Compensative Probabilism

61. • Since in practical doubt concerning the honesty of an action we cannot act honestly, and since that doubt very often cannot be directly overcome by reasons proper to individual cases, there must certainly be given from elsewhere some means of laying aside the doubt, so that, resting upon a certain conscience, we can act rightly. Now it is manifest that this means cannot consist except in some certain principle.² Therefore the state of the question here is:

In the concurrence of two opinions concerning the honesty of an action, of which one, the less safe, favors liberty, while the other, the safer, favors the law, what in this doubt is the certain universal rule to be followed for acting rightly?

This question is of such great moment that upon its solution depends the whole system of Moral Theology, whatever system may be chosen. For doubts of this kind occur many times in the individual matters of Moral Theology, since in it especially the application of laws to particular cases is treated, which is often uncertain.

But now, to solve this celebrated question, theologians have entered upon various ways. Some, namely, of excessive rigor in favor of the law; others, of excessive benignity in favor of liberty; and others finally have held the middle way between each extreme. Hence several systems have come forth, which we here briefly review:

62. Systems. - I. Rigorism or strict Tutiorism, according to which it is not lawful to follow a sentence favoring liberty unless it is morally certain; otherwise the safer part must always be followed. This is a condemned system.

II. Mitigated Tutiorism, according to which it is not lawful to follow the less safe sentence unless it is most probable.

III. Probabiliorism (another mitigated Tutiorism), according to which it is prohibited to follow an opinion favoring liberty unless it is more probable than the opposite one for the law.

IV. Equi-probabilism, according to which, in the concurrence of two opinions equally or almost equally probable, while doubt stands concerning the existence of the law, it is lawful to follow the opinion favoring liberty; but in doubt concerning the cessation of a certain law, the opinion favoring the law must be followed. This is the system of St. Alphonsus.

Since the followers also of simple Probabilism in our age are accustomed to distinguish their system by the title of Moderate Probabilism, and thus, by the celebrated name of Alphonsus, cover a doctrine altogether diverse from the doctrine of the Holy Doctor, for the sake of greater clarity we have preferred in this edition to call the Alphonsian system by the name Equi-probabilism; the more so because authors today commonly use that term, and the Saint himself (for example, H. A. Tr. I. 75) calls his system "my system of the equally probable opinion."

V. Simple Probabilism, according to which it is right to follow an opinion less probable and favoring liberty in the concurrence even of a notably more probable one for the law; and it is lawful promiscuously to follow a probable opinion that is less safe, even in doubt concerning the cessation of a certain law.

The followers of simple Probabilism are divided into two classes; for some, although they favor liberty, nevertheless say that in doubt both concerning the cessation and concerning the existence of a law, the law must be followed when the opinion favoring liberty is certainly less probable. Thus Martinet and certain more recent authors. Others teach that it is lawful to follow an opinion less probable and favoring liberty, even if it is evident that the opposite one is more probable. Thus Lacroix and other Probabilist authors of the eighteenth century almost commonly, and also Gury in the later editions of his Compendium, and Ballerini.

VI. Laxism, according to which it is lawful to follow a sentence favoring liberty, even if it is only doubtfully or slightly probable. This system also is condemned.

Therefore, excepting I and VI, the remaining systems can be maintained without the Church's condemnation. Yet among them we judge that only Equi-probabilism, which claims St. Alphonsus for itself as its principal author and as a second quasi-parent (Vind. P. I, p. 74. - Ed. 2a, T. I, p. 509), holds the middle way and for this reason is true.

99. Concerning the system of compensation it must be observed:

1. The twofold compensation, of probability and at the same time of the gravity of the law, is very difficult to estimate in practice; whence it is not a system apt to be a practical rule of acting and of forming conscience for all, even those sufficiently cultivated.

2. Not only does an inconvenience arise from the free positing of an act probably prohibited, namely, the danger of materially violating the law and frustrating the end intended by the legislator; but a greater one arises from the imposition of all uncertain precepts, namely, the deprivation of liberty and the danger lest men, on account of their weakness, fall rather into formal sins. Whence one could judge that, in a case of a solidly probable opinion, there is always a sufficiently compensating reason for the danger of materially transgressing an uncertain law.⁵

⁵ Thus in the new edition (5th) of the Tractatus de Conscientia from the Mechlin Theology, p. 81 sq. Article IV.

3. The proposition an uncertain law does not oblige seems sufficiently proved, so that of itself it can always be brought into practice, unless there is question of the value of an act and the obtaining of an end.

Yet something true is had in that system, not insofar as it hands down the due rule of acting and of forming conscience, but insofar as it admonishes prudence in the application of the rule, namely: for practice, in the application of any system whatever, all the circumstances of the subject must be considered in order to see whether it is expedient, or whether greater evils are not to be feared. But this only proves that the principles concerning the formation of conscience in such or such a state are to be subjected to the more general principles concerning human acts which govern the whole moral matter.

[We shall expound this pseudo-probabilism from the writings of three authors who professed it, namely D. Manier, D. Laloux, and Rev. P. Potton^{1 1} The first author of this system seems to have been D. Manier, priest of the Congregation of St. Sulpice, who laid down its principles in the Compendium philosophiae for the use of seminaries, t. III, Ethica, dissert. 3, de Conscientia, edit. 1859. — The same theory is expounded, but less orderly, in the posthumous work of D. Laloux, priest of the same congregation, which was published in 1862 by D. Orssand, priest of the diocese of Montpellier. — After these Rev. P. Maria Ambrosius Potton of the Order of Preachers published, in 1874, a work entitled De theoria probabilitatis, and in the following year a little book written in French under the title De la théorie du probabilisme, in which he tried to demonstrate the truth of the same doctrine, but rather entangled and obscured it with multiplied arguments, either beside the point or not sufficiently connected. This theologian attested that he had been ignorant of the writings of his predecessors when he first devised his system, so that he found himself what had before been invented by others. We have already demonstrated most fully the emptiness of this system in the journal called La Semaine du clergé, from 1876 to 1879. But because this doctrine, as is asserted by men worthy of faith, was admitted in certain seminaries of France, it has seemed to us not only opportune but necessary to expose it briefly here and refute it.

D. Manier lays down this principle, Ethica, de Conscientia, chapter 2: « A doubtful law neither lacks all obligating force, nor has all its force of obligating, but obligates more or less strictly according as it is more or less known: hence a cause not excusing from a law certainly known can sometimes excuse from a law known only imperfectly. »

Advert that here there is denied absolutely the palmary principle of probabilism: « A doubtful law does not oblige, » against which is opposed contradictorily, as head and principle of the whole new system, the following proposition: « A doubtful law obligates, » that is, the doubtful law is true law sufficiently promulgated; for here the doubtful equals cognition.

For why should a doubtful law obligate? The same author answers: « Whenever a law is wholly known to us, it has all its obligation relatively to us; if, on the contrary, it be wholly unknown to us, it has no obligation at all. Therefore, by equal reason, if a law be known to us, but imperfectly, it has some obligation, but an imperfect one. »

If the obligation arising from a doubtful law be imperfect, thence the three authors conclude together « that a cause not excusing from a law certainly known can sometimes excuse from a law known only imperfectly. »

But that anyone be excused from keeping a doubtful law, three things must be considered: 1° the nature and gravity of the law, 2° its probability, 3° its difficulty in practice, or the inconveniences which arise from observing it.

These things perceived, the principle is thus applied to the various degrees of probability: « 1° If the opinion favoring liberty be notably more probable than the opinion favoring the law, then, ordinarily speaking, the sole inconvenience arising from the privation of liberty suffices for running the risk of material infraction. It is said, ordinarily speaking, because if the law, although notably less probable, were of natural right and forbade something gravely evil, then this inconvenience alone would not seem to suffice... Hence in this case mitigated tutiorism holds, but with this condition, that the fault committed by the infraction of the law will be only light. 2° If the opinion favoring the law and the opinion favoring liberty be equally probable, but the law be most grave, nor any other motive for departing from it than the mere faculty of doing what pleases, then it is not lawful to depart from the observance of the law without some sin; and in that case probabiliorism holds, yet with this condition, that the sin of infraction will be less grave than if a certain law or one notably more probable were infringed. 3° If the opinion favoring the law and the opinion favoring liberty be equally probable, but the law be of positive right, and its observance bring great inconvenience, even though that inconvenience would not suffice to excuse from the aforementioned law supposing it certain, it will suffice to excuse from this law uncertain... Hence in this case equiprobabilism would hold. 4° Finally, if the law be notably more probable than liberty, but of positive right, and its observance bring with it some inconvenience, although that inconvenience would not suffice to excuse from the observance of a law which would be certain, nevertheless it could legitimately excuse from one which is only notably more probable; and in that case benign probabilism holds. »

In this system, 1° a doubtful law obligates per se; because 2° sin, not only formal but material merely possible, is always to be avoided; unless 3° compensation be made between the advantages accruing to the agent from the infraction of the law and the inconveniences which must arise from the same act.

On account of this compensation D. Laloux adorned that theory with the name Compensative Probabilism, which denomination P. Potton adopted with great applause.

It is asked now what is to be thought of this new system.

I say: The system of compensative probabilism is altogether to be rejected.

It is proved. That system is to be rejected which 1° relies on false principles, 2° is contradictory, 3° induces into a condemned error, 4° supposes an imaginary obligation, and 5° whose use is impossible. But compensative probabilism labors under these defects. Therefore it is to be rejected.

It is proved. First part of the minor. Compensative probabilism relies on this palmary principle: « A doubtful law obligates. » But above, art. 3, we demonstrated the truth of the contradictory proposition, namely: « A doubtful law does not oblige. » Therefore the palmary principle of the new system is false. — We proved besides « that an uncertain law cannot induce a certain obligation, » and « that before the law, namely true or certain law, the liberty of man possesses [its rights]; » which two principles flow immediately from the first, as necessary consequences. But these principles are denied in the recent theory, and contraries supposed. Therefore this theory rests on false principles.

It is proved. Second part of the minor. 1° The defenders of the system attribute to the doubtful law the power of obligating proper to a true law, from this principle, that every law obligates insofar as it is known. Whence, renewing the error into which P. Patuzzi stumbled while disputing against St. Liguori, they contend that doubt is equivalent to cognition or science; which is contradictory and absurd, and is overturned by St. Thomas saying, q. 17 de Veritate, a. 3: « No one is bound by any precept except through knowledge of that precept. » And the holy Doctor, as was demonstrated above, understands by science certain knowledge. 2° They affirm indeed that merely material sin is always to be avoided, and that toward this in every case one must flee to the safer part; and yet they concede that the sole inconvenience of the privation of liberty, which the agent would have to sustain from the observance of the doubtful law, suffices so that he may be permitted to pass over such a law, at least if the matter be light. How stands the absolute principle of embracing the safer part? 3° If such inconvenience can liberate from the obligation of a doubtful law, why would it not hold when the law exists certainly, since these theologians assert that in both cases the agent is bound by the law? Let them see how they can extricate themselves from these snares.

It is proved. Third part of the minor. That system induces to following tutiorism. For its defenders proclaim that a doubtful law always obligates more or less, and if they admit excusing causes, by this very fact they establish an obligation, since it is not necessary that the agent be excused from an obligation not existing. Therefore the safer part must necessarily always be followed in order to avoid sin in the case of a doubtful law, although a greater or even maximal probability favor liberty, seeing that however uncertain the law may be, it always presses. And this P. Potton openly professes in this proposition, which is the eighth among the twelve in which he includes his whole doctrine: « Given a law whose existence is doubtful, the evil of probable material transgression cannot be efficaciously prevented unless all probable opinions against the law are abandoned and recourse be had to the safer part. » And he concludes in the ninth proposition: « Therefore, given a law whose existence is doubtful, one must always follow the safer part. » But tutiorism is entirely reprobated, since by Alexander VIII this proposition was condemned, n. 3: « It is not lawful to follow an opinion, though most probable among probables. » Therefore the aforesaid system is involved in this condemnation, at least implicitly, but most certainly.

It is proved. Fourth part of the minor. It cannot be said that an uncertain law obligates certainly except because, if perchance it exist, the transgression of this law is sin, at least material, which is always to be avoided. This follows from the exposition of the system, and is asserted positively by P. Potton in the seventh proposition: « If, in fact, a law whose existence is doubtful to me really exists, acting against its dispositions I transgress it, at least materially, and this transgression is a true evil. » And in the eighth proposition related above, he pronounces that all probable opinions against the law are to be abandoned and recourse had to the safer part, to avert this evil of merely material sin. But this obligation is gratuitously supposed and is an imaginary thing. Therefore. — Proof of the minor. This obligation is gratuitously supposed and is an imaginary thing, if 1° material sin, considered as such, be nothing in the genus of morals, and 2° if it be in fact impossible to avoid every material sin. But so it is. Therefore. — Proof of the first part of the minor. Material sin is nothing else than the matter of sin, that is, an act which becomes sinful if the required moral form arrive. But this matter, so long as it is deprived of its proper form, is nothing morally. St. Thomas says, 1ª p., q. 15, a. 3, ad 3, that « matter, in itself, neither has being nor is knowable. » And VII Metaphys., lect. 2, he teaches that in itself matter has neither what, nor how much, nor anything of those things by which being is determined. Whence he concludes, 1ª p., q. 66, a. 2: « Matter, according to that which it is, is in potency to form. Therefore matter, considered in itself, must be in potency to the form of all those things of which it is common matter. » Matter which per se has neither what nor being becomes something through form and obtains being; for, as the Angelic Doctor says, ibid., q. 76, a. 5, « since form is not on account of matter, but rather matter on account of form, from the form must be taken the reason why matter is such, and not conversely. » And these principles are applied not only to physical matter, but also to moral matter, as is evident per se and sufficiently intimated by the denomination of material sin. Therefore material sin, so long as it is deprived of its form, with which it is clothed only through a certain law knowingly violated, is nothing morally. — It is confirmed from what St. Thomas says specially of sin, 1ª 2ae, q. 71, a. 6: « Sin is nothing else than a bad human act... Now the human act has what makes it bad from the fact that it lacks due commensuration; but every commensuration of anything is attended by comparison to some rule, from which if it depart it will be incommensurate. Now the rule of human will is twofold: one proximate and homogeneous, namely human reason; but the other is the first rule, namely the eternal law, which is as it were the reason of God. And therefore Augustine placed two things in the definition of sin: one belonging to the substance of the human act, which is as it were the material element in sin, when he said: « A word, or deed, or desire; » but the other belonging to the reason of evil, which is as it were the formal element in sin, when he said: « Against the eternal law. » » But that which is as it were formal is not found in material sin viewed in itself, because by this very fact that it is not against a certain law, that is, a true law, it is not against the eternal law. Therefore material sin is nothing in the genus of morals. Proof of the second part of the minor. The obligation of always following the safer part, to avoid material sin in every case, is imaginary if material sin ought sometimes to be permitted, and cannot in fact be avoided in every case. But so it is. For 1° material sin sometimes ought to be permitted; which happens when conscience is perplexed, that is, when someone is constituted, or judges himself constituted, between two incompatible precepts, and believes he sins whichever part he chooses. The same happens when the act is to have a twofold effect, one good and the other evil in itself, and the agent acting ex officio is bound to posit such act. 2° Experience demonstrates what Sacred Scripture testifies, Sap., IX, 14, namely that the thoughts of mortals are timid, and our providence uncertain. For even the wiser cannot foresee all things so as not to be constituted in the cases mentioned, where not only may, but must material sin be permitted, lest innocent persons transgress some law. Therefore from this twofold head it must be concluded that the obligation of always avoiding material sin is imaginary.

It is proved. Fifth part of the minor. That the compensation required by the defenders of the system can be established, there must first be taken account of the gravity of the law and its probability; then must be weighed the motives which can dispense from its observance; and afterwards it must be examined whether a true and exact proportion or equality exists between the good which the agent intends, declining the burden of the law, and the evil, as they say, of material sin which will arise from the violation of the law: and if this compensation be made not adequately, but only in part, the agent will sin more or less gravely, according to the reason of the difference¹. But these computations, weighings, and comparisons are impossible. For: 1° the gravity of a law is estimated from its necessity or utility; but a doubtful law does not appear as necessary, and concerning its greater or lesser utility much can be disputed without the degree being precisely determined. Besides, it is certain that the legislator can command or forbid a thing grave in itself under a light penalty alone. How then will his intention, in this respect, be discernible, since it is uncertain that he willed anything? 2° If the probability of the existence of the law be examined, opinions about a merely possible fact can differ greatly. 3° If grave difficulties arise already concerning the doubtful law objectively considered, not less difficult, nay more difficult, will it be to weigh with equal scale the subjective motives of dispensation, because everyone is prone to defend his own liberty, and he who constitutes himself judge in his own cause interprets most easily beyond the just and fair, in his own favor, the principle of law: « Hatred must be restricted and favors amplified. » ¹ Let us hear P. Potton himself asserting this in Theoria probabilitatis, chapter 6, n. 17: « If the excusing cause, which truly exists, nevertheless be not fully sufficient to compensate the whole damage contained in the danger of materially transgressing such a law, then there will be sin, more or less grave, according as the excusing cause falls more or less short of perfect sufficiency. And this excusing cause which perfectly sufficed to excuse from the transgression of such a law as was affected with such quantity of doubt, will no longer fully suffice, if the existence of this law become a little less doubtful, or be found a little more probable. Yet if the defect be light, if the compensation do not fall far short of perfect equality, the sin will not be grave, but light. And although, in practice, it be very difficult to perceive and measure exactly these variations, nevertheless so the thing stands, and this subtler consideration pertains to the perfect analysis of the present question. For the passage from great sin to full licitness of the act does not take place suddenly, as by an immense leap, but intermediate degrees are oftener found; just as, between the wound which takes life in an instant and perfect bodily integrity, innumerable wounds intervene, more or less grave or light, each of which holds its own degree of gravity, although in practice it be very difficult to discern degrees close to one another. ».

4° And yet, that sin be avoided, exact proportion, that is, true adequation, must be established between these indeterminate elements, which look either to the law or to the subject of the law. If from these the less learned will never extricate themselves, the more learned, impeded in them, will fall into most divergent opinions; and when action must proceed amid this practical doubt, recourse will have to be had to the safer part. Therefore the use of compensative probabilism is impossible. P. Potton fore saw this objection. He does not deny that the application of the system is at least very difficult in practice, and he answers ingenuously that the truth or falsity of any moral system is not demonstrated by the fact that it can be easily or hardly deduced into practice. Truly, this difficulty is so great as to constitute at least a moral impossibility, which would suffice to demonstrate that it is truly impossible to apply this theory to moral matters. But it has been proved, as it seems to us, that this impossibility is not only moral, but absolute; and thence our conclusion is deduced a fortiori.

The minor having been proved in parts, we conclude: Therefore the system of compensative probabilism is to be rejected.

Another system akin to the preceding.

To certain theologians of today, who are not pleased with the system of moderated probabilism, it seemed better to solve the question of the obligation of a doubtful law by the theory of an act about to have a double effect morally contrary.

This theory can be briefly exposed thus. When an act is about to have a double effect, one indeed good, which is intended, the other truly evil, which is foreseen to follow per se and proximately from the same act, but beside the intention, this act is posited with conscience unharmed, if some law imposes it upon the agent, or if the agent have right or legitimate motive for not omitting it: and this reason exists if the good effect outweighs or at least equals the evil. And this we admit with our Billuart, who demonstrated the truth of this opinion above, dissert. I, art. 1, on the voluntary indirect or in cause.

But, say the aforesaid theologians, when the law is doubtful, from the non-observance of such law there follows a double effect, one good, which is at least the use of liberty or any other advantage whatever, and another evil, which is the violation of the law. Therefore with conscience unharmed the doubtful law is passed over, if a legitimate reason persuade it.

Further, according to the same men, that the reason for passing over the doubtful law be reputed legitimate, both effects must be examined and diligently weighed, that it may be seen whether the good, which is intended, at least compensate the evil which is permitted; which compensation made, the agent licitly exempts himself from the law.

These things exposed,

I say: 1° The theory of an act about to have a double effect, although true in itself, has no relation with the question of the obligation of a doubtful law. For: 1° in that theory, the double effect is foreseen as certain, whereas in the present case the effect which is called evil, namely the material evil of violation of the law, is only possible; and elsewhere we proved that this material evil, if perchance it be present, is altogether nothing in the genus of morals. Further, no comparison nor compensation can be instituted between something and nothing. 2° The use of liberty, which is alleged as a good effect, is nowise the effect of the act posited against the doubtful law, but is the act itself: whence this term of comparison equally fails. 3° If it were admitted that a doubtful law obligate somewhat, then liberty, in the sense intended here, would no longer exist, seeing that the agent would truly be bound by the law.

2° The theologians above said suppose that the doubtful law has per se an obligatory force; which is false, as was proved above.

3° This system is nothing else than compensative probabilism, as founded upon the same principle and requiring the same condition. It is therefore undermined by the same arguments.

Let these things suffice for demonstrating the emptiness of this new system.

Titius, a priest, always instructs and directs the faithful committed to his care according to probable opinions. Hence he preaches that they need not be solicitous about directing their intention to God, for he says it is solidly probable that an intention once had in life and not retracted suffices to give form to all the works of the whole life. Nor, he says, need they be solicitous about gaining indulgences, for the same intention once had and not retracted suffices for gaining any indulgences whatever, provided that the prescribed works are fulfilled, even if the indulgence attached to them is unknown. Hence it is asked:

1. How do probabilism, equiprobabilism, and probabiliorism differ?

2. Is the use of probabilism lawful in every matter?

3. Within the limits of lawful matter, is it always and for everyone better to use probabilism?

4. What is to be said about Titius’s manner of acting?

1. See approved authors. 2. See the answer to this question, p. 54. 3. Even when probabilism may be applied, is it well always to apply it for everybody? No, it is not. There is room for prudence on the part of the confessor as to when a probable opinion is to be used.

The confessor indeed has no legislative authority and can not impose on his penitents an obligation which does not exist. But if the penitent is willing to do what is more generous and more perfect, the confessor should encourage him, and he would act very imprudently if by insisting on a probable and contrary opinion he caused the penitent to adopt a less perfect course of action than he had been prepared to follow. Occasionally when he knows his penitent and thinks that it will be for this benefit, the confessor may laudably urge him to act in a generous way, even though there is no obligation in the matter.

4. What about Titius' way of acting?

It may be hoped that the case is a fictitious one, and that no priest was ever so foolish and ignorant as to misapply probabilism in the way that Titius is said to have done. Probabilism is specially meant to settle doubts of conscience, and for use in the confessional. It is not intended to furnish matter for pastoral instruction and sermons. The preacher and instructor, without exaggerating obligations, should always propose a high ideal to his hearers and exhort them to follow it. As Rodriguez says: “By this discourse we easily see how important it is that in our spiritual exhortations we speak of that only which is perfect in a sovereign degree. If we preach, for example, on humility, it must be that humility which is most profound, and which reaches to contempt of oneself. If we preach on mortification, it must be on that which subjects all our passions to reason; if we preach on conforming our will to God, we must recommend a conformity which leaves us no will but that of the Almighty, which resigns our will entirely to His, and which establishes all its content and joy in the accomplishment of the divine will. . . . Because you are weak I must propose to you the most perfect kind of virtue and devotion, that by your aiming at what is best you may be able to perform at least what is of strict obligation.”¹

1 Practice of Religious Perfection, vol. i, chapter viii.

Titius tells his people that they need not trouble themselves about directing their intention to God, for it is solidly probable that an intention elicited once for all will suffice to direct all the actions of one's life to God if it is not retracted. This is probably true, bearing in mind the clause “if it is not retracted.” But it would most likely be understood to mean that there was no necessity for thinking about God oftener than once in a lifetime, which is, of course, altogether false. Besides it is only an opinion, and those who acted upon it might lose a great deal of merit if it is not the true opinion. Titius adopted the wrong tone in his instructions; he should not be content with the minimum, even if he tells his people what the minimum is, but he should exhort them frequently to renew their intention of pleasing God, so that they may be the more secure and may reap the greater reward.

Titius followed a probable opinion about the intention which is necessary for gaining indulgences, but here again it is only probable; it is not certain that it would suffice for gaining all indulgences as he says. So in this matter also Titius acted imprudently and from a wrong point of view, and he should correct what he said. For it is not certain that probabilism may be used in the matter of indulgences, inasmuch as indulgences are a grant made by the Church on certain conditions, and anyone who wishes to gain them must satisfy the conditions laid down.²

2 Bulot, Compend. Theol. Mor., vol. ii, n. 1002.