IV. On the Various Sources of Morality

What are the sources of morality? - As has already been said, the morality of human acts, and their moral goodness or malice, is from a bearing toward the ultimate end of human life and law, from suitability or unsuitability with that same end and law. Now this bearing, this suitability or unsuitability, in a human act which is completed by an exterior act, is derived from the exterior act and from the end of the will, as was indicated in n. 71. But a human act is not always perfected by an exterior act, but is often contained in a merely internal act.

Hence generally the aforesaid bearing toward the end can arise from a threefold head, namely from the end of the same act, from its object, and from the circumstances, which are also brought back to the object. For this reason it is commonly said that the human act takes its moral goodness or malice from this threefold head; namely particular, specific, and individual goodness or malice. For not all good acts are in the same species, nor likewise are all evil acts in the same species. Moreover, the object, the circumstances, and the end can have an order and a diverse order to man's ultimate end and to law. But in this order of human acts to the ultimate end and law, morality consists. Here the question concerns only the morality of human acts, and not their supernaturality and merit before God. Hence for their goodness, besides a good object, end, and circumstances, neither the motive of faith nor charity and grace is required. E. M. 6.

What is an end, and how manyfold is it? - By end here is properly understood that which the agent further intends through such or such an act, as the reason on account of which he acts. This is that end which is called the end of the one acting, and it is an end extrinsic to the act. "It must be said," says S. Th. 2. D. 36. q. un. a. 5 ad 5, "that some act has a twofold end, namely the proximate end, which is its object, and the remote end, which the agent intends." But if the agent does not intend another end diverse from the intrinsic end itself of the action which he does, then the end of the one acting coincides with the end of the work, as appears in one who wishes to steal in order to steal, that is, in order to become rich from another's goods. The intrinsic end of the work cannot be wholly excluded by the one acting if he knows the nature of the work, for that end is intrinsic to the work. And thus if someone blasphemes the divine Name, he cannot exclude the injury inflicted on God. Hence what the uneducated say is of no force, namely that they blasphemed God not to inflict injury on God and to sin, but for mere relief; that they fornicated not in order to sin, but to experience natural pleasure. Yet sometimes the one acting can by his intention exclude the very moral exterior action, when it depends on this, for example, if someone goes to church not to hear Mass, but so that he can commit theft.

The end of the one acting can be considered in two ways: 1. with respect to the intention of the will, that is, with respect to the act of the will intending it; 2. with respect to the act itself which is commanded as a means to that end. Under the first consideration, the end is properly the object of the will, indeed the chief object, since the end is that which moves the will to the means. Under the second consideration, the end is a mere circumstance of the commanded act, and thus it is usually numbered among the circumstances. He who steals, for example, in order to commit adultery, chiefly wills adultery; this he intends and efficaciously procures. And from this adultery comes the principal malice of the will. But the act commanded for that reason by the will of adultery, namely theft, for example, has the substantial malice proper to itself from its proper object, that is, from taking another's property against the owner's will; but that it is referred extrinsically by the one acting to such or such an end is altogether accidental to it, not from its own nature, but from the choice of the one acting.

Therefore the end which is a circumstance of the act is not the end of the work itself, which gives species to the act, but some joined end; just as that the brave man acts bravely on account of the good of fortitude is not a circumstance; but if he acts bravely for the liberation of the city, or for Christ, or something of this sort. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 7. a. 3 ad 3, q. 18. a. 6 ad 2. The intrinsic end is always the proximate end, as is clear; but the extrinsic end can be proximate and remote and ultimate. The proximate is what is immediately intended, the remote what is intended mediately, the ultimate that in which one rests.

Is there one sole end of a human action? - "The same act numerically, according as it proceeds once from the agent, is not ordered except to one proximate end, from which it has its species; but it can be ordered to several remote ends, of which one is the end of another." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 1. a. 3 ad 3. According as it proceeds once from the agent: for there can be several ends of the act according as it is continued and repeated; for example, to take another's property so that someone may grow rich from another's; to retain another's property, or to take it again, so that it may be preserved for the owner. To one proximate end, that is, of the act or work itself. Cf. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 66. a. 4 ad 2. From which it has species: for there can be several ends, even proximate ends, of the work, of one and the same act, but one is the primary end of the work, from which there is, as it were, the substantial species of the act; the others are accidental and rather take on the nature of circumstances. Thus, for example, if someone undertakes a pilgrimage in order to celebrate Mass in the Sanctuary of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus, the sacrifice of the Mass is the proximate end of the work, from which the celebration of Mass itself intrinsically takes its species; but to celebrate in that Sanctuary in honor of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus is also the proximate end of the work of the celebration itself, but as a certain extrinsic circumstance, not giving species to the act, namely the first species, or substantial species of the act. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 18. a. 2, a. 7 ad 1.

Therefore it is possible "that one act according to the species of nature be ordered to diverse ends of the will. Just as this very thing, to kill a man, which is the same according to the species of nature, can be ordered as to an end to the preservation of justice and to satisfying anger (either by the same person in diverse acts, or by diverse persons). And from this there will be diverse acts according to the species of morals, because in one way it will be an act of virtue, in another way an act of vice. But moral ends are accidental to a natural thing; and conversely the notion of a natural end is accidental to the moral; and therefore nothing prevents acts which are the same according to the species of nature from being diverse according to the species of morals, and conversely." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 1. a. 3 ad 3.

The end, whether proximate or remote, of the one acting, to which the act of the will is ordered, can itself give a moral species to the act. And if it is the ultimate end in some series, it is that which most especially gives species to the act, because it is prior in intention, and all other ends depend upon it, since all those others are subordinated. And thus he who commits adultery in order to steal, and steals in order to commit homicide, is rather a homicide than an adulterer and a thief: because homicide is the formal and motive reason of the other acts. "When many acts differing in species are ordered to one end, there is indeed diversity of species on the part of the exterior acts, but unity of species on the part of the interior act." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 18. a. 6. The end, whether proximate or remote, of the one acting can be multiple, and indeed primary; for example, if someone goes to the house of an enemy in order to kill him and at the same time steal his goods, and is determined to go even though he can accomplish only one or the other in act. Primary is that which moves and determines to the act. It is therefore distinguished from the secondary, which only impels to the act and by itself alone does not suffice to move efficaciously to acting.

Does a human action take goodness and species from the end; and does this differ from the goodness and species which is taken from the object? - R. To the 1st: "The end is the most principal cause of the act, insofar as it moves the agent to acting; hence also the moral act has species especially from the end." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 7. a. 4, q. 1. a. 2. 3; Matt. 6:1. 2. 22.

To the 2nd: "The end is the object of the will, but not of the other powers. Hence, as regards the act of the will, the goodness which is from the object does not differ from the goodness which is from the end, as it does in acts of the other powers; unless perhaps accidentally according as the end depends on the end and the will on the will"; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 2 ad 1, namely when several ends per se subordinated and willed are present together, as when someone wills curative medicine for the sake of entering military service, for the sake of victory: the formal goodness of the object, say, to be healthy, differs from the goodness of another end, say, of military service; and when the will of one end, say adultery, depends on the will of another end, say theft, as when someone wills to commit adultery in order to steal, the malice also of the object, say adultery, differs from the malice of the end, say theft. But both are accidental; for it is accidental to the end that it be subordinated to another, and it is also accidental to the will that it depend on another, otherwise this would belong to every end and every volition. Cajetan on this place.

Moreover, a human act is human insofar as it is voluntary. But in a voluntary act a twofold act is found: the interior act of the will and the exterior act. And each of these has its own proper object. "But the end is properly the object of the will. That about which the exterior action is concerned is its object. Therefore, just as the exterior act receives species from the object about which it is concerned, so the interior act of the will receives species from the end as from its proper object. But that which is on the part of the will is related as formal to that which is on the part of the exterior act, because the will uses the members for acting as instruments; nor do exterior acts have the notion of morality except insofar as they are voluntary. And therefore the species of a human act is considered formally according to the end, but materially according to the object of the exterior act. Hence the Philosopher says that he who steals in order to commit adultery is, speaking per se, more an adulterer than a thief." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 18. a. 6. For adultery is first intended and more voluntary than theft, which is chosen only as a means to it. Yet the primary species of the work is theft rather than adultery, for that is taken from the object. And thus also he who gives alms in order to satisfy God for his sins is rather penitent and just than merciful; but that action of distributing alms is rather a work of mercy than of penance and justice. S. Th. 2. D. 38. q. 1. a. 4 ad 4; Wirceburg. c. 3. a. 1; E. M.

Can the intention of an extrinsic end intrinsically change the nature of the exterior work? - R. Negatively. The reason is: 1. Because the intrinsic nature of things cannot be changed. 2. Because the intention of the one acting adds nothing to the work; indeed it does not even touch it, since it is wholly extrinsic to it. - Therefore our good intention cannot render an evil work good, nor can our evil intention render evil what is good, nor intrinsically transfer what is evil into another species of malice.

But this does not prevent, as is clear, that where the question concerns an object indifferent of itself, the extrinsic end of the one acting can confer moral goodness or malice. For this is not to change the intrinsic nature of the exterior work itself, but to determine its intrinsic indifference, insofar as it is a human work; and in morals this determination is only from intention. And thus, although the depraved intention of a judge to harm the accused cannot intrinsically change the nature of a just sentence and constitute it an unjust damaging, nevertheless the intention of taking another's property determines the very taking, according as someone takes another's property in order to preserve it for its owner, or in order to take it for himself and steal. - L. 1. 3. n. 584. 636.

Is an act good if it has a twofold end, one good, the other evil? - R. Affirmatively, if the evil end relates itself merely antecedently or consequently, that is, merely precedes the whole act or accedes to an act already preexisting, or even if it relates itself merely concomitantly, that is, contributes nothing to the being of the act itself, but is only joined to it. The reason is that then it is wholly extrinsic to the act constituted in its whole being. For it is not the reason on account of which the act itself is done, but is only the reason of another act, for example, of a certain simple complacency which precedes, accompanies, or follows the deliberate act. But this simple complacency can exercise its own influence even without infecting the act, so that someone may be moved more easily to a good act, for example, if almsgiving were proposed to someone as contributing to eternal life, and to this were joined a simple complacency in the esteem to be had thereby among men. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 7.

R. Negatively, if the evil end relates itself truly causatively, and influences the substance of the act. The reason is that then someone wills the good at least inadequately under the notion of evil, which is to will evil. "For the will to be good, it is required that it be of good under the notion of good, that is, that it will the good and on account of the good." S. Th. l. c. ad 3. Except unless the end is only lightly evil, and is not the primary end, and not even inadequately the end moving and determining. The reason is that then the only lightly evil and secondary end, merely impelling, does not influence the substantial being itself of the act, but the extrinsic accidental being of the act; and therefore the whole substance of the act remains good. And thus almsgiving will be good, even if a light ostentation has extrinsically crept into that act and truly influenced it, so that someone gave it more promptly and easily, in such a way that there is a multiple act in the genus of morals, although one in the genus of nature. This, as is clear, falls back into the preceding case. Nevertheless there are not lacking those who hold that one and the same act can be at once substantially good and lightly evil. Yet this appears difficult; for then there could be an act not only morally good as to its substance, but even supernatural, which nevertheless would be lightly evil and displeasing to God. Cf. 73. - S. Th. 1. 2. q. 18. a. 4 ad 3; Suarez d. 8. s. 1. n. 14 seq.

Does he sin who acts for the sake of delight? - R. Affirmatively, if he acts for the sake of delight alone, namely by positively excluding the further honorable end of the work; and this sin, speaking per se, does not exceed venial sin. Negatively, if he simply acts for the sake of delight. The reason of the first is that delight is for the sake of operation, not conversely, namely so that man may be enticed to the operations necessary or useful to human life. Therefore delight is not the end of action, "but a means for exercising the action more constantly, more easily, better." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 4. a. 2. Confirmed from prop. 8, condemned by Innoc. IX. The reason of the second is that since delight is not evil of itself, but good, unless someone constitutes his ultimate end in it, which without doubt would be grave, there is no grave disorder in human action. The reason of the third is that delight is not evil of itself, but good, and it is consonant with the very order of nature that man be enticed by delight to operating. S. Th. C. G. l. 3. c. 26. n. 6. 7. Therefore if someone, although he expressly thinks nothing about a further honorable end, is moved by delight to an action which he apprehends as consonant with nature, or in which he finds nothing contrary to the order of reason, for example, to taking food, playing, etc., he does not sin at all.

S. Th. 2. 2. q. 141. a. 1 ad 1; E. M. Although he expressly thinks nothing about a further honorable end, for example, about the preservation of his own life by eating and drinking. For to act honorably it suffices that someone apprehend the act as licit, or, what is the same, that he not apprehend it as illicit. For by willing an act consonant with reason he implicitly wills all those things on account of which that act is suitable to reason, although he does not expressly think about them, indeed even if he is ignorant of them.

What is understood by object? - By the object of a human act is not understood here whatever is proposed to the will; for in this way both the end and the circumstances would also be its object. Rather, it is understood as that thing which someone immediately or directly and per se wills. The object is not considered here physically, namely as it is some existing thing. About the same object physically considered, moral acts diverse in species can be concerned. And thus, for example, concerning the same wife there can be an honorable conjugal act and a shameful act of adultery. The object is considered here morally, namely as it stands under the rule of morals, or under law commanding, prohibiting, permitting. And thus the object of theft is not another's property precisely insofar as it is a thing, but insofar as right reason forbids that it be taken away against the owner's will. Hence A. D. says 1. 2. q. 19. a. 2 ad 3: "it must be said that the good is represented by reason to the will as object, and insofar as it falls under the order of reason it pertains to the genus of morals and causes moral goodness in the act of the will." S. Th. q. 18. a. 5, S. q. 41. a. 3 ad 5.

Do human acts take moral goodness or malice from the object? - R. Affirmatively. The reason is that acts are intrinsically specified from the object. For the object is said to be that which we will. That which we will; not, to whom we will. Therefore as they have species from the object, so they also have goodness and malice. "The good and evil of an action," says S. Th. 1. 2. q. 18. a. 2, "as also of other things, is considered from the fullness of being, or from its defect. But the first thing that seems to pertain to fullness of being is that which gives species to a thing. But just as a natural thing has species from its form, so an action has species from its object, as also motion from its term.

And therefore, just as the first goodness of a natural thing is considered from its form, which gives species to it, so also the first goodness of a moral act is considered from a suitable object. Hence it is also called by some good from the genus, for example, to use one's own thing. And just as in natural things the first evil is if the thing generated does not attain the specific form, for example, if a man is not generated, but something in place of a man, so the first evil in moral actions is that which is from the object, as to take another's property. And it is called evil from the genus, the genus being taken for the species, in that way of speaking by which we call the whole human species the human genus." Hos. 9:10; Wirceburg. c. 3. a. 1.

Is an act good if the object is good, but the end evil? - R. Negatively. For he who acts for an evil end, although he wills the good, nevertheless wills it under the notion of evil, and therefore according as it is willed by him it is evil. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 7. Hence S. Alph. 1. 5. n. 38 says: "if the object is good, but the end of the one acting is evil, the human act is wholly evil from the malice of the end, which destroys every goodness." Except unless the end is lightly evil, not chief and moving to acting, but secondary and impelling, for example, if someone preaches the word of God and is also impelled by vainglory. For there is a certain light disorder, which does not corrupt the substance of the action from its object and end, but is joined extrinsically by another act. Cf. 81. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 18. a. 4. 6, 2. D. 38. q. 1. a. 4; Suarez tr. 3. d. 6. s. 1. 2, d. 8. s. 1. n. 13.

Is an act good if the object is evil, but the end good? - R. Negatively. The Apostle condemns those saying: let us do evil things, that good things may come. Rom. 3:8. But the reason is that the intention of a good end, as extrinsic to the very willed object, if this is evil, does not prevent someone from really willing evil. Since the substance of the act is from the object, if this is evil, it is impossible for it to be made honorable from a good end, or even from good circumstances. - S. Aug. l. Contra mendac. n. 18; Suarez tr. 3. d. 4, d. 8. s. 1. n. 20 seq.

What is understood by circumstances? - By the circumstances of a human act are understood all those aspects which are accessory to the willed object, and, as it were, accidental to the substance of the act, and which are willed only concomitantly or consequently. "The name of circumstance," says S. Th. 1. 2. q. 7. a. 1, "is transferred to human acts from those things which are in place. But in local matters something is said to stand around which is indeed extrinsic to the thing, yet touches it or approaches it according to place. And therefore whatever conditions are outside the substance of the act, and yet touch the human act in some way, are called circumstances. But what is outside the substance of a thing, yet pertains to the thing itself, is called its accident. Hence the circumstances of human acts must be called their accidents."

As with the object, so circumstances are not considered here insofar as they are certain accidents physically affecting the act, but insofar as they are accidents of the human act, morally affecting it in moral being, already constituted from the object. Morally affecting, that is, insofar as they pertain to morals. Indeed it makes no difference to the moral being of an act that someone, for example, struck another with the right hand or the left, or stole with the right hand or the left. But jurists and theologians consider circumstances differently. For the former consider them rather insofar as they disturb society; the latter insofar as they offend God more gravely. - S. Th. 1. 2. q. 7. a. 2; Suarez tr. 2. d. 5.

Do human acts also take their moral goodness and malice from circumstances? - R. Affirmatively. For since they tend not toward an abstract object, but toward a concrete one, or one determined by its individuating circumstances, just as they take specific moral goodness and malice from the object, so also they take accidental moral goodness and malice from circumstances; and they put on various accidental qualities from them, just as man has the notion of his species from the soul, but something accidental belongs to an individual man according to his individual accidents. And certainly, since good is convertible with being, just as being is said according to substance and according to accident, so also good is attributed to something both according to its substantial being and according to its accidental being, both in natural things and in moral actions. - S. Th. 1. 2. q. 18. a. 3. 9, 2. 2. q. 154. a. 1; Wirceburg. c. 3. a. 1.

You will resolve: 1. A human act can have a threefold moral goodness or malice, whether within the same species, or even of diverse species. Thus, for example, if someone were to steal a sacred thing in order to give it as a gift to a prostitute for obtaining fornication from her, such an act from the object would be theft; from the circumstance of the sacred thing, sacrilege; from the end, fornication; and therefore it would have a threefold malice diverse in species.

2. The intrinsic and essential moral goodness or malice of the act is taken from the object. For from the object the will is moved first and per se, or directly, to the act. Hence, although for a human act to be good simply it is required that it have no evil circumstance, nevertheless it is not required that it always have proper objective circumstances, from which it receives accidental goodness or an increase of goodness, as is clear in an act concerning an altogether simple object, such as love of God. Objective circumstances are mentioned, or those on the part of the object, for circumstances on the part of the act itself are always at least in some way found, which confer upon it some goodness or malice. And thus always, at least morally speaking, which is enough in the present matter, there is in an act some intensity, pertaining to the circumstance how, by reason of which the act has some goodness or malice, which can be called accidental, insofar as the species of the act could be preserved without it.

3. In order that circumstances confer their moral goodness or malice upon an act, they must be willed either after the manner of an object, or at least after the manner of an act; because an object does not confer moral goodness or malice upon a human act except insofar as it is intended and willed. Objective circumstances, that is, those which hold themselves on the part of the object, must be willed after the manner of an object, because circumstances of this kind affect the object itself and the act indivisibly attains the object, not as though naked, but as though clothed with its circumstances. But circumstances which hold themselves on the part of the act must be willed either after the manner of an object, if that circumstance is extrinsic to the act itself, as is, for example, the circumstance who, for the one acting can regard himself as the object of his own will, and will the dignity or condition of his person to be applied to the work; or after the manner of an act, if that circumstance is intrinsic to the act itself, as is, for example, the circumstance how or when. And thus, in order that the goodness or malice of the act of the will be increased from intensity or duration, it is enough that the intensity and duration be voluntary after the manner of an act, namely insofar as the intense, lasting, etc., act itself is voluntary. S. Th. C. G. l. 3. c. 138, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 4. 6. 7; Suarez tr. 3. d. 4, d. 5, d. 6. s. 3.

Can a circumstance intrinsically change the nature of the exterior work? - R. Affirmatively. The reason is that a circumstance is intrinsic to the work itself, regarded in the concrete, and by no means extrinsic, as the end of the one acting is with respect to the exterior work. Therefore it can change the external work itself. It can change it. For not every circumstance always modifies the external work in such a way that it also intrinsically changes its nature. And thus, if a pastor recites the breviary at the time when he ought to minister the sacraments to a dying person, the intrinsic nature of the recitation of the breviary is not changed. Hence it is also enough to confess only the aforesaid omission of the administration of the sacraments. Nor indeed is that intrinsic change to be understood in such a way that an external work, indifferent, good, or evil from the proper intrinsic nature belonging to it, or in such a species by reason of its proper object, becomes by its nature determined as to malice or goodness, evil, good, or in another species. For a circumstance, since it is something accessory to the object, if the object by reason of itself is indifferent or good or evil and in such a species, remains indifferent and good and evil and in such a species under that respect, although it can also intrinsically become evil, be changed into evil, and assume another species by reason of a circumstance. Thus, for example, eating is of itself an indifferent action, but eating on a fast day after another meal has been taken is a grave sin, and therefore the action is evil not by reason of eating, but by reason of the fast day, and by this evil circumstance of time it becomes evil. To use marriage is an honorable action, but to use marriage after a vow of chastity is a gravely sinful action, not by reason of the use itself of marriage, but of the vow; and by this circumstance of the vow it is changed from good into evil. To steal is an evil action against justice, but to steal a sacred thing is an evil action also against religion from that circumstance of the sacred thing, whence to the malice of theft is added the malice of sacrilege.

How are the various circumstances distinguished? - Certain circumstances are those which change the nature of the work or act merely accidentally, namely within the same species, increasing or diminishing moral goodness or malice; and therefore they are called aggravating or diminishing, and these can be either simply such, or notably, or greatly aggravating or diminishing. Circumstances of this kind are all those which do not have goodness or malice according to themselves, but through order to another condition of the act, which has that goodness or malice according to itself. Hence they increase or diminish the aforesaid goodness or malice. And thus, for example, the intensity and remission of the act, the long or short delay of the act, does not according to itself have moral goodness or malice, but only through order to the good or evil act, of which consequently it constitutes only an accidental diversity. Thus also to take something in a greater or lesser quantity does not according to itself regard the order of reason in good or evil, but presupposes some other condition through which the act has malice or goodness, for example, this, that it belongs to another, which according to itself is opposed to reason. Hence to take another's property in a greater or lesser quantity does not diversify the species of sin. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 18. a. 11.

But there are other circumstances which essentially change the nature of the work and act and are called species-changing. Circumstances of this kind are those which according to themselves regard a special order of reason. Thus, for example, to take another's property has its species from the notion of what belongs to another, for from this it is constituted in the species of theft. And if on top of this place or time is considered, these will have the nature of a circumstance. But because reason can also order concerning place or concerning time and other things of this sort, it happens that a condition of place concerning the object is taken as according to itself contrary to the order of reason; for example, because reason orders that injury is not to be done in a sacred place. Hence to take something belonging to another from a sacred place adds a special repugnance to the order of reason. And therefore place, which was previously considered as a simple circumstance, is now considered as a principal condition of the object repugnant to reason. Hence S. Th. q. 18. a. 10 ad 2: "a circumstance," he says, "remaining in the notion of a circumstance, since it has the notion of an accident, does not give species; but insofar as it is changed into a principal condition of the object, according to this it gives species."

Circumstances which change a sin only from venial into mortal, under one respect, are only aggravating; and they are called aggravating infinitely: namely if mere opposition to such a virtue is considered, as may be seen in light and grave theft; for both are opposed to the same virtue of justice. Under another respect, they are species-changing, namely if opposition and repugnance with the general rule of morals is considered, namely with the law and the end to be attained. Circumstances which confer a new species upon an act already constituted in some moral species are properly species-adding. Thus, if someone bound by a vow sins against chastity, to the malice of the sin against chastity is added another malice against religion. But if the malice of the new species is not grave but light, then that circumstance is either held as simply aggravating, or as indeed adding a species, but with the addition, lightly: for then the whole specific substance of the act still remains intact, nor, morally speaking, does any substantial change of the act accede. Thus as regards a merely internal sin against chastity committed in a church, if the malice of sacrilege is present in it, it is only light, and therefore it is not a circumstance strictly and properly adding a species, but aggravating. But circumstances which first render an act simply good or evil are properly species-conferring or species-changing, for example, if someone undertakes a journey from the end of exercising a work of charity, that journey, indifferent of itself, first passes into an act of virtue; if someone gives alms only from vainglory, that act, although good in itself, then becomes evil. S. Th. 2. D. 38. q. 1. a. 4.

Is an act good if the circumstance is evil? - R. Affirmatively, if the question concerns one and the same act in the genus of nature, and one which is multiple in the genus of morals. The reason is that then a bad circumstance of this kind is altogether extrinsic to the good act itself. And thus in the celebration of Mass, a priest consecrating in the state of grace places a good act; then, sinning gravely by adhering to a shameful thought, and taking a sacrilegious communion, he places an evil act. - R. Negatively, if the question concerns one and the same act of the will in the genus of morals. The reason is that the act of the will, which embraces all these things together, namely the object and the circumstances, is one most simple act, and therefore, if it is not good from every side, it will be evil.

Hence, if there is a circumstance which is only lightly evil and extrinsic to the object, which the will embraces concomitantly, this lightly evil circumstance does not corrupt the good act, since it is altogether extrinsic and accidental to the substance of the act constituted in itself. And thus an affection toward venial sin in Communion does not corrupt Communion in its substance, although it renders it less fruitful. But if the lightly evil circumstance is intrinsic to the object itself, then the whole act is evil. Therefore the action of a religious giving alms against the vow of poverty or against the precept of a Superior, or from another's property, is evil, although the unlawfulness by reason of the vow or precept is only light. Suarez tr. 3. d. 8. s. 1; Wirceburg. c. 3. art. 1.

How many circumstances of human acts are numbered? - Seven, and they are: who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, when. "The reason of this enumeration can be taken thus. For a circumstance is said as something existing outside the substance of the act, yet in such a way that it touches the act itself in some way. But this can happen in three ways. In one way insofar as it touches the act itself. In another way insofar as it touches the cause of the act. In a third way insofar as it touches the effect. But it touches the act itself either after the manner of measure, as time and place; or after the manner of quality of the act, as the manner of acting. On the part of the effect it is when what someone has done is considered. But on the part of the cause of the act, as to the final cause, why is taken; on the part of the material cause or object, about what is taken (which is comprehended under what); on the part of the principal agent, who acted is taken; but on the part of the instrumental agent cause, by what aids is taken." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 7. a. 3.

How are the aforesaid circumstances to be considered? - They are not to be taken insofar as the substance of the act depends on them, but insofar as they accidentally affect it. Otherwise they would no longer have the notion of circumstances. - Therefore:

1. Who does not signify the substance of the one acting, but his quality or condition, for example, that he is bound by a vow, joined in marriage, a public magistrate, etc. To this circumstance Lugo, De Poenit. d. 16. n. 200, brings back the habit of sin; for through it is explained how someone is disposed to sin more easily. The circumstance of person, generally speaking, does not transfer sin into another species, unless the sin is directly opposed to a union, office bringing a special obligation, vow, or state; as if a priest fornicates, it passes into sacrilege, but if he blasphemes, he is guilty only of blasphemy, just as another blaspheming. Malach. 2:1. 8; C. Trid. sess. 22. C. 1 de R.; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 45. a. 4, q. 110. a. 4 ad 5; Lugo De Poenit. d. 16. s. 4.

2. What and about what likewise does not express the substance of the effect or object, but its quality or quantity, for example in theft it does not denote that the stolen thing belongs to another, for this pertains to the very substance of the act, but that it is sacred or profane, of great or small quantity, with damage thereby to a poor person, to wards, to girls to be married, with scandal of many, etc. The circumstance what and about what can easily be species-changing. But what, that is, the effect, when it is foreseen and willed, draws into its own species. To this circumstance can be brought back how often, or the multiplication of acts. Nevertheless S. Th. did not count it among the circumstances. And the reason is that circumstances are around the same act. But the number of operations does not stand around one and the same operation. For a second theft is not a circumstance of the first, or conversely; nor the third of the second, and so on. From this it follows that, because someone is no less bound to confess the second sin than the first, and no less the hundredth than any other, it is not enough to say that he stole many times, but he must explain how many times he stole, if he remembers the number; and if he does not remember, he must express how frequently, so that a probable number may be had. Lugo l. c. s. 4. § 7. s. 5. 6. 9.

3. Where does not signify bare place; for it is certain that every act of man happens somewhere; but the quality of the place, for example, that it is public, whence scandal arises; that it is sacred, whence sacrilege is had, etc. The circumstance of a sacred place, although it aggravates all sins accidentally, nevertheless draws only those into the species of grave sacrilege which are directly opposed to the sanctity of the place, or to the immunity annexed to it, such as effusions of blood or of human seed, which impede the divine worship to be exhibited there, for which the place is directly sanctified, and violent removals, which are contrary to immunity. Lugo l. c. s. 10.

4. By what aids signifies accidental instruments, or means, which the one acting used, for example, if someone used sacred vessels for poisoning, employed the aid of the devil, induced other men by command or counsel to the execution of sin. Although this circumstance sometimes seems to relate to sin merely materially, nevertheless sometimes it also changes the species. Lugo l. c. n. 475. 476.

5. Why denotes not the intrinsic end of the work, for this pertains to the substance of the act, but the extrinsic end, and that of the one acting, as if someone steals in order to get himself drunk. Why can manifestly give another species to an act. Lugo l. c. n. 477 seq.

6. How designates the accidental mode by which the interior act of the will is done, for example, intensely or remissly, from contempt, from levity, from ignorance, from fear, from passion. It also designates the mode of the exterior action, for example, that you killed by poison, by the sword, with cruelty and savagery, etc. How, although ordinarily aggravating or diminishing sin, can sometimes also give species. - Lugo l. c. n. 497 seq.; Laym. l. 3. de Iust. tr. 3. p. 3. c. 4. n. 1; Tambur. Meth. Confess. l. 2. c. 6. n. 2; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 66. a. 3 ad 1, a. 4.

7. When signifies the quality or quantity of time, for example, on a feast day, of Communion, of Holy Week; for a long time, for a short time. The circumstance of sacred time aggravates sin, but does not add the grave species of sacrilege, unless it is done in contempt of the sacred time. Lugo l. c. n. 515 seq.; Lessius on q. 7; Cajetan on the same q.; L. 1. 6. n. 923; S. Th. 4. D. 32. q. 1. a. 5, q. 4. Sol. 2.