Article III: On Contrition as Ordered to the Sacrament

489. Principle I. For the validity of the sacrament of Penance, contrition must in some way be referred and directed to absolution, and morally united to it. - For this is necessary for constituting the proximate matter of the sacrament and thus the integrity and unity of the sacramental sign. For:

Confession is required to be sacramental, or made for obtaining absolution. But for this not every confession is sufficient, but only sorrowful confession; and confession is sorrowful through contrition. Therefore contrition must in some way be made for obtaining absolution.

The minor is proved: a sacrament instituted by way of judgment requires an accusation; for it has this special feature, that the instruction of the cause is made through accusation, which the guilty person himself institutes so that he may obtain pardon through the sentence of the absolving judge. But a simple narration is not an accusation; rather, the latter must be made with hatred of sin and sorrow, and be ordered to obtaining absolution. Therefore contrition must exist and be ordered to absolution, so that the accusation may be constituted in the nature of an accusation.

490. Principle II. Contrition must be ordered to absolution and morally united to it in some way whatever, without the mode in which this must be done being specially determined. - Therefore:

1. Actual contrition is not required, namely, one which actually exists in confession or immediately precedes it; but it suffices that it remain in virtue, insofar as it preceded and has not been revoked (whether formally through a contrary act, or virtually through a sinful act), and is morally judged to persevere so that it influences confession, as is clear from him who is absolved distracted or sleeping, or even in the very confession thinks nothing about sorrow, but, having been contrite beforehand, remains distracted in confession.

2. Nor is it required that it arise from a prior explicit and reflex intention of confessing or receiving the sacrament, but it suffices that this intention afterward accede and thus contrition be referred to the sacrament; for if someone on the occasion of a sermon or reading is stirred up to sorrow (without thinking about absolution), and then from sorrow is moved to confession, he is held to be well disposed, although he institutes confession from sorrow and does not sorrow from the intention of confessing.

3. Nor is a formal and explicit relation to confession as a sacrament required, but an implicit one suffices, which is always had when the penitent, in order to absolution, gives a sign of his preceding sorrow.

Whence there suffices either confession from the motive of sorrow - or sorrow from the motive of confession - or confession with remembrance of prior sorrow. Namely, confession will be sacramental if sorrow is in some way referred to confession, "whether a) antecedently, as when sorrow for sins is elicited from the end or intention of confession to be made, e.g., if, wishing to confess tomorrow, I therefore today examine my conscience and elicit sorrow for sins; or b) concomitantly, as if now, thinking nothing about making confession, you elicit sorrow, and thence moved you purpose to confess tomorrow or at the next occasion, and in fact, sorrow not having been revoked, at the next occasion you confess; or c) consequently, as if today you sorrow for sins, thinking nothing about confession to be made, but tomorrow, the purpose of confessing having been made, you refer the first sorrow had the day before to that confession, without a new sorrow elicited" (Haine, Th. M., III, on Penance, q. 30).

4. But it is not sufficient if sorrow is in no way referred to confession, "as if today you sorrow, not thinking about tomorrow's confession, nor tomorrow when confessing do you remember yesterday's sorrow, you confess invalidly unless you conceive a new sorrow, because a part must be referred to its fellow part, and sacramental and valid confession must be sorrowful, which it cannot be unless through sorrow related to itself in one of these ways." Thus Billuart, on Penance, diss. 4, a. 8, pet. 2, resp. 4°.

491. Principle III. Contrition must precede the absolution itself, but not the confession itself. - It must precede absolution, because otherwise confession is not sorrowful; and because in judgment the knowledge of the cause must precede the sentence of the judge, and this follows all other prior acts. Yet it does not have to precede the confession itself, whatever some have said, although nevertheless this is better and more prudent, lest afterward, disturbed by distractions, the one confessing not sorrow seriously enough before absolution.

This is testified by the unanimous practice of confessors, who are accustomed, according to the Roman Ritual, tit. III, c. 1, n. 18, to stir up to contrition and require it from the penitent, not before but after confession. And indeed, in order that confession be sorrowful it suffices: 1) that it be referred to sorrow which follows, and from the intention and hope of subsequent contrition and absolution be made; which nevertheless seems necessarily already to include a certain beginning of hatred and sorrow concerning sin; - or even more certainly (for him who might wish to doubt about the reason given): 2) that confession be continued while sorrow exists, and that this sorrow influence the morally continued confession and inform it, "insofar as," says Billuart (ibid., resp. 3°), "as long as the penitent bends or humbly asks for or expects the sentence of the judge, so long he is judged morally to persevere in the confession made, and by that very fact to continue it," and implicitly to confess himself guilty and to seek pardon.¹

¹ "The prior narration or complete accusation is afterward informed through consequent contrition, and as thus informed is subjected to the keys by the penitent himself requesting or awaiting absolution" Suarez, disp. 20, sect. 4, n. 3°.

Whence, even if by someone a mere narration, not an accusation, of his sins had been made, from the fact that afterward, sorrowing, he awaits absolution, by that very fact he continues the narration now informed by sorrow, i.e., he makes an accusation and orders it to absolution. And the very expression of contrition is a new accusation of the same sins.

492. Practical observations. - 1. An act of contrition once elicited in order to absolution can persevere not only for hours but even for one or another day, provided that it is not retracted and perseveres in effect, e.g., in the will of confessing, flight from occasions, more frequent prayers, etc. Such an interval does not destroy the moral union between the various parts of the judicial act, nor consequently of the sacramental judgment. But for how much time contrition perseveres must be prudently judged from the various circumstances: it is easily judged to last beyond a day if confession is instituted from sorrow alone; on the contrary, only for a day or through many hours, if also from devotion, obligation, custom, etc. In practice, for greater fruit and security, it is preferable to elicit actual contrition.

2. When the penitent, at once or a little after absolution, accuses himself of a sin, even a grave one, omitted from forgetfulness, it is not required that a new act of contrition be explicitly elicited, provided that it was conceived from a universal motive. For contrition previously conceived from a universal motive still perseveres, and extends itself to the forgotten sin, and through the new accusation is ordered to a new absolution; indeed explicit sorrow seems to be present in the act of accusing this sin. In practice, however, penitents are to be exhorted to elicit anew an act of contrition.

3. But if the interval is longer and therefore it is doubted whether contrition sufficiently perseveres, a new sorrow is required, even for sins already absolved and now declared anew: for past sorrow, even concerning the same sins, is in no certain way ordered to the new sacramental judgment, and therefore is to be repeated.