Article II: On the Duties in the Act of Confession

607. Various duties are to be exercised in the act of confession. - For the confessor is bound to know the case and to pronounce sentence. To the knowledge of the case there pertains: 1) as judge, to question the penitent and to form for himself a judgment concerning the case; then, on that occasion also, 2) as teacher, to instruct and admonish; 3) as physician, to provide remedies; 4) as father, to dispose and prepare; finally, to the pronouncement of sentence, 5) as minister exercising the power of the keys and sacramental judgment, to grant, deny, or defer absolution. For, as the Ritual warns, t. 3, c. 1, n. 23: "Let him diligently see when and to whom absolution is to be conferred, or denied, or deferred, lest he absolve those who are incapable of such a benefit."

608. Principle I. The confessor, as judge, from office is sometimes bound to question the penitent with moral diligence, and indeed of itself under grave obligation, as often as he probably judges that he, whether culpably or inculpably, perhaps omits certain things necessary to be known for knowledge of the case or for absolution.

It is said: 1) sometimes, for if from the confession itself or from the condition of the person of the penitent he judges that he knows the sins completely and the dispositions of soul sufficiently, the confessor is not bound to question, as this would be idle in the case. This also holds concerning uneducated persons who seem sufficiently instructed and diligently accuse their sins;

2. with moral diligence, because the confessor is bound to question only to supply the defect of the penitent, who himself is not bound to greater diligence; and besides, excessive diligence would render the sacrament burdensome and hateful;

3. of itself, under grave obligation: for it concerns a grave matter, since it regards the salvation of the penitent and the reverence of the sacrament; although nevertheless there can be negligence culpable only lightly, as if in a long series of sins one or another question is omitted.

It is proved: a) From the authority of the Church, namely from Lateran Council IV, in the decree concerning annual confession: "But let the priest be discreet and prudent... diligently inquiring both the circumstances of the sinner and of the sin"; and from the Roman Ritual, t. 3, c. 1, n. 16: "if the penitent has not expressed the number, species, and circumstances of sins necessary to be explained, let the priest prudently question him."

b) By reason: The confessor, as judge, cannot pronounce sentence unless he knows the case, namely both the sins which the penitent has committed, as to number, species, and circumstances, and his dispositions, and often also the occasions and causes of sins, which he must be disposed to leave or combat. But for this it is not always sufficient that he hear the penitent, but often it is required that he question him. Therefore he is bound to question as often as he knows or reasonably doubts or presumes that the penitent does not sufficiently manifest these things.

609. Concerning what things one must question. - Therefore he is bound to question concerning three things, namely those things, and insofar as they are necessary, for procuring 1) the validity of the sacrament, 2) the integrity of confession, or 3) the correction or amendment of the penitent.

1. For procuring the validity of the sacrament, e.g., for knowing whether there is sufficient matter of confession, whether the penitent is concealing something out of shame, as often happens in boys and girls, whether the penitent is sufficiently disposed.

2. For the integrity of confession, e.g., concerning the number of sins, species, circumstances changing the species; or concerning sins of which penitents are not accustomed to accuse themselves, as concerning internal sins, the omission of the duties of state, etc.

3. For the correction of the penitent, e.g., concerning the cause and occasion of sins, frequency, gravity, malice, etc.

Yet not all are to be questioned, but only those concerning whom, whether from the manner of confessing, or from the common state or condition of the person, there is for the confessor a special reason for conjecturing that one of the aforesaid defects is present.1

610. Principle II. The confessor, after the case has been inspected from sufficient accusation or, if necessary, from supplementary questioning, as judge, from office is bound to form for himself a prudent judgment about it, namely concerning the sins committed and concerning the dispositions of the penitent.

It is proved: 1) The confessor is bound to form a judgment concerning sins, which is necessary for knowing what satisfactions or remedies are to be imposed and whether the dispositions of the penitent are sufficient. Hence he must form a judgment concerning the morality of sins, i.e., concerning their species and gravity, both objective and subjective, insofar as this is possible.

And indeed: a) Concerning objective morality, it is at least required that, endowed with habitual knowledge of the principles by which the gravity and diverse species of sins can be distinguished, he hear the penitent, and in hearing judge according to the common principles stated.

b) Concerning subjective morality, he can presume it to be the same as the objective, unless there is a special reason for judging otherwise, or for doubting; in which case he must question the penitent.

c) Let him judge concerning all things as much as he can by ordinary diligence, for it is not always possible to say concerning individual delicts whether they are of such species and gravity, mortal or venial, which not even great theologians can do; because often the matter is difficult in itself, nor can the penitent himself always say whether he fully consented.

d) But if the confessor lacked the aforesaid knowledge or from ignorance judged falsely concerning sins, the confession would not on that account be invalid.

e) But if, because of distraction or noise or singing, he did not hear certain sins, he must question if it is probable that in these perhaps grave matter is present.

f) Yet he is not bound distinctly to remember all sins at the moment of absolution, but it suffices that he remember the state of the penitent confusedly.

2. The confessor is also bound to form a judgment concerning the sufficient disposition of the penitent, which is necessary for knowing what sentence he ought to pronounce, namely whether to grant or deny absolution.

The disposition of the penitent can be recognized by conjectural signs, concerning which it will be said in n. 617.

But what must be done by a confessor who doubts concerning the sincerity of the penitent or knows or presumes that he is concealing a sin? He must attend to the principle: "The penitent is to be believed when speaking both for himself and against himself," unless it certainly appears that he is lying. For the penitent is the accused and the witness, whose testimony of itself has force only in this tribunal and is better than any other, since he himself knows better than anyone else whether he has sinned or not, whether the sin committed has already been declared or not.

Hence: a) If there is doubt concerning the sincerity of the penitent, the confessor is bound to question diligently, and he can exhort him to perfect sincerity; but if the penitent perseveres in his declaration, he is to be believed and absolved.

b) If the confessor knows with certainty, and indeed from his own experience, that the penitent is concealing a grave sin committed, he must convince the penitent; and if he continues to deny, he must be dismissed without absolution, unless it can be thought that he is in good faith and is ignorant of the gravity of the fault, or that he has already confessed it, or that he has a just reason for concealing it.

c) If the confessor knows from the testimony of others, he is bound to question the penitent specially concerning the sin, but if he continues to deny, he is to be absolved; unless, however, the testimony of others were altogether of greater authority, so that it would make certitude, not merely broadly so called, but true and perfect certitude.

d) If the confessor knows from the confession of another, e.g., of an accomplice, wife, betrothed woman, etc., he cannot question the penitent except generally, as he is accustomed to question, and not specially unless he would also question persons of the same condition in that way; nor is it expedient to ask from the accomplice permission to use the knowledge acquired, because in this case it would render confession hateful. But if the penitent perseveres in silence, he can absolve him as if he had not heard the confession of the other; because he is not bound to use knowledge acquired in confession and, on the other hand, he cannot prevent the sacrilege; - indeed he seems to be bound to absolve, at least conditionally, because otherwise he would break the seal, since he would use the knowledge of confession rather openly for the governance of another. Yet St. Alphonsus asserts that absolution is to be denied, but that one must pray somewhat and that the denial of absolution is to be dissimulated: on the one hand, he says, the priest does not break the seal because he manifests nothing and causes a burden to neither; on the other hand, he consults the reverence of the sacrament, by impeding its frustration.

611. Principle III. The confessor, as teacher, from office is bound to instruct the penitent, as far as possible, concerning those things which are strictly necessary for duly receiving the sacrament, unless absolution can be deferred to another time; - indeed regularly and of itself at least to admonish concerning the Christian truths and precepts to be learned, both common and particular to state, which the penitent must know.

It is said: 1) He is bound to instruct or teach those things which are necessary for duly receiving the sacrament; therefore not concerning all things which the penitent is bound to know and can learn elsewhere (unless by accident from charity, if it were impossible for someone to learn them elsewhere), but of itself concerning all things which he is bound to know for duly receiving the sacrament here and now. Yet exception is made: a) if to teach here and now is impossible and there is extreme necessity of receiving the sacrament which cannot be deferred; b) if absolution can be deferred to another time.

2. Concerning other truths and obligations to be learned he is bound only to admonish, and indeed of itself and regularly; because by accident he can be not bound if from this a greater evil would follow for the penitent or for others.

It is proved: The minister of Penance 1) from office is bound to procure valid and fruitful administration, and therefore he is teacher for teaching those things which are necessary for valid and fruitful reception; and 2) since the sacrament is for amendment and liberation from past and future sins, he is also bound from office (and not only as any man from charity, if it can be done without inconvenience) at least to admonish concerning truths to be learned and obligations to be fulfilled, insofar as it contributes to the aforesaid end, because from office he is bound to lead the penitent away from future sin and bring him onto the way of salvation. Cf. Ritual, t. 3, c. 1, n. 14 and 18.

And indeed, since for the validity of the sacrament the confessor needs jurisdiction, he is either the proper pastor of the penitent, or from a certain deputation holds the place of the proper pastor. Hence it pertains to him from office to teach subjects their duties and obligations, and the means for avoiding defects in the future; - indeed, since in ministering the sacrament he is the minister of the Church "constituted for the good of the Christian commonwealth," he is also bound to procure the common good if it is possible, and "to prefer the public good to the private good of the penitent," as St. Alphonsus has it, Th. M., l. VI, n. 615.

Hence he must: 1) teach, and indeed before absolution, the truths necessary for receiving the sacrament here and now, namely those which, even only probably, are necessary to be known for salvation by necessity of means, and those which pertain to the necessary dispositions of contrition, confession, purpose, and satisfaction, as to substance and according to the capacity of each one;

2. likewise admonish concerning duties which result from the sins declared, e.g., as to making restitution, removing or repairing scandal, laying aside hatred, seeking reconciliation, etc.

3. admonish concerning truths necessary to be known by necessity of precept and concerning the duties of Christian life, both common and particular to state: a) if ignorance of them is vincible, or soon becomes so; b) even if it is invincible but fruit of the admonition is hoped for; c) even if fruit is not hoped for, but the ignorance or the lack of admonition would be to the greater detriment either of the penitent himself (e.g., because it exposes him to danger of sinning or of persevering in sin), or of others or of the common good.

Here the rules handed down in the treatise on Charity, I, n. 942, and in the treatise on Prudence, where there is question of the formation of a right conscience, II, n. 69, come to be applied.1

612. Principle IV. The confessor, especially as spiritual physician, from office is bound to indicate salutary remedies for obtaining the perseverance of the penitent and for guarding against his future fall.

It is proved: The sacrament of Penance was also instituted for the healing of souls and their preservation from future sins; and therefore it would be frustrated of its partial end if the minister did not indicate remedies against future sins. "Although penance," says St. Thomas, q. 12, a. 3, ad 3, "from its first institution or intention regards the past, yet also consequently it regards the future, insofar as it is preserving medicine." This is confirmed from the Ritual, t. 3, c. 1, n. 18.

But for this it is necessary to know the causes and occasions of sins, and concerning them, if it is useful, to question, just as a physician investigates the causes of diseases; these causes otherwise must often already be investigated for judging the dispositions of the penitent, among which it is required that he himself be willing to avoid or combat the said causes. For it is necessary to know the causes and occasions of sins: 1) because otherwise they cannot be extirpated from the root, and, unless they are extirpated, they will again produce evil effects; 2) because according to diverse causes diverse opportune remedies must be assigned. Thus different remedies must be indicated against lust, whether it proceeds from an external occasion, or from internal complexion, or from depraved thoughts or temptations; different remedies also befit according to the diverse condition, age, or temperament of the penitent. But above all it is advantageous to impose medicinal satisfactions, as was said in n. 553, and sometimes also it is necessary to rebuke the penitent.

But those confessors gravely fail in their office who, content with the remission of past sins, wholly neglect the guarding of the new life and the medicine of infirmity.1

613. Principle V. The confessor, as father, generally is bound from charity, insofar as it can be done, to propose apt motives of contrition to the indisposed and thus to prepare them for absolution.

It is said: 1) to the indisposed: for if the confessor prudently judges that the penitent is well disposed, he is strictly bound to nothing, although it is always expedient to exhort to contrition because the exhortation of the confessor is especially efficacious, and he can at least briefly exhort him to renew the act of contrition;

2. apt motives, such as the deformity of sin, the value of divine grace, the danger of damnation, the brevity of life and the danger of death, the goodness of God and the benefits of Christ and other similar things, according to the capacity and disposition of each one;

3. from charity, and not strictly from office, because for this it suffices to absolve those who are disposed, but he can send away the indisposed until they are disposed; yet from charity he is often bound to act otherwise;

4. insofar as it can be done, i.e., if there is founded hope and time for disposing to contrition; unless, however, in extreme necessity, in which there is a grave obligation of trying all things even with the greatest inconvenience.

It is proved: From charity each one is generally bound to procure the good of his neighbor and to avert grave harm from him, at least if it can easily be done. But the sinner who is dismissed without absolution incurs grave harm, since he is exposed to the danger of remaining for a long time in the state of mortal sin, and perhaps of being deterred from confession. Therefore the confessor is bound to avert this harm from the penitent, at least if it can easily be done. But since the penitent cannot be absolved while indisposed, the confessor must dispose him insofar as it can be done. Hence the Ritual, l.c., n. 18: "he will try by efficacious words to bring him to sorrow and contrition, and will induce him to amend and better institute his life, and will hand down remedies for sins."

The obligation of itself is grave, at least if the neighbor is in grave spiritual necessity and can be induced to the due disposition without great inconvenience. Thus according to the rules handed down in the treatise on Charity.

614. Principle VI. Absolution regularly and of itself, and indeed from justice and under grave obligation, must be granted to the penitent guilty of grave sin who is certainly well disposed. - This general principle is enunciated in Law, can. 886: "If the confessor cannot doubt concerning the dispositions of the penitent and the latter asks for absolution, absolution is neither to be denied nor deferred, but granted."

For the confessor, by receiving the confession, obliges himself, as by a contract, to pronounce sentence according to the institution of Christ. But, according to the institution of Christ, absolution must of itself be granted to those well disposed, since this sacrament was instituted precisely for remitting sins. Therefore, by force of contract, and therefore from justice, he must of itself absolve those rightly disposed, who consequently have a strict right to absolution; - and indeed under grave obligation, if the penitent is in the state of mortal sin, because it is a grave injury, since he is unjustly deprived of the greatest private good of sacramental grace.

It is said: 1) guilty of grave sin, because if he has only venial sins or mortal sins already remitted, to defer the penitent sometimes is not a grave sin, because a grave injury is not inflicted upon him; indeed, if this is done from a reasonable cause, sometimes there will be no sin;

2. who is certainly disposed, i.e., morally or quasi-certainly, with a practical and imperfect certitude which excludes every prudent and grave doubt; namely, so that there is a grave reason for judging this and no serious reason for doubting, for often it is impossible to have greater certitude concerning dispositions;

3. regularly and of itself: for absolution granted immediately usually profits more than if it is deferred, because it gives sacramental grace by which the penitent can more efficaciously resist temptation and cultivate virtue. Nevertheless, sometimes by accident absolution can be deferred even for one sufficiently disposed:

a) so that before absolution restitution or reparation which can be made in the present may be urged; this at the same time is an apt way of exploring more and proving the disposition of the penitent and of more certainly obtaining the fulfillment of the duty;

b) also if the confessor as physician prudently judges this to be more useful for the penitent, who then would be unwilling irrationally; yet his consent is to be sought, because delay generally will not profit unless the penitent consents to it. Hence by a general rule it is now established in law: "to a penitent certainly disposed and asking for absolution this... is not to be deferred";

c) only for a short time, e.g., for some hours, for a day, for eight days, or a little more, because it is a grave inconvenience to remain long in mortal sin.

1. Concerning the way in which one is to question in practice, see our Questions concerning Various Categories of Penitents, c. 1, q. 1 and 2.

1. More practical things concerning the obligation of instructing and admonishing are handed down in our little work: On Various Categories of Penitents, c. 1, q. 3.

1. See several other things in our little work On the Minister of Penance, c. 4, q. 2, a. 2, IV. It is profitable to read St. Alphonsus, Praxis Confessarii, n. 6-7; 15-16.

615. Principle VII. Absolution must be denied to those who are morally certainly incapable or unworthy. - This is altogether certain, since in either case absolution is invalid or at least fruitless; but knowingly and willingly to administer a sacrament in a manner certainly invalid or fruitless is a grave sacrilege (n. 88).

Those radically incapable are the perpetually insane, the not-yet-baptized, those certainly dead, those ignorant of things necessary to be known by necessity of means, and those who certainly are not morally present.

Those incapable because unworthy are indicated by the Ritual, l.c., n. 23: "Let him not absolve those who are incapable of such a benefit: such are those who give no signs of sorrow; who do not wish to lay aside hatreds and enmities, or to restore the goods of others, if they can, or to leave a proximate occasion of sinning, or in some other way to abandon sins (e.g., a depraved custom or a sinful craft), and to amend life for the better; or those who have given public scandal, unless they publicly make satisfaction and remove the scandal." To these can be added in a general way all those who are unwilling to fulfill a grave obligation known to them; or who refuse to confess their sins integrally, unless they are excused from material integrity by a grave reason. For in these and similar cases the essential condition required for validity is lacking, namely contrition.

But let it be noted that the confessor: 1) before he denies absolution, must generally exhort sinners to contrition, so that as much as can be done he may dispose them, and if by fervent exhortation he renders them contrite, he can absolve them; - 2) if he must deny absolution, he should do this only with great charity and with kindly words, by explaining the reason why he cannot act otherwise, and by declaring that he will gladly grant absolution as soon as the penitent will be disposed.

616. Principle VIII. Absolution is regularly to be deferred for those who are doubtfully capable or disposed, unless a grave reason urges that they be absolved under condition. - This is altogether certain, for of itself it is illicit to expose a sacrament to the danger of nullity or fruitlessness, because the reverence due to the sacrament prohibits this as sacrilege; - unless by accident, if there is a grave and proportionate reason or a necessity of notable utility to be obtained immediately for the neighbor, because the sacraments are for men. This is to be understood when the confessor has applied every effort for obtaining a sufficient disposition, and a certain disposition cannot be obtained.

Namely, as often as there is danger of nullity for the sacrament and danger of notable detriment for the neighbor, and both cannot be avoided at the same time, rather the danger to the neighbor must be avoided and the sacrament nevertheless conferred under condition: for the sacraments are for men, and the law of charity in a case of grave necessity prevails over the law of religion.

Thus in the following cases:

1. In danger of death, when the necessity of absolving here and now presses, and there is present only doubtful matter, or doubtful disposition, or a doubtfully capable subject, e.g., because there is doubt concerning his life or concerning sufficient presence to the minister.

2. In the case of Marriage soon to be celebrated or Confirmation soon to be received, if the disposition of the penitent is doubtful; likewise in a return to the Church after Baptism repeated under condition.1

3. In the case in which a doubtfully disposed penitent would for a long time lack the occasion of confessing.

4. In the case in which a doubtfully disposed penitent would be exposed to grave infamy or to giving scandal to others, if he were dismissed without absolution.

5. If it is greatly to be feared lest the doubtfully disposed and dismissed penitent be cast into despair or not return to receive the sacrament; not, however, if he seriously threatens this, which is rather a sign of indisposition.

6. If matter cannot be had except doubtfully grave; or if there is doubt concerning sufficient or perfect use of reason in the penitent, while the precept of confession presses or perhaps grave matter is present.

7. Finally, in doubt whether the minister has already absolved or has absolved duly, i.e., with the due form. This case is reduced to doubt concerning the condition of the subject, because if the penitent had already been validly absolved, the matter of the sacrament would be lacking, namely a new confession.

Therefore there are only six cases on the part of the penitent, and one on the part of the minister.

617. Signs of sufficient or insufficient disposition in the penitent. - For forming a truly founded or morally certain judgment concerning the sufficient disposition of the penitent, a truly grave motive is required.

A. But the indications of positive disposition are: 1) the due preparation of the penitent for confession, 2) the confession itself duly made, especially if it is done spontaneously, e.g., for more easily avoiding sin and obtaining the state of grace, 3) the affirmation of the penitent if it appears true and sincere, 4) the manner of confessing, namely a manner evidently candid and humble.

These are ordinary signs, namely those which of themselves and in ordinary circumstances suffice; but when there is a special reason for doubting concerning the disposition or sincerity of the penitent, graver signs drawn from the special circumstances of the penitent are required, or extraordinary conjectural signs, whether of more abundant grace, or of more intense sorrow, or of firmer purpose.

a) Of more abundant grace, as 1) if he confesses from a supernatural and peculiar motive, e.g., on the occasion of preaching, or of the death of a friend, or of imminent evil; 2) if for confessing he had to undergo a sufficiently great inconvenience, such as a long journey, the loss of a day of gain, a great external conflict; 3) if the confession is made altogether spontaneously from the sole impulse of grace, with no other external circumstance impelling, especially in regions where faith has grown weak and human respect does not impel toward the sacraments.

b) Of more intense sorrow, as, for example, 1) if he has applied special means: fasting, alms, prayers, Masses, so that he might make a good confession; 2) if he says words flowing from the heart, or gives sighs and sheds tears, which is a sign having force in many, provided it is not done from a human motive, but not always certain or sincere; 3) if he confesses with greater sincerity, with outpouring of heart, e.g., sins which he previously culpably omitted; 4) if he signifies that he apprehends his sins and the danger of damnation better.

c) Of firmer purpose, as 1) if he says that after the sin he immediately repented; 2) if he especially asks for remedies and willingly promises to apply them, or willingly accepts a great penance; 3) if he has already persevered for some time or has applied diligence to this by the remedies indicated, e.g., by fleeing the occasion, burning bad books, renouncing the company of the wicked; in one word, if there is already a change of life; 4) if he has relapsed with greater difficulty, i.e., after notable resistance, or more rarely in the same circumstances; 5) if he has already fulfilled a difficult obligation, e.g., restitution or reparation of reputation or honor, or reconciliation with enemies.

B. On the contrary, those are called doubtfully disposed in the strict sense against whose disposition from positive indications a grave suspicion arises, while on the other hand, because of much graver reasons, a probable and prudent judgment concerning sufficient disposition cannot be formed.

From positive indications these are judged doubtfully disposed: 1) those who have relapsed in the same or a worse way, without having applied the remedies prescribed by the confessor and without a serious effort at amendment; 2) those who only coldly respond that they are sorry, especially if they have already relapsed rather often; 3) if they show great affection for sin, or have drawn great utility from sins, or devote their whole effort to satisfying passions; 4) when they are of a freer and more lax life, or rashly excuse their sins, or engage in contention and altercation with the confessor, or seem to boast of the sin committed; 5) when they approach the sacrament not spontaneously, but only by command of parents or others, or from mere custom, or to please others, or from fear lest they lose their reputation; 6) if they refuse a moderate penance proportioned to their strength.

We said: a) From positive indications. Therefore if against dispositions proved by a grave reason no grave positive reason militates, or only a light and slight reason does, then the penitent is not judged doubtfully disposed, because in human and practical matters a solidly founded opinion, to which no grave reason is opposed, is equivalent to practical certitude. And thus the opinions of some, who contend that probable disposition suffices, by understanding probability in the strict philosophical sense of a much greater likeness to truth, can be reconciled with the opinion of St. Alphonsus, who requires a morally certain disposition with a certitude broadly so called and imperfect (II, n. 80). But if they understood otherwise, even, for example, concerning the less probable, they would not judge rightly.

b) While on the other hand a probable and prudent judgment concerning sufficient disposition cannot be formed. For although from one or another motive, e.g., from a sudden relapse, a grave suspicion can arise, on the other hand there can be much graver reasons concerning sufficient disposition, namely extraordinary signs of contrition. But a notably more probable opinion is equivalent to practical certitude (II, n. 80). Then, therefore, absolution is to be given immediately and indeed in an absolute manner.

618. It is asked under what condition one doubtfully disposed is to be absolved? - Many in practice use the condition: if you are disposed, or even defend it theoretically; while others reject it, indeed formerly it was disputed whether absolution under such a condition is not invalid.

A. Some Louvain authors and certain others, such as Collet, said that this condition, like several others, stands in the way of the special character of the sacrament of Penance, which was instituted after the manner of judgment.

They distinguished between conditions of fact, e.g., if you are living, if you are baptized, etc., concerning which the confessor need not judge; and conditions of law, e.g., if you are disposed, if you are willing to restore, etc., concerning which he must judge. The former they generally admitted, because they do not invalidate the sacrament; but the condition concerning which the confessor must judge, such as this one: if you are disposed, they rejected as invalidating, since it takes away the nature of judgment, since by it the confessor supposes precisely that about which he must judge and pronounce judgment. Hence, just as there would be no sentence of a civil judge concerning a disputed thing if he said: "I adjudge the thing to you, if it is yours," so absolution is invalid if the confessor says: "if you are disposed, I absolve you." This opinion is now obsolete.

For the opinion, even at the time of the dispute, most common outside the school of the Louvain authors, and now, after the controversy has ended, altogether common, holds that the sacrament of Penance is valid if the condition is fulfilled. The reason is the general doctrine: conditions concerning the present do not invalidate the sacraments; because when the condition is verified, in the case the disposition of the penitent, the conditioned form is equivalent to the absolute form, and thus all things required for the value of the sacrament are present.

And indeed: 1) Such a condition does not take away every judgment. For it is some judgment to say: if you are disposed, I make for you the right by which it is owed that the sin be remitted to you and no longer imputed. Even in human judgments, a conditioned sentence is not rarely pronounced, e.g., "you will go to prison, unless within three days you pay the debt," or "I condemn you to prison, but, if you do not fall again into fault, for the time you will be immune from penalty," or "you are condemned or freed, if in your chest there is this or that document," which immediately is ordered to be searched for by trustworthy men.1

2. That condition does not take away the nature of the judgment proper to this sacrament. The confessor must judge concerning the disposition of the penitent; but, according to St. Thomas, q. 17, a. 3, this is only a judgment of discretion, so that the confessor may absolve prudently and licitly, but it is not the judicial sentence itself nor is it necessary for its validity. The essence of judgment here consists only in the pronouncement of the sentence of absolution upon the guilty person who is contrite and confessed; - for otherwise he would absolve invalidly who absolves while judging nothing concerning the dispositions of the penitent, or judging him positively indisposed, while nevertheless he is duly disposed; which no one will admit.

3. To the arguments of the adversaries it is answered: There is a disparity with human judgment. a) This does not confer a right but declares it, and therefore it is null if it is made under that condition which precisely must be declared, because it declares nothing if it supposes in the condition that which it must declare; for thus it supposes that which is sought. On the contrary, the sacrament of Penance confers a right, which can also be done under condition. - b) Human judgment must be handed over to execution by men, and therefore it is necessary that it be known and declared that the condition is verified; the sentence of the priest God Himself executes, and therefore it suffices that God know whether the condition has been fulfilled. - c) As to the example brought forward, parity is denied, because it is of the essence of civil judgment that the judge pronounce whose the thing is; it is not of the essence of sacramental judgment to pronounce that the penitent is capable, disposed, living, has restored, etc., but to pronounce that the right is granted to him for liberation from sins.

B. On the contrary, many of the more recent authors, conformably to the mind of St. Alphonsus,¹ set down the condition: if you are disposed. The reason for this can be assigned from the difference between Penance and other sacraments.

¹ Cf. Lehmkuhl, Th. M. II, n. 370, who adds: "Indeed, the sentence even of human judgment and in a civil matter not rarely in some way has this condition implicitly, 'provided only that the testimony of the witnesses has been true'; for unless it rests upon this estimation and condition, which nevertheless can sometimes fail, the sentence is unjust and thus null... Similarly, the sacramental sentence always rests upon this supposition, that the penitent says what is true and truly grieves..."

For: 1) The disposition necessary for justification, namely attrition, which is not of the essence of the other sacraments, is a part and necessary condition of this sacrament, and, added to absolution as to the form, together with confession and satisfaction constitutes the very matter of the sacrament. Hence, just as other sacraments, when there is doubt concerning the matter, are ministered under the condition: if I can, so this sacrament is ministered to one doubtfully contrite under the condition: if you are disposed.

2. Hence, they say, the sacrament of Penance cannot be at the same time valid and unformed or fruitless. For if it is valid, the disposition for justification, namely attrition, is present, and consequently the fruit is obtained immediately.

C. Many others reject the condition: if you are disposed, and admit, just as for other sacraments, only the condition: if you are capable.

They judge that contrition, which is the necessary part for the value of the sacrament of Penance, is not the same as that which is a sufficient disposition for justification or the fruit of the sacrament, as was said in n. 506. They say the first contrition is that which can be externally manifested and judged by the confessor with practical certitude, namely, that which is internal and sincere, supernatural and universal; but as a disposition for justification more is required, namely also contrition appreciatively supreme, by which a man is so disposed that he holds sin as the supreme evil and efficaciously wishes to suffer all things rather than commit it. But this escapes human experience and cannot be judged with practical certitude, and therefore does not pertain to the sensible sign of the sacrament. Hence, if the former contrition is present and the other is lacking, the sacrament will be valid but fruitless; but when the other disposition comes, it will obtain fruit and revive.

From this, they say, one must conclude, just as for the other sacraments, that absolution is never to be ministered under the condition: if you are disposed, i.e., if you have all the dispositions required for receiving the sacrament well; but under the condition: if you are capable, namely of receiving the sacrament, to which all other conditions on the part of the subject can be reduced: if you are living, if you are baptized, if you have sinned, if I have not absolved you... For the formula: if you are disposed, in the case in which the disposition, namely appreciatively supreme contrition, were absent, would render the sacrament altogether null and would impede its reviviscence forever. On the contrary, the form: if you are capable, would leave the sacrament valid in the case in which that lesser contrition were present which suffices, as part of the sacrament, for value, and that greater contrition were not present which is required for fruit, namely justification; and consequently, if the penitent afterward elicited appreciatively supreme contrition, by that very fact the sacrament would revive and the penitent would obtain the effect of grace in the same way as happens in other sacraments. Namely, the reviviscence of the sacrament is not to be impeded.

In practice this conclusion is legitimate, even if the last opinion is not certain, but only probable, as in fact it is. For from this it follows that in practice one must attend to it. For the sacraments are not to be ministered in any probable and uncertain way whatever, but in the safer and more certain way for the good of the penitent, and indeed not so that their effects are impeded, but so that they profit men as much as is possible. And therefore one must abstain from the condition: if you are disposed, and use that other one: if you are capable.

Namely, the same reason why the sacrament is to be given with danger of fruitlessness or even invalidity, the spiritual necessity of the neighbor or the danger lest he be deprived of grace necessary to him, is also the reason why it is not conferred under the condition if you are disposed, so that the sacramental fruit, if not in the present, at least in the future, may be able to come to him. For it is better to permit the absence of present fruit than to impede reviviscence and future fruit; because the danger of the sacrament, as a lesser evil, is to be preferred to the danger to salvation or to the spiritual good of men. And this seems to be the reason why the Church in her rituals is silent concerning the aforesaid condition, and although she enumerates several conditions, never makes mention of this one; indeed it was unknown in the Church until the seventeenth century.

619. Observations. - 1. If some penitent is doubtfully disposed, every effort must be applied so that he may be brought to a certain disposition; only then is he to be absolved under condition if a certain disposition cannot be had and yet there is present a grave danger of spiritual detriment, because the grace of the sacrament is necessary to him here and now.

2. It is not licit regularly or always to absolve under condition, because the sacrament of Penance was instituted after the manner of judgment; but judgment must regularly be pronounced in an absolute manner.

3. Hence concerning the sufficiency of dispositions the confessor must judge from office, and the practice of those is to be rejected who, to avoid difficulties, simply absolve under the condition: if you are disposed. And this all the more because the placing of the condition cannot remove every material irreverence from danger of nullity from the sacrament; and if it is placed without sufficient reason, neither can it remove the formal and voluntary irreverence (n. 23, II).

1. Not so of itself when the precept of communion presses, because this can be postponed; - unless by accident there is fear of infamy or scandal, as is said under 4.

1. Th. M. l. VI, n. 28.