Aggravating circumstances

Some circumstances affecting the intensity, or quantity, or duration of an action add to or lessen its malice, but they do not change its moral species; such circumstances are called aggravating circumstances. Although they do not change the moral species of the act, they sometimes make a venial sin mortal, or vice versa, as the quantity in theft; they are then said to change the theological species of the action. If the circumstances add to the action a special and distinct malice of their own, they change its moral species, as the sacred object or place in a sacrilegious theft. Such a theft is not only against justice, but also against the virtue of religion.

How are the various circumstances distinguished? - Certain circumstances are those which change the nature of the work or act merely accidentally, namely within the same species, increasing or diminishing moral goodness or malice; and therefore they are called aggravating or diminishing, and these can be either simply such, or notably, or greatly aggravating or diminishing. Circumstances of this kind are all those which do not have goodness or malice according to themselves, but through order to another condition of the act, which has that goodness or malice according to itself. Hence they increase or diminish the aforesaid goodness or malice. And thus, for example, the intensity and remission of the act, the long or short delay of the act, does not according to itself have moral goodness or malice, but only through order to the good or evil act, of which consequently it constitutes only an accidental diversity. Thus also to take something in a greater or lesser quantity does not according to itself regard the order of reason in good or evil, but presupposes some other condition through which the act has malice or goodness, for example, this, that it belongs to another, which according to itself is opposed to reason. Hence to take another's property in a greater or lesser quantity does not diversify the species of sin. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 18. a. 11.

But there are other circumstances which essentially change the nature of the work and act and are called species-changing. Circumstances of this kind are those which according to themselves regard a special order of reason. Thus, for example, to take another's property has its species from the notion of what belongs to another, for from this it is constituted in the species of theft. And if on top of this place or time is considered, these will have the nature of a circumstance. But because reason can also order concerning place or concerning time and other things of this sort, it happens that a condition of place concerning the object is taken as according to itself contrary to the order of reason; for example, because reason orders that injury is not to be done in a sacred place. Hence to take something belonging to another from a sacred place adds a special repugnance to the order of reason. And therefore place, which was previously considered as a simple circumstance, is now considered as a principal condition of the object repugnant to reason. Hence S. Th. q. 18. a. 10 ad 2: "a circumstance," he says, "remaining in the notion of a circumstance, since it has the notion of an accident, does not give species; but insofar as it is changed into a principal condition of the object, according to this it gives species."

Circumstances which change a sin only from venial into mortal, under one respect, are only aggravating; and they are called aggravating infinitely: namely if mere opposition to such a virtue is considered, as may be seen in light and grave theft; for both are opposed to the same virtue of justice. Under another respect, they are species-changing, namely if opposition and repugnance with the general rule of morals is considered, namely with the law and the end to be attained. Circumstances which confer a new species upon an act already constituted in some moral species are properly species-adding. Thus, if someone bound by a vow sins against chastity, to the malice of the sin against chastity is added another malice against religion. But if the malice of the new species is not grave but light, then that circumstance is either held as simply aggravating, or as indeed adding a species, but with the addition, lightly: for then the whole specific substance of the act still remains intact, nor, morally speaking, does any substantial change of the act accede. Thus as regards a merely internal sin against chastity committed in a church, if the malice of sacrilege is present in it, it is only light, and therefore it is not a circumstance strictly and properly adding a species, but aggravating. But circumstances which first render an act simply good or evil are properly species-conferring or species-changing, for example, if someone undertakes a journey from the end of exercising a work of charity, that journey, indifferent of itself, first passes into an act of virtue; if someone gives alms only from vainglory, that act, although good in itself, then becomes evil. S. Th. 2. D. 38. q. 1. a. 4.

Must circumstances of mortal sins which notably aggravate them necessarily be confessed? - "There are three opinions, all very probable. - The first opinion affirms it. It is proved, 1. from the Roman Ritual, de Sacram. poenit., from the Roman Catechism, p. 2, c. 5, n. 47.

It is proved, 2. by reason, because the same reason which persuades that circumstances changing the species are to be confessed also urges for circumstances notably aggravating, since both notably change the judgment of the confessor. - The second opinion says that the circumstance what must necessarily be confessed, namely that which touches the substantial integrity of the sin in the individual, as is the quantity of theft. The reason is that otherwise the confessor will not be able to form a due judgment about the substance of the sin. - The third opinion, more probable to me, denies that there is an obligation of confessing aggravating circumstances. It is proved, 1. from St. Thomas, 4 d. 16, q. 3, a. 2, q. 5, who by his authority has indeed given great weight to this opinion. It is proved, 2. by reasons. The first reason: because from the words of Trent, sess. 14, C. 5, the Council seems not obscurely to exclude the obligation of confessing circumstances other than those changing the species, because it sufficiently suggests that these suffice for this: that the confessor form a right judgment about the gravity of crimes and about the punishment to be imposed. The second reason: because otherwise penitents would always fluctuate amid anxieties, since they could always doubt about the integrity of their Confessions in determining which circumstances are or are not notably aggravating. St. Thomas, l. c., q. 5, ad 2. Hence Lugo assigns a reason a priori for this opinion, saying that Christ prescribed nothing other than Confession of sins; but one who explains the circumstances changing the species of sin already truly confesses and explains the essence of the sin, since the quiddity or essence of sin is taken from its specific nature. The third reason: because if we were bound to manifest circumstances notably aggravating, we would also be bound to confess those notably diminishing, namely if someone sinned from anger, fear, more intense passion, from the inducement of others, and similar things, which obligation even the adversaries deny. The last and stronger reason: because no one is bound to observe a doubtful law; hence since the law of confessing aggravating circumstances is very doubtful, we are not bound to it. And therefore, Lugo rightly says, Trent did not explain this obligation of confessing them because the Council could not sufficiently gather it from the words of Christ and the institution of the sacrament." L. 468. - Except: "if the circumstance brings in a censure or reservation, or if the penitent is prudently questioned by the confessor for his necessary direction." L. 467. - Instr. pro parvul., etc., p. 4, at the end of the Roman Council, published by command of Benedict XIII; Lugo, d. 16, s. 3.

7. Now there are certain circumstances which change the nature of the work or act merely accidentally, namely within the same species, they increase or diminish moral goodness or malice; and therefore they are called aggravating or diminishing. Circumstances of this sort are all those which do not have goodness or malice according to themselves, but through order to another condition of the act which has that goodness or malice according to itself. Whence they increase or lessen the aforesaid goodness or malice. And thus, for example, the intensity and remission of an act, the long or short delay of an act, do not have moral goodness or malice according to themselves, but only through order to a good or evil act, of which consequently they constitute only an accidental diversity. Thus also to take something in a greater or lesser quantity does not of itself regard the order of reason in good or evil, but presupposes some other condition through which the act has malice or goodness, for example this, that it is another’s, which according to itself is repugnant to reason. Whence to take another’s property in a greater or lesser quantity does not diversify the species of sin. Circumstances which, by aggravating a sin, render it mortal from venial are called aggravating infinitely.

8. Of aggravating circumstances, some aggravate notably, others lightly. A circumstance is judged to aggravate notably in quantitative matter, or matter which consists in number, weight, and measure, when, taken separately and separated from the act, it would suffice for mortal sin; as one who, beyond five or six lire constituting in the case a mortal sin, should steal another five or six, namely ten or twelve. But in other matters it would be judged to aggravate notably when it notably exceeds the ordinary manner of sinning in matters of this sort, as if someone should spend the whole night in impurities with a woman, if someone should persevere for months and years in fraternal hatred, if someone should kill an enemy by cutting him limb by limb, etc. If neither of these occurs, it is judged to aggravate lightly, as that a thief steals seven or eight lire in the same case of grave matter of five or six lire, or that after a quarrel someone, being angry, remains for a little while in hatred. Billuart, De Act. hum., Diss. 4, art. 2, § 2.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 10 and 11; De Malo, q. 2, a. 6-8.

151. A moral circumstance is an accident of a human act morally affecting it once it has already been constituted in its moral being.

For this a threefold condition is required:

1. that the act already be constituted in moral being, that is, have morality from the object independently of circumstances: for an accident supposes a substance. Thus, with respect to theft, it is not a circumstance that the thing belongs to another, but that it is notable; similarly, an act indifferent from the object has its first specific morality from a circumstance first and principally intended, which therefore becomes the object because it is intended first and per se under the notion of good or evil;

2. that the circumstance be outside the substance of the act and affect it, and therefore that it not destroy or essentially change the substantial moral being which the act has from the object, as if someone does a good act solely for an evil end: for then it would not be an accident, but would pass over into the substance and object;

3. that the circumstance attain the act according to moral being, by increasing or diminishing goodness or malice: thus that someone steals with the right hand or the left hand is a physical and indifferent circumstance; but that the thing be precious or cheap is a moral circumstance.

Now by reason of influence upon morality, some circumstances change the species, others only aggravate or diminish within the same species.

1. Several authors teach that circumstances truly and properly diminishing moral good or evil are not given; but in this there is only a different mode of speaking.

152. Principles. I. Moral circumstances changing the species are those which add to the act a goodness or malice diverse in species from that which the act has from the object, because according to themselves, separately and independently from the morality which proceeds from the object, they imply some agreement or repugnance with right reason, or a special and distinct conformity or difformity with the rules of morals: thus when someone gives alms in order to satisfy for sin, or steals a sacred thing, the circumstance of end expresses a special conformity with reason and the circumstance of the sacred expresses a special difformity. These circumstances do not remain in the notion of circumstance, but rather are considered as the principal condition of the object (or as a partial object), and become as it were the specific difference of this object: the genus is to take another's property or to give alms; the species is to take a sacred thing, to give satisfactory alms.

II. Moral circumstances only aggravating or diminishing within the same species are those which do not imply something per se agreeing with or repugnant to reason, and according to themselves express no order to the rules of morals, but only by reason of a prior circumstance or condition of the object have the morality which they suppose and only modify it, such as more and less, much and little, intensely and remissly. Thus to take much or little of itself does not express goodness or malice, but to take much or little of another's property does.

Among these some are:

1. Notably aggravating or diminishing. Such are:

a) in quantitative matter, which consists in number, weight, measure, those which, taken separately and separated from the act, suffice for mortal sin, for example, if someone beyond 100 gold coins steals another 100, or steals a gilt watch which he thinks is gold, it will be a circumstance notably aggravating the theft; on the contrary, if he steals a gold watch which he thinks is silver, it is a circumstance notably diminishing;

b) in other matters (duration, intensity, execution), those which notably exceed the ordinary mode of acting well or badly in these matters, for example, if someone perseveres in hatred for a year, or the whole night with a woman in shameless acts; or only for some instant consents to her. Sometimes they so notably increase or diminish that they render a sin from venial mortal, or from mortal venial, and thus are said to aggravate or diminish infinitely, for example, the circumstance of grave harm for one's neighbor from a slight theft, or the circumstance of half-full deliberation in blasphemy, imprecation, shameful delight.

2. Others are slightly aggravating or diminishing, such as:

a) in quantitative matter, those which, taken separately, do not suffice for mortal sin, as if someone instead of 100 francs steals either 101 or 99;

b) in other matters, those which do not much exceed the ordinary mode of acting, as if someone, angry after a quarrel, remains somewhat in hatred.

153. Practical rules follow from the aforesaid:

1. An act indifferent from the object can become good or evil from circumstances: thus to eat temperately to restore one's strength is good; to do this with excess is evil; then the circumstance passes over into the notion of object because it is first and per se intended under the notion of good or evil.

2. An act good from the object is rendered evil by circumstances, gravely or lightly, according to the degree of malice which is in them, for example, commerce in a sacred place, servile labor on the Lord's Day, marriage with a person bound by a vow of chastity. Then the circumstance becomes the principal condition or part of the object.

3. An act good or evil from the object can receive a new species of goodness or malice from circumstances, for example, one who keeps chastity from a vow contracts the goodness of chastity and of religion; one who steals a sacred thing contracts the malice of theft and sacrilege. This circumstance also becomes a condition of the object.

4. An act good or evil from the object can acquire or lose from circumstances some greater degree of goodness or malice, for example, a poor man giving alms, a man outstanding in learning who places himself after others; a priest sinning, a rich man giving alms as though compelled, a poor man committing theft. Such remain mere circumstances.

154. Observation.

From circumstances properly so called, which affect the act, there differ internal or external actions which sometimes are done during the principal action and only accompany it, without influence upon it. These are truly distinct acts, which can be evil, but do not affect the goodness of the principal action. Thus if care of the sick, communion, or hearing Mass is done also on account of sensible affection for the sick person, vainglory, curiosity, it will be an evil circumstance; on the contrary, if they are done with a movement of impatience, affection toward venial sin, distractions, these will only be evils which accompany them.

The circumstances of sins are distinguished in various ways. For 1°. some change the species, namely those which by reason of themselves add to the act a malice distinct in species from that which the act has by reason of its object; thus the circumstance of a vow or of marriage adds to fornication the malice of sacrilege or adultery; 2°. others are only aggravating, but notably or lightly, according as, notably or lightly, within the same species they increase the malice of the sinful act by reason of duration, intensity, degree, mode, time, person, place, etc.; and finally 3°. others are diminishing, as those which render the malice of sin less, for example, defect of advertence, etc. - Consult what was said above, n. 26.