Article III: On Concupiscence

S. Th. I-II, q. 6, a. 7; q. 73, a. 6; q. 77, a. 5 and 7; q. 78, a. 2 and 4.

76. Concupiscence: 1) in the broadest sense is either a) habitual disorder, that is, the privation of rectitude left by original sin in the sensitive appetite, especially when it tends toward sensible good, and consequently in reason and will; or b) any passion or disordered movement of the appetite, preceding deliberation, especially when it tends toward evil or rises up against reason (a first-first movement);

2. In the strictest sense, it is the special passion by which the concupiscible appetite tends toward an absent sensible delectable good, and is opposed to fear, which is the movement of the appetite fleeing evil;

3. In a less strict sense, here it is taken not indeed for every passion, but for any affection or movement of the sensitive appetite or of the will tending toward a delectable good in order to pursue it.

1. Many modern authors think concupiscence is to be understood only as passion, and indeed every passion. Yet this is not true, for fear is also a passion, and St. Thomas teaches precisely the opposite about it and about concupiscence. They err because they confuse two very diverse questions: 1) whether any passion whatever (even fear) diminishes the free, concerning which we shall speak later, n. 93; 2) whether concupiscence diminishes the voluntary. In this question, concupiscence is understood not only as a movement of passion, but also of the will, as is clear from I-II, q. 73, a. 6, ad 2; and from II Sent. d. 22, q. 2, a. 2, ad 5.

By reason of the act of the deliberate will, concupiscence is antecedent, which (in the order of causality) precedes the free consent of the will and causes it: then something is done from concupiscence, as when, having seen a beautiful woman, lust draws the will so that it takes delight in her. And it is consequent, which (in the order of causality) follows the free consent of the will and proceeds from it, as if one, willing to sin with a woman, excites concupiscence for perpetrating the sin: then something is done with concupiscence. It is plain that consequent concupiscence, since it follows upon the voluntary, in no way impedes it nor causes the involuntary, but is only a sign and effect of the voluntary. Therefore the question concerns only antecedent concupiscence, how it is related to the voluntary and involuntary.

77. Principle I. Antecedent concupiscence causes the voluntary rather than the involuntary. - For something is called voluntary from the fact that the will is borne toward it. But by concupiscence the will is inclined to willing that which it desires. Therefore concupiscence rather makes toward this, that something be voluntary, than involuntary.

Therefore, unlike fear, concupiscence per se never makes the involuntary simply or in a certain respect, because in him who acts from fear there remains a prior will repugnant to that which he does, but in him who acts from concupiscence there does not remain a prior will which was rejecting that which he desires; and therefore the concupiscent person acts against what he was willing, while the fearful person acts against what even now, according to itself, he wills. Yet concupiscence makes the involuntary by accident when some evil is joined to the object which is desired, for example when a lustful man is at the same time avaricious and wills fornication, for procuring which he must spend money.

78. Principle II. Antecedent concupiscence increases the voluntary, diminishes the freely voluntary; whence that which is done from concupiscence is more voluntary, less free. - For such concupiscence:

1. Ballerini and his disciples, such as Bucceroni, Genicot, and Noldin, on account of the confusion spoken of in the preceding note, teach that antecedent concupiscence simply diminishes the voluntary, and not only under the aspect of freedom. Yet they do not speak rightly in this way. Whence Schmitt, in the more recent editions of Noldin's work, I, n. 53, corrected this somewhat, writing: antecedent concupiscence diminishes freedom. And Salsmans, in the very recent edition of Genicot's work, changed one word, and in place of concupiscence put passion; but for that reason the doctrine is not more adequate nor less ambiguous.

1. Always increases the improperly so called voluntary, because concupiscence itself, as an indeliberate movement of the appetite, is voluntary in this way from its nature.

2. Generally it increases the properly so called voluntary as to inclination or propensity, because our will is borne more into the object which we desire, since the intellect proposes it as more desirable and to be pursued with greater efficacy; nevertheless it diminishes it as to the indifference of judgment and therefore as to deliberation. For it makes the intellect perceive less the reason of evil in the object and propose it as more lovable; hence it also diminishes freedom, and consequently the goodness of the act and the sin.

3. Sometimes, if it is very vehement, it takes away knowledge and deliberation and the use of reason, and therefore the properly so called voluntary and the free; yet it does not make the involuntary: for in him who does not use reason, there is neither the properly voluntary nor the involuntary.

79. Observation. - Consequent concupiscence in no way diminishes the voluntary properly so called, nor the free, nor consequently goodness or sin, because it itself is the effect of the free will. Whence what is done with concupiscence is not less voluntary nor free. Nevertheless it can diminish deliberation and freedom as to the act following from it; but as to that act it is antecedent.