Conditional Absolution

1. Pamphilus, a confessor, hearing the confessions of clerics in the seminary, does not know whether he ought to add or omit the word suspensionis, since the aforesaid clerics are constituted only in minor orders. For the Ritual says that the aforesaid word is to be omitted if the penitent is a layman.

It is asked: What is to be said to the Case?

R. The aforesaid word, suspensionis, can be omitted in the Case, since in reality there is no such suspension in force. "If the penitent is a layman," says Reuter, Neo-confess., p. 1, c. 7, n. 22, "or, as Gobat and Stoz hold, only in minor orders, the word suspensionis is omitted." I. M. 748.

2. Nicasius, imparting absolution to a dying man, and fearing about his own intention, in order to drive out that fear, says: I wish to minister to thee the sacrament of absolution. This form having been pronounced, the sick man dies.

It is asked: What is to be said to the Case?

R. Nicasius indeed acts badly, perverting the form of the Church which is had in the Roman Ritual. But he acts very badly in the most grave Case of a dying man. For the absolution given is not only illicit, but also invalid. The will of doing something is not the same as doing that thing. Hence, I wish to minister, or I wish to absolve, is not the same as, I minister, or, I absolve. St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 84, a. 3, ad 5, explaining the form of the sacrament of penance, explains it thus: "I absolve thee, that is, I bestow upon thee the sacrament of absolution." But again, it is one thing to bestow the sacrament of absolution, another thing to wish to bestow the sacrament of absolution. Hence the Holy Office, June 23, 1840, declared invalid a baptism conferred with this form: I wish to minister to thee the sacrament of baptism of sins in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, Acta S. Sed., vol. 25, p. 246. In this form, besides that word I wish, that other added word of sins disturbs the whole sense of the form.

3. Presence of the penitent. Remigius the confessor, after hearing the confession of Fugatius, while he was piously exhorting him and was asking whether he was prepared not to sin, notices, astonished, that he gives no response. He looks back, but sees no one; for the penitent had gone away, thinking himself absolved. Then looking again, he saw Fugatius in the middle of the crowd, kneeling and praying, and joyfully absolved him at once.

It is asked: What is to be said to the Case?

R. Remigius acted rightly, because since the penitent was morally present, the absolution was valid. Indeed the absolution would have been valid although the confessor had not seen the penitent in the midst of the crowd of the faithful, because for that reason he would not have ceased to be morally present. Yet he would have acted more rightly if, without scandal, under some pretext, he had been able to call the penitent back to himself, so that he might absolve him more fittingly. But it does not seem, in the Case, that grave inconvenience was really lacking in calling the penitent again to himself from the middle of the crowd.

4. Titius, formerly a fervent Catholic, afterward ensnared by the seductions of a friend, gives his name to a certain perverse sect. The members of this sect mutually bind themselves to reject the sacraments even at the article of death; indeed they promise that they will also give diligent effort that the access of a Catholic priest to sick companions be altogether prevented. After a most wicked life carried on through many years, Titius falls sick unto death. At once some of the sectarians come to him, indeed under the pretext of furnishing assistance, but in reality so that, according to the prescription of the sect, they may prohibit the parish priest, if perhaps he is called, from approaching.

Titius, who had not renounced the Catholic faith in his mind, fearing the divine judgments, would wish to provide for his own salvation and to call a confessor. But he knows very well that this cannot easily be done because of the perversity of the companions who stand by. But it came opportunely into his mind that he could communicate by telephone with a very Catholic friend. Hence, pretending that he wished to rest for a little while, he sends the associates out of his room, and at once manifests his state to his friend, and at the same time earnestly asks him to call the parish priest to hear his confession by telephone. The parish priest who is called is seized by the novelty of the matter; nevertheless he at once hastens there, and, the confession by telephone having been completed, since he doubts whether this manner of confessing is valid, yet so that he may provide for the sick man in some way, he absolves him under condition. A little while afterward Titius dies.

Soon the parish priest, the matter having been considered more maturely, begins to doubt whether he conducted himself rightly; hence he consults a theologian, asking him:

1.º Whether and how the penitent must be present to the confessor absolving? - 2.º Whether the presence of the penitent to the confessor, required for the value of the sacrament, is had in the Case? - 3.º Whether he himself conducted himself rightly?

R. To the 1st. There can be no doubt that the penitent must be present to the confessor absolving. This is established, 1.º from the most common doctrine of theologians. It is established, 2.º from the Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 2, where, explaining the proper nature of this sacrament from Christ's institution, it says that Christ so instituted this sacrament that he willed penitents to stand before this tribunal as accused persons, and to be freed from sins by the sentence of priests. For an accused person to stand before this tribunal certainly signifies the presence of the accused before the judge, since this tribunal is constituted only by the confessor and at the same time the penitent. This is established, 3.º from the decree of Clement VIII and Paul V, by which it was forbidden to teach that either confession made to an absent priest, or absolution imparted to an absent penitent, is licit. Cf. Enchiridion Morale, 3rd ed., n. 696. This is established, 4.º from the fact that the form of this sacrament consists in words, namely in the words of absolution, which are directed to one present.

But the presence required must be moral presence. Yet, if from the very form of this sacrament it is established that the presence of the penitent before the confessor is altogether required, from the same form it is established that that presence is required by which men are accustomed to converse among themselves with human voice. For the confessor, while he pronounces the form, seems to converse with the penitent himself. Fittingly St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 429, explaining this moral presence, says: "This moral presence is reputed to be that within which men can and are accustomed to speak with a common voice, although higher... Elbel with Sporer and others adds that such presence can be extended to about twenty paces, especially where the penitent has not yet gone out from the sight of the confessor... But Tamburini deservedly does not approve Leander, who says that it is enough for moral presence if the priest sees the penitent, or perceives him by another sense; for presence for absolution requires greater nearness than for hearing a sermon or Mass."

To the 2nd. The presence of the penitent to the confessor required for the value of the sacrament is certainly not had in the Case, prescinding from the telephone; since certainly the sick penitent in his own house is neither physically nor morally present to the confessor in the house of his friend. Therefore the question can be raised only about that circumstance of communication by telephone. But communication by telephone does not remove distance, nor consequently render mutually present to themselves those who are distant from one another, but is only an efficacious medium of communication between those distant or not present. But from the mere fact of communication of two persons between themselves, the presence of the persons themselves is not had, as is seen in communication by a messenger, by a letter, or by any other medium whatever; for example, by lights of diverse color lit at night, or by flags also of diverse color displayed upon a pole, or by sound and explosion produced by some instrument, or finally by telegraph. Nor indeed does it avail to object that communication in the Case is had through the very human voice of the one speaking, whence it is that the one hearing is one hearing the speaker. For first, that voice which is transmitted and heard through the telephone is not in reality the human voice of the speaker, but is a certain physical reproduction of this voice, or rather the physical effect of that voice. Wherefore the one hearing in reality does not hear the speaker, namely the voice of the speaker, but hears the sound of a metallic plate by its vibrations imitating and reproducing the sound of the voice, which impresses its vibrations of air upon another metallic plate, whence then the sound of the other plate, which is heard, is determined. Wherefore a human voice is not had, nor consequently are words had, but only a certain perfect imitation of the human voice, by a mechanical sound physically produced by the human voice. Hence from the telephone, which is here brought forward in place of the telegraph, not only is the difficulty from the impediment of distance in the Case not removed, but even that difficulty is not diminished. Perhaps it would be diminished, but certainly it would not be removed, if not the telephone but a voice-duct, commonly called a portavoce, were used; for then the speaker's own voice would in reality be heard. Nevertheless even in this Case moral presence would not be had, and because distance is had, therefore such a medium of communication is used.

To the 3rd. The parish priest does not seem to have conducted himself well in the Case. For indeed, in extreme necessity, it is licit to administer the sacraments conditionally, even with a slight probability concerning their value, as St. Alphonsus teaches, and theologians commonly teach. But that slight probability which the doctors here bring into the matter is not a true slight probability, which is not true probability, as slight, from the slight motive on which it rests, but it is a slight probability which nevertheless is true probability, since it is slight from a slight degree, that is, constituted in the lowest degree of probability. And indeed, even in doubt of baptism, which is most necessary, baptism cannot be repeated unless there is at least a probable doubt of the preceding baptism, as is had in the Roman Ritual, De Bapt. adult., or, what is the same thing, unless there is a probable doubt about the validity of the first baptism, as is had in the Decision of the Holy Office, May 27, 1671, A. S. S., vol. 25, p. 256. Moreover, in the Case there can indeed perhaps be had some slight motive for the validity of that absolution, but a truly prudent, grave, and probable motive, although in the lowest degree, is not had. Wherefore it does not seem that the parish priest conducted himself well, even by absolving only under condition.

But the parish priest ought, after the confession heard by telephone, to have stirred the penitent to an act of perfect contrition, consulting for his eternal salvation by this means, in the best way in which it could be done. Then, if time allowed, he ought at once to go to the house of the sick man, and by some pretext, and even employing some simulation of some very grave business to be treated, penetrate into the room of that sick man, and then, a summary confession having been made by him, he could beyond doubt absolve him absolutely. But what if the sectarians present in every way prevented the aforesaid summary confession? If the parish priest then noticed in Titius some other sign of confession, as the thing would be easy, a sign of this sort would still suffice, and he could absolve Titius absolutely. But if, coming to the house of Titius after his confession heard by telephone, he had found him destitute of senses, then indeed the difficulty would be serious, but as it seems, he could have absolved Titius under condition. For in the Roman Ritual it is said absolutely of a sick man who, destitute of senses, could not confess: if he has shown the desire of confessing either by himself or through others, he is to be absolved. Moreover Titius altogether showed the desire of confessing, and by himself, namely through that confession previously made by him by telephone. The defect of presence in that confession indeed stands in the way; from it, however, the excellent dispositions of Titius can well be gathered, dispositions in which Titius certainly perseveres, and which, as ordinarily happens, he signified by some external effect and act; so that it can well be presumed that Titius both has and perhaps still shows the desire of confessing, although it is not noticed. For indeed we have been so constituted by nature that that interior contrition of soul, when it is true and sincere, regularly speaking, is betrayed outwardly at least by sadness and by lowering of the eyes and countenance. And if Titius could be absolved if his servant, for example, by his mandate had called the parish priest, and then, the sick man being present, had testified to the parish priest the desire of his confession, or even if he had previously testified a desire of this sort to him, and had gone away on account of other business, as several theologians teach, could the same be done in the proposed Case? But it is not necessary to define this speculative question, which we leave at present undecided and altogether doubtful, to be decided by wiser men, because in reality practically no difficulty can seem to be present in giving that conditional absolution. For in reality, as formerly, so also today, this is the practice of all confessors: that finding sick persons destitute of senses, unless their positive and actual unworthiness is established from some other source, they absolve them under condition. Confer the Commentary on the Absolution and Assistance of the Dying.

5. Conditional absolution. 1.º Claudinus, a confessor, absolves those doubtfully disposed under condition in the following Cases: 1.º the sick gravely endangered as to life, especially the dying, although much more probably indisposed; 2.º soldiers about to go into the army or battle, and sailors and others about to undertake a sea voyage; 3.º habitual betrothed persons now about to be joined in marriage; 4.º strangers, men who scarcely or hardly at all will be able to return to his tribunal, and are immediately about to depart; 5.º penitents who certainly or probably are foreseen not to return, although they can return; indeed also young men who threaten that they will not return unless they are absolved; 6.º boys of seven years, and even of ten years, and half-witted persons, who probably sinned gravely, and furnish only doubtful signs of reason and disposition; 7.º from a bridge he absolves sailors and the others contained in a ship who, by an unexpected shipwreck, were being submerged in the waters of a river; 8.º a soldier who, pierced in a duel, was lying dying and destitute of senses; 9.º a heretic in a hospital, dying, destitute of senses, and struggling with death.

It is asked: What is to be said to the Case?

R. Claudinus acted rightly in the first four Cases, because on the one hand there is no positive evidence of the indisposition of the penitents, and on the other hand, since they are found in danger of salvation and in a case of necessity, he provides for their spiritual good in the best way he can. But he acted badly by absolving the men or young men in the fifth Case from the fact that they threatened that they would not return, although they could easily return. For this seems an undoubted sign of indisposition. But as to those who, threats being excluded, were in reality foreseen not to return if they had been dismissed without absolution, the solution depends on the various circumstances of particular cases. In the sixth Case, he ought first to have disposed them insofar as could be done; but, the doubt persevering, he could absolve the same persons under condition, especially with the precept of annual confession urging. G. 395, 396.

In the seventh Case he could and ought out of charity to absolve those miserable shipwrecked persons under condition. The reason is that those dying persons were morally present, and they could be supposed to wish to confess and to give signs of sorrow, in the Case in which they were seen by the priest. At least among all, one or another could have been truly disposed, and could furnish all the conditions required so that the sacrament of penance, in so great an extremity, could be valid and applied. But the priest ought to have called out to them in a loud voice, and in one word exhorted them to contrition, and suggested it to them. Moreover he ought to have used the form in the plural number: I absolve you from your sins, etc. Elbel 37. But what if the priest immediately after the shipwreck had no longer seen any of those submerged? Nevertheless he could still have imparted conditional absolution to them, provided he prudently judged them still morally present, because in that Case there could still appear hope of validity and of fruit to be received from it. But otherwise it must be said if, because of the force of the river, they had slipped away so far that they could no longer perceive the priest calling out to them. G. 391.

In the eighth Case Claudinus seems praiseworthy, since, insofar as he could, he helped the miserable sinner. For it absolutely could have happened that he was disposed and wished in some way to confess. But he ought first to have called out to him, so that he might exhort him, if perhaps he was heard by him, to contrition disposedly, and also to confessing in whatever way. G. 486. Cf. Commentary on the Absolution and Assistance of the Dying.

In the ninth Case Claudinus also seems praiseworthy. The reason is that, if the contrary is not positively established, it can be presumed that here and now he wishes to die in the Catholic Religion, and consequently to confess and to be absolved. For this can absolutely happen. Certainly at least one such person among a hundred thousand can be found. But in a case of necessity it is licit to use even a slightly probable opinion in favor of a man in danger. It is surely certain that there are merely material heretics, and those who do not have hatred of confession. But it was not established in the Case that the aforesaid dying man was a formal heretic, and some hope could be had, although most slight, of the value of the absolution to be conferred. - La-Croix 1866; Elbel 212, 214; Reuter, Neo-confessar. 203; G. 488-491; Gennari, Consultaz. Mor. Can. Lit., p. 1, Cons. 58; M. E. vol. 6, p. 2, p. 107 seqq.; I. M. 751-754.

6. Titius, a foreign youth from the sect of Protestants, who nevertheless was endowed with good morals and who seemed to err only materially in faith, while he was staying at Rome together with his widowed mother during the winter season, as he was accustomed, was seized by a most grave disease which the physician judged incurable. Caius, a Catholic priest of the same nation, who frequented his house, at once approached him, that he might consult for his eternal salvation. When they were conversing together, Titius declared himself to be a sinner, at the same time asking Caius to pour forth prayers to God, to obtain from Him pardon of his sins. Having obtained this good occasion, Caius desired gently to lead him, after heresy had been abjured, to the Catholic faith and to rebaptize him under condition; he secretly manifested this desire of his to the mother. But the mother, who pertinaciously adhered to the same sect, strongly resisted, adding at the same time both that there was no doubt about the validity of the baptism, and giving permission only that he should have conversation with him about those things alone which are common to heretics with Catholics; and from that time she sat constantly at the side of the sick man.

But when the disease grew worse, Caius, to whom nothing else remained, addressed Titius in this way: Do you believe all things whatsoever that have been revealed by God through Christ? Are you sincerely sorry for your sins? Do you confirm what you have already declared before God and me, namely, that you are a sinner? Does it please you that, through my help, toward attaining eternal life better, insofar as I can, you yourself be helped? When the sick man had nodded assent to each of these things, "Therefore trust in God," Caius says, "and He Himself will pardon your sins." These things having been said, he secretly absolved him under condition. A little while afterward Titius dies, and, by order of the mother, he is led to burial by the rite of the Protestants.

It is asked: 1.º Whether, at the article of death, a material heretic, enjoying the use of reason, can be absolved unless first, having been convinced concerning the Catholic faith, he embraces it and makes confession? - 2.º Whether Caius conducted himself rightly in all things?

R. To the 1st. St. Alphonsus, speaking of a dying man, destitute of senses, in the act of sin, to be absolved, altogether excludes heretics, saying, l. 6, n. 483: "For heretics, even if in that Case they give signs of penance, ought not to be absolved unless they expressly ask absolution, because such persons can never prudently be presumed to furnish those signs in order to confession, from which they exceedingly abhor." This is certainly a presumption, and a general presumption, which ought to yield to truth, and also to a contrary presumption in a particular case. Indeed there would be a contrary presumption if the heretic were altogether material and in good faith, with his mind altogether disposed and prepared for fulfilling all those things which have been ordained by God in His divine Providence for the eternal salvation of men.

Fr. Gury, Cas., vol. 2, n. 488, distinguishes between a formal and material heretic, and concerning a material heretic dying and destitute of senses says that absolution under condition is to be granted to him. And the Most Reverend Gennari, Consultaz., etc., p. 255, extends this even to a formal heretic. Moreover, if absolution can be given at least conditionally to a heretic of this sort dying and destitute of senses, it can also be given to the same if he enjoys the use of reason and the danger of death is imminent.

The question here about absolution to be given to such a heretic can exist only because of its invalidity from defect of intention and of the acts of the penitent. Moreover, such a defect does not seem really to be present. For first, as to intention, if implicit intention suffices in baptism, even in penance implicit intention can suffice, since penance is not of greater necessity, nor does it bring greater obligations, than baptism. Now indeed implicit intention is sufficiently had by the sincere and explicit will of admitting and employing all things necessary for salvation, ordained by God. But as to the acts of the penitent, since confession made only in general suffices for the validity of absolution, this can well be suggested to a dying heretic, so that he duly confess himself a sinner, or that he has sinned, and then ask pardon of his sins from God with hope of pardon; and then neither the necessary confession nor contrition is lacking for the validity of absolution.

As is had in the Instruction of the Sacred Congregation, January 30, 1833, Collectanea S. C. de P. F. n. 650: "Theologians everywhere teach that for the value of the sacrament there is not necessary in the minister that intention which they call express or determinate, but that only a generic intention suffices, namely of doing what the Church does, or of doing what Christ instituted, or what Christians do." And, as is added there immediately, an express and distinct intention of making a sacrament is not required, but a confused, implicit, general intention of doing what is done in the true Church of Christ suffices. But if an implicit and general intention of this sort suffices in the minister, it seems consequently and much more to suffice in the subject: that general will and intention of fulfilling and employing all the means instituted by Christ for one's own sanctification and eternal salvation.

Nor indeed can there be difficulty on the part of defect of Catholic faith. For a material heretic and one in good faith can well have supernatural faith necessary for justification. Nor likewise can there be defect from the fact that the aforesaid acts of the penitent, namely confession and contrition, were not ordered by him to absolution; for at least implicit ordering is not lacking by that general will just mentioned. And this holds insofar as that ordering is affirmed necessary. For if no necessity of such ordering is maintained, then there will be no difficulty from this head.

Besides, theologians almost commonly admit, as to a material heretic and one destitute of senses, that he can be absolved under condition. Come now, why indeed can such a heretic be absolved at least conditionally? Certainly not because such a heretic, who never had any suspicion of the sacrament of penance, now destitute of senses thinks about such a sacrament and elicits an express desire of confession and an act of contrition. This in reality is naturally absurd. Nor also because, during that state, he is supernaturally enlightened by God so as to know the necessity of the sacrament of penance, and, recovering the use of reason at least for some very brief space of time, duly disposes himself for it by his acts. This surely pertains not to probability, but to possibility; not to the natural order of things, but to miracles; and therefore for this reason it cannot be affirmed that the aforesaid heretic can be absolved at least conditionally. Therefore there can be no other reason except that in such a heretic those said acts can prudently be presumed, which, absolutely speaking, could suffice for the validity of the sacrament.

Wherefore to the proposed Question the response seems to be affirmative, namely that the aforesaid heretic can be absolved under condition. Fittingly La-Croix, l. 6, p. 2, n. 1866: "If a Catholic priest understands that a non-Catholic man has been brought to extremities, he acts prudently, unless something else stands in the way, if he approaches him... elicits with him acts of faith, hope, and charity, and of perfect contrition for sins... But if the circumstances allow, he can afterward ask whether, if he knew that he was not in the true faith, he would wish to embrace another, and to do all things necessary for salvation; whether he would wish to confess and to be absolved, if this were necessary for salvation. If he nods assent to these things... he can be absolved under condition."

To the 2nd. From what has been said, Caius seems to have conducted himself rightly, disposing Titius for a holy death insofar as it was in him and the circumstances allowed, and absolving him under condition. As to the fact that, by order of the mother, the body of Titius was led to burial by the rite of the Protestants, it surely did not pertain to Caius, a private priest, to prevent that; and for avoiding greater evils and sins and scandals he conducted himself well by concealing that he had absolved Titius under condition, and by keeping secret the absolution given. Yet there seems to be another thing which Caius ought to have done first. Caius is of the same nation as Titius. Wherefore Caius ought to have known well the manner of conferring baptism among Protestants; and therefore, doubting about its value, he wished to rebaptize Titius under condition, and was prevented only by the obstinate Protestant mother. Hence, while such a doubt stood concerning the validity of the baptism received, as Caius secretly absolved Titius under condition, so also he ought previously to have baptized him secretly under condition, which he could easily have done, for example with a little cloth wetted with water, applied to the forehead and lightly pressed, so that a little water would flow.

7. Albinus, a confessor, for a just cause conditionally absolves Jacob, doubtfully disposed. But the latter, now about to depart, by I know not what fate, asks the confessor whether he has been absolved. Astonished, the confessor, hesitating, answers affirmatively, not daring to declare that he had given only conditional absolution. Can I therefore communicate? the penitent asks again. Behold a new difficulty; and again, hesitating, Albinus answers negatively. Jacob marvels, and indignantly asks the reason for the denial. But the confessor, so that he may extricate himself from such great difficulties, consents that the penitent receive the sacred Synaxis, kindly exhorting the penitent that before Communion he repeat from the heart acts of faith, hope, charity, and contrition.

It is asked: 1.º Whether it is necessary or fitting that penitents absolved under condition be warned? - 2.º Whether the confessor in such a Case ought to prohibit them from Communion, or can permit it positively or negatively? - 3.º What is to be said of Albinus?

R. To the 1st. It is neither necessary nor expedient that the confessor warn the penitent that he was absolved only conditionally, because from this warning no good and many inconveniences can follow. For from it anxiety and disturbance of the penitent arise, and ambiguities for the confessor. Nor indeed is there any harm present for the penitent. For, if afterward he confesses at another time, these sins will be remitted indirectly in that confession itself, if they truly were not remitted. If he does not confess, and the sins in reality were not remitted, and danger is present for the penitent, that is certainly from his negligence and evil will in omitting confession, and by no means from the conditional absolution. On the contrary, if this is not given, if perhaps he is disposed, since the matter is doubtful, the penitent is exposed to danger of salvation.

To the 2nd. The confessor who conditionally absolves the penitent ought neither to impel him to Communion nor to draw him back from it. Let the confessor himself be silent, and let the penitent do whatever pleases him. For if he approaches the Eucharist in good faith, he can even receive first grace by communicating; if in bad faith, namely because he feels himself indisposed, he himself voluntarily casts himself into danger.

To the 3rd. To the first question of the penitent Albinus ought to have answered affirmatively, without any hesitation, since in reality he absolved insofar as the dispositions of the penitent allowed. To the second question he ought to have answered the penitent that the whole matter was left to his own judgment. But since Albinus positively furnished consent for Communion, he indeed did well by exhorting the penitent to acts of charity and contrition, lest perhaps he receive Communion sacrilegiously. G. 392-394.

431. • I say I. It is certain that absolution imparted under a condition concerning the present or the past is valid in every case, provided that the other things required for the validity of the Sacrament are present; for the condition in no way changes the sense of the sacramental form, which it does not affect in any respect, but affects only the will of the Confessor, who does not intend to absolve unless the condition placed is fulfilled. But when this is fulfilled, the form becomes absolute; and consequently nothing is found which can prejudice its validity. - Thus St. Lig., no. 431, where he says that all agree concerning this. - Billuart, diss. 6, art. 10, sec. 7, where he asserts that it is the most common opinion. - Collet, De integr. conf., sec. 5. - Antoine, ch. 2, etc. Pontas, under the word Absolution, case 5, is to be numbered among the few adversaries, but he is rightly censured by Collet's annotator, ibid. ².

¹ On the title above. Someone will perhaps wonder and ask why the Author, beyond both his own custom and that of others, treats more laboriously this argument which hitherto appeared to require lighter labor. But an obvious response presents itself: namely, where and when some new error begins to arise and creep forward, it certainly must be met at once, and the monster, before it grows up and increases in strength, must be utterly destroyed in its cradle by a thunderbolt-like stroke, as Horace says.

² The Author here alleges Writers who, according to the testimony of St. Alphonsus, are commonly regarded as more rigorous, namely, to indicate that this doctrine is so certain and manifest that not even the more rigorous thought they should depart from it. Nevertheless, this kind of argument is sometimes fallacious. For it could be shown by many examples that writers regarded as the most rigorous have not rarely declined into laxities which no one among the most benign ever admitted.

432. The adversaries generally distinguish between a condition of fact, for example, if thou art alive, and a condition of law, concerning which the Confessor must judge, for example, if thou art disposed. They permit conditional absolution in the former case because the conditions are not subjected to the judgment of the Confessor, but they reject it altogether in the latter. Hence:

They object 1. The form of the Sacrament of Penance must be judicial; but if the form is conditional, it is not judicial, for a judgment by its nature is absolute, so much so that the sentence of a civil judge who should perhaps say, I adjudge this to thee, if it is thine, is regarded as nothing. Therefore, etc.

Reply 1. I deny the minor. For the form of a judgment is by no means destroyed by adding a condition, even if the condition concerns the dispositions of the penitent. And indeed the Priest judges: 1. concerning the sins disclosed; 2. concerning the penance to be imposed; 3. concerning the probable dispositions of the penitent; 4. concerning the expediency of imparting absolution, although conditionally, on account of the greatest good of the penitent. Therefore, the matter of judgment is not lacking. Reply 2. There is no strict comparison between civil judgment and sacramental judgment; indeed, they differ in many respects, as is evident from what was said above, no. 416. But attend especially to this: the sentence of a civil judge always obtains its effect and is given to execution; whereas in the forum of Penance, whether the sentence is rendered absolutely or conditionally, its effect nevertheless always depends upon hidden conditions known to God alone. Wherefore, the sentence of the Confessor is conditional by its nature, even if it is rendered in the most absolute manner, since it remains entirely unknown to him whether the effect will follow.

433. • They object 2. In controversies concerning the validity of the Sacraments, the safer side must always be followed.

Reply 1. I deny the supposition, namely, that this question is subject to controversy, since the opinion of the adversaries possesses no probability, either intrinsic or extrinsic.

Reply 2. It is false that the safer side must always be followed in favor of the Sacrament; for since the Sacraments are for men, cases are given in which the Sacrament must be exposed to danger of nullity in order to assist men placed in spiritual necessity.

But two hypotheses can be imagined when necessity and a doubtful disposition of the penitent concur at the same time. The first is that absolution is simply to be denied; the second, that absolution is to be conceded in any manner whatsoever. Behold, a dying man of doubtful disposition stands before you. Come now! Declare what you will do. Will you allow this penitent to depart from the living without absolution? Will you thus escape the mark of cruelty? For if perhaps he is sufficiently disposed, although you doubt, do you not condemn one who ought to be saved? But if you absolve this penitent, how, I ask, will you absolve? With an absolute form, you say. Very well; but tell me, if you please, will you thereby render a firmer judgment concerning the dispositions of the penitent? Will you judge certainly disposed one whom you know to be doubtfully disposed? Proceed now, therefore: exclude as much as you wish both an oral and even a mental condition; will your sacramental sentence thereby be more certain? Therefore, whether you will or not, if you then absolve, you necessarily absolve conditionally and not otherwise. Indeed, a sacramental sentence in Penance is of itself and by its nature necessarily conditional, since it supposes in the penitent requisite conditions which can be lacking.

434. • I say II. It is likewise certain that conditional absolution is sometimes licit; for if it is valid, it must also be licit when necessity presses. - Thus very commonly do Theologians teach. - St. Lig., ibid. - Lacroix, bk. 6, part 1, no. 78. - Elbel, Sporer, the Salmanticenses, etc.

But the doctrine of some who hold that conditional absolution can be imparted for any slight cause and with no necessity pressing, even if the sufficient disposition of a penitent burdened also with mortal sins is doubted in any manner whatsoever, is to be rejected as plainly lax. For no one fails to see how many sacrileges a practice of this kind would induce. For the Confessor would no longer be a prudent dispenser of the Sacraments, but would cast pearls before swine; and by this facility of absolving he would cause penitents to waste away in their sins. - St. Lig., no. 432, etc.

But no more admissible is the doctrine of those who, with Collet and certain others, hold that absolution under condition is not to be imparted except in extreme necessity or in the extreme danger of life; for a doctrine of this kind is exceedingly harmful to penitents who can return to the Confessor only with difficulty and, if dismissed without absolution, incur the danger of eternal damnation.

In what necessity, therefore, absolution under condition can or must be imparted is to be established according to the common doctrine and practice by the following rules.

435. • First Rule. Absolution can and must be given under condition whenever, if conceded absolutely, it would expose the Sacrament to danger of nullity, and, if denied absolutely, it would expose the penitent to danger of grave spiritual harm.

Second Rule. Even if a necessity of this kind does not press, absolution can nevertheless be given under condition whenever, if conceded absolutely, it would expose the Sacrament to danger of nullity, and, if denied absolutely, it would deprive the penitent of some notable spiritual good, although not a necessary one.

Hence, with the due conditions observed, when necessity presses or a grave and proportionate cause is present, it is lawful to absolve conditionally in the following cases: 1. in doubt whether the penitent is living or dead; 2. in doubt concerning sufficient matter, for example, when the precept of annual confession presses ³, etc.; 3. in doubt concerning jurisdiction on the part of the Confessor; 4. in doubt whether the penitent was duly absolved; 5. in doubt concerning the use of reason in children, the insane, etc.; 6. in doubt whether the penitent is morally present; 7. in doubt whether a dying person deprived of his senses is capable of the Sacrament ⁴; 8. in doubt concerning the disposition of the penitent, when not only extreme but even simply grave spiritual necessity presses. - St. Lig., no. 432. - See the cases to be resolved below, no. 639 ⁵.

³ Let no one think from these things that the Author wished to teach in this place that even those who bring not only no necessary matter but not even certainly sufficient matter are bound by the precept of annual confession.

⁴ This case refers to a twofold doubt, namely: 1. whether one who is found deprived of his senses is a Christian or not; 2. whether he is capable of absolution by reason of disposition.

⁵ ** The VV. object, as though opposed to the doctrine set forth here - namely, that it is lawful to absolve under condition also (no. 3) in doubt concerning jurisdiction on the part of the Confessor, and (no. 8) in doubt concerning the disposition of the penitent - the doctrine of St. Alphonsus, who (bk. 6, no. 432), as regards the first point, writes: But I would not admit this unless the penitent would have to lack absolution for a long time. But as regards the second: But I am unable to acquiesce in this doctrine as thus generally handed down; for I say that a sinner relapsing into mortal faults, who is not proved disposed by extraordinary signs, cannot be absolved under condition..., unless it is prudently feared that the sinner will not return again to confession and will waste away in his sins.

Reply. Gury does not propose these things absolutely, but, as he premises, when necessity presses or a grave and proportionate cause is present. But what the proportionate cause is he explains in the Resolutions (no. 439), to which he refers the reader. Moreover, in these Resolutions the reader will find those prudent limits which the VV. relate from St. Alphonsus as though to correct Gury's doctrine.

436. • Against the foregoing they object 1. That practice of absolving conditionally, especially those of doubtful disposition, is full of dangers, an encouragement of iniquities, etc.

Reply. I distinguish. That practice is full of dangers, etc., if it is employed indiscriminately, without discretion, and outside a case of necessity or grave utility, I concede; but if the rules handed down are observed, I deny.

They object 2. A penitent doubtfully absolved will proceed to receive the Eucharist and will communicate sacrilegiously; but this cannot be permitted. Therefore.

Reply 1. The Communion will not be sacrilegious, just as the confession is not sacrilegious; for the penitent is supposed to be acting in good faith. At most the Communion will be null, or will produce no fruits.

Reply 2. That Communion will not be useless; for it will easily excite in the communicant various acts and efforts of the virtues, at least some, toward loving God and fleeing evil. Indeed, according to the common opinion, even if the communicant is in the state of mortal sin, nevertheless, if he approaches Communion with attrition and in good faith, he will be restored to the state of grace. Nor will attrition be difficult for him; for approach to the sacred Table and the reception of the Body of Christ are accustomed most easily to arouse pious movements of sorrow and love in those communicating in good faith.

437. • They object 3. A penitent doubtfully absolved will no longer confess his sin, and if he was not truly disposed, he will die in sin.

Reply. That sin doubtfully absolved can be remitted: 1. through the reception of the Eucharist, as was just said; 2. indirectly with the others in the next confession, even if the penitent never again subjects his sin to the keys. Nor may you say that perhaps he will no longer approach the Sacrament of Penance; for this case, as rare, must be regarded as something per accidens. But the penitent would have been exposed to a much greater danger to salvation if he had been dismissed without absolution in that grave necessity which we always require for imparting such absolution.

They object 4. It is not lawful to use a probable opinion in the administration of the Sacraments, as is established from Proposition 1 condemned by Innocent XI. Therefore, it is not lawful to give an absolution that will be doubtfully valid.

Reply. I distinguish. Where both the validity of the Sacrament and the good of the person are endangered, I concede; otherwise, where necessity or another grave cause presses, I deny. - St. Lig., nos. 28, 57, and bk. 1, no. 59, and others commonly. In the condemned proposition, nothing is at issue except the essential parts of the Sacrament, namely, the validity of the matter and form insofar as they depend upon the minister. - Thus commonly with Goritia, table V, On Conscience. - But here the matter is supplied by the penitent and is consequently independent of the minister. Otherwise, penitents could for the most part not be absolved, since their dispositions are very often established only probably.

438. • They object 5. The practice of absolving conditionally must at least be restricted to the rarest cases of extreme necessity, namely, where a dying person is already deprived of his senses or where he is now on the point of dying; for it is his own fault, and a most grave fault, if he appears doubtfully disposed. - Thus the anonymous Author of the Letters against the excellent book of Cardinal Gousset entitled Justification of the Doctrine of St. Liguori.

Reply. Several false suppositions are found in the objection. For: 1. It is false that a penitent doubtfully disposed is certainly indisposed, at least per se; for there is a contradiction in the very terms. 2. It is false that the penitent is always at fault because he does not appear certainly disposed; for he can be sufficiently disposed without the Confessor knowing this certainly, since whenever he is not certainly indisposed, he can be truly disposed. 3. Grave reasons can be present for the salvation of the penitent on account of which absolution ought to be given rather than omitted, as was said above. Otherwise, there would sometimes be the greatest imprudence in the Confessor if he deferred absolution to extreme necessity, in which the penitent will scarcely, or perhaps hardly at all, be capable of the Sacrament. - See Gousset, *Lettres a M. le Cure ***,* Letter 8.

439. Resolutions. - 1. A penitent in mortal sin is to be absolved under condition whenever it is prudently doubted whether absolution was imparted or duly given, and certainty concerning this cannot easily be had. - Thus commonly do the Theologians teach.

2. All the dying concerning whose indisposition or incapacity there is no certainty are to be absolved under condition, as will be said more fully below where the integrity of confession and the minister are treated. - Thus also almost all.

3. Likewise, penitents of doubtful disposition who are in grave danger of death, for example, a woman in difficult childbirth, a sailor or anyone else about to undertake a long voyage, a soldier before battle, a sick person before a very laborious surgical operation, and a fortiori a criminal who is to suffer capital punishment, etc. - Thus commonly with St. Lig., no. 432.

4. Persons of weak understanding can be absolved under condition when there is doubt concerning their use of reason or sufficient disposition, serious diligence having first been employed to dispose them as far as possible, especially in the following cases: 1. if they are in danger of death; 2. if the precept of annual confession presses; 3. if they have confessed some mortal sin. The reason is that they are exposed to danger of proximate damnation if death presses, or because of the danger of remaining for a long time in mortal sin. On the other hand, there is no way or hope that, if absolution is delayed, they will shortly return disposed and be absolved more securely, as can perhaps be hoped concerning others. Indeed, they will be able to be absolved conditionally several times in the year, even if they bring only light sins, lest they be deprived so long of sacramental grace, or remain in mortal sin, if perhaps they are in it. - Thus St. Lig., no. 432. - Lacroix, no. 1797, and many others against others.

5. Those betrothed who are doubtfully disposed and are shortly to contract marriage can also probably be absolved under condition; because otherwise they will certainly profane that Sacrament, and, dejected in spirit because absolution was denied, they will not return to confess and will waste away in sins.

6. Pious penitents also can probably be absolved conditionally at times, when it is doubtful whether they submit sufficient matter to the keys. But it is much better that they furnish certain matter from their past life, and thus not be deprived of the grace of the Sacrament, according to what was said above, no. 424. - St. Lig., no. 442.

180. 1° On its validity. Gerson (fifteenth century) seems to be the first who explicitly defended the validity of conditional absolution;³ Cajetan sharply attacked his opinion;⁴ yet the more common and morally certain opinion has become that this absolution, the things to be posited having been posited, is valid.

³ De Schismate tollendo, among Opera omnia, Antwerp, 1706, t. II, p. 79; De Unitate Ecclesiae, p. 118.

⁴ Summula de peccatis, Lyons, 1551, p. 3.

The general principle is that that form is invalid which leaves the effect of the sacrament in suspense, but that form is valid which by no means suspends the effect.¹

¹ We proved this in the Treatise on the Sacraments, n. 101.

Now a condition concerning an uncertain future, for example, I absolve you, if within a month you shall make restitution, suspends the effect of the sacrament; for at the time when the sacrament is conferred, the effect is not produced, since the execution of the condition is uncertain, and moreover the intention itself of the Priest remains suspended; but at the time when the condition is verified, the sacrament no longer exists, and consequently cannot obtain its effect.

But a condition concerning the past or the present, for example, I absolve you if you have already made restitution, or if you are living, does not suspend the effect of the sacrament, and consequently does not render absolution invalid; for at the time when the sacrament is effected, the condition is already verified or not. If the former, absolution immediately produces its effect; if the latter, it is immediately invalid.

Nor should it be said that a conditional form stands in the way of the nature of this sacrament, which is administered in the manner of a judgment. For even in human judgments, a conditional sentence is not rarely passed, for example, you will go to prison unless within three days you pay the debt; or I condemn you to prison, but, if you do not fall again into fault, for a time you will be immune from punishment. Moreover civil judgment is committed to execution by men, while the sentence of the confessor God Himself executes: therefore it suffices that God knows whether the condition has been fulfilled or not.

181. Yet a few theologians, such as the Louvain theologians and Collet,² have said that a condition even concerning the present invalidates the sacrament, if it is not a condition of fact (for example, if you are living, if you are capable), but of law (for example, if you are disposed, if you will to make restitution); for through a condition of this kind the nature of judgment is destroyed, since it belongs to the confessor himself to pass judgment concerning these dispositions of the penitent. - But this reason does not hold; for the confessor certainly must judge concerning the dispositions of the penitent, but in a human mode, insofar as can be done; now sometimes he judges that the matter is doubtful, and consequently, if a grave reason is added, absolution is to be granted under condition.

² Collet, in Migne, Theol. Cursus, t. XXII, 732.

Moreover, so that every doubt may be removed, it suffices that the confessor, doubting concerning the dispositions of the penitent, intend to absolve him according to the intention of Christ and of the Church under the tacit condition: if you are capable, which is held by all as valid.

182. 2° On its lawfulness. (A) Conditional absolution is lawful when these two things concur at the same time: (a) a grave reason for judging that the form pronounced absolutely would expose the sacrament to the danger of nullity; (b) a notable utility for the penitent of receiving absolution immediately.

For (a) the very nature of the sacrament requires that it be administered in the manner of a judgment; but, regularly speaking, a judgment ought to be absolute, especially in the sacred tribunal. For either the confessor is morally certain that the penitent is capable and disposed, and then he must absolve absolutely; or he judges certainly that he is incapable or indisposed, and then absolution must be denied; or he doubts, and then regularly absolution must be deferred, unless a special reason is present for receiving the sacrament immediately. (b) Moreover, if conditional absolution were given easily, both penitents and the confessor himself would easily fall into a certain negligence, and would not much care about arousing the necessary dispositions; from which it would also happen that sacrileges would gradually be multiplied.

183. (B) The chief causes on account of which conditional absolution can be given are:

(a) On the part of the confessor: if he positively doubts whether he absolved or not, - whether he omitted an essential word or not; then let him say, or rather intend (for it is better to conceive the condition in the mind alone): if you are not absolved, I absolve you. - But if he doubts whether he has jurisdiction, or whether the jurisdiction given to him has expired, is extended to such a penitent, or to such a case, and at the same time a grave reason is present for absolving the penitent immediately, then (from can. 209) the Church supplies jurisdiction, and therefore absolution can be given without condition.

(b) On the part of the penitent: in a case of necessity, if the dying person presents doubtful matter or doubtful dispositions, or if it is doubted whether he is still living or capable of absolution.

Also, outside a case of necessity, if those doubtfully disposed are about to contract marriage, or to leave the place, or wish, for a grave reason, for example, to avoid infamy, soon to receive holy communion; - or if there is a founded fear that those doubtfully disposed, if they are dismissed without absolution, will not return to the sacred tribunal, or will fall into despair; - or if there is question of the half-witted, of children whose use of reason is doubtful, and who otherwise would be deprived for a long time of the benefit of the sacrament; - or of the pious, who provide only doubtful matter, and from whom certain matter cannot be obtained, on account of their peculiar dispositions; for these can sometimes be absolved conditionally, lest they lack absolution for too long. For in these and similar cases the two conditions stated above are verified: on the one hand, the absolute pronouncing of the form exposes the sacrament to the danger of nullity; and on the other, there is a sufficient reason for absolving the penitent immediately.

184. (C) Corollaries. (a) A penitent absolved under condition must regularly abstain from communion, since otherwise he exposes himself to the danger at least of material sacrilege. Hence the confessor cannot positively tell such a penitent to receive holy communion. But if he is asked by the penitent, let him answer prudently according to the various circumstances; for example, let him say: "follow the dictate of your conscience."

(b) But there is not given a strict obligation of accusing again sins conditionally absolved, as will be better understood from the things to be said where we treat of confession. For it can prudently be judged that they were remitted; moreover, if the penitent is in good faith, as is supposed, they will be remitted in the following confession.

Absolution should be given conditionally: a) When the confessor entertains a serious doubt with regard to one of the following points: α) Whether there is sufficient matter for the administration of the Sacrament; β) Whether he has already absolved the penitent; γ) Whether he possesses the necessary jurisdiction; δ) Whether the penitent has the use of reason; ε) Whether the penitent is dead or alive. b) When the confessor can arrive at no certain conclusion with regard to the penitent's disposition, and absolution cannot be deferred, he should absolve conditionally. ⁶

⁶ Cfr. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, pp. 232 sq.; Gopfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. III, 4th ed., pp. 241 sqq.

C. Independent from every suspensive condition in the future. For the sacraments immediately operate the effect which they can, nor is it in the power of the minister to suspend this into the future. For at the time at which the sacrament is conferred, the effect is not produced, since the execution of the condition is uncertain and the intention of the priest, which is required for the validity of the sacrament, remains suspended; but at the time at which the condition is verified, the sacrament now does not exist, and therefore cannot produce the effect. Hence:

1. Absolution under a condition concerning an uncertain future is invalid, e.g., I absolve you if within a month you shall have made restitution.

2. On the contrary, under a condition concerning the present or past it is valid, if the condition is verified, e.g., I absolve you if you are alive, if you are capable, if you have made restitution, if I have not absolved you, etc. For this does not suspend the effect, for when the condition is verified, the absolution is in reality absolute, and consequently it is valid in the same way as this and immediately produces its effect.

V. Observation. - Concerning the validity of absolution under a condition concerning the present, doubt sometimes existed, especially concerning the condition: if you are disposed. Thus once several Louvain authors and certain others, such as Collet, said that this condition, like several others, stands against the special character of the sacrament of Penance, which was instituted by way of judgment.

They distinguished between conditions of fact, e.g., if you are alive, if you are baptized, etc., concerning which the confessor does not have to judge, and conditions of law, e.g., if you are disposed, if you wish to make restitution, etc., concerning which he does have to judge. The former they generally admitted, because they do not invalidate the sacrament; but the condition concerning which the confessor must judge, such as that one: if you are disposed, they rejected as invalidating, because it takes away the nature of judgment, since through it the confessor supposes precisely that concerning which he must judge and bear judgment. Whence just as there would be no sentence of a civil judge concerning a litigated thing if he said: "I adjudge the thing to you, if it is yours," so absolution is invalid if the confessor says: "if you are disposed, I absolve you." This opinion is now obsolete.

For the opinion which, even at the time of the dispute, was most common outside the school of the Louvain authors, and now, after the controversy has ended, altogether common, holds that the sacrament of Penance is valid if a condition is placed beneath. The reason is the general doctrine: conditions concerning the present do not invalidate the sacraments; because when the condition is verified, in the case the disposition of the penitent, the conditioned form is equivalent to an absolute one, and thus all things required for the value of the sacrament are present.

And indeed: 1) Such a condition does not take away every judgment. For it is some judgment to say: if you are disposed, I make for you the right by which it is owed that sin be remitted to you and no longer imputed. Even in human judgments, a conditioned sentence is rather often borne, e.g., "you will go to prison unless within three days you pay the debt," or "I condemn you to prison, but, if you do not fall again into fault, for a time you will be immune from punishment," or "you are condemned or liberated, if in your desk there is this or that document," which immediately is ordered to be inquired into by trustworthy men.¹

¹ Cf. Lehmkuhl, Th. M., II, n. 370, who adds: "Indeed the sentence even of human judgment and in a civil matter not rarely has this condition implicitly in some way, 'if only the testimony of the witnesses was true'; for unless it rests on this estimation and condition, which nevertheless can sometimes fail, the sentence would be unjust and thus null... By parity, a sacramental sentence always rests on this supposition, that the penitent speaks truly and truly grieves..."

2. That condition does not take away the nature of the judgment proper to this sacrament. The confessor must judge concerning the disposition of the penitent; but, according to St. Thomas, q. 17, a. 3, this is only a judgment of discretion, so that the confessor may prudently and licitly absolve, but it is not the judicial sentence itself nor is it necessary for its validity. Here the essence of judgment consists only in the pronouncing of the sentence of absolution upon a contrite and confessed guilty person; - for otherwise he would absolve invalidly who absolves while judging nothing concerning the dispositions of the penitent or judging him positively indisposed while nevertheless he is duly disposed; which no one will admit.

3. To the arguments of the adversaries the response is: there is a disparity with human judgment. a) This does not give a right but declares it and therefore is null if it is made under that condition which precisely must be declared, because it declares nothing if it supposes in the condition what it must declare: thus it supposes what is being asked; on the contrary, the sacrament of Penance gives a right, which can also be done under condition. - b) Human judgment must be committed to execution by men, and therefore it is necessary that it be known and declared that the condition is verified; God Himself executes the sentence of the priest, and therefore it suffices that God knows whether the condition has been fulfilled. - c) As to the example brought forward, parity is denied, because it belongs to the essence of civil judgment that the judge pronounce whose the thing is; it does not belong to the essence of sacramental judgment to pronounce that the penitent is capable, disposed, lives, has made restitution, etc., but to pronounce that a right is conceded to him for liberation from sins.

Although the condition: if you are disposed, leaves the sacrament valid, nevertheless it does not seem opportunely to be used in practice, indeed generally not even licitly, as will be said below, c. IV, q. 2, a. 3, VII.

VII. It is asked under what condition one doubtfully disposed is to be absolved?

Several more recent authors indicate the condition: if you are disposed; the reason of which can be assigned from the difference between Penance and the other sacraments.

Namely, the disposition necessary for justification, namely attrition, which is not of the essence of the other sacraments, is a necessary part of this sacrament, and, added to absolution as form, together with confession and satisfaction, constitutes the very matter of the sacrament. Hence, just as the other sacraments, when doubt exists concerning the matter, are ministered under the condition: if I am able, so this sacrament is ministered to one doubtfully contrite under the condition: if you are disposed. - Hence also the sacrament of Penance cannot be at once valid and unformed or fruitless: for if it is valid, the disposition for justification, namely attrition, is present, and therefore the fruit is obtained at once.

Several others reject the condition: if you are disposed, and do not admit, just as for the other sacraments, any condition except: if you are capable.

They judge that contrition, which is a necessary part for the value of the sacrament of Penance, is not the same as that which is a sufficient disposition for justification or the fruit of the sacrament (as is explained where the effect of contrition is spoken of): they say the first contrition is that which can be externally manifested and judged by the confessor with practical certitude, namely, that which is internal and sincere, supernatural and universal; but as a disposition for justification there is required more, namely, also contrition appretiatively supreme, by which a man is so disposed that he has sin as the supreme evil and efficaciously wills to suffer all things rather than commit it: but this escapes human experiment and cannot be judged by practical certitude, and therefore does not pertain to the sensible sign of the sacrament. Hence if the former contrition is present and the other lacking, the sacrament will be valid but fruitless: but when the other disposition arrives, it will obtain fruit and revive.

From this it is to be concluded, they say, that just as for the other sacraments, absolution is never to be ministered under the condition: if you are disposed, that is, if you have all the dispositions required for the sacrament; but under the condition: if you are capable, namely, of receiving the sacrament, to which all other conditions placed on the part of the subject can be reduced: if you live, if you are baptized, if you have sinned, if I have not absolved you... For the formula: if you are disposed, in the case in which disposition, namely, contrition appretiatively supreme, were absent, would render the sacrament wholly null and would impede its reviviscence forever; - on the contrary the form: if you are capable, would leave the sacrament valid in the case in which that lesser contrition were present which suffices, as a part of the sacrament, for value, and that greater one were not present which is required for fruit, namely, justification; and therefore, if the penitent afterward elicited contrition appretiatively supreme, by that fact the sacrament would revive and the penitent would obtain the effect of grace in the same way as happens in the other sacraments. Namely, the reviviscence of the sacrament is not to be impeded.

In practice, the aforesaid conclusion is legitimate, even if the second sentence is not certain, but only probable, as in fact it is. For from this it follows that attention must be given to it in practice. For the sacraments are not to be ministered in any merely probable and uncertain mode, but in the safer and more certain mode for the good of the penitent, and indeed not in such a way that their effects are impeded, but so that they may profit men as much as possible. And therefore one must abstain from the condition: if you are disposed, and employ that other: if you are capable.

Namely, the same reason why the sacrament is to be given with danger of fruitlessness or even invalidity, the spiritual necessity of the neighbor or the danger lest he be deprived of grace necessary to him, is also the reason why it should not be conferred under

the condition if you are disposed, so that namely the sacramental fruit, if not in the present at least in the future, may be able to come to him, and thus assistance may be given to his spiritual necessity. For it is better to permit the absence of present fruit than to impede reviviscence and future fruit; because the danger of the sacrament, as the lesser evil, is to be preferred to the danger of the salvation or spiritual good of men. And this seems to be the reason why the Church in her rituals is silent concerning the aforesaid condition, and although she enumerates many conditions, she never makes mention of this one; indeed this one was unknown in the Church until the seventeenth century.

447. Corollaries. - From this practical corollaries can be deduced:

1° That absolution given to an absent person, whether through letters or through an intermediary, even when he confesses in this way, is illicit and invalid,1 both because it is not done by vocal words, and because it is not done to one present.

Besides, the nature of the sacrament of Penance seems to require that, from the mode in which it is administered, per se at least the priest can be made certain concerning the actual state of the penitent; for which there is required a present confession and absolution of one present; nor does an intermediary bear the place of the penitent as to disposition. On account of this Clement VIII, on June 20, 1602, in the Congregation of the Holy Office, at least as false, rash, and scandalous, condemned this proposition: "that it is lawful through letters or an intermediary to confess sins sacramentally to an absent confessor and from the same absent one to obtain absolution," and commanded that it should never in any case be reduced to practice. From this it follows that the absolution is not only illicit but also invalid, for otherwise sometimes, at least in extreme necessity, it could licitly be reduced to practice.

2° That absolution given to an absent person is also invalid, even if confession was made to a priest present, on account of the same motives.

3° Likewise that absolution given to one present is invalid, but by force of confession made in absence and here and now in no way renewed, not even in general. For then present matter is lacking, namely confession, and therefore the absolution would not be sacramental, as not informing the matter, nor is the priest more certified concerning the actual state of the penitent.

It is also reported that Clement VIII pronounced that he had condemned and prohibited the proposition adduced not only copulatively but divisively, concerning absolution and confession separately; and most certainly Paul V, in the Congregation of the Holy Office on July 14, 1605, declared the decree to have value in the divided sense, so that he ordered the contrary interpretation to be expunged from the writings of Suarez.

4° Whence, as an axiom, they are accustomed to say: absolution is invalid, whether a) an absent person confesses and an absent person is absolved, or b) a present person confesses and an absent person is absolved, or c) an absent person confesses and a present person is absolved.

5° Nevertheless the practice of absolving dying persons destitute of the senses, who manifested a desire of confession, concerning which testimony is had through bystanders, is not disapproved, as Clement VIII declared.

For then there is present confession of a present person made to one present through bystanders, as through interpreters. For as Billuart says, on Penance, diss. 7, art. 3, § II, "the penitent is present, the bystanders present, the confessor present, and through the testimony of the bystanders the confession itself present." Namely, the penitent is present, and his confession is morally continued and expressed by the mouth of the bystanders, so that the priest can be morally certain concerning the actual state of the penitent, since it is in no way likely that he, while the danger of death stands, has changed his good disposition.

6° Finally, absolution by telephone, or through a long phonetic canal, is invalid, or at least very doubtful.

For according to the natural and ordinary mode of conversing, the penitent and confessor are not present to each other, and by the common estimation of men, the conversation is judged to take place between absent persons: simple communication is not yet presence. Indeed neither is the very voice of the one speaking heard on the telephone, but it is only perfectly reproduced; but an artificial transfer of the voice does not suffice that the absolution which reaches the penitent be truly vocal. Whence, at most, in a case of extreme necessity, and only under condition, could the penitent be thus absolved, in default of a more certain mode.

But if the Sacred Penitentiary, on July 1, 1884, to a question proposed about this, wrote back that nothing was to be answered, it seems to have wished to signify: that the question did not pertain to itself, but to the Holy Office.

1. Formerly several admitted this, as Peter Paludanus, Adrianus, Sylvester, whose opinion according to P. Soto can be held. John of St. Thomas moreover adduces for it I. Medina, On Confession, 9; and Navarrus, Summa, c. 21, n. 30. Against it stand Cajetan and Ledesma and generally the more recent authors; and St. Thomas is adduced, III, q. 84, a. 3, ad 3; a. 4, ad 3; and IV Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3; d. 14, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 1, ad 2; d. 17, q. 3, a. 4, qc. 3, ad 3; St. Bonaventure and St. Albert the Great in IV Sent.; Alexander of Hales, III, q. 60, m. 1, a. 1; Richard in IV, d. 17, a. 2, q. 5; Ferrariensis, Contra Gentiles, IV, c. 72.

618. It is asked under what condition one doubtfully disposed is to be absolved? - Many in practice use the condition: if you are disposed, or even defend it theoretically; while others reject it, indeed formerly it was disputed whether absolution under such a condition is not invalid.

A. Some Louvain authors and certain others, such as Collet, said that this condition, like several others, stands in the way of the special character of the sacrament of Penance, which was instituted after the manner of judgment.

They distinguished between conditions of fact, e.g., if you are living, if you are baptized, etc., concerning which the confessor need not judge; and conditions of law, e.g., if you are disposed, if you are willing to restore, etc., concerning which he must judge. The former they generally admitted, because they do not invalidate the sacrament; but the condition concerning which the confessor must judge, such as this one: if you are disposed, they rejected as invalidating, since it takes away the nature of judgment, since by it the confessor supposes precisely that about which he must judge and pronounce judgment. Hence, just as there would be no sentence of a civil judge concerning a disputed thing if he said: "I adjudge the thing to you, if it is yours," so absolution is invalid if the confessor says: "if you are disposed, I absolve you." This opinion is now obsolete.

For the opinion, even at the time of the dispute, most common outside the school of the Louvain authors, and now, after the controversy has ended, altogether common, holds that the sacrament of Penance is valid if the condition is fulfilled. The reason is the general doctrine: conditions concerning the present do not invalidate the sacraments; because when the condition is verified, in the case the disposition of the penitent, the conditioned form is equivalent to the absolute form, and thus all things required for the value of the sacrament are present.

And indeed: 1) Such a condition does not take away every judgment. For it is some judgment to say: if you are disposed, I make for you the right by which it is owed that the sin be remitted to you and no longer imputed. Even in human judgments, a conditioned sentence is not rarely pronounced, e.g., "you will go to prison, unless within three days you pay the debt," or "I condemn you to prison, but, if you do not fall again into fault, for the time you will be immune from penalty," or "you are condemned or freed, if in your chest there is this or that document," which immediately is ordered to be searched for by trustworthy men.1

2. That condition does not take away the nature of the judgment proper to this sacrament. The confessor must judge concerning the disposition of the penitent; but, according to St. Thomas, q. 17, a. 3, this is only a judgment of discretion, so that the confessor may absolve prudently and licitly, but it is not the judicial sentence itself nor is it necessary for its validity. The essence of judgment here consists only in the pronouncement of the sentence of absolution upon the guilty person who is contrite and confessed; - for otherwise he would absolve invalidly who absolves while judging nothing concerning the dispositions of the penitent, or judging him positively indisposed, while nevertheless he is duly disposed; which no one will admit.

3. To the arguments of the adversaries it is answered: There is a disparity with human judgment. a) This does not confer a right but declares it, and therefore it is null if it is made under that condition which precisely must be declared, because it declares nothing if it supposes in the condition that which it must declare; for thus it supposes that which is sought. On the contrary, the sacrament of Penance confers a right, which can also be done under condition. - b) Human judgment must be handed over to execution by men, and therefore it is necessary that it be known and declared that the condition is verified; the sentence of the priest God Himself executes, and therefore it suffices that God know whether the condition has been fulfilled. - c) As to the example brought forward, parity is denied, because it is of the essence of civil judgment that the judge pronounce whose the thing is; it is not of the essence of sacramental judgment to pronounce that the penitent is capable, disposed, living, has restored, etc., but to pronounce that the right is granted to him for liberation from sins.

B. On the contrary, many of the more recent authors, conformably to the mind of St. Alphonsus,¹ set down the condition: if you are disposed. The reason for this can be assigned from the difference between Penance and other sacraments.

¹ Cf. Lehmkuhl, Th. M. II, n. 370, who adds: "Indeed, the sentence even of human judgment and in a civil matter not rarely in some way has this condition implicitly, 'provided only that the testimony of the witnesses has been true'; for unless it rests upon this estimation and condition, which nevertheless can sometimes fail, the sentence is unjust and thus null... Similarly, the sacramental sentence always rests upon this supposition, that the penitent says what is true and truly grieves..."

For: 1) The disposition necessary for justification, namely attrition, which is not of the essence of the other sacraments, is a part and necessary condition of this sacrament, and, added to absolution as to the form, together with confession and satisfaction constitutes the very matter of the sacrament. Hence, just as other sacraments, when there is doubt concerning the matter, are ministered under the condition: if I can, so this sacrament is ministered to one doubtfully contrite under the condition: if you are disposed.

2. Hence, they say, the sacrament of Penance cannot be at the same time valid and unformed or fruitless. For if it is valid, the disposition for justification, namely attrition, is present, and consequently the fruit is obtained immediately.

C. Many others reject the condition: if you are disposed, and admit, just as for other sacraments, only the condition: if you are capable.

They judge that contrition, which is the necessary part for the value of the sacrament of Penance, is not the same as that which is a sufficient disposition for justification or the fruit of the sacrament, as was said in n. 506. They say the first contrition is that which can be externally manifested and judged by the confessor with practical certitude, namely, that which is internal and sincere, supernatural and universal; but as a disposition for justification more is required, namely also contrition appreciatively supreme, by which a man is so disposed that he holds sin as the supreme evil and efficaciously wishes to suffer all things rather than commit it. But this escapes human experience and cannot be judged with practical certitude, and therefore does not pertain to the sensible sign of the sacrament. Hence, if the former contrition is present and the other is lacking, the sacrament will be valid but fruitless; but when the other disposition comes, it will obtain fruit and revive.

From this, they say, one must conclude, just as for the other sacraments, that absolution is never to be ministered under the condition: if you are disposed, i.e., if you have all the dispositions required for receiving the sacrament well; but under the condition: if you are capable, namely of receiving the sacrament, to which all other conditions on the part of the subject can be reduced: if you are living, if you are baptized, if you have sinned, if I have not absolved you... For the formula: if you are disposed, in the case in which the disposition, namely appreciatively supreme contrition, were absent, would render the sacrament altogether null and would impede its reviviscence forever. On the contrary, the form: if you are capable, would leave the sacrament valid in the case in which that lesser contrition were present which suffices, as part of the sacrament, for value, and that greater contrition were not present which is required for fruit, namely justification; and consequently, if the penitent afterward elicited appreciatively supreme contrition, by that very fact the sacrament would revive and the penitent would obtain the effect of grace in the same way as happens in other sacraments. Namely, the reviviscence of the sacrament is not to be impeded.

In practice this conclusion is legitimate, even if the last opinion is not certain, but only probable, as in fact it is. For from this it follows that in practice one must attend to it. For the sacraments are not to be ministered in any probable and uncertain way whatever, but in the safer and more certain way for the good of the penitent, and indeed not so that their effects are impeded, but so that they profit men as much as is possible. And therefore one must abstain from the condition: if you are disposed, and use that other one: if you are capable.

Namely, the same reason why the sacrament is to be given with danger of fruitlessness or even invalidity, the spiritual necessity of the neighbor or the danger lest he be deprived of grace necessary to him, is also the reason why it is not conferred under the condition if you are disposed, so that the sacramental fruit, if not in the present, at least in the future, may be able to come to him. For it is better to permit the absence of present fruit than to impede reviviscence and future fruit; because the danger of the sacrament, as a lesser evil, is to be preferred to the danger to salvation or to the spiritual good of men. And this seems to be the reason why the Church in her rituals is silent concerning the aforesaid condition, and although she enumerates several conditions, never makes mention of this one; indeed it was unknown in the Church until the seventeenth century.

619. Observations. - 1. If some penitent is doubtfully disposed, every effort must be applied so that he may be brought to a certain disposition; only then is he to be absolved under condition if a certain disposition cannot be had and yet there is present a grave danger of spiritual detriment, because the grace of the sacrament is necessary to him here and now.

2. It is not licit regularly or always to absolve under condition, because the sacrament of Penance was instituted after the manner of judgment; but judgment must regularly be pronounced in an absolute manner.

3. Hence concerning the sufficiency of dispositions the confessor must judge from office, and the practice of those is to be rejected who, to avoid difficulties, simply absolve under the condition: if you are disposed. And this all the more because the placing of the condition cannot remove every material irreverence from danger of nullity from the sacrament; and if it is placed without sufficient reason, neither can it remove the formal and voluntary irreverence (n. 23, II).

1. Not so of itself when the precept of communion presses, because this can be postponed; - unless by accident there is fear of infamy or scandal, as is said under 4.

1. Th. M. l. VI, n. 28.

I say. The form of the sacrament of Penance is distinguished as twofold: one essential, and the other preceptive or rubrical. The first consists in the words: I absolve you from your sins; as is clear from the Council of Trent, sess. 14, chap. 3, where it is said: "The holy Synod teaches that the form of the sacrament of Penance, in which principally its force is placed, is set in those words of the Minister: I absolve you, etc.; to which indeed, according to the custom of the holy Church, certain prayers are laudably joined." But the rubrical form consists in those prayers which precede or follow the essential form, and thus it is contained in the Roman Ritual:

"May almighty God have mercy on you, and, your sins having been forgiven, lead you to eternal life. Amen.

May the almighty and merciful Lord grant you indulgence, absolution, and remission of your sins. Amen.

May our Lord Jesus Christ absolve you, and I by His authority absolve you from every bond of excommunication, suspension, and interdict, insofar as I can and you need. Then I absolve you from your sins in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Amen.

May the Passion of our Lord Jesus Christ, the merits of the Blessed Mary Virgin and of all the Saints, whatever good you have done, and whatever evil you have endured, be to you unto remission of sins, increase of grace, and the reward of eternal life. Amen."

Observe, however, 1°. that the hand is to be raised from the word Indulgence up to the words The Passion of the Lord; 2°. that the sign of the cross is to be made over the penitent while it is said: In the name of the Father, etc.; 3°. that the word suspension must be omitted if the penitent is a layman; 4°. that the word then is to be pronounced, for in the recent TYPICAL EDITION of the Roman Ritual it is found written as a part of the text.

Observe 2°. that there is a pious custom, which nevertheless in no way obliges, that before confession, while he blesses the penitent, the confessor says: "May the Lord be in your heart and on your lips, that you may rightly confess all your sins," or some similar prayer.

Question 1. Whether anything can be omitted from the rubrical form, and when? Resp. Although the prayers joined by the Church to the absolving formula are not necessary for obtaining absolution itself, nevertheless, unless for a just cause, let them not be omitted (Can. 885).

But, since according to a probable opinion the Passion raises the good works of the penitent to the merit of sacramental satisfaction, it is fitting that it be omitted very rarely. But the words Our Lord, etc., do not seem able to be omitted without venial fault, unless necessity presses. - Cf. Rit. Rom. § Form of Absolution. - O'Kane, nn. 981 and seq.

Question 2. Whether the raising of the hand and the formation of the sign of the cross are necessary in imparting absolution? Resp. It is certain that it is not required for the validity of the sacrament, because it pertains neither to the matter nor to the form. This is clear from the Councils of Florence and Trent, as well as from the unanimous consent of theologians, at least after the Council of Trent. Nor is it required under mortal sin for liceity according to the common opinion, against a few; because it is only a Rubric, which does not seem grave. Indeed several grave authors assert that this can be omitted without sin; thus Busembaum, reported and implicitly approved by St. Alphonsus. Whatever may be the case, at least the raising of the hand can be omitted without sin while the prayers which precede formal absolution are recited. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 425. - O'Kane, nn. 982 and 983.

Question 3. Whether stole and surplice are required in the administration of the sacrament of Penance? Resp. On this matter the Fathers of Baltimore speak thus: "Approaching the sacred tribunal, let the confessor be vested with surplice and violet stole, according to the prescription of the Roman Ritual." Moreover the prescription of the Roman Ritual has itself thus: "Let [the priest] use a surplice and a stole of violet color, according as the time or the custom of places shall bear." Therefore in practice attention must be paid to custom, to the particular statutes of each diocese, and to the privileges which some families of Regulars enjoy in this matter. - Cf. Conc. Plen. Balt. II, n. 213. - Baruffaldi, de Sacr. Poenit. tit. 18, n. 21. - Acta S. Sedis, vol. 4, p. 62, n. 111.

Question 4. Whether all the words of the essential form: I absolve you from your sins, are essential? Resp. Negatively, for it is probably taught that the word you can be omitted, because it is sufficiently contained in the word your, and more probably still the whole clause from your sins, because those two words I absolve you contain the whole effect of the sacrament. But, practically speaking, it is necessary to utter the whole essential form, both because it is prescribed, and because outside a case of necessity, which could scarcely be imagined in this matter, it is not lawful to use probabilities in those things which pertain to the validity of the sacrament. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 430. - Lugo, disp. 13, n. 26. - O'Kane, n. 984.

Question 5. Whether a priest can validly absolve several persons with one form, saying: I absolve you all from your sins? Resp. Affirmatively, because all things required for validity are found. Indeed, this also can licitly be done in a case of necessity, for example, in a shipwreck, before battle, or in the battle itself, etc.; and such an absolution would be multiple, not indeed formally, but virtually and equivalently, and there would be as many sacraments as there were men who had been disposed through some confession and sufficient sorrow. - Cf. Lacroix, n. 645.¹

¹ Cf. Addenda, p. 1142, n. 108.

Question 6. What presence of the penitent is reputed moral in order to absolution? Resp. That alone which effects that the words I absolve you, according to the common estimation of men, are judged to fall upon the penitent: and this indeed is certainly verified when the confessor and penitent are not farther apart from one another than if two men could and usually would converse with an ordinary voice. Many theologians, determining this distance more closely, extend it to 20 paces, especially if the penitent is not outside the sight of the confessor. But when necessity presses, a penitent can and must be absolved as often as he is perceived by some sense. Hence 1°. he is to be absolved who is seen to fall from a roof, to fall into a river, or to be submerged in the sea, at least if he is not far distant from the confessor; 2°. if the confessor, on account of danger of infection or because of another cause, cannot enter the room of the sick person, he must absolve him from the doorway; 3°. if a penitent were to depart from the confessor not yet absolved, thinking himself absolved, he would have to be absolved if, being a little distant, he were seen, or were certainly known to be present within a nearby crowd; nevertheless he would have to be called back, if this could conveniently be done. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 429.

Question 7. What is to be said of absolution given by employing that new instrument which they commonly call telephone? Resp. Outside a case of necessity it is certainly and gravely illicit for a confessor to use such an instrument, because the sacrament certainly would be exposed to danger of nullity, and because a new practice would be introduced in the administration of the sacraments, and one liable to frauds. But whether in a case of extreme necessity the use of such an instrument could be tolerated is difficult to decide, and the question is worthy of being referred to the Apostolic See. - Yet to say what seems to me, it does not appear why a priest should be condemned who through the telephone conditionally absolved some penitent, after he had learned from him that he was seized by sudden and most grave illness, that he grieved greatly for his sins, and that he had applied his ears to the instrument and would wait for absolution. For moral presence and the connection between matter and form are certainly required in every sacrament, but in a different degree and manner according to the diversity of each rite. But since the sacrament of Penance was instituted after the manner of a forensic judgment, for which that presence suffices by force of which the judge and the accused can converse together, in the proposed case absolution does not seem to be certainly invalid, since the penitent and priest can be said in a true sense to be conversing. - Cf. Irish Ecclesiastical Record, Feb., Mar. and Apr. 1883; and Jun. and Jul. 1885.

Question 8. What is to be said of conditional absolution? Resp. It is certain that an absolution imparted under a condition concerning the present or the past is valid in every case, provided that the other things required for the validity of the sacrament are present: for the condition in no way changes the sense of the sacramental form, which it does not affect at all; but it affects only the will of the confessor, who does not intend to absolve unless the condition attached is fulfilled; but when this has been fulfilled, the form becomes absolute; and consequently nothing is found which could hinder its validity. It is likewise certain that conditional absolution is sometimes licit; for if it is valid, it must also be licit when necessity presses.

But the doctrine of some must be rejected as plainly lax, who hold that conditional absolution can be imparted from any light cause whatever, and with no necessity pressing, even if the sufficient disposition of a penitent burdened also with mortal sins is in some way doubted. For there is no one who does not see how many sacrileges a practice of this kind would introduce. For the confessor would then no longer be a prudent dispenser of the sacraments, but would cast pearls before swine; and by this facility of absolving he would bring it about that penitents would waste away in sins. But no more is the doctrine of those to be admitted who, with Collet and certain others, hold that absolution under condition is not to be imparted except in extreme necessity or in extreme danger of life: for a doctrine of this kind is supremely harmful to penitents who can return to the confessor only with difficulty, and, dismissed without absolution, incur danger of eternal damnation.

Hence, with due conditions preserved, when necessity presses, or when there is present a grave and proportionate cause, it is lawful to absolve conditionally in the following cases: 1°. in doubt whether the penitent is living or dead; 2°. in doubt of sufficient matter, for example, when the precept of annual confession presses, etc.; 3°. in doubt of jurisdiction on the part of the confessor; 4°. in doubt whether the penitent was duly absolved; 5°. in doubt of the use of reason in children, the insane, etc.; 6°. in doubt whether the penitent is morally present; 7°. in doubt whether a dying person destitute of the senses is capable of the sacrament; 8°. in doubt concerning the disposition of the penitent, when not only extreme but also simply grave spiritual necessity presses. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 431 and seq. - Billuart, diss. 6, art. 10, §7. - Lacroix, lib. 6, part. 1, n. 78.