his presence and by his direction, and such signature shall be made, or acknowledged, by the testator in the presence of two or more witnesses, present at the same time, and such witnesses shall attest and shall subscribe the will in the presence of the testator, but no form of attestation shall be necessary.”

1 1 Victoria, chapter 26, section 9.

2. Does the absence of those formalities make a will invalid in conscience?

Probably at least an informal will is not at once invalid in conscience. It may be taken as a declaration of the last will of the testator and as such acted upon. But the law may be invoked by any one who is interested to have the informal will set aside, and if this is effectively done it must be held invalid in conscience as it is in law.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 502.

3. What is required for the validity of a will in favor of pious causes?

Such wills are subject to canon law, which requires nothing more for their validity than certain proof of the intention of the testator, and the verbal testimony of two witnesses is sufficient for the purpose.²

2 The same work, p. 506.

4. The case. The will of the husband of Titia was invalid by English law, as the witnesses did not sign in each other's presence. However, the legacy to the schools is governed by ecclesiastical law, and as there is no doubt about the intention of the testator, Titia is in conscience bound to pay the legacy. This solution has been upheld by many decrees and answers of the Roman Congregations. Thus the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith gave the following answer to Cardinal Logue, April 30, 1895: “Now indeed it is certain . . . that the legacy endures, since the civil law cannot by its authority determine those things which pertain to pious causes; and consequently the legacy binds the heirs according to the tenor and mode of the legacy itself.”¹

1 Irish Ecclesiastical Record, vol. xv, p. 259.

A case very like the one proposed was submitted to the Sacred Penitentiary and solved by it, Jan. 10, 1901: “The Sacred Penitentiary, after maturely weighing the matters set forth, responds: The practice of this Sacred Tribunal in similar cases is that pious legacies generally be regarded as valid and obligatory in the tribunal of conscience; the heirs, however, are readily admitted to a composition with the Church or the pious cause to which the legacy was made.”²

2 Acta S. S., xxxiv, p. 384.