Contrition Taken Integrally

253. The qualities of contrition in this place, with scholastic controversies set aside, must be weighed in such a way that it may be clear what is required for certainly valid absolution. Therefore, in order that contrition, whether perfect or imperfect, may suffice for receiving the sacrament validly, it must be true, supernatural, universal, above all things.

1. True and formal, i.e., an act must necessarily be elicited by which the will grieves concerning sin from a sufficient motive and detests it; since contrition at least constitutes the necessary disposition of the sacrament of penance, and therefore must be truly present; moreover, contrition probably constitutes an essential part of the sacrament, wherefore it must be formally present.

a. Because contrition must be true, a mere recitation of the formula of contrition does not suffice unless at the same time affections of the will are present; nor does sorrow merely thought suffice, even if out of invincible ignorance someone thinks that he has sorrow; nor does the desire of sorrow and of absolution suffice; nor finally does sorrow concerning punishment or another evil effect which has followed from sin suffice: but the sorrow itself is required, and that concerning sin by which God is offended. And because contrition must be formal, merely virtual sorrow implicitly contained in another act, e.g., in an act of perfect charity, does not suffice: for although an act of perfect charity has the power of blotting out mortal sins outside the sacrament, nevertheless it does not suffice for obtaining the remission of sins by force of the sacrament, but the proximate matter of the sacrament is required, which is the act of sorrow and detestation concerning committed sins, whether these are mortal or venial.

b. Among the older theologians, especially before the Council of Trent, several thought that supposed contrition, by which the penitent in good faith thinks that he is contrite, sufficed for receiving valid absolution.¹ But this opinion lacks all probability. Supposed contrition indeed preserves the penitent from the sin of sacrilege, but it cannot make absolution valid.² Some more recent theologians also (Lugo, Ballerini) maintain that virtual contrition suffices for obtaining valid absolution;³ but since this opinion does not exceed probability, it cannot be brought into practice without danger of frustrating the sacrament.

c. For practice, however, this must be noted: those who are of timorous conscience and desire to have sorrow, or grieve that they do not grieve, provided they try to elicit it, usually have true sorrow, even if they do not perceive it. Therefore, since it is not so much the sorrow itself but rather the quality of the sorrow, and that quality not necessary for the sacrament, which is lacking, namely intense and sensible sorrow, absolution is not to be denied to those who desire to have sorrow, or say that they grieve because they do not have sorrow, provided they seriously wish to abstain from mortal sins and to fulfill at least grave obligations.

¹ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri V, n. 33 ff.

² Ibid., n. 46 note.

³ Ibid., n. 52 ff.

254. 2. Supernatural, both by reason of principle and by reason of motive; for sorrow is the disposition necessarily required by the will of God for obtaining justification, which, since it is wholly supernatural, the disposition required for it also must be supernatural.

a. By reason of principle: i.e., contrition must be elicited with the supernatural help of God, namely with actual grace moving and assisting unto eliciting the act of sorrow and detestation: for merely natural sorrow conceived by the powers of nature alone does not suffice in the sacrament of penance.

b. By reason of motive: i.e., sorrow must be elicited from a supernatural motive, i.e., from a motive which has relation to God, as the motives enumerated by the Council of Trent have it, not from a merely natural motive, such as sin would be insofar as it is opposed to rational nature, brings detriment to reputation, health, etc. There are those who for supernatural contrition require a motive supernatural in this sense, that it must be known from revelation and apprehended through the light of faith; now, although an act of truly supernatural contrition does not require a motive supernatural in this sense, nevertheless in reality a penitent will scarcely ever lack contrition truly supernatural also by reason of motive, because the motives enumerated by the Council of Trent are drawn from faith and are apprehended by penitents by the light of faith.

255. 3. Universal, which either explicitly or implicitly extends itself at least to all mortal sins not yet remitted, even if perhaps they do not occur to memory: for no sin is remitted without penance; but one sin cannot be remitted without another; therefore sorrow must extend itself at least to all mortal sins not yet remitted. But it is not necessary that it be universal explicitly; it suffices that it be universal implicitly, i.e., that it be elicited from a universal motive. Nor is it necessary that it also extend to venial sins not yet remitted, because mortal sins can be remitted without venial sins.

a. Explicitly: it can happen in a twofold way that sorrow explicitly extends itself to all mortal sins: first, if the penitent elicits as many distinct sorrows concerning the several sins; then, if by one act of sorrow he repents of all and each of those which he distinctly remembers and actually recalls to memory. Although for obtaining justification, whether in the sacrament or outside the sacrament, it is not required that sorrow explicitly extend itself to all mortal sins, nevertheless of itself it is most useful and very much to be recommended that the penitent call to mind the several sins and detest all and each.

b. Implicitly: again, it can happen in a twofold way that sorrow implicitly extends itself to all mortal sins: first, if the penitent knows himself to be in the state of sin, as guilty of several mortal sins, and by an act of sorrow conceived from a universal motive grieves concerning all the things which he thus knows confusedly; then, if he thinks expressly and in species of only one sin and grieves concerning it from a universal motive common to all mortal sins. For by the very fact that from a universal motive he detests one sin, he implicitly and necessarily also detests all other sins committed by himself which deserve to be detested on account of the same motive, even though he does not remember them.¹

¹ Sporer-Bierbaum III, pr. 3, n. 88 ff.

256. 4. Appreciatively highest or above all things. Therefore the penitent must esteem mortal sin as a greater evil and for this reason detest it more than any other evil, and must be prepared in soul rather to undergo any other evil whatever than again to commit sin. For sin is the highest evil, since it is contrary to the highest and infinite good. Moreover true contrition must exclude every will of sinning;¹ but unless the penitent detests sin above all things, every will of sinning is not excluded, since he is so disposed that for the sake of avoiding some evil he would wish to commit sin.

a. Nevertheless it is not necessary, indeed ordinarily it is to be dissuaded, that explicit comparisons be made between sin and some particular evil to be undergone (rather to be burned alive, rather to sustain the torments of the martyrs, etc., than to sin again). And if comparisons of this kind either occur spontaneously or are suggested by the tempter, nothing is to be chosen, but all are to be rejected with this pious and firm will: I do not wish to sin any more, and aided by divine grace I hope that I will not sin.

b. It is not necessary that contrition be intensively highest. Contrition would be intensively highest if the very act of the will by which we grieve concerning sin committed were greater and more vehement than the act by which we grieve concerning any other evil, however grave. But neither intensively highest sorrow nor sorrow of a certain and determined degree of intensity is required; rather true and internal sorrow in any degree, even remiss, suffices: for where the essence of contrition is had, a sufficient disposition for the remission of any sin is present; but the essence of contrition is had in any degree of true contrition.

c. From the same reason it is deduced that sufficient contrition does not demand any delay of time: for true contrition can be elicited by the will in an instant; nevertheless it is greatly to be recommended that some time be spent in eliciting sorrow, by which the sorrow may be more certain and more intense.

d. Finally, for contrition which suffices for justification, it is not required that sorrow be sensible, namely that it overflow into the sensitive appetite and into sensible acts, into tender affections of the heart, sighs, and tears; but it suffices that it be spiritual, by which namely the will from a sufficient motive grieves concerning and detests the sin committed. For sensible sorrow of this kind is not in our power, nor does it belong to the perfection of contrition: for it can happen that without sensible sorrow someone grieves more vehemently than another who by his nature is prone to tender affections and tears. Nevertheless signs of this kind, sensible ones, are very often indications of great and vehement sorrow in those who truly and sincerely grieve.

e. By these things it is not denied that contrition must be manifested outwardly by some sensible sign: for according to the probable opinion of many, contrition is an essential part of the sacrament; but the parts of a sacrament must necessarily be sensible. Moreover it becomes sensible through the sorrowful confession of sins, through the devout petition and expectation of absolution, and through other external signs.

Particular Questions. Having explained the qualities of contrition, certain questions which pertain to this matter must be proposed and solved. In treating these questions one must attend to the probable doctrine, namely that the acts of the penitent are essential parts and the proximate matter of the sacrament, lest the sacrament be exposed to danger of nullity.

¹ Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 4.

I. Notion. Contrition is "sorrow of soul and detestation concerning a committed sin, with the purpose of not sinning for the future."¹ It is said concerning a committed sin, so that sorrow over the fact that one does not sorrow over sin does not suffice; in which case not sin, but the defect of sorrow, is the object of sorrow. Nevertheless, one who sorrows over the defect of sorrow is commonly to be judged also to sorrow over the sin itself. Contrition comprises three things, namely detestation, sorrow, and purpose. Moreover:

1. Detestation is the act by which the will abhors the committed sin, turns itself away from the committed sin, and expels every affection for sin; this act of the will is expressed in this way: I would wish not to have sinned; it displeases me that I committed sin. Detestation pertains to the essence of contrition. For contrition must formally be opposed to sin; this happens through detestation, by which the sinner now does not will what he previously willed (St. Alphonsus, VI, 435).

2. Sorrow is a certain sadness of the will arising from the fact that the evil of sin is apprehended as present (St. Thomas, 1-2, question 35, article 8; question 36, article 1). In man as wayfarer sorrow necessarily follows detestation, so that it must at least be called a necessary element of contrition. But it is disputed whether sorrow pertains to the very essence of contrition. Whatever the case may be, at least this must be admitted: contrition consists principally in detestation, which is the cause of sorrow and specifies sorrow, which of itself is indifferent, and renders it morally good (St. Alphonsus, VI, 435).

The acts of detestation and sorrow, although they are distinguished from one another, nevertheless are morally so conjoined in man as wayfarer that they are regarded after the manner of one.

3. What purpose is will be explained in n. 301.

¹ Council of Trent, session 14, chapter 4.

II. Division. Contrition is distinguished into perfect and imperfect.

1. Perfect contrition is that which is conceived from the motive of charity. Moreover:

a) It is certainly conceived from the motive of charity if it is elicited from love of God loved above all things because of the divine goodness or perfection, insofar as this comprises the essence of God with all the attributes. But note that from love of this kind there is also elicited contrition which is conceived from the desire of possessing God, not insofar as this possession is good for the penitent, but insofar as it is pleasing to God, who is most perfectly loved in possession (St. Alphonsus, II, 24, doubt 1).

b) It is not conceived from the motive of charity if it is elicited from love of God loved because of some relative attribute, for example beneficence, as such, or insofar as it is not considered as a divine perfection pertaining to God.

c) It is disputed whether it is conceived from the motive of charity if it is elicited from love of God loved because of some divine attribute, whether absolute or relative, provided this is considered as a divine perfection pertaining to God, considered separately through formal abstraction. Many affirm this: 1. because Sacred Scripture stirs us up to charity by the motive of God's goodness toward us: "Let us therefore love God, because God first loved us";¹ therefore because of an attribute of God, a relative one; 2. because the divine attributes are not really distinguished from his essence, nor can they be conceived by us with objective precision from the other perfections and the essence of God; 3. because preachers commonly exhort the faithful to charity by unfolding the relative attribute, namely God's goodness toward us. Others, whose opinion St. Alphonsus holds as more probable, teach that some divine attribute taken separately is not sufficient for eliciting an act of perfect contrition from love of God, but that the formal object of love is constituted from the essence of God together with all his attributes. For in order that someone love God as the supreme good - which is required for an act of charity - he must antecedently conceive God thus by an act of the intellect, according to the familiar saying: nothing is willed unless known. Moreover, in the concept of one attribute taken separately, for example wisdom, God as the supreme good is contained only virtually and implicitly; but what is known only virtually and implicitly is not yet known in relation to reducing the will to act. It is added that, according to the truer opinion, the act of charity of the homeland and of the way is specifically the same; but it is established that the act of charity of the homeland subjectively has the whole divine goodness as its formal motive. Therefore it follows that this whole goodness is also subjectively required for the formal object of the act of charity of the way (St. Alphonsus, VI, 436). Nevertheless, the controversy is not practical, because commonly the case supposed does not occur except in appearance; in other words, God sometimes seems to be loved because of an attribute considered separately, but in reality he is loved because of the supreme goodness. Hence preachers do not take account of this controversy.

Corollary I. It was formerly disputed whether perfect contrition is that which is elicited from the motive of some moral virtue which has an order to God, for example gratitude, religion, obedience, penance. But this opinion is now very commonly denied, and it is taught that contrition elicited from the motives of those virtues is not that which proximately disposes for justification, that is, perfect contrition.²

Corollary II. Someone can elicit perfect contrition even if he does not explicitly add that he loves God for God's sake or because of his infinite perfection; in other words, even if he does not say, for example: My God, I detest my sins because I love Thee because of Thy infinite goodness; but only: I detest my sins, the offenses against Thee, because Thou art supreme goodness. Nor is it required for an act of perfect contrition that one attend to the meaning of the individual words of the formula; it suffices that he grasp with the intellect and will in the soul the general sense of the formula.

Corollary III. Besides this, for perfect contrition it is not required that one detest sin from fear of hell or another inferior motive.

2. Imperfect contrition, which commonly is called attrition, is that which is conceived from an honorable motive distinct from the motive of charity, for example from the motive of hope, gratitude, penance, etc.

¹ 1 John 4:19.

² Council of Trent, session 14, chapter 4.

III. Required contrition. Not only perfect contrition, concerning which there is no doubt, but also imperfect contrition or attrition suffices for rightly receiving the sacrament of Penance. This opinion, which today is almost commonly admitted,¹ is proved by these arguments:

1. The Council of Trent calls contrition taken generically a part and quasi-matter of the sacrament,² and thus sufficiently indicates that it - whether or not it is called proximate matter - suffices for the sacrament of Penance. But imperfect contrition also is contained as a species under generic contrition as circumscribed by the Council.

2. The same Council says this about imperfect contrition: "Although without the sacrament of Penance it cannot of itself lead the sinner to justification, nevertheless it disposes him to obtain the grace of God in the sacrament of Penance."³ Therefore, according to these words of the Council, attrition disposes to justification in one way within the sacrament and in another way outside the sacrament. Now outside the sacrament it disposes remotely to justification. It remains, therefore, that we say that within the sacrament it disposes proximately to it.

3. Then it is wholly improbable that the power of remitting sins is in act never exercised upon sin not yet remitted. But this would happen if in the sacrament of Penance attrition did not suffice, but perfect contrition were required, that is, a disposition which of itself would already bring with it the remission of sin before absolution.

4. Finally, since the more benign opinion has now for many centuries been almost common, it is hard to understand why it has not been reprobated by the Church, if it were not safe; especially since this sacrament is of such frequent use.

Objection. The Council of Trent, among those things which are required for receiving justification in Baptism, lists: "and they begin to love Him as the font of all justice";⁴ these words you may deservedly apply also to the sacrament of Penance.

Response 1. It cannot be admitted that an act of true charity is required by the Council for receiving justification in Baptism; for the contrary opinion as regards Baptism was almost common both before the Council (cf. St. Thomas, 4 Distinction 6, question 1, article 3) and after the Council.

Response 2. Initial love can well be understood of some good affection toward God, who is the font of our justice; one who is affected by this good affection toward God is deservedly said to begin to love God, according to these words of St. Thomas, whose doctrine the Council of Trent so greatly attended to: "Insofar as hope regards him through whom something becomes possible for us, love is caused by hope, and not conversely. For from the fact that through someone we hope goods can come to us, we are moved toward him as toward our good; and thus we begin to love him" (1-2, question 40, article 7; St. Alphonsus, VI, 442). Others explain the words of the Council differently.

¹ Otherwise Périnelle, O.P., L'attrition d'après le Concile de Trente et S. Thomas d'Aquin.

² Session 14, chapter 3 and canon 4.

³ Session 14, chapter 4.

⁴ Session 6, chapter 6.

Corollary I. From what has been said, it is gathered in what sense the solemn expression is true: the attrite, by the power of the keys, becomes contrite. Namely, he becomes equivalently contrite, insofar as the attrite person with the sacrament passes from the state of the attrite to the state of the contrite, that is, he is justified equally as one perfectly contrite. Others explain it otherwise.

Corollary II.

It is useful, in order that what has been said about imperfect contrition may be unfolded more fully, to assign the diverse motives from which it can be elicited. Moreover, the Council of Trent teaches that "attrition is commonly conceived from consideration of the baseness of sin, or from fear of hell and of punishments."¹ Now, by adding "commonly," it sufficiently indicates that, besides the motives enumerated, others are given; or it can also be said that all motives are implicitly contained in the motives assigned by the Council. Namely, the motive of the baseness of sin contains all motives of the virtues distinct from charity. Besides, the motive of hope is contained in the motive of fear of punishments, because it is equivalent whether someone detests sin from hope of eternal life or from fear of hell, that is, of losing eternal life. All these things will be clearer from what is to be said. Therefore contrition conceived, for example, from the following motives suffices:

1. From the motive of obedience: "I detest my sins because by sinning I have transgressed Thy law."

2. From the motive of special penance: "because by sinning I have injured Thy right"; "that I may compensate Thy injured right."

3. From the motive of religion: "because by sinning I denied Thee the worship owed."

4. From the motive of gratitude: "because by sinning I have shown myself so ungrateful toward Thee"; "because Thou hast heaped benefits upon me."

5. From the motive of hope, for example:

a) From hope of eternal beatitude: "I grieve concerning my sins because by sinning I have lost the right to eternal beatitude"; "that I may recover the right to eternal beatitude."

b) From hope of justification: "because by sinning I have lost sanctifying grace"; "that I may recover sanctifying grace."

c) From hope of a temporal supernatural good: "that I may embrace a salutary state of life."

Here also belongs contrition conceived:

6. From fear, simply servile,² of punishments. Namely:

a) From fear of hell, for example: "because by sinning I have deserved eternal punishments"; or: "lest I be eternally damned." That this motive suffices is expressly taught by the Council of Trent in the place cited. The same must be said of fear of purgatory.

b) From fear of temporal punishments of this life, as the same Council seems to signify by saying "from fear of hell and of punishments"; for these words seem to be taken not in a composite sense, as some wish, but in a divided sense, because the Council, in the place cited, adduces the example of the Ninevites, who were being struck by a temporal punishment, namely the destruction of the city. For the rest, temporal punishments must be viewed as inflicted by God, and insofar as they in some way begin the divine punishment, unless we amend ourselves. Otherwise they cannot ground contrition that is estimatively highest (n. 299). Nor then is the matter outside every controversy (St. Alphonsus, VI, 443).

7. From the motive precisely of that virtue to which the committed sin is opposed, for example: "I detest the sin of lust because chastity is so beautiful." Here also belongs attrition conceived:

8. From the special baseness of the sin committed, for example: I detest the sin of lust because lust is so foul. Likewise attrition elicited from the general baseness of sin suffices, for example: "I detest sin because it has deprived me of supernatural brightness; because my soul has been so greatly defiled through it."

Corollary III. Salutary attrition is not so difficultly resolved into perfect contrition. For the attrite person is already tending toward God; hence he easily apprehends sin as an evil to God, or as injurious to infinite Goodness, and detests it also under this respect. These things especially hold for attrition conceived from the motive of a virtue which is referred to God, namely religion, obedience, penance, and gratitude. But they hold most of all for the motive of gratitude; since one who is grateful easily wills good to his benefactor, and consequently grieves over sin insofar as it is an evil to God. But since gratitude is especially stirred up by considering the incarnation, passion, and death of Christ, and his presence in the Holy Eucharist, he who is also himself God, therefore meditation on those mysteries is the easiest way of arriving at perfect contrition.

Corollary IV. Let confessors indeed commonly exhort penitents who are not sufficiently disposed to attrition, for motives of this kind especially move such men. Nevertheless, generally let them not omit at the end, and in some way, to propose to them and also to others the motives of perfect contrition.

¹ Session 14, chapter 4.

² Attrition from fear or dread is twofold: attrition from filial fear and attrition from servile fear. Attrition from filial fear is had when someone detests sin because it is an offense against God, the best Father; from servile fear, when someone detests sin because of fear of punishment. Attrition from servile fear is likewise twofold: attrition from fear simply servile, and attrition from fear servilely servile. The former is detestation of sin because of fear of punishment, born from ordered love of one's own good, that is, from love subordinated, or at least subordinable, to the divine good or to our last end. The latter is detestation of sin because of fear of punishment, born from disordered love of one's own good, that is, born from love not subordinated to the divine good or to our last end; in other words, born from love of one's own good as the last end. The former is honorable; the latter is dishonorable.

IV. Properties of contrition. The summary of the doctrine is this: 1. For the sacrament of Penance to be received validly and fruitfully there is required contrition: a) true, b) internal, c) formal, d) supernatural, e) estimatively highest, f) universal as regards mortal sins, g) external; 2. for the sacrament of Penance to be received validly there is likewise required contrition: a) true, b) internal, c) formal, d) supernatural, e) external; but it is disputed whether, considering only validity, contrition estimatively highest and universal is required. We shall weigh the individual points.

1. True, or not merely thought to exist. Several of the ancients taught that contrition merely thought to exist, but in good faith, suffices for the validity - though not for the fruit - of the sacrament. But that opinion today is commonly and deservedly rejected. For the Council of Trent teaches that contrition is required for the essence of the sacrament (n. 297). But doctrine of this kind must manifestly be understood of true contrition, not of that which is present merely putatively (St. Alphonsus, VI, 433, 2). Note, however, that most of those who think they grieve over sins also truly grieve over them.

2. Internal; for contrition, which by Trent is called a part and quasi-matter of the sacrament, is defined by the same Council as "sorrow of soul."

3. Formal, so that virtual contrition does not suffice, that is, that which is contained especially in an act of charity. Several older authors judged that virtual contrition sufficed for the validity and fruit of the sacrament. But: 1. this opinion is now almost commonly rejected; 2. the Council of Trent teaches that contrition is a part and quasi-matter of the sacrament. Moreover, that word in its obvious sense signifies formal contrition, not virtual contrition (St. Alphonsus, VI, 449).

Note, however: 1. Formal contrition can well be conceived in the very recollection or confession of sins; hence it is not required that someone has used a formula of contrition. 2. It will scarcely happen that someone about to receive the sacrament of Penance, and therefore thinking about his sins, elicits an act of perfect charity without formally grieving over his offenses against God.

4. Supernatural. Now:

a) Certainly it must be supernatural by reason of the eliciting principle; in other words, it must be elicited through the help of grace, which elevates the act above the order of nature. This is clear: 1. from the Council of Trent;¹ 2. it is established that no salutary act can be done by man, that is, one positively conducive to salvation, without the help of grace. Therefore neither can man salutarily repent without the help of grace.

b) It is disputed whether contrition must be supernatural by reason of the motive; in other words, whether it must be conceived from a motive apprehended through faith. For the rest, the controversy is less practical; since it is certain that for the genesis of contrition which prepares for justification, faith and hope are required,² although it is not required that someone reflexively elicit an act of faith and hope, but it suffices that he perform it in act exercised, as they say (St. Alphonsus, VI, 439). Moreover, it can scarcely happen that one who believes and hopes, and fulfills the other conditions required for salutary contrition, does not grieve from a motive apprehended through faith.

5. Estimatively highest. Contrition estimatively or appreciatively highest consists in this: that the penitent detests sin from a motive which, while it persists, he cannot be induced to sin; or - as others state the doctrine - in this: that the penitent detests sin more than any evil by fear of which he can be induced to sin. Moreover:

a) By the consent of all, it is required for the fruit of the sacrament. For in order that the sinner be reconciled with God, there is required a will which perfectly efficaciously, or absolutely, or with respect to every possible hypothesis, turns away from sin. But a will of this kind is lacking in one who lacks contrition estimatively highest. For the will extends itself no further than the motive on which it rests. Now one who lacks contrition estimatively highest lacks a motive which, while it persists, he cannot be induced to sin. Therefore he lacks a will which absolutely turns away from sin.

b) It is disputed whether it is required for the validity of the sacrament. Many authors deny this, or at least hold the negative opinion as probable; but the affirmative seems to be held. For: 1. the Council of Trent defines contrition, which it proposes as necessary for the existence or validity of the sacrament,³ in this way: "sorrow of soul and detestation concerning a committed sin, with the purpose of not sinning for the future."⁴ But these words in their obvious sense signify a will which absolutely detests the committed sin and absolutely purposes to abstain from sin; in other words, contrition estimatively highest. Therefore this is required for validity. 2. Contrition which is presented by the Council of Trent as necessary for validity, from the same Council, suffices with the sacrament⁵ for justification or for the fruit of the sacrament. But only contrition estimatively highest suffices for justification or for the fruit of the sacrament. Therefore it is also required for validity (cf. St. Thomas, Supplement, question 29, article 8).⁶ 3. True contrition is certainly required for the validity of the sacrament. But contrition which is not appreciatively highest is not true contrition. The minor is proved from the fact that true contrition consists in the act of turning oneself away from every habitual attachment to mortal sin. But contrition which is not appreciatively highest does not involve aversion from every habitual attachment to mortal sin except conditionally, or aversion under some respect.

For the will turns itself away from something insofar as the motive by which it is moved objectively excludes turning toward that thing. Hence, if the motive is only of such objective power that, while it stands, the will can still be joined with mortal sin, there is no aversion except conditionally, or aversion under some respect. But contrition not appreciatively highest has a motive which is only of such objective power that, while it stands, the will can still be joined with sin. Therefore the will in contrition not appreciatively highest is not properly an aversion from mortal sin, or is not true contrition, but only aversion or contrition conditionally or under some respect (St. Alphonsus, VI, 433, 7).

Objection 1. Contrition is matter of the sacrament only insofar as it is sensible or is manifested. But contrition is not manifested insofar as it is estimatively highest. Therefore as such it is not matter of the sacrament.

Response. I distinguish the major: contrition is matter of the sacrament only insofar as it is sensible or manifested, according to itself, I concede; according to its qualities, I deny; otherwise it would also have to be manifested as supernatural.

Objection 2. Only that penance is the object of judgment in the sacramental forum which can be known sufficiently certainly through an external act of the penitent. But this cannot be said of contrition estimatively highest.

Response. I deny the minor; for of itself confession suffices so that the contrition required for receiving the sacrament rightly may be sufficiently certainly admitted. But for receiving the sacrament rightly, contrition estimatively highest is demanded.

Corollary I. From the fact that contrition estimatively highest is required, do not infer that contrition highest intensively, that is, highest in degree of vehemence, is also required. For this does not pertain to the substance of contrition, which it is established from the Council of Trent suffices.

Corollary II. Nor is it required that a comparison be instituted between sin and temporal evils; indeed, commonly this is not even expedient, and it is dangerous (St. Thomas, Quodlibet 1, article 9; St. Alphonsus, VI, at the cited place).

6. Universal. The universality of contrition consists in this: that it extends itself to all committed sins. This takes place: 1. when someone grieves from a universal motive, even if the penitent does not recall individual sins; 2. when he grieves from particular motives which comprehend all committed sins. Now the universality of contrition:

a) As regards committed mortal sins, is certainly required for the fruit of the sacrament, since one mortal sin is not remitted without another. Hence, if contrition is lacking as regards one mortal sin, none would be remitted.

It is disputed whether universality is required for the validity of the sacrament. Some affirm this, and their principal reason seems to us to be that which we have already alleged on p. 226: "Contrition which by the Council of Trent is called the quasi-matter of the sacrament, and therefore is required for validity and suffices for it, from the same Council seems also to suffice, at least with the sacrament, for justification."⁷ But particular contrition does not suffice for justification. Therefore neither does it seem to suffice for validity. St. Alphonsus (VI, 444) and most other authors deny this, and judge that particular sorrow - that is, sorrow which does not extend itself to other mortal sins, but to one only or to certain sins from those committed - suffices for the validity of the sacrament. The reason alleged is that in the case there is true contrition, so that all things required for validity seem to be present. The case would be if someone, in good faith, grieved solely from the special baseness of some sin; but this will happen very rarely, because commonly penitents grieve either from a universal motive alone, or also from one.

Finally note: if a penitent, questioned by the confessor, states sins about which he did not previously think, it is indeed useful, but not necessary, to stir him up to a new act of sorrow, because an act elicited from a universal motive is presumed to have been conceived.

b) As regards venial sins, universal contrition is required only insofar as a venial sin is not remitted to which sorrow does not extend itself. For the rest, cf. the Scholion on contrition and purpose as regards venial sins.

Corollary. From what has been said it is gathered how far the sacrament of Penance can be informe, that is, valid but not fruitful. Many deny this, but St. Alphonsus (VI, 444) and most more recent authors affirm it, namely in the case in which someone grieves solely from a particular motive concerning one or some mortal sins.⁸ Others add the case in which the sinner lacks contrition estimatively highest (p. 226). But the sacrament of Penance, though informe, probably revives when the obstacle has been removed (n. 11).

7. External, that is, manifested or sensible in some way. For contrition more probably is an essential part of the sacramental sign itself; but it cannot be this unless in some way it is externally disclosed or manifested. It can be manifested, for example, by oral recitation of contrition, by confession either actually instituted or - if it has followed confession - morally enduring, or by expectation of absolution.

¹ Session 14, chapter 4; session 6, canon 3.

² Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 6.

³ Session 14, chapter 3.

⁴ Session 14, chapter 4.

⁵ Session 14, chapter 4.

⁶ On the opinion of St. Thomas, see Ter Haar, De occasionariis et recidivis, n. 237 sq.

⁷ Session 14, chapters 3 and 4.

⁸ Some judge that the sacrament, even in this case, is valid and fruitful, because, when the sinner grieves in order that he may receive grace, his sorrow, although in appearance particular, in reality virtually extends itself to all sins. They add that particular sorrow does not suffice without a universal purpose. But a universal purpose will scarcely be present without universal sorrow.

V. Relation between contrition and the other parts of the sacrament. Here note:

1. Contrition or detestation of sins must, as is clear, precede absolution from them; but it makes no difference whether it precedes or follows the act of confessing, although it is better to elicit it before confession and repeat it after confession (St. Alphonsus, VI, 445).¹

2. It is disputed whether contrition must be referred by the penitent to absolution. Some deny this, both because it belongs to the minister, not the penitent, to refer the matter of the sacrament to the form; and because from Trent² attrition, which excludes the will to sin, suffices in the sacrament for justification, without there being any mention of some relation to be made by the penitent. Others affirm it, because the minister cannot assume the acts of the penitent as matter unless they have been referred by the penitent to the sacrament. Others add that, just as one receiving, for example, Orders must order the touching of the matter to the sacrament, so also one receiving the sacrament of Penance must refer contrition to it. Nor should it be objected that sometimes those can be absolved who are ignorant of the sacrament, and therefore do not refer contrition to absolution. For they can, with the necessary conditions posited, be absolved conditionally, because the opinion of which we are speaking is not certain. St. Thomas seems to adhere to the affirmative opinion (3 p., question 86, article 6). Whatever the case may be, in practice you should follow the safer part (St. Alphonsus, VI, 447); but the question itself does not seem practical, because contrition, by the very fact that someone wishes to be absolved, seems sufficiently ordered to absolution.

3. It is not required that contrition actually or virtually endure until absolution, but it suffices that it persist habitually, that is, that it has not been retracted, with the things to be observed nevertheless observed, that is, those to be set forth under 4. The reason is that the penitent - although his acts are the matter of the sacrament - nevertheless is not the minister of the sacrament. Many indeed seem to require that contrition persevere actually or virtually, that is, in some effect; but in reality - many of them at least - do not speak of virtual perseverance properly so called (cf. St. Alphonsus, VI, 446). For the rest, it is difficult to determine how long contrition virtually endures. St. Alphonsus says this: "I, however... do not hesitate to assert that whenever confession derives from sorrow for sins, sorrow always virtually perseveres at least for one or another day, while that confession is the effect of sorrow. It is otherwise, however, if someone should confess from mere devotion, or to fulfill a vow, or a penance" (Homo Apostolicus, tract 16, n. 20).

4. As regards the space of time which can intervene between contrition actually elicited, likewise between confession, and absolution, some judge that only so much can intervene as can intervene between the parts of a civil judgment, because the sacrament of Penance was instituted after the manner of a judgment. But most reject that, nor does the reason alleged settle the question, because from elsewhere it is clear that a sacramental judgment is a judgment of its own kind (St. Alphonsus, VI, 446); for the rest, the space of time of which we are speaking cannot be determined. In practice, however, there will be no difficulty, since one who is absolved a rather long time after contrition has been elicited and confession instituted will commonly repeat both contrition and, at least in some way, confession before absolution.

Question. Whether a new absolution requires a new act of contrition, so that one who, after receiving absolution, declares a sin inculpably omitted, or again confesses sins already declared, must, I say, in order to be absolved again, elicit a new act of sorrow.

Response. Most more recent authors, against St. Alphonsus (VI, 448) and others, hold the negative opinion as morally certain; but undeservedly. The reason for doubting is this: just as a new act of confessing is required for a new judgment, so also, at least probably, a new act of contrition is required. Nevertheless, commonly there is no obligation of imposing a new penance; but it suffices that the imposed penance, insofar as it regards sins previously declared, be commuted, and insofar as it ought to regard the sins now declared, be left unchanged.

Objection. Even if a new act of contrition is not elicited, all things necessary for the sacrament are had, namely absolution, confession, and contrition morally persevering.

Response. It is doubtful whether contrition morally persevering suffices; since probably, as we have proved, a new act of contrition is required.

For the rest, the controversy seems less practical, because the penitent, by confessing the omitted sin or by again confessing sins already declared, commonly, at least in act exercised, will elicit a new act of contrition.

¹ Some older authors taught the contrary, relying on nearly these reasons:

1. Contrition must be manifested through confession, and therefore must be prior to it. Response: contrition can also be manifested in other ways, for instance by oral recitation. Besides, contrition elicited after confession is well manifested through confession, insofar as this morally perseveres, or at least through the petition or expectation of absolution.

2. Confession must not be a mere narration of sins, but a sacramental accusation; hence let it be informed by sorrow. Response: besides the fact that confession, insofar as it morally perseveres after contrition has been elicited, is informed by sorrow, it becomes sacramental by the fact that it is instituted in order to absolution.

² Session 14, on Penance, chapter 4.

450. Questions. QUESTION 1. Must contrition be supremely intense?

Reply. Negative. The reason is that intensity is something merely accidental. For the degree of sorrow, or the greater or lesser affection or effort, does not pertain to the essence of contrition, which can exist in its entirety without a degree of intensity of this kind. Besides, how would you know that this or that degree of intensity must be attained? Moreover, the intensity of sorrow is not always in our power. Hence, at times with respect to sensation we are moved more vehemently by a temporal evil than by an offense against God, although the will is ready rather to suffer all temporal evils than to offend God. Therefore, it suffices that it be appreciatively supreme, that is, that sin be held in hatred before other things by a serious judgment. - St. Lig., nos. 433-442 ².

² Cardinal de Lugo (De Poenitentia, disp. 5, nos. 84-87), after concluding that the opinion which requires contrition to be supremely intense is rightly commonly rejected, and that the opinion which requires contrition to be at least more intense than the acts by which a man is affected toward other objects is likewise to be rejected as exposed to many fallacies and dangers, nevertheless adds: We do not deny that it is expedient for the sinner to endeavor to grieve with the highest intensity, both so that he may be more certain of his penance and so that he may satisfy more fully not only for the fault but also for the punishment; in this sense the Fathers who require the highest sorrow must be understood.

QUESTION 2. Is a FORMAL comparison required in the appreciation between various evils and sin, or God?

Reply. Negative. For it suffices that the sinner sincerely and truly detest his sins and be unwilling to sin any more. Indeed, Confessors act very imprudently who, in order to discover whether sorrow is supreme, propose to penitents certain very dangerous comparisons, for example: Would you rather be burned alive, or undergo all the torments of the martyrs, or eat poisonous reptiles, than sin again? For such comparisons move the imagination more vividly, and when a strong temptation approaches, the true disposition which previously existed is easily lost. - St. Lig., no. 433. - Elbel, no. 79 ³.

³ St. Alphonsus and Elbel are not alone in admonishing that these comparisons must be avoided; indeed, St. Alphonsus rightly says that this is common to all. This is common among all, he says (loc. cit.), with St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, etc., in Croix, bk. 6, pt. 2, no. 731, namely, that an explicit comparison between sin and other evils is not expedient ..., and still less to choose hell, etc. Hence it is plain that certain formulas of contrition in which you may see comparisons of this kind - rather a thousand deaths, or even rather hell, etc. - are less to be approved. And this admonition can indeed be useful also to preachers. For if, after the affections of penance or charity have been excited, they imprudently leap to those comparisons, they will easily accomplish this: that the fervor kindled in the hearers quickly becomes lukewarm, indeed grows cold and perhaps is entirely extinguished. The special help of divine grace for undertaking and overcoming any arduous things can and ought certainly to be hoped for when the hour presses, but not whenever someone rashly commits himself to dangers through empty imaginings.

Navarrus (Manuale, ch. 10, no. 4) well calls comparisons of this kind harmful and superfluous temptations. And (ch. 1, no. 17) he thus notes their imprudence: No one ... is bound to compare specifically, judging within himself that he would rather suffer this and that kind of death and punishments than sin or have sinned. Indeed, this would be imprudence; just as the confessor would be imprudent who asks the penitent whether he would rather that his children or he himself had died than sinned; or whether he is prepared rather to die or lose his children than to admit a mortal sin.... For such a temptation is excessive.... Therefore, it suffices for the confessor that the penitent appears to have sufficient repentance for his sins.

Indeed, St. Thomas charges that custom not only with imprudence but with foolishness (Quodlibet 1, art. 9): One who is contrite is bound IN GENERAL to will to suffer any punishment rather than to sin.... But he is not bound IN PARTICULAR to descend to this punishment or that; indeed, he would act FOOLISHLY if someone should solicit himself or another concerning particular punishments of this kind. For it is manifest that, just as delightful things move more when considered in particular than in common, so terrible things terrify more if they are considered in particular; and there are some who do not fall under a lesser temptation who perhaps would fall under a greater one. Thus, someone hearing adultery is not incited to lust; but if through consideration he descends to each enticement, he is moved more. And similarly, someone would not refuse to suffer death for Christ; but if he should descend to considering each punishment, he would be drawn back more. And therefore, to descend to particulars in such things is to lead a man into temptation and to furnish an occasion of sin.

QUESTION 3. What duration of time is required for conceiving true and supreme contrition?

Reply. None per se, because duration does not pertain to the essence of the act but is merely accidental to it; therefore, it suffices that the act be substantially completed, which can occur even in a very brief moment. Nevertheless, it is safer to elicit a more intense and more prolonged act of contrition, lest perhaps from levity or excessive haste no act be conceived as to its substance. - St. Lig., no. 433, and others commonly.

216. 1° Principle: Contrition must be universal with respect to mortal sins, but not necessarily with respect to venial sins. It is certain.

(A) With respect to mortal sins, we must detest not only all those which have been declared, but also those which have been omitted on account of forgetfulness or a legitimate reason. For (a) we must detest sins insofar as they are an offense of God and deprive us of His friendship; but this reason extends itself to all mortal sins, even those which could not be declared on account of a legitimate reason; for each and every mortal sin grievously offends God, and indeed in such a way that they deprive us of divine friendship, as is clear from what was said above (n. 210); therefore we must detest all and each.

(b) Moreover, contrition is ordained to the remission of sin; but, in the present order of things, one mortal sin cannot be forgiven without the others, since it is not remitted except through the infusion of sanctifying grace, which cannot enter a soul in which one mortal sin remains; in truth no one can be both friend and enemy of God at the same time: now he who is adorned with sanctifying grace, by that very fact, is the friend of God, while he who retains one mortal sin is His enemy; therefore one mortal sin cannot be forgiven without the others; therefore contrition must extend to all mortal sins, since no mortal sin is remitted without contrition.

(c) Hence Scripture often urges sinners to retract all sins, so that they may be able to obtain pardon:¹ "Be converted, and do penance for all your iniquities, and iniquity shall not be your ruin. Cast away from you all your transgressions... and why will you die, O house of Israel?"

¹ Ezek. 18:30-31.

217. (B) With respect to venial sins, it is not required that contrition extend to all; for venial sins do not destroy the friendship of God, nor separate us from the ultimate end, so that one can be remitted without another. Besides, genuine sorrow can be conceived for one venial sin without being conceived for another, at least when these sins are of diverse kinds; for example, I can grieve over a lie, on account of the special malice inherent in it, without grieving over a slight act of pride or of intemperance.

218. 2° Corollaries. (A) It is not required that the penitent run through each mortal sin and grieve formally and distinctly for each, but it suffices that he detest them virtually and implicitly by a motive common to all. For the motives of contrition are of themselves universal, namely those on account of which we detest sin insofar as it is opposed to the attainment of the ultimate end, or insofar as it offends God, infinitely good and infinitely perfect, etc.; moreover these motives, when they are truly conceived, extend themselves to all and each of the sins, and that sufficiently, although virtually and implicitly; therefore it is not necessary that each be run through in the mind, and that a formal act of contrition be elicited for each. This, moreover, is often very difficult, and in some cases, for example, in the matter of chastity, dangerous. But as often as it can be done without danger, it is to be recommended, as useful for exciting a more vivid contrition.

This reason, however, evidently does not hold if someone hates some mortal sin on account of its special turpitude; for such a motive does not extend itself to other sins of diverse species; for example, if someone hates theft on account of its special turpitude, it does not follow from this that he detests an act of intemperance.

Hence it is altogether expedient that penitents, for the sake of greater security, conceive sorrow from a universal motive, so that in this way even those sins about which they are not actually thinking can be retracted. And this, moreover, is altogether easy for him who already sincerely grieves over one mortal sin: as soon as he no longer adheres to sin, he does not with difficulty reject all those things which are able to cause the loss of eternal beatitude.

219. (B) He who knowingly and willingly accuses only venial sins, having no contrition for them, sins gravely; for by that very fact he renders the sacrament null, on account of the defect of contrition, and so commits a grave irreverence. - Yet this will scarcely ever happen in practice, since such a man, by the very fact that he avoids mortal sins, is habitually well disposed; whence it will happen most rarely that he approaches the sacred tribunal knowingly and willingly lacking contrition. - For the rest, for the validity of the sacrament, it suffices that in such a case he accuse some sin of his past life for which he sincerely grieves.

220. (C) He who, knowingly and willingly, indiscriminately accuses venial sins for which he grieves and others for which he certainly knows that he does not grieve, more probably does not sin. Some indeed contend that he sins venially, because in some way he deceives the confessor, implicitly saying that he grieves for these sins by the very fact that he confesses them, while in reality he has conceived no contrition for them. - But this reason does not hold; for the confessor can understand, from things commonly occurring, that a penitent of this kind accuses certain venial sins not as matter of the sacrament, but so that he may be better known by the director, or for the sake of humility, or for other reasons. It would indeed be better in this case for the penitent openly to declare that he is not contrite for such or such a sin which he accuses; but he is not strictly held to this. In practice let him try to conceive contrition from a universal motive, which of itself embraces all venial sins, for example, to avoid the punishments of Purgatory, or because sin displeases God; then certainly there will be no sin, and in addition a richer fruit will be received from the sacrament.

349. 4. Contrition must be universal, inasmuch as it extends to absolutely all mortal sins not yet remitted.

The reason is that every mortal sin is a total aversion from God. Now contrition is conversion to God and must destroy every aversion from God, and therefore one mortal sin cannot be remitted without another. It is not strictly required, however, although it is generally better, that special contrition be elicited for each mortal sin. It suffices that the penitent, from a universal motive, namely, because he has offended the most good God and has merited the punishments of Gehenna, sorrow over all mortal sins committed, whether known or here and now unknown.

Since venial sins need not necessarily be accused in confession, it is not required that contrition be universal concerning them. But if someone confesses only venial sins, he must under grave obligation elicit true and formal contrition for at least one, or for other free matter consisting of sins already remitted, because otherwise he would not furnish sufficient proximate matter for the sacrament, which would therefore be frustrated; and this is certainly a grave sacrilege.

489. Principle I. For the validity of the sacrament of Penance, contrition must in some way be referred and directed to absolution, and morally united to it. - For this is necessary for constituting the proximate matter of the sacrament and thus the integrity and unity of the sacramental sign. For:

Confession is required to be sacramental, or made for obtaining absolution. But for this not every confession is sufficient, but only sorrowful confession; and confession is sorrowful through contrition. Therefore contrition must in some way be made for obtaining absolution.

The minor is proved: a sacrament instituted by way of judgment requires an accusation; for it has this special feature, that the instruction of the cause is made through accusation, which the guilty person himself institutes so that he may obtain pardon through the sentence of the absolving judge. But a simple narration is not an accusation; rather, the latter must be made with hatred of sin and sorrow, and be ordered to obtaining absolution. Therefore contrition must exist and be ordered to absolution, so that the accusation may be constituted in the nature of an accusation.

490. Principle II. Contrition must be ordered to absolution and morally united to it in some way whatever, without the mode in which this must be done being specially determined. - Therefore:

1. Actual contrition is not required, namely, one which actually exists in confession or immediately precedes it; but it suffices that it remain in virtue, insofar as it preceded and has not been revoked (whether formally through a contrary act, or virtually through a sinful act), and is morally judged to persevere so that it influences confession, as is clear from him who is absolved distracted or sleeping, or even in the very confession thinks nothing about sorrow, but, having been contrite beforehand, remains distracted in confession.

2. Nor is it required that it arise from a prior explicit and reflex intention of confessing or receiving the sacrament, but it suffices that this intention afterward accede and thus contrition be referred to the sacrament; for if someone on the occasion of a sermon or reading is stirred up to sorrow (without thinking about absolution), and then from sorrow is moved to confession, he is held to be well disposed, although he institutes confession from sorrow and does not sorrow from the intention of confessing.

3. Nor is a formal and explicit relation to confession as a sacrament required, but an implicit one suffices, which is always had when the penitent, in order to absolution, gives a sign of his preceding sorrow.

Whence there suffices either confession from the motive of sorrow - or sorrow from the motive of confession - or confession with remembrance of prior sorrow. Namely, confession will be sacramental if sorrow is in some way referred to confession, "whether a) antecedently, as when sorrow for sins is elicited from the end or intention of confession to be made, e.g., if, wishing to confess tomorrow, I therefore today examine my conscience and elicit sorrow for sins; or b) concomitantly, as if now, thinking nothing about making confession, you elicit sorrow, and thence moved you purpose to confess tomorrow or at the next occasion, and in fact, sorrow not having been revoked, at the next occasion you confess; or c) consequently, as if today you sorrow for sins, thinking nothing about confession to be made, but tomorrow, the purpose of confessing having been made, you refer the first sorrow had the day before to that confession, without a new sorrow elicited" (Haine, Th. M., III, on Penance, q. 30).

4. But it is not sufficient if sorrow is in no way referred to confession, "as if today you sorrow, not thinking about tomorrow's confession, nor tomorrow when confessing do you remember yesterday's sorrow, you confess invalidly unless you conceive a new sorrow, because a part must be referred to its fellow part, and sacramental and valid confession must be sorrowful, which it cannot be unless through sorrow related to itself in one of these ways." Thus Billuart, on Penance, diss. 4, a. 8, pet. 2, resp. 4°.

491. Principle III. Contrition must precede the absolution itself, but not the confession itself. - It must precede absolution, because otherwise confession is not sorrowful; and because in judgment the knowledge of the cause must precede the sentence of the judge, and this follows all other prior acts. Yet it does not have to precede the confession itself, whatever some have said, although nevertheless this is better and more prudent, lest afterward, disturbed by distractions, the one confessing not sorrow seriously enough before absolution.

This is testified by the unanimous practice of confessors, who are accustomed, according to the Roman Ritual, tit. III, c. 1, n. 18, to stir up to contrition and require it from the penitent, not before but after confession. And indeed, in order that confession be sorrowful it suffices: 1) that it be referred to sorrow which follows, and from the intention and hope of subsequent contrition and absolution be made; which nevertheless seems necessarily already to include a certain beginning of hatred and sorrow concerning sin; - or even more certainly (for him who might wish to doubt about the reason given): 2) that confession be continued while sorrow exists, and that this sorrow influence the morally continued confession and inform it, "insofar as," says Billuart (ibid., resp. 3°), "as long as the penitent bends or humbly asks for or expects the sentence of the judge, so long he is judged morally to persevere in the confession made, and by that very fact to continue it," and implicitly to confess himself guilty and to seek pardon.¹

¹ "The prior narration or complete accusation is afterward informed through consequent contrition, and as thus informed is subjected to the keys by the penitent himself requesting or awaiting absolution" Suarez, disp. 20, sect. 4, n. 3°.

Whence, even if by someone a mere narration, not an accusation, of his sins had been made, from the fact that afterward, sorrowing, he awaits absolution, by that very fact he continues the narration now informed by sorrow, i.e., he makes an accusation and orders it to absolution. And the very expression of contrition is a new accusation of the same sins.

492. Practical observations. - 1. An act of contrition once elicited in order to absolution can persevere not only for hours but even for one or another day, provided that it is not retracted and perseveres in effect, e.g., in the will of confessing, flight from occasions, more frequent prayers, etc. Such an interval does not destroy the moral union between the various parts of the judicial act, nor consequently of the sacramental judgment. But for how much time contrition perseveres must be prudently judged from the various circumstances: it is easily judged to last beyond a day if confession is instituted from sorrow alone; on the contrary, only for a day or through many hours, if also from devotion, obligation, custom, etc. In practice, for greater fruit and security, it is preferable to elicit actual contrition.

2. When the penitent, at once or a little after absolution, accuses himself of a sin, even a grave one, omitted from forgetfulness, it is not required that a new act of contrition be explicitly elicited, provided that it was conceived from a universal motive. For contrition previously conceived from a universal motive still perseveres, and extends itself to the forgotten sin, and through the new accusation is ordered to a new absolution; indeed explicit sorrow seems to be present in the act of accusing this sin. In practice, however, penitents are to be exhorted to elicit anew an act of contrition.

3. But if the interval is longer and therefore it is doubted whether contrition sufficiently perseveres, a new sorrow is required, even for sins already absolved and now declared anew: for past sorrow, even concerning the same sins, is in no certain way ordered to the new sacramental judgment, and therefore is to be repeated.

III. Merbesius. For true contrition there is required not only a grief for all mortal sins conceived generally and confusedly, but also one conceived specially and distinctly of individual sins, both as to number and as to species. Page 54, column 1.