Antecedent and consequent passion

In theology concupiscence is used in two distinct senses. It frequently signifies the inclination to evil, which in human nature is a result of the fall of our first parents. In this sense it is called sin by the Apostle.¹ Without any moral or immoral implication the word is used here to denote any passion or any movement of the sensitive appetite towards its proper object. It comprehends, therefore, any movement of love, desire, or hatred, sorrow, anger, or delight.

Concupiscence is antecedent or consequent. The former precedes any action of the will, and so is involuntary. The latter is voluntary, either because it is deliberately and directly excited by the will, or at any rate willed in its cause.

¹ Trent, sess. 5, de pec. orig.

Antecedent concupiscence lessens the malice of an evil action which is done under its impulse. For concupiscence troubles the intellect, so that it cannot dispassionately weigh the moral quality of the object proposed to the will and the motives for rejecting it; moreover, concupiscence paints the object in more than naturally attractive colours, so that it exerts an undue influence on the will. Concupiscence thus disturbs the indifference of the will and renders the act which follows less voluntary and free. It is accordingly less imputable to the agent.

It sometimes happens that antecedent concupiscence renders the subsequent action involuntary, and so in no wise imputable, however wrong it may be. This will be the case when some sudden onslaught of passion deprives the agent of the use of reason and blindly impels him to evil. Strong passions, such as love or anger, especially in impressionable natures, sometimes produce this result, and even when murder or suicide is committed in such circumstances juries are warranted in bringing in a merciful verdict of murder or suicide while temporarily insane. If, however, the passion was not altogether antecedent, but in the early stages of its onslaught there was room for deliberation, the consequent evil will not be altogether involuntary; it will to some extent be voluntary in its cause at least.+

It used to bea matter of dispute among theologians whether a man could be insane and not responsible for his actions in some one category, while he retained his self-control in others. In our days it will hardly be disputed that monomania exists, and if it exists, as, for example, in the matter of intoxicating drink, the monomaniac will not be directly responsible for his actions done under the influence of his madness, although he may be responsible for them in their cause.” ¹ Similarly, those who suffer from illusions may be so demented on the particular point as not to be responsible for actions which they perform under the influence of their illusion. It is a question of fact when this is the case, a fact which it is difficult even for experts to determine.

Natural propensities to evil arising from hereditary taint or from temperament lessen the voluntariness of the action just as passion does, but they are not as a rule so strong as to make what in itself is mortally sinful only venial.

¹ St Thomas, 1-2, q. 77, a. 7, can. 2206.

Consequent concupiscence increases the malice of a bad action if it is wilfully excited, because the tendency of the will to evil is voluntarily made more intense. If the passion is voluntary only in its cause, it is rather a sign of the great intensity of the perverse will from which it flows, but which it does not cause.

11. The reason of the second part is that an act is less voluntary in the account of the free, the less dependence it has on the part of the free will and advertence on the part of reason. But when the preceding passion is more vehement, the less is the dependence of this consequent act upon the will freely determining itself and upon reason considering. For the free will, the more it finds the soul already inclined by passion, the less it itself influences the determination of the consequent act. Then, although passion cannot directly influence judgment, nevertheless it can indirectly influence it in three ways: 1.º through a certain distraction, for sense is less attentive to individual things when it attends to many; 2.º through a certain contrariety, insofar as it inclines to things contrary to that which ought to be judged, and the soul becomes weak and feeble; 3.º through bodily alteration, for it perverts the phantasy, which does not furnish itself for the right operations of the intellect, as is seen in the insane and the furious from the vehemence of passions. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 7. ad 3., q. 10. a. 3., q. 73. a. 6. ad 2., q. 77. a. 1. 2. 3. 6. 7.; Suarez D. 3. S. 3. 4.

18. Hence it follows that sin is diminished the more, the more vehement the preceding passion is. “It must be said that it belongs to the account of sin that it be voluntary. But that is called voluntary whose principle is in the agent himself. And therefore the more the interior principle is increased, by so much also sin becomes graver; but the more the exterior principle is increased, by so much sin becomes lighter. But passion is a principle extrinsic to the will; but the motion of the will is an intrinsic principle. And therefore the stronger the motion of the will has been for sinning, by so much the sin is greater; but the stronger the passion has been impelling to sinning, by so much the sin becomes less.” St. Thomas, On Evil q. 3. a. 11. ad 3. Cf. n. 10. 11. 12.

85. Preliminary Note. Before the influence of passions upon voluntary acts is determined, it is useful to observe that passions can stand in two ways toward the will and reason: antecedently and consequently.¹⁰⁷ An antecedent passion arises from causes independent of the will, for example, from bodily disposition, from natural heredity, from sudden and unforeseen commotion, etc. But a consequent passion arises in two ways: a) By way of redundance; for when the will vehemently seeks something, motions arise at once in the sensitive appetite; "for the will cannot be moved intensely toward something without some passion being stirred up in the sensitive appetite";¹⁰⁸ for example, saints most intensely loving God have experienced ecstasies and other bodily changes; a bridegroom loving his bride more intensely feels carnal motions. - b) By way of election, when a man deliberately chooses to be affected by some passion, so that he may be able to act more promptly and fervently, the passion itself cooperating. For example, someone wishing to take vengeance upon his enemy first recalls to memory every injury endured, vividly presents to himself joy over the enemy humbled, and, to stimulate the blood more, drinks generous wine; by all these things a vehement passion of anger is produced by way of election. For this way of election there is not always required a positive act of the will, as in the example brought forward, but voluntary permission also suffices, as if a man voluntarily permits, for example, venereal delectation.

¹⁰⁷ S. theol. I-II, q. 24, a. 3 ad 1.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. q. 77, a. 6.

86. Principle 1. Antecedent passion diminishes the perfect and free voluntary;¹⁰⁹ indeed, if it is so vehement that it takes away the use of reason, it takes away every voluntary.

The reason is that antecedent passion in some measure clouds reason, vehemently impels toward action, and therefore in some measure diminishes the perfect and free voluntary, and consequently also sin. Hence sins which are committed under the influence of passion are (other things being equal) lesser and are customarily called sins of infirmity. - But if passion is so vehement that it absorbs the use of reason, it also destroys the voluntary. For where the use of reason is lacking, the voluntary also is lacking. In practice passion is rarely so vehement that it totally takes away the use of reason, unless, however, it arises from a diseased quality of the body.

¹⁰⁹ As is said more broadly below n. 89, concupiscence or desire of sensitive good does indeed increase the voluntary simply so called (because, assisting and impelling it, the will is borne with greater impetus toward the object), but diminishes the perfect and free voluntary, because it diminishes the indifference of the will. Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 6, a. 7, and Billuart, De act. hum. diss. 1, a. 8.

87. Principle 2. Consequent passion by way of election increases the voluntary.

The reason is obvious; for the will acting from consequent passion not only wills the act, but also commands the sensitive appetite to assist it in acting by means of the passion. But just as the will is more intense when it produces not only the internal act but also the external act, so also it is in this case.

88. Principle 3. Consequent passion by way of redundance does not indeed increase the voluntary, but is a sign of a more intense will.

The reason is again obvious; for if the act of the will is so vehement that it not only moves the soul but also overflows into the sensitive appetite, this surely shows that the object is sought most intensely.

The Angelic Doctor¹¹⁰ thus embraces the doctrine proposed in these principles: "The passions of the soul can stand in two ways toward the judgment of reason: in one way antecedently; and thus, since they cloud the judgment of reason, upon which the moral goodness of the act depends, they diminish the goodness of the act. For it is more praiseworthy that someone do a work of charity from the judgment of reason than from the passion of mercy alone. In another way they stand consequently, and this in two ways: in one way by way of redundance, because, namely, when the higher part of the soul is moved intensely toward something, the lower part also follows its motion; and thus passion existing consequently in the sensitive appetite is a sign of a more intense will; and thus it indicates a greater moral goodness. In another way by way of election, when, namely, a man from the judgment of reason chooses to be affected by some passion, so that he may act more promptly, the sensitive appetite cooperating; and thus passion of the soul adds to the goodness of the action." - The Code of Canon Law also introduced the same doctrine into canonical practice, establishing in c. 2206 concerning the influence of passion: "Passion, if it was voluntary and deliberately excited or nourished, rather increases the imputability of the action; otherwise it diminishes it more or less according to the diverse heat of the passion; and it entirely takes it away if it precedes and impedes every deliberation of the mind and consent of the will."

¹¹⁰ S. theol. I-II, q. 24, a. 3 ad 1; cf. q. 77, a. 6 and 8.

S. Th. I-II, q. 6, a. 7; q. 73, a. 6; q. 77, a. 5 and 7; q. 78, a. 2 and 4.

76. Concupiscence: 1) in the broadest sense is either a) habitual disorder, that is, the privation of rectitude left by original sin in the sensitive appetite, especially when it tends toward sensible good, and consequently in reason and will; or b) any passion or disordered movement of the appetite, preceding deliberation, especially when it tends toward evil or rises up against reason (a first-first movement);

2. In the strictest sense, it is the special passion by which the concupiscible appetite tends toward an absent sensible delectable good, and is opposed to fear, which is the movement of the appetite fleeing evil;

3. In a less strict sense, here it is taken not indeed for every passion, but for any affection or movement of the sensitive appetite or of the will tending toward a delectable good in order to pursue it.

1. Many modern authors think concupiscence is to be understood only as passion, and indeed every passion. Yet this is not true, for fear is also a passion, and St. Thomas teaches precisely the opposite about it and about concupiscence. They err because they confuse two very diverse questions: 1) whether any passion whatever (even fear) diminishes the free, concerning which we shall speak later, n. 93; 2) whether concupiscence diminishes the voluntary. In this question, concupiscence is understood not only as a movement of passion, but also of the will, as is clear from I-II, q. 73, a. 6, ad 2; and from II Sent. d. 22, q. 2, a. 2, ad 5.

By reason of the act of the deliberate will, concupiscence is antecedent, which (in the order of causality) precedes the free consent of the will and causes it: then something is done from concupiscence, as when, having seen a beautiful woman, lust draws the will so that it takes delight in her. And it is consequent, which (in the order of causality) follows the free consent of the will and proceeds from it, as if one, willing to sin with a woman, excites concupiscence for perpetrating the sin: then something is done with concupiscence. It is plain that consequent concupiscence, since it follows upon the voluntary, in no way impedes it nor causes the involuntary, but is only a sign and effect of the voluntary. Therefore the question concerns only antecedent concupiscence, how it is related to the voluntary and involuntary.

77. Principle I. Antecedent concupiscence causes the voluntary rather than the involuntary. - For something is called voluntary from the fact that the will is borne toward it. But by concupiscence the will is inclined to willing that which it desires. Therefore concupiscence rather makes toward this, that something be voluntary, than involuntary.

Therefore, unlike fear, concupiscence per se never makes the involuntary simply or in a certain respect, because in him who acts from fear there remains a prior will repugnant to that which he does, but in him who acts from concupiscence there does not remain a prior will which was rejecting that which he desires; and therefore the concupiscent person acts against what he was willing, while the fearful person acts against what even now, according to itself, he wills. Yet concupiscence makes the involuntary by accident when some evil is joined to the object which is desired, for example when a lustful man is at the same time avaricious and wills fornication, for procuring which he must spend money.

78. Principle II. Antecedent concupiscence increases the voluntary, diminishes the freely voluntary; whence that which is done from concupiscence is more voluntary, less free. - For such concupiscence:

1. Ballerini and his disciples, such as Bucceroni, Genicot, and Noldin, on account of the confusion spoken of in the preceding note, teach that antecedent concupiscence simply diminishes the voluntary, and not only under the aspect of freedom. Yet they do not speak rightly in this way. Whence Schmitt, in the more recent editions of Noldin's work, I, n. 53, corrected this somewhat, writing: antecedent concupiscence diminishes freedom. And Salsmans, in the very recent edition of Genicot's work, changed one word, and in place of concupiscence put passion; but for that reason the doctrine is not more adequate nor less ambiguous.

1. Always increases the improperly so called voluntary, because concupiscence itself, as an indeliberate movement of the appetite, is voluntary in this way from its nature.

2. Generally it increases the properly so called voluntary as to inclination or propensity, because our will is borne more into the object which we desire, since the intellect proposes it as more desirable and to be pursued with greater efficacy; nevertheless it diminishes it as to the indifference of judgment and therefore as to deliberation. For it makes the intellect perceive less the reason of evil in the object and propose it as more lovable; hence it also diminishes freedom, and consequently the goodness of the act and the sin.

3. Sometimes, if it is very vehement, it takes away knowledge and deliberation and the use of reason, and therefore the properly so called voluntary and the free; yet it does not make the involuntary: for in him who does not use reason, there is neither the properly voluntary nor the involuntary.

79. Observation. - Consequent concupiscence in no way diminishes the voluntary properly so called, nor the free, nor consequently goodness or sin, because it itself is the effect of the free will. Whence what is done with concupiscence is not less voluntary nor free. Nevertheless it can diminish deliberation and freedom as to the act following from it; but as to that act it is antecedent.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 77; q. 9, a. 2; De Malo, q. 3, a. 9, 10, 11.

467. On the part of the sensitive appetite the cause of sin is passion, by which man is moved toward a sensible good or is drawn back from a sensible evil, against the good or order of reason. But since passions are certain sicknesses of the soul, which weaken and impede the use of reason and of the will, the sins which proceed from them are commonly called sins of infirmity (Rom. VII, 23; James I, 14).

468. Passion cannot directly draw or move the will, but only indirectly. And indeed:

1. on the part of the subject, by a certain subtraction, by distracting power from the will: for since all the powers proceed from the soul as from one root, it follows a) that the intense exercise of one potency diminishes the force of acting in the others, and b) that man, while he attends vehemently to one thing, is less attentive to other things. Hence the more intensely the sensitive appetite acts, the more remiss the force of the will becomes, or the motion of the will is impeded;¹

¹ The argument concludes for the present state, for powers which need organs, because these, in the present state, lose their powers by exercise; it is not valid for powers which exercise themselves without an organ.

2. by contrariety, on the part of the object or good which reason apprehends, by inclining toward a good contrary to reason: a) for to a man in passion that appears good which does not appear so to him when existing outside passion, just as to one loving or angry there appears a good which does not appear to one who is quiet, and thus passion often tends into an object contrary to reason; moreover b) passion imports a vehement apprehension of the imagination, which reason needs in its exercise, and by which in the case it is inclined especially to consider and approve the object of passion and to judge it good. Hence it happens that the judgment of reason, and consequently the will, often follow passion and act otherwise than if passion were not present;²

² How passion can incline to sinning notwithstanding an opposed universal moral knowledge, St. Thomas indicates, a. 2, ad 4: "He who has knowledge in the universal, on account of passion is impeded lest he be able to take under that universal (proposition), and to arrive at the conclusion; but he takes under another universal, which the inclination of passion suggests, and under it concludes. Hence the Philosopher says, in VII Ethics, that the syllogism of the incontinent man has four propositions, two universal: of which one is of reason, for instance, that no fornication is to be committed, the other is of passion, for instance, that delight is to be pursued. Passion, therefore, binds reason lest it take and conclude under the first; hence while it lasts, it takes and concludes under the second." Cf. De Malo q. 3, a. 9, ad 7.

3. by bodily change, sometimes so transmuting the body that the imagination depends solely on the disposition of the body and is no longer ruled by reason; in this case it totally binds the cognition of reason and impedes its deliberation and use, and consequently sin: thus many, on account of the abundance of love and anger, have been turned into insanity.

469. Inordinate love of self is the cause of every sin. - For to love someone is to will good for him; but by sin someone inordinately wills good for himself; hence sin proceeds from this, that one inordinately loves himself.

But the good which man inordinately seeks for himself is threefold:

a) delectable goods according to touch or the sense of the flesh, which pertain to the conservation of the individual and of the species, and the inordinate appetite for these is the concupiscence of the flesh or natural concupiscence;

b) delectable goods according to the apprehension of the imagination, such as monies, external goods, splendor, pomp, adornment of garments, etc., and the inordinate appetite for these is the concupiscence of the eyes or the cupidity of those things which outwardly appear to the senses and, thus known, please;

c) finally, the inordinate appetite for a difficult or arduous good, and therefore an excellent one, is called pride of life, which is the appetite of excellence.

These three are the cause of all sins (I John II, 16); to these also can be reduced all passions which are the cause of sin: to the first two, all passions of the concupiscible appetite; to the third, all passions of the irascible appetite.

470. Principles. I. Passion which totally binds the use of reason impedes deliberation and liberty and therefore excuses from sin, unless it has been voluntarily contracted in its cause, for example, from drunkenness.

III. Consequent passion, as being voluntary and free, in no way excuses nor diminishes, but either is a sign of the magnitude of the sin, if it proceeds from it by redundancy, or increases it, if it is directly chosen and excited in order to sin more intensely; as was said in the treatise On Human Acts, n. 180.³

³ No concomitant passion is given, because no passion is related to an act of the will without influence.

By the name of concupiscence here there comes, not indeed that inborn tinder of depraved desires concerning which the Apostle complains, Rom. vii, 23, but a movement of the sensitive appetite, by which we tend toward a sensible good; or, as St. Thomas says after Damascene, 3, dist. 26, q. 1, art. 1: "a movement of the sensitive appetitive power which is from the imagination of good or evil."

But concupiscence so understood is distinguished as twofold, for one is antecedent, and another consequent. The former is that which, in the order of causality, precedes any deliberation or consent of the will, and allures and draws it to consenting. But the latter is that which, in the order of causality, follows an act of the will, either because a vehement movement of the will overflows into the lower appetite, or because the will directly and by design excites this appetite itself. That which is produced from mere overflowing is voluntary only in cause; that which is directly and by design excited is voluntary in itself. Cf. Baller., note (b), p. 14.

Antecedent concupiscence does not remove, but rather increases, the voluntary, insofar as by this name the inclination of the will is signified; but it diminishes, and even wholly removes it, insofar as the judgment of reason and the indifference of the will are signified. The reason for the first is that through concupiscence the will is inclined to willing that which it desires, and from another side the mind is not impeded from knowing at least the sensible qualities of the thing; indeed it is more occupied in considering them. Therefore the act proceeding from it is done through itself from a fuller and more intrinsic propensity of the will. But the reason for the second is that concupiscence turns the mind away from considering the inconveniences and defects of the object, and diminishes the indifference of the will. But when the passion is so great that it wholly removes the use of reason, as happens in those who are driven mad on account of love or anger, the act is indeliberate, and for that reason is rendered wholly involuntary. Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 6, art. 7; q. 73, art. 6; and q. 77, arts. 2, 6, and 7.

Consequent concupiscence neither increases nor diminishes the voluntary, but rather, as St. Thomas says, 1-2, q. 77, art. 6, "is a sign of its magnitude, insofar as it demonstrates the intensity of the will toward the act." The reason for the first is that the act of the rational will in that hypothesis precedes the movement of concupiscence, as a cause precedes an effect. Therefore the later disturbance of reason, which concupiscence induces, cannot affect the act which has already preceded, and therefore neither diminish nor increase the account of the voluntary. But the reason for the second is that, as St. Thomas has it, De Malo, q. 3, art. 11: "when from a strong movement of the will the sensitive appetite is moved to passion, passion adds merit or demerit, because it is a sign that the movement of the will is stronger; and in this way it is true that he who gives alms with greater compassion merits more, and he who sins with greater lust sins more, because this is a sign that the movement of the will is stronger."

You Will Resolve. 1st. Antecedent concupiscence diminishes the merit or demerit of an act; for it diminishes the free element, from which an act has that it is worthy of praise or blame, capable of merit or demerit.

2nd. Consequent concupiscence contributes nothing through itself and formally to the moral goodness or malice, merit or demerit, of an act, but rather takes on the morality, merit, or demerit of this act; although, as has been said, it is a sign and indication of greater or lesser merit or demerit.

3rd. Concupiscence which so follows an act of the will that it has been excited and willed is good and praiseworthy in itself, if it is not inordinate or immoderate, and is referred to an honest end. Cf. Suarez, in 1-2, tract. 2, disp. 3, sect. 3, n. 1.

Note. - Concerning concupiscence, insofar as it is the tinder of depraved desires and inclines the will to sin, we shall treat below, where we treat of sins.