Article II. On Concupiscence

By the name of concupiscence here there comes, not indeed that inborn tinder of depraved desires concerning which the Apostle complains, Rom. vii, 23, but a movement of the sensitive appetite, by which we tend toward a sensible good; or, as St. Thomas says after Damascene, 3, dist. 26, q. 1, art. 1: "a movement of the sensitive appetitive power which is from the imagination of good or evil."

But concupiscence so understood is distinguished as twofold, for one is antecedent, and another consequent. The former is that which, in the order of causality, precedes any deliberation or consent of the will, and allures and draws it to consenting. But the latter is that which, in the order of causality, follows an act of the will, either because a vehement movement of the will overflows into the lower appetite, or because the will directly and by design excites this appetite itself. That which is produced from mere overflowing is voluntary only in cause; that which is directly and by design excited is voluntary in itself. Cf. Baller., note (b), p. 14.

Antecedent concupiscence does not remove, but rather increases, the voluntary, insofar as by this name the inclination of the will is signified; but it diminishes, and even wholly removes it, insofar as the judgment of reason and the indifference of the will are signified. The reason for the first is that through concupiscence the will is inclined to willing that which it desires, and from another side the mind is not impeded from knowing at least the sensible qualities of the thing; indeed it is more occupied in considering them. Therefore the act proceeding from it is done through itself from a fuller and more intrinsic propensity of the will. But the reason for the second is that concupiscence turns the mind away from considering the inconveniences and defects of the object, and diminishes the indifference of the will. But when the passion is so great that it wholly removes the use of reason, as happens in those who are driven mad on account of love or anger, the act is indeliberate, and for that reason is rendered wholly involuntary. Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 6, art. 7; q. 73, art. 6; and q. 77, arts. 2, 6, and 7.

Consequent concupiscence neither increases nor diminishes the voluntary, but rather, as St. Thomas says, 1-2, q. 77, art. 6, "is a sign of its magnitude, insofar as it demonstrates the intensity of the will toward the act." The reason for the first is that the act of the rational will in that hypothesis precedes the movement of concupiscence, as a cause precedes an effect. Therefore the later disturbance of reason, which concupiscence induces, cannot affect the act which has already preceded, and therefore neither diminish nor increase the account of the voluntary. But the reason for the second is that, as St. Thomas has it, De Malo, q. 3, art. 11: "when from a strong movement of the will the sensitive appetite is moved to passion, passion adds merit or demerit, because it is a sign that the movement of the will is stronger; and in this way it is true that he who gives alms with greater compassion merits more, and he who sins with greater lust sins more, because this is a sign that the movement of the will is stronger."

You Will Resolve. 1st. Antecedent concupiscence diminishes the merit or demerit of an act; for it diminishes the free element, from which an act has that it is worthy of praise or blame, capable of merit or demerit.

2nd. Consequent concupiscence contributes nothing through itself and formally to the moral goodness or malice, merit or demerit, of an act, but rather takes on the morality, merit, or demerit of this act; although, as has been said, it is a sign and indication of greater or lesser merit or demerit.

3rd. Concupiscence which so follows an act of the will that it has been excited and willed is good and praiseworthy in itself, if it is not inordinate or immoderate, and is referred to an honest end. Cf. Suarez, in 1-2, tract. 2, disp. 3, sect. 3, n. 1.

Note. - Concerning concupiscence, insofar as it is the tinder of depraved desires and inclines the will to sin, we shall treat below, where we treat of sins.