Article III. On the Qualities of Contrition.

253. The qualities of contrition in this place, with scholastic controversies set aside, must be weighed in such a way that it may be clear what is required for certainly valid absolution. Therefore, in order that contrition, whether perfect or imperfect, may suffice for receiving the sacrament validly, it must be true, supernatural, universal, above all things.

1. True and formal, i.e., an act must necessarily be elicited by which the will grieves concerning sin from a sufficient motive and detests it; since contrition at least constitutes the necessary disposition of the sacrament of penance, and therefore must be truly present; moreover, contrition probably constitutes an essential part of the sacrament, wherefore it must be formally present.

a. Because contrition must be true, a mere recitation of the formula of contrition does not suffice unless at the same time affections of the will are present; nor does sorrow merely thought suffice, even if out of invincible ignorance someone thinks that he has sorrow; nor does the desire of sorrow and of absolution suffice; nor finally does sorrow concerning punishment or another evil effect which has followed from sin suffice: but the sorrow itself is required, and that concerning sin by which God is offended. And because contrition must be formal, merely virtual sorrow implicitly contained in another act, e.g., in an act of perfect charity, does not suffice: for although an act of perfect charity has the power of blotting out mortal sins outside the sacrament, nevertheless it does not suffice for obtaining the remission of sins by force of the sacrament, but the proximate matter of the sacrament is required, which is the act of sorrow and detestation concerning committed sins, whether these are mortal or venial.

b. Among the older theologians, especially before the Council of Trent, several thought that supposed contrition, by which the penitent in good faith thinks that he is contrite, sufficed for receiving valid absolution.¹ But this opinion lacks all probability. Supposed contrition indeed preserves the penitent from the sin of sacrilege, but it cannot make absolution valid.² Some more recent theologians also (Lugo, Ballerini) maintain that virtual contrition suffices for obtaining valid absolution;³ but since this opinion does not exceed probability, it cannot be brought into practice without danger of frustrating the sacrament.

c. For practice, however, this must be noted: those who are of timorous conscience and desire to have sorrow, or grieve that they do not grieve, provided they try to elicit it, usually have true sorrow, even if they do not perceive it. Therefore, since it is not so much the sorrow itself but rather the quality of the sorrow, and that quality not necessary for the sacrament, which is lacking, namely intense and sensible sorrow, absolution is not to be denied to those who desire to have sorrow, or say that they grieve because they do not have sorrow, provided they seriously wish to abstain from mortal sins and to fulfill at least grave obligations.

¹ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri V, n. 33 ff.

² Ibid., n. 46 note.

³ Ibid., n. 52 ff.

254. 2. Supernatural, both by reason of principle and by reason of motive; for sorrow is the disposition necessarily required by the will of God for obtaining justification, which, since it is wholly supernatural, the disposition required for it also must be supernatural.

a. By reason of principle: i.e., contrition must be elicited with the supernatural help of God, namely with actual grace moving and assisting unto eliciting the act of sorrow and detestation: for merely natural sorrow conceived by the powers of nature alone does not suffice in the sacrament of penance.

b. By reason of motive: i.e., sorrow must be elicited from a supernatural motive, i.e., from a motive which has relation to God, as the motives enumerated by the Council of Trent have it, not from a merely natural motive, such as sin would be insofar as it is opposed to rational nature, brings detriment to reputation, health, etc. There are those who for supernatural contrition require a motive supernatural in this sense, that it must be known from revelation and apprehended through the light of faith; now, although an act of truly supernatural contrition does not require a motive supernatural in this sense, nevertheless in reality a penitent will scarcely ever lack contrition truly supernatural also by reason of motive, because the motives enumerated by the Council of Trent are drawn from faith and are apprehended by penitents by the light of faith.

255. 3. Universal, which either explicitly or implicitly extends itself at least to all mortal sins not yet remitted, even if perhaps they do not occur to memory: for no sin is remitted without penance; but one sin cannot be remitted without another; therefore sorrow must extend itself at least to all mortal sins not yet remitted. But it is not necessary that it be universal explicitly; it suffices that it be universal implicitly, i.e., that it be elicited from a universal motive. Nor is it necessary that it also extend to venial sins not yet remitted, because mortal sins can be remitted without venial sins.

a. Explicitly: it can happen in a twofold way that sorrow explicitly extends itself to all mortal sins: first, if the penitent elicits as many distinct sorrows concerning the several sins; then, if by one act of sorrow he repents of all and each of those which he distinctly remembers and actually recalls to memory. Although for obtaining justification, whether in the sacrament or outside the sacrament, it is not required that sorrow explicitly extend itself to all mortal sins, nevertheless of itself it is most useful and very much to be recommended that the penitent call to mind the several sins and detest all and each.

b. Implicitly: again, it can happen in a twofold way that sorrow implicitly extends itself to all mortal sins: first, if the penitent knows himself to be in the state of sin, as guilty of several mortal sins, and by an act of sorrow conceived from a universal motive grieves concerning all the things which he thus knows confusedly; then, if he thinks expressly and in species of only one sin and grieves concerning it from a universal motive common to all mortal sins. For by the very fact that from a universal motive he detests one sin, he implicitly and necessarily also detests all other sins committed by himself which deserve to be detested on account of the same motive, even though he does not remember them.¹

¹ Sporer-Bierbaum III, pr. 3, n. 88 ff.

256. 4. Appreciatively highest or above all things. Therefore the penitent must esteem mortal sin as a greater evil and for this reason detest it more than any other evil, and must be prepared in soul rather to undergo any other evil whatever than again to commit sin. For sin is the highest evil, since it is contrary to the highest and infinite good. Moreover true contrition must exclude every will of sinning;¹ but unless the penitent detests sin above all things, every will of sinning is not excluded, since he is so disposed that for the sake of avoiding some evil he would wish to commit sin.

a. Nevertheless it is not necessary, indeed ordinarily it is to be dissuaded, that explicit comparisons be made between sin and some particular evil to be undergone (rather to be burned alive, rather to sustain the torments of the martyrs, etc., than to sin again). And if comparisons of this kind either occur spontaneously or are suggested by the tempter, nothing is to be chosen, but all are to be rejected with this pious and firm will: I do not wish to sin any more, and aided by divine grace I hope that I will not sin.

b. It is not necessary that contrition be intensively highest. Contrition would be intensively highest if the very act of the will by which we grieve concerning sin committed were greater and more vehement than the act by which we grieve concerning any other evil, however grave. But neither intensively highest sorrow nor sorrow of a certain and determined degree of intensity is required; rather true and internal sorrow in any degree, even remiss, suffices: for where the essence of contrition is had, a sufficient disposition for the remission of any sin is present; but the essence of contrition is had in any degree of true contrition.

c. From the same reason it is deduced that sufficient contrition does not demand any delay of time: for true contrition can be elicited by the will in an instant; nevertheless it is greatly to be recommended that some time be spent in eliciting sorrow, by which the sorrow may be more certain and more intense.

d. Finally, for contrition which suffices for justification, it is not required that sorrow be sensible, namely that it overflow into the sensitive appetite and into sensible acts, into tender affections of the heart, sighs, and tears; but it suffices that it be spiritual, by which namely the will from a sufficient motive grieves concerning and detests the sin committed. For sensible sorrow of this kind is not in our power, nor does it belong to the perfection of contrition: for it can happen that without sensible sorrow someone grieves more vehemently than another who by his nature is prone to tender affections and tears. Nevertheless signs of this kind, sensible ones, are very often indications of great and vehement sorrow in those who truly and sincerely grieve.

e. By these things it is not denied that contrition must be manifested outwardly by some sensible sign: for according to the probable opinion of many, contrition is an essential part of the sacrament; but the parts of a sacrament must necessarily be sensible. Moreover it becomes sensible through the sorrowful confession of sins, through the devout petition and expectation of absolution, and through other external signs.

Particular Questions. Having explained the qualities of contrition, certain questions which pertain to this matter must be proposed and solved. In treating these questions one must attend to the probable doctrine, namely that the acts of the penitent are essential parts and the proximate matter of the sacrament, lest the sacrament be exposed to danger of nullity.

¹ Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 4.

257. When sorrow must be elicited. a. It must necessarily be elicited before sacramental absolution: for no one can be validly absolved who is not rightly disposed; but he who does not grieve concerning sins committed is not rightly disposed.

b. Of itself it is not required that it be elicited before confession, although this is greatly to be recommended; but it suffices that it be elicited after confession, whether because the penitent himself only after confession disposes himself to sorrow, or because after confession he is at last disposed by the confessor to detesting sin.

Confession performed without preceding sorrow can indeed seem insufficient for receiving valid absolution, both because it is a simple narration of sins, not a sacramental accusation, and because sorrow which follows confession is manifested by no sensible sign: for ordinarily sorrow becomes sensible only through confession. Nevertheless there is no doubt that in him who truly grieves after confession but before absolution, both are found: sacramental confession and sorrow outwardly manifested. For by the very fact that the penitent has confessed with the intention of obtaining absolution, the confession is sacramental; but sorrow becomes sensible because the penitent, expecting absolution, as it were continues the accusation informed by subsequent sorrow and orders it to absolution: for the confession, the petition for absolution, and the expectation of it morally pertain to confession and constitute and complete it.

c. It is not to be elicited so long before confession that at the time of confession it no longer morally endures. But sorrow is judged to endure morally as long as it has not been revoked and endures virtually, i.e., in some effect, e.g., in the will to confess, in flight from occasions, in more frequent prayers, etc.

1. How long elicited sorrow endures virtually cannot be accurately determined: for intense sorrow and sorrow ordered to confession endure longer than remiss sorrow and sorrow not ordered to confession. Without doubt it can endure for three or four hours, indeed for a whole day or a whole night, and in some circumstances (where namely confession is instituted not from mere devotion or from obligation, but from sorrow conceived concerning sins) even for several days. Moreover, in the opinion of those who affirm that sorrow is only a necessary disposition, it suffices that sorrow endure habitually; but it endures habitually as long as it is not revoked. Sorrow elicited before confession is judged to be revoked through a fall into sin; indeed through mortal sin every sorrow is revoked, but through venial sin at least sorrow concerning that very sin which is committed is revoked.

Therefore he who, for example, prepared himself for confession in the morning, can validly and licitly confess in the evening without a new act of sorrow: for sorrow elicited in the morning in order to confession and not revoked is judged still to endure in the evening, so that by force of that sorrow the confession is sorrowful.

2. Two things must be noted here for practice. First indeed, it must be inculcated to the faithful that they elicit sorrow before confession: for it could very easily happen that that little delay, while absolution is being given, would not suffice for conceiving contrition, and therefore absolution would be frustrated of its effect. Then, it is by no means necessary that confessors induce a penitent whom they could finally move in the confessional to due disposition, so that he outwardly manifest sorrow and refer it explicitly to the sins already set forth, by saying, for example, I grieve concerning my sins already set forth, or I grieve concerning my sins, concerning which I accuse myself again; rather they can absolve him without a new accusation.

258. Whether elicited sorrow must be with the intention of confessing. The negative opinion seems to be true and morally certain: for it suffices that the confession be sorrowful; but for this it is not required that the sorrow be elicited from the intention of confessing, provided that afterward, when confession is instituted, the sorrow still morally endures. The reason for this matter is taken from Trent, which, when it accurately describes the contrition required for the sacrament, nowhere demands that sorrow be elicited from the intention of confessing.¹

Therefore he who, thinking nothing of confession, has elicited contrition, can approach the sacrament without new sorrow, provided the contrition morally endures. For the explanation of this matter it must be noted that there were authors who, for valid absolution, required not only a moral union between sorrow and confession, but further demanded that sorrow be elicited in order to absolution and be referred to the sacrament through the intention of the penitent: for, they say, the parts of the sacrament (matter and form) must be ordered to the sacrament by intention. But, with the opinion admitted by force of which the acts of the penitent are parts of the sacrament, only those parts which are placed by the minister must be made from the intention of confecting the sacrament. Therefore, since the opinion of those authors lacks every foundation, it does not seem to be probable.²

¹ Cf. sess. 14, c. 4.

² Cf. Lugo, disp. 14, n. 37 ff.; Suarez, disp. 20, sect. 4, n. 29; Ballerini-Palmieri V, n. 76 ff.

259. Whether one act of sorrow suffices for several absolutions. Nothing prevents one act of sorrow from sufficing for repeated absolution, whether this constitutes a new sacramental judgment or only the complement of the prior absolution, provided the sorrow was elicited previously as universal and endures virtually, because nothing prevents the same sorrow from sufficing for two absolutions.¹

a. Therefore if the penitent later, for example on the following day, again subjects to the keys sins already rightly accused and remitted, yesterday's sorrow suffices so that valid absolution can again be granted, provided yesterday's universal sorrow still virtually perseveres. Nevertheless renewal is to be recommended.

b. If the penitent immediately or a little after absolution confesses a sin omitted through forgetfulness, it is indeed advisable to renew sorrow; nevertheless it is not necessary, but without new sorrow absolution can be given validly and licitly. For the sorrow previously elicited, as is supposed, was universal and also extended itself to this sin, nor was it revoked. With this opinion the practice of confessors also agrees, who in a case of this kind are not accustomed to warn the penitent about renewing sorrow.²

c. If the dying person, who on account of danger of death was absolved after one or another sin at least had been heard, afterward completes the confession, it is not necessary that he renew sorrow before the second absolution, although in these cases it is advisable.

¹ Cf. Lugo, disp. 14, n. 24 ff.; Tamburini, Methodus expeditae confess., l. 1, c. 2, n. 8; Ballerini-Palmieri V, n. 81 ff.

² Dicastillo, tr. 8, disp. 6, n. 165.

260. Whether the sacrament of penance can be formless. If someone approaches the sacrament of penance in good faith thinking that he has sufficient attrition, which in reality he does not have, he cannot perceive the effect of the sacrament, because sorrow is absolutely necessary for obtaining remission of sins. Indeed the sacrament not only lacks its effect, but is also invalid: for the act of contrition, at least as disposition, is altogether required not only for receiving the sacrament fruitfully, but also for receiving it validly.¹ Therefore in this case the sacrament of penance cannot be formless. Among the cases about which question can be raised, the principal one is this: if the sorrow of the penitent in good faith is not universal, as if someone guilty of two sins, wholly forgetful of one, grieves concerning the other from a particular motive. Whether in this case the sacrament is valid but formless, or invalid, is a question disputed among scholastics.

The solution of the question depends upon this: whether the sacrament of penance is valid when sorrow concerning sins is not universal but only particular. Therefore the patrons of the opinion denying that there can be a valid but formless sacrament appeal to the positive will of Christ so instituting this sacrament that universal sorrow concerning all mortal sins absolutely should be required for its validity, not only for perceiving its effect. They gather this will of Christ from the Council of Trent, which makes no distinction between the sorrow which is required for a valid sacrament and the sorrow which is required for a fruitful sacrament. But those who affirm that the sacrament can be formless think that in this case the sacrament is valid, since all things are present which are required for the validity of the sacrament: sorrowful confession with absolution; but, they say, that sorrow must necessarily be universal cannot be demonstrated. Nevertheless in this case, for valid absolution the penitent must elicit a universal purpose explicitly: for in sorrow which proceeds from a particular motive there is not contained a universal purpose. Nor should it be said that in the universal purpose of avoiding future sins there is necessarily included detestation of past sins; and therefore sorrow is always universal provided the purpose is universal: for in a universal purpose the particular sorrow is not contained except implicitly; but there can be a universal purpose and particular sorrow.²

Note. This controversy has no practical importance. First, indeed, penitents very rarely elicit contrition from a merely particular motive; then still more rarely do they add a universal purpose if they have ever elicited contrition from a particular motive. Therefore, whatever is theoretically disputed, in practice the sacrament of penance will scarcely ever be formless: for either universal contrition is elicited, and then the sacrament is valid and formed; or particular contrition is elicited, and then the sacrament is invalid from defect of a universal purpose.

¹ Cf. Sporer-Bierbaum III, pr. 3, n. 257 ff.; Ballerini-Palmieri V, n. 46 note.

² Suarez contends that in this case the sacrament of penance is formless (de poenit., disp. 20, sect. 5), whose opinion Lugo also defends (disp. 14, sect. 6), who (n. 88) says: "I do not see an argument by which it can efficaciously be rejected."