3. On Passion or Concupiscence

72. Notion. Passion can be taken in diverse ways.⁷⁵ For our purpose it is enough to indicate two acceptations:

1. According to Aristotle, passion is a motion of the sensitive appetite arising from the imagination of good or evil with a bodily transmutation. It is called a) motion, that is, act or operation, because in the Aristotelian sense passions are not habits, but commotions or acts, which nevertheless are called passions because they are produced by imagination and bring in bodily disturbances,⁷⁶ as will be said at once. It is called b) of the sensitive appetite, because neither the intellect nor the will properly elicits these acts, but the appetite, either concupiscible or irascible. It is called c) from the imagination of good or evil, because passions arise through some good or evil object vividly represented by the imagination. It is called d) with a bodily transmutation; Aristotle adds: "especially about the heart," because passions are vehement bodily commotions, which are especially felt in the heart: palpitations of the heart, a swifter flow and reflux of the blood, heat or cold, etc. For experience establishes that a man under the influence of passion has most intense bodily commotions. - Passions accepted in this Aristotelian sense are purely sensitive acts (Regungen des sinnlichen Strebevermögens, Gemütsbewegungen, émotions); they are neither good nor evil and are found in every man.⁷⁷ Therefore even in Christ there were passions, who said: "My soul is sorrowful even unto death,"⁷⁸ and of whom the evangelist narrates: "He looked round about with anger."⁷⁹ Passions can be very useful in performing arduous acts; hence the zeal and indignation of Phinees is praised.⁸⁰

2. According to the Stoics, Plato, and the common usage of modern authors, passions are disordered acts or habits of the sensitive appetite. Hence they are called diseases of the soul and entice men to many sins.⁸¹ Such passions would better be called vices;⁸² thus, for example, excessive love of riches is called avarice, excessive inclination to anger is called irascibility.

Concupiscence is taken in a threefold sense: 1. insofar as it is a special passion, namely, desire; 2. insofar as it is the same as passion in general; in this second sense we speak here of concupiscence; 3. insofar as it is the depraved inclination of the appetite (inferior and superior) vitiated by original sin. In this sense St. Paul says: "Sin (original) wrought in me all concupiscence" (Rom. 7:8). St. James (1:14) says: "Every one is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured."

⁷⁵ Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 22, a. 1.

⁷⁶ Hence St. Augustine (De civ. Dei 9, 4) says: "The motions of the soul which the Greeks call πάθη, but among us some, as Cicero, call disturbances; some, affections or affects; but some, as is held in the Greek, more expressively call passions." Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 22, a. 2.

⁷⁷ S. theol. I-II, q. 24, a. 1.

⁷⁸ Mark 14:34.

⁷⁹ Mark 3:5.

⁸⁰ Num. 25:7 sqq.

⁸¹ Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 24, a. 3.

⁸² S. theol. I-II, q. 45, a. 1 ad 1.

73. Divisions. Following Aristotle,⁸³ St. Thomas⁸⁴ distinguishes eleven passions, of which six pertain to the concupiscible appetite and five to the irascible appetite.

Since all the passions are motions, as was said above, they vividly seek or flee either good or evil; and this motion is signified by the small arrows here placed next to each passion.

A few things must be said about each:

⁸³ Ethic. Nicom. l. 2, c. 5.

⁸⁴ S. theol. I-II, q. 23, a. 4.

⁸⁵ By Plato, Aristotle, and the scholastics two powers were distinguished in the sensitive appetite, namely, the concupiscible (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν), whose object is sensible good or evil taken simply; and the irascible (τὸ θυμοειδές), whose object is good or evil insofar as it is arduous. Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 23, a. 1.

74. 1. Love (insofar as it is a passion, but not insofar as it is an act of the will or a virtue) is the first propensity or inclination toward good according to itself, abstracting from whether it is present or absent; or it is mere complacency in good represented by the imagination. Hence it is briefly defined by the Angelic Doctor⁸⁶ as "complacency in the appetible" (Wohlgefallen). For the appetible effects a threefold immutation in the appetitive power: first, it causes in it a certain complacency of good, which is love itself strictly taken; second, it causes motion toward obtaining this good, which is desire; third, rest in the possessed good, which is joy or delectation.⁸⁷ Love, therefore, is the father of all the other passions, just as the desire for happiness in general is the father of all human acts. Wherefore St. Thomas⁸⁸ says: "From love are caused both desire, and sadness, and delectation, and consequently all the other passions; whence every action which proceeds from any passion whatever also proceeds from love as from a first cause." The passion of love can be concerned with any sensitive good whatever. Thus, for example, there is given love of riches, of carnal delectation, etc. And this passion of love, if it is well ordered, offers to the soul the best and strongest assistance; but if it is disordered, it also produces the worst effects and utterly reduces the soul into servitude. There will be discussion below about the causes of love and its effects in the treatise on charity. Hatred is opposed to love.

⁸⁶ Ibid. q. 26, a. 2.

⁸⁷ S. theol. I-II, q. 25, a. 2 and q. 26, a. 2.

⁸⁸ Ibid. q. 28, a. 6 ad 2.

75. 2. Hatred, insofar as it is a passion, is an aversion from evil, as from something unfitting and harmful (Mißfallen). Hatred is a very vivid passion and is vehemently felt,⁸⁹ and if it is well regulated it assists the soul excellently, because it makes a man abhor every true evil with all his strength; but if this passion is inordinate, it brings forth every wicked crime. For as love is strong as death, so hatred is hard as hell. There will be discussion of depraved hatred when sins against charity and disordered vengeance are treated.

⁸⁹ Ibid. q. 29, a. 3.

76. 3. Desire is a tendency toward absent good. Wherefore it differs both from delectation, which is about present good, and from love, which is about good according to itself, as it abstracts from present or absent.⁹⁰ St. Thomas does not name this passion desire, but concupiscence;⁹¹ modern authors, however, under the name concupiscence are accustomed to understand the whole appetite corrupted through original sin, as has already been said.

⁹⁰ Ibid. q. 30, a. 2.

⁹¹ Ibid. q. 31, a. 3 ad 2.

77. 4. Flight, which is also called horror (Abscheu, Schauder), is aversion and withdrawal from future evil. For example, bodily punishments are imminent for a boy, and he immediately flees them. If someone abhors almost every bodily fatigue and every strong exertion in the exercise of religion and the labors of his state, this flight is an inordinate passion easily inducing the capital sin of sloth or acedia.

78. 5. Delectation (Lust), as it is taken here, is the rest of the appetite in sensible good possessed and present. But rest here is not understood privatively, or as a mere cessation from work, but positively, or as that pleasant sensation which is had if the good loved and desired has finally at some time been obtained. Delectation is not the same as joy, but extends more broadly than it. For delectation is concerned with objects both sensible and spiritual; but joy is rather concerning a spiritual object, and therefore is not found in brutes, which nevertheless are capable of delectation. Indeed delectation and joy can be opposed according to diverse respects. "For sometimes someone feels delectation according to the body, concerning which, however, he does not rejoice according to reason."⁹² The passion of delectation is very easily disfigured by disorder and induces to very many sins; for inordinate sensible delectations are most frequent and most vehement. But well-ordered delectation contributes much both to working strenuously and to bravely overcoming all onrushing evils or at least tolerating them.⁹³ Sadness is opposed to delectation.

⁹² Ibid. I-II, q. 31, a. 3.

⁹³ Ibid. q. 33, a. 4.

79. 6. Sadness (Trauer) is an affection caused in the sensitive appetite from the apprehension of present evil. Therefore the passion of sadness is a certain internal pain and is rarely good, unless it lasts briefly. For sadness lasting a long time is accustomed to have the worst effects: it renders a man, as they say, apathetic and unfit for strenuous labor, it weighs down the soul, impedes the motions of the soul and even, sometimes, the motions of the body, and often harms bodily health.⁹⁴ But if sadness lasts briefly, it is excellent; for it restrains a man from inordinate concupiscence and delectation. -

What St. Thomas discusses about the remedies of sadness⁹⁵ is conformable to experience and worthy of note. The Angelic Doctor assigns as efficacious remedies against sadness: 1) fitting delectations, 2) weeping, sighs, and other outward signs of sadness; for interior pain is diminished when it is poured forth outwardly, 3) the compassion of friends, 4) contemplation of truth, 5) sleep and baths.

These six passions are in the concupiscible appetite; but in the irascible appetite are found five passions, which regard good and evil not simply, but as arduous, which we are able to attain not without strenuous appetite, once difficulties have been overcome.

⁹⁴ Ibid. q. 37, a. 1-4.

⁹⁵ S. theol. q. 38, a. 1-5.

80. 1. Hope is a tendency toward future good, difficult and arduous, yet possible of attainment. St. Thomas⁹⁶ briefly assigns the difference between hope and the other passions: "Concerning the object of hope four conditions are considered: first, indeed, that it be good; for properly speaking there is no hope except concerning good; and through this hope differs from fear, which is concerning evil; second, that it be future; for hope is not concerning a present good already had; and through this hope differs from joy, which is concerning present good; third, it is required that it be something arduous, attainable with difficulty; for one is not said to hope for some very small thing which is at once in his power to have; and through this hope differs from desire⁹⁷ or cupidity, which is concerning future good absolutely; whence it pertains to the concupiscible appetite, but hope to the irascible; fourth, that that arduous thing be possible of attainment; for no one hopes for that which he is altogether unable to attain; and according to this hope differs from desperation." - Hope is ordinarily a good passion, which assists our operations much; for it causes a certain delectation and sharpens our powers.⁹⁸ Desperation is opposed to hope.

⁹⁶ Ibid. q. 40, a. 1.

⁹⁷ Suarez (De passion. disp. 1, sect. 8) thinks that hope and desire do not differ except accidentally; the opinion of St. Thomas is truer.

⁹⁸ S. theol. I-II, q. 40, a. 8.

81. 2. Desperation is a motion of the sensitive appetite withdrawing from an arduous good which appears impossible of attainment. Thus, for example, a sick man, knowing that the illness is incurable, despairs of recovering health. Desperation is a very dangerous passion and causes many evils. There will be discussion below, n. 548, about desperation insofar as it is a sin against the theological virtue of hope. As man can sin by defect, so also by exaggeration of hope. St. Thomas⁹⁹ aptly notes that in youths and in drunkards and others who do not use great deliberation, hope not rarely abounds, because, when difficulties have not been sufficiently considered, they easily judge themselves able to attain what they will.

⁹⁹ Ibid. a. 6.

82. 3. Daring is an act rising up against a terrible evil, present, for the sake of overcoming it. Daring is not indeed a part of hope, but its effect,¹⁰⁰ and it increases and decreases with it. Sometimes daring arises from a bodily disposition; wherefore St. Thomas, citing Aristotle, says:¹⁰¹ "Those who have a small heart according to quantity are more daring; and animals having a large heart according to quantity are timid, because the natural heat cannot warm a large heart as much as a small one.... Those having a blood-filled lung are more daring because of the heat of the heart consequently arising from it.... Lovers of wine are more daring because of the heat of wine."

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. q. 45, a. 2 ad 3.

¹⁰¹ Ibid. a. 3.

83. 4. Fear is a motion of the sensitive appetite following upon the apprehension of a future difficult evil which cannot be resisted; or more briefly: it is the dejection of a mind conquered by the gravity of danger. Fear is accustomed to effect great bodily changes, for example, pallor of the face, trembling of the voice and limbs, erection of the hairs, dryness of the throat, indeed sometimes sudden canities, disturbance of the mind, and death. Several species of fear are assigned, for example, blushing and shame, bashfulness, stupor, etc.¹⁰² Moderate fear is very good and leads to true humility; excessive fear can cause desperation and impedes man from performing great works. Those things which were said above concerning fear in order to its influence upon the voluntary can also be applied to the passion of fear (at least in some measure).

¹⁰² Ibid. q. 41, a. 4.

84. 5. Anger is an appetite of vengeance with a heat of blood around the heart. Anger differs from hatred. For he who hates wills evil to another as such, but an angry man wills evil to another in vengeance for an injury received.¹⁰³ Hatred of neighbor, that is, hatred of enmity, is never licit, since it is directly opposed to the virtue of charity;¹⁰⁴ but anger is sometimes licit, namely, when it is an appetite of just vengeance. Likewise hatred, insofar as it is a passion, can be licit, namely, if it is an ordered aversion from a true harmful evil. - Contemptuous estimation and despising are the principal motives of anger;¹⁰⁵ for a man is accustomed to be very angry when his neighbor knowingly and deliberately offends him, since this arises from contemptuous estimation and despising; on the contrary, he more easily forgives an offense done from inadvertence or from a passing passion. Anger can produce baneful effects in the body and also disturb the soul. On this matter St. Gregory says:¹⁰⁶ "The heart inflamed by the goads of its anger palpitates, the body trembles, the tongue trips itself, the face grows fiery, the eyes are made fierce, and known persons are not recognized at all; with the mouth indeed it forms a cry, but the sense does not know what it is saying." Anger is the most vehement passion, and therefore greatly needs the direction of reason. - Anger does not have an opposed passion as do the other passions enumerated up to this point. For the object of anger is a present arduous evil. Therefore the opposed passion would have to be concerned with a present arduous good. But a present good cannot be arduous, and therefore no passion can be concerned with it.

These are all the passions enumerated by the Angelic Doctor. But if modern authors add other passions, those are either not true passions or are reduced to the eleven enumerated.

Influence of Passions upon the Voluntary

¹⁰³ Ibid. q. 46, a. 6.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. below n. 564.

¹⁰⁵ S. theol. I-II, q. 47, a. 2.

¹⁰⁶ Lib. Moralium 5, 45. - Below in the treatise on the capital vices there will be discussion of anger and its remedies.

85. Preliminary Note. Before the influence of passions upon voluntary acts is determined, it is useful to observe that passions can stand in two ways toward the will and reason: antecedently and consequently.¹⁰⁷ An antecedent passion arises from causes independent of the will, for example, from bodily disposition, from natural heredity, from sudden and unforeseen commotion, etc. But a consequent passion arises in two ways: a) By way of redundance; for when the will vehemently seeks something, motions arise at once in the sensitive appetite; "for the will cannot be moved intensely toward something without some passion being stirred up in the sensitive appetite";¹⁰⁸ for example, saints most intensely loving God have experienced ecstasies and other bodily changes; a bridegroom loving his bride more intensely feels carnal motions. - b) By way of election, when a man deliberately chooses to be affected by some passion, so that he may be able to act more promptly and fervently, the passion itself cooperating. For example, someone wishing to take vengeance upon his enemy first recalls to memory every injury endured, vividly presents to himself joy over the enemy humbled, and, to stimulate the blood more, drinks generous wine; by all these things a vehement passion of anger is produced by way of election. For this way of election there is not always required a positive act of the will, as in the example brought forward, but voluntary permission also suffices, as if a man voluntarily permits, for example, venereal delectation.

¹⁰⁷ S. theol. I-II, q. 24, a. 3 ad 1.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. q. 77, a. 6.

86. Principle 1. Antecedent passion diminishes the perfect and free voluntary;¹⁰⁹ indeed, if it is so vehement that it takes away the use of reason, it takes away every voluntary.

The reason is that antecedent passion in some measure clouds reason, vehemently impels toward action, and therefore in some measure diminishes the perfect and free voluntary, and consequently also sin. Hence sins which are committed under the influence of passion are (other things being equal) lesser and are customarily called sins of infirmity. - But if passion is so vehement that it absorbs the use of reason, it also destroys the voluntary. For where the use of reason is lacking, the voluntary also is lacking. In practice passion is rarely so vehement that it totally takes away the use of reason, unless, however, it arises from a diseased quality of the body.

¹⁰⁹ As is said more broadly below n. 89, concupiscence or desire of sensitive good does indeed increase the voluntary simply so called (because, assisting and impelling it, the will is borne with greater impetus toward the object), but diminishes the perfect and free voluntary, because it diminishes the indifference of the will. Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 6, a. 7, and Billuart, De act. hum. diss. 1, a. 8.

87. Principle 2. Consequent passion by way of election increases the voluntary.

The reason is obvious; for the will acting from consequent passion not only wills the act, but also commands the sensitive appetite to assist it in acting by means of the passion. But just as the will is more intense when it produces not only the internal act but also the external act, so also it is in this case.

88. Principle 3. Consequent passion by way of redundance does not indeed increase the voluntary, but is a sign of a more intense will.

The reason is again obvious; for if the act of the will is so vehement that it not only moves the soul but also overflows into the sensitive appetite, this surely shows that the object is sought most intensely.

The Angelic Doctor¹¹⁰ thus embraces the doctrine proposed in these principles: "The passions of the soul can stand in two ways toward the judgment of reason: in one way antecedently; and thus, since they cloud the judgment of reason, upon which the moral goodness of the act depends, they diminish the goodness of the act. For it is more praiseworthy that someone do a work of charity from the judgment of reason than from the passion of mercy alone. In another way they stand consequently, and this in two ways: in one way by way of redundance, because, namely, when the higher part of the soul is moved intensely toward something, the lower part also follows its motion; and thus passion existing consequently in the sensitive appetite is a sign of a more intense will; and thus it indicates a greater moral goodness. In another way by way of election, when, namely, a man from the judgment of reason chooses to be affected by some passion, so that he may act more promptly, the sensitive appetite cooperating; and thus passion of the soul adds to the goodness of the action." - The Code of Canon Law also introduced the same doctrine into canonical practice, establishing in c. 2206 concerning the influence of passion: "Passion, if it was voluntary and deliberately excited or nourished, rather increases the imputability of the action; otherwise it diminishes it more or less according to the diverse heat of the passion; and it entirely takes it away if it precedes and impedes every deliberation of the mind and consent of the will."

¹¹⁰ S. theol. I-II, q. 24, a. 3 ad 1; cf. q. 77, a. 6 and 8.

89. Scholion 1. On antecedent concupiscence. The things which have been said hold good concerning all passions. But concerning concupiscence, insofar as it is a passion of the sensitive appetite pursuing good, and insofar as it is distinguished from a sensitive motion fleeing evil, such as fear, certain special things must be noted. For there is often discussion of concupiscence of the flesh, of concupiscence of the eyes, etc. But the question is only about antecedent concupiscence, since it is plain that consequent concupiscence does nothing with respect to the voluntary or involuntary, because it follows upon the voluntary itself, but is only a sign of an intense voluntary.¹¹¹ But antecedent concupiscence increases the voluntary, yet is accustomed to diminish the free, and consequently also the sin committed from concupiscence. This proposition, considered at first sight, seems to be paradoxical, but nevertheless is most true. For antecedent concupiscence causes the apprehended good to appear greater and the will to seek it more intensely. And this is proved by daily experience. Therefore we see that those who pursue some object with love are borne toward it with greater impetus than if they were not affected by this passion; for example, a man under the influence of carnal concupiscence acts most intensely to satisfy lust. But the freedom of acting is diminished by antecedent concupiscence. For the free voluntary proceeds from an intrinsic principle with cognition of the end placed under indifference. But antecedent concupiscence greatly diminishes this indifference, because it darkens reason by exaggerating the appetibility of the object and by diminishing the evil perhaps joined to the object. Hence this concupiscence as it were gilds things vile in themselves, and everyone is said to be tempted by his own concupiscence, drawn away and allured.¹¹² But since sin essentially consists in an act of free choice and not in the voluntary alone, antecedent concupiscence is accustomed to diminish the sin committed from it.¹¹³

¹¹¹ Billuart, De act. hum. diss. 1, a. 8.

¹¹² James 1:14.

¹¹³ Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 77, a. 6. Because many authors do not sufficiently distinguish the voluntary from the free, nor the diverse meanings of the word concupiscence, hence disagreements and confusions arise.

90. Scholion 2. On the influence of habits upon the voluntary. The things which have been said up to this point concerning the influence of passions upon the voluntary can be asserted in almost the same way concerning the influence of habits. But a habit, as it is taken here, is a constant inclination, acquired by repeated acts, toward producing similar acts.

a) A voluntary habit, that is, one caused and foreseen from free acts and not yet efficaciously retracted, increases the voluntary and does not diminish the free. The reason is that it offers to the will facility and propensity for acting; but the will freely consents to its influence. Hence good habits produce very good acts, for example, acts of virtues; but bad habits not retracted produce very bad acts; for which reason the Angelic Doctor¹¹⁴ asserts that he who sins from a voluntary habit sins from certain malice. From these things it appears, for example, that the sins of some man blaspheming from an inveterate and never retracted habit are not light from the fact that this man now thinks nothing while uttering blasphemies of this kind. For he freely retains the habit which is the cause of so many sins. Therefore all the sins which actually follow are imputed to him.

b) An involuntary habit, that is, one indeed caused from free acts, but retracted by a sincere act of contrition, diminishes or even takes away the voluntary. It diminishes the voluntary if actual advertence to the act is imperfect; it takes away the voluntary if this advertence is totally removed. And this is plain, for example, in a man who contracted a habit of making himself drunk or of blaspheming. If this man, aided by the grace of God, has elicited an act of true contrition, so that he again is in the state of sanctifying grace and has retracted all his depraved habits, but nevertheless because of the acquired propensity again falls back into the same sins, these sins are less voluntary and consequently less grave; indeed, if they anticipate every advertence of reason, they are only material sins. - It is plain of itself that a habituated or customary sinner is strictly bound to employ efficacious remedies for the extirpation of the depraved habit, as will be explained below in the treatise on penance.

¹¹⁴ Ibid. q. 78, a. 2: "A sin is said to be from certain malice when it is from the election of evil. But that to which one is inclined through his own habit is electable to each one. Therefore a sin which is from habit is from certain malice."