Article II: On Circumstances

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 18, a. 10 and 11; De Malo, q. 2, a. 6-8.

151. A moral circumstance is an accident of a human act morally affecting it once it has already been constituted in its moral being.

For this a threefold condition is required:

1. that the act already be constituted in moral being, that is, have morality from the object independently of circumstances: for an accident supposes a substance. Thus, with respect to theft, it is not a circumstance that the thing belongs to another, but that it is notable; similarly, an act indifferent from the object has its first specific morality from a circumstance first and principally intended, which therefore becomes the object because it is intended first and per se under the notion of good or evil;

2. that the circumstance be outside the substance of the act and affect it, and therefore that it not destroy or essentially change the substantial moral being which the act has from the object, as if someone does a good act solely for an evil end: for then it would not be an accident, but would pass over into the substance and object;

3. that the circumstance attain the act according to moral being, by increasing or diminishing goodness or malice: thus that someone steals with the right hand or the left hand is a physical and indifferent circumstance; but that the thing be precious or cheap is a moral circumstance.

Now by reason of influence upon morality, some circumstances change the species, others only aggravate or diminish within the same species.

1. Several authors teach that circumstances truly and properly diminishing moral good or evil are not given; but in this there is only a different mode of speaking.

152. Principles. I. Moral circumstances changing the species are those which add to the act a goodness or malice diverse in species from that which the act has from the object, because according to themselves, separately and independently from the morality which proceeds from the object, they imply some agreement or repugnance with right reason, or a special and distinct conformity or difformity with the rules of morals: thus when someone gives alms in order to satisfy for sin, or steals a sacred thing, the circumstance of end expresses a special conformity with reason and the circumstance of the sacred expresses a special difformity. These circumstances do not remain in the notion of circumstance, but rather are considered as the principal condition of the object (or as a partial object), and become as it were the specific difference of this object: the genus is to take another's property or to give alms; the species is to take a sacred thing, to give satisfactory alms.

II. Moral circumstances only aggravating or diminishing within the same species are those which do not imply something per se agreeing with or repugnant to reason, and according to themselves express no order to the rules of morals, but only by reason of a prior circumstance or condition of the object have the morality which they suppose and only modify it, such as more and less, much and little, intensely and remissly. Thus to take much or little of itself does not express goodness or malice, but to take much or little of another's property does.

Among these some are:

1. Notably aggravating or diminishing. Such are:

a) in quantitative matter, which consists in number, weight, measure, those which, taken separately and separated from the act, suffice for mortal sin, for example, if someone beyond 100 gold coins steals another 100, or steals a gilt watch which he thinks is gold, it will be a circumstance notably aggravating the theft; on the contrary, if he steals a gold watch which he thinks is silver, it is a circumstance notably diminishing;

b) in other matters (duration, intensity, execution), those which notably exceed the ordinary mode of acting well or badly in these matters, for example, if someone perseveres in hatred for a year, or the whole night with a woman in shameless acts; or only for some instant consents to her. Sometimes they so notably increase or diminish that they render a sin from venial mortal, or from mortal venial, and thus are said to aggravate or diminish infinitely, for example, the circumstance of grave harm for one's neighbor from a slight theft, or the circumstance of half-full deliberation in blasphemy, imprecation, shameful delight.

2. Others are slightly aggravating or diminishing, such as:

a) in quantitative matter, those which, taken separately, do not suffice for mortal sin, as if someone instead of 100 francs steals either 101 or 99;

b) in other matters, those which do not much exceed the ordinary mode of acting, as if someone, angry after a quarrel, remains somewhat in hatred.

153. Practical rules follow from the aforesaid:

1. An act indifferent from the object can become good or evil from circumstances: thus to eat temperately to restore one's strength is good; to do this with excess is evil; then the circumstance passes over into the notion of object because it is first and per se intended under the notion of good or evil.

2. An act good from the object is rendered evil by circumstances, gravely or lightly, according to the degree of malice which is in them, for example, commerce in a sacred place, servile labor on the Lord's Day, marriage with a person bound by a vow of chastity. Then the circumstance becomes the principal condition or part of the object.

3. An act good or evil from the object can receive a new species of goodness or malice from circumstances, for example, one who keeps chastity from a vow contracts the goodness of chastity and of religion; one who steals a sacred thing contracts the malice of theft and sacrilege. This circumstance also becomes a condition of the object.

4. An act good or evil from the object can acquire or lose from circumstances some greater degree of goodness or malice, for example, a poor man giving alms, a man outstanding in learning who places himself after others; a priest sinning, a rich man giving alms as though compelled, a poor man committing theft. Such remain mere circumstances.

154. Observation.

From circumstances properly so called, which affect the act, there differ internal or external actions which sometimes are done during the principal action and only accompany it, without influence upon it. These are truly distinct acts, which can be evil, but do not affect the goodness of the principal action. Thus if care of the sick, communion, or hearing Mass is done also on account of sensible affection for the sick person, vainglory, curiosity, it will be an evil circumstance; on the contrary, if they are done with a movement of impatience, affection toward venial sin, distractions, these will only be evils which accompany them.