V. On the Integrity of Confession

Must Confession be integral; what is this kind of integrity; what is its force? - Resp. Confession must be integral. The reason is that no judgment can be exercised when the cause is unknown; because the confessor must impose salutary penances and prescribe efficacious remedies; because the whole infirmity must be known in order that it may be healed. Trent, sess. 14, C. 5, c. 7; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 9, a. 2. - Integrity is one thing material, another formal. Material integrity is situated in the accusation of all mortal sins which were simply committed, or which after diligent examination of oneself occur to the mind. Formal integrity consists in the accusation of all sins which, after diligent examination of oneself, occur to the mind, and which one here and now, with the circumstances considered, morally can or is bound to confess. Material integrity is not always necessary; for sometimes it is morally impossible because of inculpable forgetfulness; and although sins occur to the mind, from other just causes Confession becomes morally impossible. Wherefore only formal integrity is necessary. Trent, sess. 14, C. 5. - By reason of integrity, the lowest species of sins and their exact number are to be accused under grave obligation, so that it is lawful neither to increase nor to diminish sins. If someone cannot confess the lowest species of sins, he must confess them according to the higher species or genus which he can. Likewise, if someone cannot confess the precisely determined number, he must confess the number which comes nearer to the truth, using, e.g., the particle "about," or, if he cannot even do this, he must say how often approximately in a year, in a month, in a week, in a day, whether frequently, whether rarely, etc. "Sporer rightly notes that the confessor should not be too anxious about seeking the number of sins in a habitual penitent, because it is often impossible to have such a certain number." L. 466; Ithur., Cas. 38, n. 3. - But the particle "about" is generally understood by theologians in this way: about three is 2-4; about ten is 8-12; about thirty is 27-33; about one hundred is 95-105; about one thousand is 950-1050. L. 466; Lugo, d. 16, nn. 78, 81, 94 ff., 644. - E. M.

Resolutions: If someone in Confession has omitted a circumstance necessary to be explained, he must afterward confess it. Wherefore he must again confess the substance of the sin if he cannot otherwise explain it, e.g., if he sinned with a married woman; by no means, however, if he can explain it without that, e.g., if he sinned with a person consecrated to God. "Long-lasting hatred, just as also carnal concupiscence toward a woman, must necessarily be expressed in Confession... because of the number of sins which are repeated in that long delay." L. 467. One who has declared the number of sins around about as much as he can, afterward finding a notable excess, must declare it, because a greater number is not contained in a lesser; but if, on the contrary, he afterward finds a number notably lesser, he is bound to nothing, for the true number was comprehended in the greater. - One who has confessed the number of sins confusedly, as the uneducated, children, and habitual sinners for the most part do, if afterward the sins distinctly come into memory, or only some in particular, must not confess them again; for he already explained all sufficiently in that confused way in which he then could. And therefore he is much less bound afterward either to confess again with greater diligence applied, or with the help of a more learned confessor, in order to explain those sins more distinctly; which would also be exposed to innumerable scruples and anxieties. - For the integrity of Confession, diligent examination is prerequired, Trent, sess. 14, C. 5, according to the capacity of the penitent, the delay of time, and the other circumstances. But for this a moderate diligence suffices, such as a prudent man applies in difficult affairs, such as, morally speaking, learned and fearful persons are accustomed to apply, even if someone thinks he would find more things with greater diligence. Bonacina, t. 1, d. 5, q. 5; Laymann, l. 5, tr. 6, c. 8. But by reason of inadvertence it rarely happens that Confession is sacrilegious because of defect of previous examination. This examination can prudently be supplied by the confessor through discreet questions, and with no greater diligence than the penitent himself is bound to have, according to his condition, especially as regards the uneducated and others concerning whom there is reason to fear that, once dismissed, they will not return again. But it is not necessary to write down sins lest they fall from memory; nor is this to be counseled, because of the danger of publication. - L. 471, 504; Lugo, d. 16, n. 573 ff.; E. M.

Must the external act of sin necessarily be accused? - Resp. In the affirmative, because it is one and the same thing with the internal act in the moral genus, and these two constitute one total act. Besides, the external act is directly prohibited by divine law, e.g., You shall not commit homicide. Moreover, without the declaration of the external act, the confessor for the most part could not perform his office as is fitting, concerning admonitions to be offered, etc. This is also established from the universal custom of the faithful, which explains the law in this sense, and from proposition 25 condemned by Alexander VII. - E. M.

Must the effect of sin necessarily be expressed in Confession? - Some affirm it, because it is evil or a sin at least in its cause; others deny it, because it is evil or a sin only denominatively.

St. Alphonsus affirms it, l. 5, n. 10. "A voluntary omission in its cause," says the holy Doctor, "is also imputed as sin, even if afterward the will cannot operate; for example, if someone makes himself drunk, foreseeing that by reason of the drunkenness he will omit Mass, then he is bound to confess the cause and its effect, namely drunkenness and the omission of the sacred rite, as Salm., etc., with others commonly, better say against Vazquez, etc., provided the will is not retracted before the effect follows, as Sanchez, etc., probably teach; for then it is probable that he is not bound to confess the effect which followed. From this it is also deduced that if the effect happens after retraction, a censure imposed against sinners is not incurred, because this requires contumacy in the act of sin." Cf. also l. 4, n. 149, and l. 7, n. 40.

But Lugo denies it, who has these things: "It must be supposed in a sin, e.g., by which you killed another with poison, that there intervenes first the internal act of the will by which you wished to give him poison; then the external action by which you prepared and gave the poison; then the effect which followed, namely his death.... The first and sufficiently common opinion affirms that the external effect must be explained.... The contrary opinion is broadly defended by Fr. Vazquez, etc. This opinion has always seemed truer to me.... The more common reason... is that the external act, which is denominated free from the actual freedom of the internal act, is truly and properly a sin; but the effect afterward following, e.g., in sleep, is not properly a sin..., but the effect of sin. But in Confession all and only sins must be explained; therefore the external act must be explained when it is a free act, but not the effect afterward following..., because there cannot be actual sin in one who does not actually sin, nor can he actually sin who does not actually act. But the one who sleeps, while his enemy dies from the poison, then does nothing; therefore he does not then sin." De Poen., d. 16, nn. 437, 439, 440, 449. - But this opinion must be limited, unless the penitent has incurred a censure or reserved case because of the effect which followed. Lugo himself has this limitation; indeed he adds: "It can also happen that a censure is incurred by one who has already been justified from the past sin through contrition, or through attrition with the sacrament," n. 453. Cf. also n. 460 and Laymann, l. 1, t. 2, c. 2, n. 5. But, as Ithur., Cas. 40, n. 31 ff.; Cas. 50, n. 26 f., excellently observes, there is no reservation where there is no subject of reservation, or sin, since it has already been absolved. For of no being there are no properties. What is not, is not such. But where only retraction of the will preceded, the cause having been retracted through the will, the effect is no longer culpable in itself. But reservation or censure cannot be incurred when one does not sin through the act.

The same opinion must besides be limited unless the confessor, performing not only the office of judge but also of teacher and physician, prudently questions the penitent about the effect which followed. Instr. pro parv., etc., p. 4, at the end of the Roman Council, published by command of Benedict XIV.

Does it harm the integrity of Confession if someone accuses venials to his ordinary confessor, but mortals to another? - Resp. In the negative, speaking of itself, provided he never receives absolution unless he has first manifested all mortals to one confessor and is absolved by the same. The reason is that grave sins are necessary matter of Confession, and that Confession is integral which embraces all mortals, since venials are not necessarily to be accused. - But in practice attention must be given to the circumstances of penitents and to the motives by which they are led. For those are not to be condemned who sometimes confess graver sins to an unknown confessor, but subject lighter ones to the ordinary, if from shame, by which they would be overwhelmed with a confessor familiarly known, they would commit themselves to the danger of confessing sacrilegiously. Wherefore the confessor would inquire about this matter only from imprudent curiosity; "unless nevertheless on that occasion the penitent remains in a moral occasion of sinning, or goes around for this reason, that he may sin more freely; for then he will sin gravely, and because of defect of attrition the Confession will be null." Hence, although neither occasion nor habit is of itself necessarily to be accused, the confessor nevertheless has a right to inquire both about proximate occasion and about habit, both if there is a prudent suspicion that he is deceived by the penitent concerning his dispositions, and if from this there is a special sin, and so that he may impose a salutary and suitable satisfaction. - Prop. 58 condemned by Innocent XI; Lugo, d. 14, nn. 172, 173; d. 16, n. 57; Suarez, d. 22, s. 3, n. 10; L. 471. Cf. here 707.

Does it harm integrity if someone disguises another voice, lest he be recognized by the confessor? - Resp. In the negative, of itself. Provided he opens all mortals, he performs an integral Confession. Nor is it necessary that he be known by name by the confessor; for it suffices that the confessor intend to absolve the present sinner. But the intention of the confessor of itself is always determined to the penitent. La-Croix, l. 6, p. 1, n. 68.

Must circumstances of mortal sins which notably aggravate them necessarily be confessed? - "There are three opinions, all very probable. - The first opinion affirms it. It is proved, 1. from the Roman Ritual, de Sacram. poenit., from the Roman Catechism, p. 2, c. 5, n. 47.

It is proved, 2. by reason, because the same reason which persuades that circumstances changing the species are to be confessed also urges for circumstances notably aggravating, since both notably change the judgment of the confessor. - The second opinion says that the circumstance what must necessarily be confessed, namely that which touches the substantial integrity of the sin in the individual, as is the quantity of theft. The reason is that otherwise the confessor will not be able to form a due judgment about the substance of the sin. - The third opinion, more probable to me, denies that there is an obligation of confessing aggravating circumstances. It is proved, 1. from St. Thomas, 4 d. 16, q. 3, a. 2, q. 5, who by his authority has indeed given great weight to this opinion. It is proved, 2. by reasons. The first reason: because from the words of Trent, sess. 14, C. 5, the Council seems not obscurely to exclude the obligation of confessing circumstances other than those changing the species, because it sufficiently suggests that these suffice for this: that the confessor form a right judgment about the gravity of crimes and about the punishment to be imposed. The second reason: because otherwise penitents would always fluctuate amid anxieties, since they could always doubt about the integrity of their Confessions in determining which circumstances are or are not notably aggravating. St. Thomas, l. c., q. 5, ad 2. Hence Lugo assigns a reason a priori for this opinion, saying that Christ prescribed nothing other than Confession of sins; but one who explains the circumstances changing the species of sin already truly confesses and explains the essence of the sin, since the quiddity or essence of sin is taken from its specific nature. The third reason: because if we were bound to manifest circumstances notably aggravating, we would also be bound to confess those notably diminishing, namely if someone sinned from anger, fear, more intense passion, from the inducement of others, and similar things, which obligation even the adversaries deny. The last and stronger reason: because no one is bound to observe a doubtful law; hence since the law of confessing aggravating circumstances is very doubtful, we are not bound to it. And therefore, Lugo rightly says, Trent did not explain this obligation of confessing them because the Council could not sufficiently gather it from the words of Christ and the institution of the sacrament." L. 468. - Except: "if the circumstance brings in a censure or reservation, or if the penitent is prudently questioned by the confessor for his necessary direction." L. 467. - Instr. pro parvul., etc., p. 4, at the end of the Roman Council, published by command of Benedict XIII; Lugo, d. 16, s. 3.

Does the circumstance of habit of sin change the species; and must it be manifested in Confession? - Resp. To the first: "It must be said that duration is not a circumstance drawing into another species; similarly neither frequency nor assiduity, unless perhaps by accident from something supervening. For something does not acquire a new species from the fact that it is multiplied or prolonged, unless perhaps in the prolonged or multiplied act something supervenes which varies the species, such as disobedience, or contempt, or something of this kind." St. Thomas, 1. 2, q. 88, a. 5, ad 1.

Resp. To the second: "It is necessary to distinguish a twofold habit: one which induces to perpetrating similar sins with one's freedom and advertence; the other which induces to perpetrating sins without freedom and advertence, and therefore in such a way that they are not a new sin, but the sin (in its cause) consists in this, that the habit was freely acquired, or in this, that due effort is not applied to obliterate it; as happens when someone from habit blasphemes or perjures himself without adverting here and now to the malice of blasphemy or perjury. This latter habit, freely induced or not uprooted, must be confessed as a special sin; for we are gravely obliged to lack it. For although one who perjures himself or blasphemes without advertence does not sin here and now, nevertheless he sins if he does not strive to uproot the habit of perjuring or blaspheming thus. But the former habit is then also to be subjected to the keys when someone adverts that through it he is placed in proximate danger of perpetrating new faults; for since exposing oneself to proximate danger of sinning is a sin, one who adverts that through the habit of sinning he is in that danger commits this special sin: that he subjects himself to this danger, or that he does not strive to turn himself away from it. But because men rarely advert to this, for this reason they rarely accuse themselves of this habit, and therefore rarely is there an obligation of manifesting it before the confessor questions about it. "It is indeed true that one who exposes himself to danger of sinning and immediately sins sufficiently explains both sins by confessing the sin committed, with which that other sin, by which he exposed himself to the danger of sinning, morally makes one. But when a notable delay intervenes between one sin and the other, sufficient for a moral interruption, or when someone only exposes himself to the proximate danger of committing some sin, yet does not commit it, then that by which one exposed himself to proximate danger of sinning must be explained separately; for in that very thing there is sin, according to that of Ecclesiasticus 3: 'He who loves danger will perish in it.'" Viva, on prop. 60 condemned by Innocent XI, last part. - Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 200 ff.; cf. here 704; E. M.

Must the penitent declare the diverse persons with whom he sinned? - Resp. In the negative, of itself. The reason is that it suffices that the number of sins and their species be declared; but sins do not change species for this reason, that they were committed with several persons. - Hence one who fornicated with three different persons, or three times with the same person, satisfies by saying that he fornicated three times; nor is he bound spontaneously to say whether the accomplice was one or several, whether they were prostitutes or others. Nevertheless, if the confessor asks about this, the penitent is bound to respond, because it is expedient that the confessor know whether perhaps there is a proximate occasion of sinning, as is likely if the sin was committed several times with the same person. But different satisfaction and different remedies will have to be prescribed by the confessor according to the multiplicity and diversity of the persons with whom one has sinned. - La-Croix 1040; Bonacina, de Integr., diss. 3, n. 14; Tamburini, in decal., l. 7, c. 7; Elbel, de Act. hum., 103.

Is one bound by a vow of chastity who sins with another similarly bound required to declare both circumstances? - Resp. In the affirmative. The reason is that there are two plainly distinct sins there, namely a sin against one's own vow, and a sin of cooperation with another toward violating that person's vow. - The very same must be said of a married man having relations with another's wife. "Different in species is the obligation by which he himself must not violate his own marriage, and that by which he must not bring it about that the other violate his own." Lugo, d. 16, n. 258. - La-Croix 1063; Salmant., c. 6, n. 63; L., l. 1, n. 46.

Must a priest or religious sinning against chastity disclose his condition, or only the circumstance of the vow of chastity? - It probably suffices that each manifest the circumstance of the vow, because the species of obligation does not seem to be changed by the special condition either of priest or of religious. For the vow of each is solemn. Therefore the sin of each pertains to the same species of personal sacrilege. The controversy can only be about a simple vow, concerning which cf. vol. 1, n. 500. - Lugo, d. 16, s. 4, § 2.

Must one who has committed incest explain the quality, namely: 1. with one related by blood, or with one related by affinity; 2. the degree of consanguinity or affinity; 3. the line in spiritual relationship; 4. the line and degree in legal relationship? - Resp. To the first: Lessius, l. 4, c. 3, n. 79, and others affirm. Lugo, d. 16, nn. 313-316, and others deny. This opinion is judged more probable by St. Alphonsus, 469, and is proved by authority and reason from St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 154, a. 9, ad 2. "A person related by affinity," he says, "is joined to someone on account of a person joined by blood; and therefore, because one is on account of the other, consanguinity and affinity make an unbecomingness of the same nature."

Resp. To the second: Suarez, d. 22, s. 3, n. 12, Diana, t. 1, tr. 7, r. 107, and others, from St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 154, a. 9, and Cajetan there, think that all incests are of the same nature, and that as concerns degree, from this there is had only an aggravating circumstance because of the same virtue of piety and the reverence due to relatives, which is harmed; but greater or lesser connection does not change the species. Ballerinius apud Gur., 486, seems to approve this opinion. - Navarrus, Man., c. 7, n. 4, and others hold that the species of incest is changed from the various degree of connection, because between degree and degree there is special reverence. St. Alphonsus, 470, says this opinion is less probable. - Salmant., de 6 Dec. praec., c. 5, nn. 28, 36, and others, relying also on the authority of the Angelic Doctor, hold that incest differs in species only in the first degree, both of the direct line and of the transverse line, because the reverence due to relatives in that first degree is of a different nature. St. Alphonsus in the cited place says this opinion seems equally probable as the following. - Tamburini, Meth. Confess., l. 2, c. 5, § 2, n. 6, and others judge that all incests among blood relatives, except only the first degree in the direct line, are of the same species. The reason is that only in the said first degree is there present a special nature of connection and of reverence due. "And for this opinion," says St. Alphonsus in the cited place, "St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 154, a. 9, seems undoubtedly to stand," and he says that it seems altogether to be held, and he adds: "indeed Lugo, d. 16, n. 314, etc., rightly teach that one must explain whether a father sinned with a daughter, or a son with his mother, whose fault has a diverse malice by reason of the special reverence due to the mother." Indeed the first degree of the direct line invalidates marriage by natural law. - But Tamburini, ibid., c. 7, n. 48, states that any incest, whether on account of consanguinity or on account of affinity, whatever the degree may be, does not differ in species. And by reason of parity he affirms that the same is to be said not improbably also about other injuries inflicted as regards parents, brothers, and wife, concerning which he had treated properly, c. 5, § 2, n. 6.

The Angelic Doctor, l. c., ad 3, says: "In the mingling of related persons, there is something which is unbecoming in itself and repugnant to natural reason, such as when mingling is made between parents and children, whose kinship is of itself and immediate.... But other persons, who are not joined according to themselves, but through order to parents, do not have unbecomingness in this way from themselves, but fittingness or unfittingness varies about this according to custom and human or divine law, because the use of venereal things, which is ordered to the common good, is subject to law." But it must be noted that by reason of superiority and the obligation arising from it, the sin is truly different if a father seduces a daughter, stepdaughter, or daughter-in-law, from that which a son commits when seducing his mother, stepmother, or mother-in-law.

Resp. To the third: The line in spiritual relationship does not change the species, whether one sins with her whom he held in baptism, or with her mother. L., l. 3, n. 450.

Resp. To the fourth: As for consanguinity and affinity, so consequently and much more for legal relationship the matter is disputed. - Cf. vol. 1, n. 798.

Must the nearness of persons be declared in sins of hatred or injury? - Resp. To the first: As to hatred, in the affirmative, if it is a question of nearer relationship on account of the strict bond of the virtue of piety. Hence grave hatred toward parents, children, grandparents, grandchildren, a spouse, brothers, sisters, and relatives by affinity in the first degree must be declared. - But in the negative, more probably, if it is a question of more remote relationship, namely among other blood relatives or relatives by affinity. For when the connection is more remote, there is had only an aggravating circumstance, and not also one changing the species and necessarily to be expressed in Confession. - Lugo, d. 16, n. 303 ff.

Resp. To the second: Lugo has these things, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 299 ff.: "I think that one universal rule cannot be given on this point; for sometimes the circumstance of the related person against whom one sins will have to be explained; sometimes it will not. This indeed depends on the quality of the offense and on the degree of connection. Hence if parents are struck by a child, if they are killed, if they are affected with insults, if they are defamed, those sins without doubt have a special circumstance against piety, love, and reverence due to parents, which are gravely harmed by sins of this kind. From this, however, it does not follow that every grave injury which is against a father has that other specific malice against piety and must be explained in Confession. For if a son steals from his father that which suffices for a mortal sin of theft against justice, he does not always sin gravely against piety or is bound to explain that circumstance... because... it is not... gravely opposed to that which piety and reverence toward a father demands."

Must the circumstance of dignity and office of the person necessarily be accused, e.g., if the sinner is a superior, magistrate, priest, etc.; if he is a confessor? - Resp. To the first: In the negative, more probably, of itself, i.e., the reason of scandal or office or particular obligation being excluded. The reason is that the circumstance of the dignity of the person sinning does not of itself change the species of sin, but at most aggravates the sin. - But the crime of injured majesty is equated with parricide, e.g., if someone kills the Pope, Emperor, King, or Prince, on account of the same virtue of observance and piety to which it is opposed. - Lugo, d. 16, nn. 309-311.

Resp. To the second: Resp. In the negative, more probably, provided it has no relation to Confession. The reason is that the confessor from his office is bound only to right direction in the tribunal of penance; from this direction no spiritual relationship arises. Moreover no injury is done to the sacrament through this sin, since it has no respect to Confession. Nevertheless it is easily evident that both a penitent of this kind must be entirely deterred from confessing further to that priest, and a confessor of this kind from admitting that penitent further to Confession. - Lugo, d. 16, n. 351 ff.; L., l. 3, n. 451.

Therefore a distinction must be made between the excellence and dignity of the person and his office. The circumstance of excellence and dignity of the person is of itself only aggravating, because from this no special virtue is gravely harmed. But the circumstance of office changes the species if the office induces a peculiar obligation of procuring the spiritual good of another. "For a Bishop, e.g., or a parish priest, from his own office, is pastor and physician of his subjects, and therefore is specially bound to impede their sins and to procure their salvation. Therefore they sin against the duty of their office if they positively attempt to stain those souls for whom they ought specially to watch. This sin not only pertains to the species of scandal, but is also specially against the duty of satisfying the proper office of Bishop or pastor, etc.... On the contrary, this malice is not found in any confessor whatever. For although in the very act of Confession he is pastor and physician, and has a peculiar obligation of governing and caring for the penitent, afterward, however, one who from office does not have that duty does not retain some peculiar obligation by this alone, that he once heard that person's Confession.... This could more easily be conceded in one who, although he is not parish priest or prelate, has nevertheless been specially chosen and assumed by the penitent himself as spiritual father by whom he is governed, which duty he has habitually accepted and retains, and therefore from the habitual duty itself seems to be obliged at least to moderate diligence concerning the salvation of his client, and much more to not positively bring upon him so grave a danger of eternal damnation." Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, nn. 356-358, 179-181; L., l. 1, n. 451; Elbel, de Act. hum., n. 97.

Must the circumstance of sacred time necessarily be accused? - Resp. In the negative. This is evident from the universal practice both of confessors and of penitents; since it is established that neither are the former solicitous about questioning concerning such a circumstance, nor are the latter accustomed to declare it.

Therefore the circumstance of sacred time does not seem to have to be explained, unless certain things are specially prohibited on account of reverence for the time, e.g., lest someone on Good Friday exhibit public games, comedies, or theatrical spectacles. - Lugo, d. 16, n. 520; L., l. 3, n. 273.

Does one satisfy the integrity of Confession who accuses a recent sin as if committed formerly? - "Resp. 1. In the affirmative, of itself, because the circumstance of time by no means pertains to Confession. Hence a penitent satisfies the obligation of Confession who mixes new sins with old ones, or who, making a general Confession, does not distinguish from the others mortal sins committed since the last Confession, even if he does this intentionally to cover the time at which he committed the sins. - 2. But if the penitent lies about the time, e.g., if he denies that he sinned today and declares the sin as if committed at another determined and remote time, the doctors more commonly think that he does not satisfy his obligation. The reason is that the act which the penitent placed today is not an act placed in the preceding year. Hence he lies in two ways, namely by concealing the sin committed today and by accusing a sin committed at another time. Thus Tamburini, l. c. - Nevertheless there are not lacking theologians who think this lie light." Thus Fr. Gury, 488. - The reason which is adduced for the second case does not exceed mere probability. And indeed it seems to prove too much; for then a lie about any accidental circumstance whatever would render Confession void. Moreover Gury himself in the first case says: "The circumstance of time by no means pertains to Confession." And rightly indeed: for the intrinsic substance of sin, which pertains to Confession, is one thing; the extrinsic accident of sin, which of itself is irrelevant to Confession, is another. Hence the aforesaid reason, insofar as it is urged for denying the sufficiency of that Confession, Lugo himself, d. 16, n. 53, calls merely probable. - Baller., ibid.; D'Annibale, ed. 3, p. 3, n. 309; Lugo, d. 16, s. 2, § 1.

Busembaum apud St. Alphonsus, 425, also affirms it as probable, "unless some circumstance, e.g., changing the species, or reservation of the case, or proximate occasion of sinning, requires otherwise, and sufficient penance is imposed." And St. Alphonsus himself implicitly affirms the same, H. A., tr. 16, n. 4.

Is it always a mortal sin to lie in Confession? - Of itself one sins mortally only when the lie concerns necessary matter of Confession concealed without a just cause, or grave matter falsely supposed, namely by accusing a grave sin not committed. Therefore a lie about matters not pertaining to Confession or to the conscience of the penitent is not of itself mortal, because it is neither gravely harmful to the penitent, as is supposed, nor gravely injurious to the sacrament, since it is not referred to it. "Hence the denial of a venial sin committed, or of a mortal sin already confessed, does not exceed the malice of a simple lie," L. 496, and therefore of itself is neither mortal nor invalidates the sacrament.

Of itself: for "it is sacrilege and the absolution is null... if you deny or lie about sins otherwise duly absolved, when the confessor, as judge or physician, asks something about them as necessary for the present Confession, Lugo, d. 14, s. 10; Tamb., l. 2, c. 10, § 2; otherwise, if it does not concern the present Confession." - "If someone affirms a mortal sin which he did not do, or denies having done what he did, he commits a twofold mortal sin: one of sacrilege against the virtue of religion because of the reverence due to the sacrament, the other of a lie gravely pernicious to himself against the virtue of truthfulness." L. 495-497; H. A. 28; Lugo, d. 16, s. 2, § 6.

Is the penitent bound to unfold the whole Confession again if he notices that the confessor, because of sleep or distraction, did not perceive some sins and he does not know which ones; or did not judge rightly about them? - Resp. To the first: In the affirmative, if the Confession was brief, because he can prudently doubt about each one whether it was understood by the confessor or not. But otherwise if the Confession was lengthy and only a few things seem not to have been perceived; because then he can presume that each thing was understood, nor does it appear likely that Christ imposed the precept of integrity with so great a burden. If, however, the doubt concerned only one or another sin, that would have to be repeated. But the Confession will be invalid if the confessor understood no sin, whether because of sleep, or because of deafness or distraction.

Resp. To the second: "Salmanticenses, etc., teach that a Confession made in good faith to a confessor who does not know how to discern species and number, nor between mortal and venial, even in obvious cases, is not to be repeated. The reason is that... absolution is valid when on both sides the things required for the validity of the sacrament already concur. For thus one must judge that Christ the Lord instituted this sacrament, since such defects happen everywhere. Nevertheless I say this must be understood unless it is established that the number or species were not explained; otherwise the integrity of Confession must certainly be supplied." L. 500. In good faith, because if in bad faith, when the penitent knows that the confessor is of insufficient knowledge, or when he clearly sees that the confessor does not perceive the gravity of his sin, the Confession is to be repeated. For a sin which the confessor did not hear, or did not understand, and consequently about which he did not pronounce sacramental judgment, cannot be remitted by the power of the keys. - L. 198-499.

Are there sometimes causes excusing from the integrity of Confession? - Resp. In the affirmative, because sometimes that integrity is physically or morally impossible.

In order that someone be judged excused from the integrity of Confession by reason of moral impotence, although sins occur to the mind, these conditions are to be observed: 1. That only those sins be omitted which cannot be declared, or from whose manifestation there would follow a most grave extrinsic inconvenience, whether spiritual or temporal, either to the penitent, or to the confessor, or to some third person. 2. That another confessor cannot be found to whom an integral Confession may be made without such inconvenience. 3. That Confession is here and now necessary. From the common opinion of the doctors, this necessity is judged to be present if the precept of annual Confession or Communion must be fulfilled; if the reception of the Eucharist or the celebration of Mass cannot be omitted without disgrace or scandal; if otherwise someone must long lack the benefit of the sacraments; indeed, as Suarez adds, de Poenit., d. 23, s. 2, n. 7, if someone otherwise would be deprived of the great utility which the sacrament of itself brings. Wherefore the penitent's fear suffices lest he remain in the state of mortal sin for one or another day.

But a difficulty intrinsic to Confession never excuses, however grave it may be. The reason is that Confession from its own nature is essentially laborious; and therefore, if a grave difficulty, e.g., great repugnance or shame or the loss of one's own reputation before the confessor, excused from integrity, the faithful would for the most part be excused from accusing mortal sins, and therefore the institution of the sacrament of penance would collapse for the greatest part. Besides, the Church could not reserve atrocious crimes, because it creates no light inconvenience for penitents.

When the cause excusing from material integrity ceases, the divine precept of confessing all omitted mortal sins urges again; for when an impediment occurs, the obligation of Confession does not cease simply, but is only suspended. Therefore, when the excusing cause ceases, the obligation of the law revives integrally; and since the precept of confession is not fixed to a time or to a circumstance, but affects the whole life, therefore sins not yet accused are afterward, if it can be done, necessarily to be accused. This is established besides from proposition 11 condemned by Alexander VII. - L. 487, 490; Lugo, d. 16, s. 13.

Resolutions: The following chiefly excuse from the integrity of Confession: 1. Extreme infirmity, i.e., when a dying person can express only one or another sin, or, already deprived of the use of the tongue, shows penance and asks absolution only by some sign. - 2. Defect of speech and hearing; thus mutes and deaf persons who cannot confess integrally by signs are exempted from integrity; likewise foreigners wholly or almost wholly ignorant of the language of the region in which they confess. - 3.

Defect of time, e.g., if soldiers must immediately proceed to battle. But the mere multitude of penitents does not excuse. - 4. Danger to the life of the penitent, confessor, or a third person, e.g., if enemies arrive, if many are in danger of shipwreck or contagion. - 5. Danger to reputation, e.g., if a priest soon about to celebrate, and needing general Confession, could not confess integrally without the bystanders suspecting the matter. - 6. Danger of revelation or violation of the seal, e.g., if a confessor cannot confess integrally without manifesting sins heard in Confession, or if the penitent, from a grave cause, fears that the confessor will break the law of the seal. - 7. Danger of scandal or fall, both on the part of the penitent and on the part of the confessor, e.g., if a woman certainly knew the very great frailty of the confessor. - 8. Another grave extrinsic harm, whether one's own or another's, whether spiritual or temporal, deservedly feared, e.g., in a scrupulous person who is perpetually distressed about forgotten sins. - L. 479, 488-494.

Is there an obligation of confessing a mortal sin which cannot be explained without manifestation of the accomplice? - "For explaining a venial sin, or a mortal sin otherwise confessed, it is not lawful to manifest the grave crime of another. But the penitent is bound, when he can conveniently do so, to seek another confessor to whom the person of the accomplice is unknown, so that his reputation may be preserved; nor does the opinion seem sufficiently probable... that this is only of counsel; for commonly they say that this is of precept." L. 489. - Therefore the proposed question regards only the case in which it is a question of necessary matter, and someone cannot conveniently go to another confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown. And for this case there are two opinions: one affirming that he is bound to confess the sin; the other affirming that he is bound to keep it silent until another confessor is found.

The reason of the second opinion, which Ballerinius apud Gury, 499, holds, is that the natural precept of preserving the neighbor's reputation must be preferred to the precept of preserving the integrity of Confession. The reason of the first opinion, which St. Alphonsus follows in the cited place, is "because the precept of confessing integrally must be observed whenever it can be observed licitly; but it can be observed sufficiently licitly in our case, since the manifestation of another's crime is not illicit when it is made from a reasonable cause, as St. Thomas teaches, 2. 2, q. 73, a. 2. Therefore it must be observed. And thus answer is made to the opposite reason of the contrary opinion." L., l. c.; Suarez, d. 34, ss. 1, 2; Lugo, d. 16, s. 7.

What are the causes excusing from seeking another confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown? - 1. If danger of death urges, or the precept of annual Confession; 2. if it is grave for the penitent to omit Confession or Communion; 3. if someone would open his conscience to another confessor only with difficulty; 4. if someone otherwise would have to remain in sin even for one day; 5. if someone otherwise would be deprived of the benefit of some extraordinary indulgence; 6. if, by going to the confessor to whom the accomplice is known, better direction and notably greater consolation would be had. - Hence by reason of seeking counsel, of lessening sorrow, etc., mothers and wives are often excused when they manifest to a confessor the sins of sons or husbands, although he knows them. For it would be too hard for those women to be bound to seek another confessor. But generally there is not held to be a grave obligation of going to another confessor for the purpose of hiding the accomplice, unless perhaps it is a question of a very grave crime. L. 490.

What is the necessity and utility of general Confession? - General Confession must be judged necessary whenever preceding confessions were morally certainly invalid or sacrilegious, either on the part of the penitent because of a defect of contrition or integrity, or on the part of a confessor lacking jurisdiction; but in other cases it can never be prescribed.

The reason for each is clear. - It can be advised when, although the invalidity of preceding confessions is not established, nevertheless grave doubt can be had about this. For then it is useful for removing anxieties of soul which harm both peace of conscience and the exercise of virtues. General Confession is to be permitted, or even prudently advised, although not necessary, when, the circumstances considered, the penitent is going to perceive notable spiritual fruit from it, e.g., by reason of humility, devotion, fervor, knowledge of himself, manifestation of conscience for more perfect direction, or greater purity of soul, for obtaining divine helps more efficaciously, etc.; because the confessor from charity ought to promote the greater spiritual good of the penitent when he easily can. - It is to be prohibited in other cases as useless, and even harmful, when other inconveniences besides loss of time are prudently to be feared, namely scruples, anxieties, disturbance of conscience, etc. For if so great a burden for confessor and penitent is not to be undertaken without hope of notable fruit, all the more not with fear of notable harm. - Benedict XIV, Constitution Apostolica Constitutio, June 26, 1749, §§ 16, 17; Lugo, d. 16, s. 15.

Resolutions: General Confession is easily to be permitted, indeed advised, in the principal epochs of the Christian life, namely before first Communion, before the choice or reception of a particular state of life, e.g., before priesthood, religious profession, or even before marriage; likewise when someone resolves to lead a more perfect life. Besides the Confession made at the time of first Communion, generally speaking, another general Confession of the whole life is easily to be permitted; but another would be conceded only with difficulty when the prior one was made rather accurately, in good faith and with good will, unless perhaps it was made already a long time before. - A partial general Confession is easily to be permitted to devout persons, namely of one year, or from the time of the last general Confession, according to the custom observed among many religious families. - General Confession is not to be permitted even in doubt about the validity of preceding Confessions where notable inconveniences of disturbance of conscience are to be feared from it, because grave and certain inconveniences are not to be undergone because of a doubtful obligation. - Regularly general Confession is not to be permitted to scrupulous or fearful persons, because if one is permitted, when this has been finished they will immediately wish to make another, and after the second, they will seek to undertake even a third by importunate prayers, with the greatest detriment to the soul. For experience establishes that often in these persons general Confession generates many more scruples than it destroys.

How is general Confession to be performed? - Supposing that the confessor prudently judges that there is place for making a general Confession, if the penitent is sufficiently instructed and desires himself to declare his sins, it is altogether better to hear him, without questioning, insofar as can be done. If he judges some questions necessary or opportune, let him ask them as often and then when there is need, lest afterward they fall from the mind. Nevertheless, here it must be noted that if the confessor patiently and attentively hears the penitent, both the confessor himself and the penitent will be freed from the burden of many questions; since often penitents, explaining other sins afterward, are accustomed to add circumstances necessary as regards sins previously stated, and which the confessor would have had to ask. - If the penitent either is not sufficiently instructed or desires to be helped by the work of the confessor, he will be able especially to ask these questions: 1. About past Confessions and Communions, whether and how often they were sacrilegious, so that it may be known whether the present general Confession is necessary or only useful. If it is only useful, then both confessor and penitent can be less solicitous about the integrity of Confession, since it is altogether free for the penitent to declare the sins he wishes. But if it is necessary, then the penitent will have to be heard, questioned, and helped with much greater diligence. 2. About his age, about the condition of marriage and office, for judging the number and species of sins. 3. About the general precepts of the Decalogue and of the Church, and about the special obligations of his own state, selecting questions concerning sins into which it is prudently judged the penitent could have fallen, his condition being attended to and the circumstances of the person considered. 4. Let this be added in the last place: whether the penitent has anything else to say about which he experiences remorse of conscience.