Section — Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology
§ I. On Contrition Taken Integrally
I. Notion. Contrition is "sorrow of soul and detestation concerning a committed sin, with the purpose of not sinning for the future."1 It is said concerning a committed sin, so that sorrow over the fact that one does not sorrow over sin does not suffice; in which case not sin, but the defect of sorrow, is the object of sorrow. Nevertheless, one who sorrows over the defect of sorrow is commonly to be judged also to sorrow over the sin itself. Contrition comprises three things, namely detestation, sorrow, and purpose. Moreover:
Detestation is the act by which the will abhors the committed sin, turns itself away from the committed sin, and expels every affection for sin; this act of the will is expressed in this way: I would wish not to have sinned; it displeases me that I committed sin. Detestation pertains to the essence of contrition. For contrition must formally be opposed to sin; this happens through detestation, by which the sinner now does not will what he previously willed (St. Alphonsus, VI, 435).
Sorrow is a certain sadness of the will arising from the fact that the evil of sin is apprehended as present (St. Thomas, 1-2, question 35, article 8; question 36, article 1). In man as wayfarer sorrow necessarily follows detestation, so that it must at least be called a necessary element of contrition. But it is disputed whether sorrow pertains to the very essence of contrition. Whatever the case may be, at least this must be admitted: contrition consists principally in detestation, which is the cause of sorrow and specifies sorrow, which of itself is indifferent, and renders it morally good (St. Alphonsus, VI, 435).
The acts of detestation and sorrow, although they are distinguished from one another, nevertheless are morally so conjoined in man as wayfarer that they are regarded after the manner of one.
- What purpose is will be explained in n. 301.
II. Division. Contrition is distinguished into perfect and imperfect.
- Perfect contrition is that which is conceived from the motive of charity. Moreover:
a) It is certainly conceived from the motive of charity if it is elicited from love of God loved above all things because of the divine goodness or perfection, insofar as this comprises the essence of God with all the attributes. But note that from love of this kind there is also elicited contrition which is conceived from the desire of possessing God, not insofar as this possession is good for the penitent, but insofar as it is pleasing to God, who is most perfectly loved in possession (St. Alphonsus, II, 24, doubt 1).
b) It is not conceived from the motive of charity if it is elicited from love of God loved because of some relative attribute, for example beneficence, as such, or insofar as it is not considered as a divine perfection pertaining to God.
c) It is disputed whether it is conceived from the motive of charity if it is elicited from love of God loved because of some divine attribute, whether absolute or relative, provided this is considered as a divine perfection pertaining to God, considered separately through formal abstraction. Many affirm this: 1. because Sacred Scripture stirs us up to charity by the motive of God's goodness toward us: "Let us therefore love God, because God first loved us";1 therefore because of an attribute of God, a relative one; 2. because the divine attributes are not really distinguished from his essence, nor can they be conceived by us with objective precision from the other perfections and the essence of God; 3. because preachers commonly exhort the faithful to charity by unfolding the relative attribute, namely God's goodness toward us. Others, whose opinion St. Alphonsus holds as more probable, teach that some divine attribute taken separately is not sufficient for eliciting an act of perfect contrition from love of God, but that the formal object of love is constituted from the essence of God together with all his attributes. For in order that someone love God as the supreme good - which is required for an act of charity - he must antecedently conceive God thus by an act of the intellect, according to the familiar saying: nothing is willed unless known. Moreover, in the concept of one attribute taken separately, for example wisdom, God as the supreme good is contained only virtually and implicitly; but what is known only virtually and implicitly is not yet known in relation to reducing the will to act. It is added that, according to the truer opinion, the act of charity of the homeland and of the way is specifically the same; but it is established that the act of charity of the homeland subjectively has the whole divine goodness as its formal motive. Therefore it follows that this whole goodness is also subjectively required for the formal object of the act of charity of the way (St. Alphonsus, VI, 436). Nevertheless, the controversy is not practical, because commonly the case supposed does not occur except in appearance; in other words, God sometimes seems to be loved because of an attribute considered separately, but in reality he is loved because of the supreme goodness. Hence preachers do not take account of this controversy.
Corollary I. It was formerly disputed whether perfect contrition is that which is elicited from the motive of some moral virtue which has an order to God, for example gratitude, religion, obedience, penance. But this opinion is now very commonly denied, and it is taught that contrition elicited from the motives of those virtues is not that which proximately disposes for justification, that is, perfect contrition.2
Corollary II. Someone can elicit perfect contrition even if he does not explicitly add that he loves God for God's sake or because of his infinite perfection; in other words, even if he does not say, for example: My God, I detest my sins because I love Thee because of Thy infinite goodness; but only: I detest my sins, the offenses against Thee, because Thou art supreme goodness. Nor is it required for an act of perfect contrition that one attend to the meaning of the individual words of the formula; it suffices that he grasp with the intellect and will in the soul the general sense of the formula.
Corollary III. Besides this, for perfect contrition it is not required that one detest sin from fear of hell or another inferior motive.
- Imperfect contrition, which commonly is called attrition, is that which is conceived from an honorable motive distinct from the motive of charity, for example from the motive of hope, gratitude, penance, etc.
1 1 John 4:19.
III. Required contrition. Not only perfect contrition, concerning which there is no doubt, but also imperfect contrition or attrition suffices for rightly receiving the sacrament of Penance. This opinion, which today is almost commonly admitted,1 is proved by these arguments:
The Council of Trent calls contrition taken generically a part and quasi-matter of the sacrament,2 and thus sufficiently indicates that it - whether or not it is called proximate matter - suffices for the sacrament of Penance. But imperfect contrition also is contained as a species under generic contrition as circumscribed by the Council.
The same Council says this about imperfect contrition: "Although without the sacrament of Penance it cannot of itself lead the sinner to justification, nevertheless it disposes him to obtain the grace of God in the sacrament of Penance."3 Therefore, according to these words of the Council, attrition disposes to justification in one way within the sacrament and in another way outside the sacrament. Now outside the sacrament it disposes remotely to justification. It remains, therefore, that we say that within the sacrament it disposes proximately to it.
Then it is wholly improbable that the power of remitting sins is in act never exercised upon sin not yet remitted. But this would happen if in the sacrament of Penance attrition did not suffice, but perfect contrition were required, that is, a disposition which of itself would already bring with it the remission of sin before absolution.
Finally, since the more benign opinion has now for many centuries been almost common, it is hard to understand why it has not been reprobated by the Church, if it were not safe; especially since this sacrament is of such frequent use.
Objection. The Council of Trent, among those things which are required for receiving justification in Baptism, lists: "and they begin to love Him as the font of all justice";4 these words you may deservedly apply also to the sacrament of Penance.
Response 1. It cannot be admitted that an act of true charity is required by the Council for receiving justification in Baptism; for the contrary opinion as regards Baptism was almost common both before the Council (cf. St. Thomas, 4 Distinction 6, question 1, article 3) and after the Council.
Response 2. Initial love can well be understood of some good affection toward God, who is the font of our justice; one who is affected by this good affection toward God is deservedly said to begin to love God, according to these words of St. Thomas, whose doctrine the Council of Trent so greatly attended to: "Insofar as hope regards him through whom something becomes possible for us, love is caused by hope, and not conversely. For from the fact that through someone we hope goods can come to us, we are moved toward him as toward our good; and thus we begin to love him" (1-2, question 40, article 7; St. Alphonsus, VI, 442). Others explain the words of the Council differently.
1 Otherwise Périnelle, O.P., L'attrition d'après le Concile de Trente et S. Thomas d'Aquin.
Corollary I. From what has been said, it is gathered in what sense the solemn expression is true: the attrite, by the power of the keys, becomes contrite. Namely, he becomes equivalently contrite, insofar as the attrite person with the sacrament passes from the state of the attrite to the state of the contrite, that is, he is justified equally as one perfectly contrite. Others explain it otherwise.
Corollary II.
It is useful, in order that what has been said about imperfect contrition may be unfolded more fully, to assign the diverse motives from which it can be elicited. Moreover, the Council of Trent teaches that "attrition is commonly conceived from consideration of the baseness of sin, or from fear of hell and of punishments."1 Now, by adding "commonly," it sufficiently indicates that, besides the motives enumerated, others are given; or it can also be said that all motives are implicitly contained in the motives assigned by the Council. Namely, the motive of the baseness of sin contains all motives of the virtues distinct from charity. Besides, the motive of hope is contained in the motive of fear of punishments, because it is equivalent whether someone detests sin from hope of eternal life or from fear of hell, that is, of losing eternal life. All these things will be clearer from what is to be said. Therefore contrition conceived, for example, from the following motives suffices:
From the motive of obedience: "I detest my sins because by sinning I have transgressed Thy law."
From the motive of special penance: "because by sinning I have injured Thy right"; "that I may compensate Thy injured right."
From the motive of religion: "because by sinning I denied Thee the worship owed."
From the motive of gratitude: "because by sinning I have shown myself so ungrateful toward Thee"; "because Thou hast heaped benefits upon me."
From the motive of hope, for example:
a) From hope of eternal beatitude: "I grieve concerning my sins because by sinning I have lost the right to eternal beatitude"; "that I may recover the right to eternal beatitude."
b) From hope of justification: "because by sinning I have lost sanctifying grace"; "that I may recover sanctifying grace."
c) From hope of a temporal supernatural good: "that I may embrace a salutary state of life."
Here also belongs contrition conceived:
- From fear, simply servile,2 of punishments. Namely:
a) From fear of hell, for example: "because by sinning I have deserved eternal punishments"; or: "lest I be eternally damned." That this motive suffices is expressly taught by the Council of Trent in the place cited. The same must be said of fear of purgatory.
b) From fear of temporal punishments of this life, as the same Council seems to signify by saying "from fear of hell and of punishments"; for these words seem to be taken not in a composite sense, as some wish, but in a divided sense, because the Council, in the place cited, adduces the example of the Ninevites, who were being struck by a temporal punishment, namely the destruction of the city. For the rest, temporal punishments must be viewed as inflicted by God, and insofar as they in some way begin the divine punishment, unless we amend ourselves. Otherwise they cannot ground contrition that is estimatively highest (n. 299). Nor then is the matter outside every controversy (St. Alphonsus, VI, 443).
From the motive precisely of that virtue to which the committed sin is opposed, for example: "I detest the sin of lust because chastity is so beautiful." Here also belongs attrition conceived:
From the special baseness of the sin committed, for example: I detest the sin of lust because lust is so foul. Likewise attrition elicited from the general baseness of sin suffices, for example: "I detest sin because it has deprived me of supernatural brightness; because my soul has been so greatly defiled through it."
Corollary III. Salutary attrition is not so difficultly resolved into perfect contrition. For the attrite person is already tending toward God; hence he easily apprehends sin as an evil to God, or as injurious to infinite Goodness, and detests it also under this respect. These things especially hold for attrition conceived from the motive of a virtue which is referred to God, namely religion, obedience, penance, and gratitude. But they hold most of all for the motive of gratitude; since one who is grateful easily wills good to his benefactor, and consequently grieves over sin insofar as it is an evil to God. But since gratitude is especially stirred up by considering the incarnation, passion, and death of Christ, and his presence in the Holy Eucharist, he who is also himself God, therefore meditation on those mysteries is the easiest way of arriving at perfect contrition.
Corollary IV. Let confessors indeed commonly exhort penitents who are not sufficiently disposed to attrition, for motives of this kind especially move such men. Nevertheless, generally let them not omit at the end, and in some way, to propose to them and also to others the motives of perfect contrition.
2 Attrition from fear or dread is twofold: attrition from filial fear and attrition from servile fear. Attrition from filial fear is had when someone detests sin because it is an offense against God, the best Father; from servile fear, when someone detests sin because of fear of punishment. Attrition from servile fear is likewise twofold: attrition from fear simply servile, and attrition from fear servilely servile. The former is detestation of sin because of fear of punishment, born from ordered love of one's own good, that is, from love subordinated, or at least subordinable, to the divine good or to our last end. The latter is detestation of sin because of fear of punishment, born from disordered love of one's own good, that is, born from love not subordinated to the divine good or to our last end; in other words, born from love of one's own good as the last end. The former is honorable; the latter is dishonorable.
IV. Properties of contrition. The summary of the doctrine is this: 1. For the sacrament of Penance to be received validly and fruitfully there is required contrition: a) true, b) internal, c) formal, d) supernatural, e) estimatively highest, f) universal as regards mortal sins, g) external; 2. for the sacrament of Penance to be received validly there is likewise required contrition: a) true, b) internal, c) formal, d) supernatural, e) external; but it is disputed whether, considering only validity, contrition estimatively highest and universal is required. We shall weigh the individual points.
True, or not merely thought to exist. Several of the ancients taught that contrition merely thought to exist, but in good faith, suffices for the validity - though not for the fruit - of the sacrament. But that opinion today is commonly and deservedly rejected. For the Council of Trent teaches that contrition is required for the essence of the sacrament (n. 297). But doctrine of this kind must manifestly be understood of true contrition, not of that which is present merely putatively (St. Alphonsus, VI, 433, 2). Note, however, that most of those who think they grieve over sins also truly grieve over them.
Internal; for contrition, which by Trent is called a part and quasi-matter of the sacrament, is defined by the same Council as "sorrow of soul."
Formal, so that virtual contrition does not suffice, that is, that which is contained especially in an act of charity. Several older authors judged that virtual contrition sufficed for the validity and fruit of the sacrament. But: 1. this opinion is now almost commonly rejected; 2. the Council of Trent teaches that contrition is a part and quasi-matter of the sacrament. Moreover, that word in its obvious sense signifies formal contrition, not virtual contrition (St. Alphonsus, VI, 449).
Note, however: 1. Formal contrition can well be conceived in the very recollection or confession of sins; hence it is not required that someone has used a formula of contrition. 2. It will scarcely happen that someone about to receive the sacrament of Penance, and therefore thinking about his sins, elicits an act of perfect charity without formally grieving over his offenses against God.
- Supernatural. Now:
a) Certainly it must be supernatural by reason of the eliciting principle; in other words, it must be elicited through the help of grace, which elevates the act above the order of nature. This is clear: 1. from the Council of Trent;1 2. it is established that no salutary act can be done by man, that is, one positively conducive to salvation, without the help of grace. Therefore neither can man salutarily repent without the help of grace.
b) It is disputed whether contrition must be supernatural by reason of the motive; in other words, whether it must be conceived from a motive apprehended through faith. For the rest, the controversy is less practical; since it is certain that for the genesis of contrition which prepares for justification, faith and hope are required,2 although it is not required that someone reflexively elicit an act of faith and hope, but it suffices that he perform it in act exercised, as they say (St. Alphonsus, VI, 439). Moreover, it can scarcely happen that one who believes and hopes, and fulfills the other conditions required for salutary contrition, does not grieve from a motive apprehended through faith.
- Estimatively highest. Contrition estimatively or appreciatively highest consists in this: that the penitent detests sin from a motive which, while it persists, he cannot be induced to sin; or - as others state the doctrine - in this: that the penitent detests sin more than any evil by fear of which he can be induced to sin. Moreover:
a) By the consent of all, it is required for the fruit of the sacrament. For in order that the sinner be reconciled with God, there is required a will which perfectly efficaciously, or absolutely, or with respect to every possible hypothesis, turns away from sin. But a will of this kind is lacking in one who lacks contrition estimatively highest. For the will extends itself no further than the motive on which it rests. Now one who lacks contrition estimatively highest lacks a motive which, while it persists, he cannot be induced to sin. Therefore he lacks a will which absolutely turns away from sin.
b) It is disputed whether it is required for the validity of the sacrament. Many authors deny this, or at least hold the negative opinion as probable; but the affirmative seems to be held. For: 1. the Council of Trent defines contrition, which it proposes as necessary for the existence or validity of the sacrament,3 in this way: "sorrow of soul and detestation concerning a committed sin, with the purpose of not sinning for the future."4 But these words in their obvious sense signify a will which absolutely detests the committed sin and absolutely purposes to abstain from sin; in other words, contrition estimatively highest. Therefore this is required for validity. 2. Contrition which is presented by the Council of Trent as necessary for validity, from the same Council, suffices with the sacrament5 for justification or for the fruit of the sacrament. But only contrition estimatively highest suffices for justification or for the fruit of the sacrament. Therefore it is also required for validity (cf. St. Thomas, Supplement, question 29, article 8).6 3. True contrition is certainly required for the validity of the sacrament. But contrition which is not appreciatively highest is not true contrition. The minor is proved from the fact that true contrition consists in the act of turning oneself away from every habitual attachment to mortal sin. But contrition which is not appreciatively highest does not involve aversion from every habitual attachment to mortal sin except conditionally, or aversion under some respect.
For the will turns itself away from something insofar as the motive by which it is moved objectively excludes turning toward that thing. Hence, if the motive is only of such objective power that, while it stands, the will can still be joined with mortal sin, there is no aversion except conditionally, or aversion under some respect. But contrition not appreciatively highest has a motive which is only of such objective power that, while it stands, the will can still be joined with sin. Therefore the will in contrition not appreciatively highest is not properly an aversion from mortal sin, or is not true contrition, but only aversion or contrition conditionally or under some respect (St. Alphonsus, VI, 433, 7).
Objection 1. Contrition is matter of the sacrament only insofar as it is sensible or is manifested. But contrition is not manifested insofar as it is estimatively highest. Therefore as such it is not matter of the sacrament.
Response. I distinguish the major: contrition is matter of the sacrament only insofar as it is sensible or manifested, according to itself, I concede; according to its qualities, I deny; otherwise it would also have to be manifested as supernatural.
Objection 2. Only that penance is the object of judgment in the sacramental forum which can be known sufficiently certainly through an external act of the penitent. But this cannot be said of contrition estimatively highest.
Response. I deny the minor; for of itself confession suffices so that the contrition required for receiving the sacrament rightly may be sufficiently certainly admitted. But for receiving the sacrament rightly, contrition estimatively highest is demanded.
Corollary I. From the fact that contrition estimatively highest is required, do not infer that contrition highest intensively, that is, highest in degree of vehemence, is also required. For this does not pertain to the substance of contrition, which it is established from the Council of Trent suffices.
Corollary II. Nor is it required that a comparison be instituted between sin and temporal evils; indeed, commonly this is not even expedient, and it is dangerous (St. Thomas, Quodlibet 1, article 9; St. Alphonsus, VI, at the cited place).
- Universal. The universality of contrition consists in this: that it extends itself to all committed sins. This takes place: 1. when someone grieves from a universal motive, even if the penitent does not recall individual sins; 2. when he grieves from particular motives which comprehend all committed sins. Now the universality of contrition:
a) As regards committed mortal sins, is certainly required for the fruit of the sacrament, since one mortal sin is not remitted without another. Hence, if contrition is lacking as regards one mortal sin, none would be remitted.
It is disputed whether universality is required for the validity of the sacrament. Some affirm this, and their principal reason seems to us to be that which we have already alleged on p. 226: "Contrition which by the Council of Trent is called the quasi-matter of the sacrament, and therefore is required for validity and suffices for it, from the same Council seems also to suffice, at least with the sacrament, for justification."7 But particular contrition does not suffice for justification. Therefore neither does it seem to suffice for validity. St. Alphonsus (VI, 444) and most other authors deny this, and judge that particular sorrow - that is, sorrow which does not extend itself to other mortal sins, but to one only or to certain sins from those committed - suffices for the validity of the sacrament. The reason alleged is that in the case there is true contrition, so that all things required for validity seem to be present. The case would be if someone, in good faith, grieved solely from the special baseness of some sin; but this will happen very rarely, because commonly penitents grieve either from a universal motive alone, or also from one.
Finally note: if a penitent, questioned by the confessor, states sins about which he did not previously think, it is indeed useful, but not necessary, to stir him up to a new act of sorrow, because an act elicited from a universal motive is presumed to have been conceived.
b) As regards venial sins, universal contrition is required only insofar as a venial sin is not remitted to which sorrow does not extend itself. For the rest, cf. the Scholion on contrition and purpose as regards venial sins.
Corollary. From what has been said it is gathered how far the sacrament of Penance can be informe, that is, valid but not fruitful. Many deny this, but St. Alphonsus (VI, 444) and most more recent authors affirm it, namely in the case in which someone grieves solely from a particular motive concerning one or some mortal sins.8 Others add the case in which the sinner lacks contrition estimatively highest (p. 226). But the sacrament of Penance, though informe, probably revives when the obstacle has been removed (n. 11).
- External, that is, manifested or sensible in some way. For contrition more probably is an essential part of the sacramental sign itself; but it cannot be this unless in some way it is externally disclosed or manifested. It can be manifested, for example, by oral recitation of contrition, by confession either actually instituted or - if it has followed confession - morally enduring, or by expectation of absolution.
1 Session 14, chapter 4; session 6, canon 3.
2 Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 6.
6 On the opinion of St. Thomas, see Ter Haar, De occasionariis et recidivis, n. 237 sq.
7 Session 14, chapters 3 and 4.
8 Some judge that the sacrament, even in this case, is valid and fruitful, because, when the sinner grieves in order that he may receive grace, his sorrow, although in appearance particular, in reality virtually extends itself to all sins. They add that particular sorrow does not suffice without a universal purpose. But a universal purpose will scarcely be present without universal sorrow.
V. Relation between contrition and the other parts of the sacrament. Here note:
Contrition or detestation of sins must, as is clear, precede absolution from them; but it makes no difference whether it precedes or follows the act of confessing, although it is better to elicit it before confession and repeat it after confession (St. Alphonsus, VI, 445).1
It is disputed whether contrition must be referred by the penitent to absolution. Some deny this, both because it belongs to the minister, not the penitent, to refer the matter of the sacrament to the form; and because from Trent2 attrition, which excludes the will to sin, suffices in the sacrament for justification, without there being any mention of some relation to be made by the penitent. Others affirm it, because the minister cannot assume the acts of the penitent as matter unless they have been referred by the penitent to the sacrament. Others add that, just as one receiving, for example, Orders must order the touching of the matter to the sacrament, so also one receiving the sacrament of Penance must refer contrition to it. Nor should it be objected that sometimes those can be absolved who are ignorant of the sacrament, and therefore do not refer contrition to absolution. For they can, with the necessary conditions posited, be absolved conditionally, because the opinion of which we are speaking is not certain. St. Thomas seems to adhere to the affirmative opinion (3 p., question 86, article 6). Whatever the case may be, in practice you should follow the safer part (St. Alphonsus, VI, 447); but the question itself does not seem practical, because contrition, by the very fact that someone wishes to be absolved, seems sufficiently ordered to absolution.
It is not required that contrition actually or virtually endure until absolution, but it suffices that it persist habitually, that is, that it has not been retracted, with the things to be observed nevertheless observed, that is, those to be set forth under 4. The reason is that the penitent - although his acts are the matter of the sacrament - nevertheless is not the minister of the sacrament. Many indeed seem to require that contrition persevere actually or virtually, that is, in some effect; but in reality - many of them at least - do not speak of virtual perseverance properly so called (cf. St. Alphonsus, VI, 446). For the rest, it is difficult to determine how long contrition virtually endures. St. Alphonsus says this: "I, however... do not hesitate to assert that whenever confession derives from sorrow for sins, sorrow always virtually perseveres at least for one or another day, while that confession is the effect of sorrow. It is otherwise, however, if someone should confess from mere devotion, or to fulfill a vow, or a penance" (Homo Apostolicus, tract 16, n. 20).
As regards the space of time which can intervene between contrition actually elicited, likewise between confession, and absolution, some judge that only so much can intervene as can intervene between the parts of a civil judgment, because the sacrament of Penance was instituted after the manner of a judgment. But most reject that, nor does the reason alleged settle the question, because from elsewhere it is clear that a sacramental judgment is a judgment of its own kind (St. Alphonsus, VI, 446); for the rest, the space of time of which we are speaking cannot be determined. In practice, however, there will be no difficulty, since one who is absolved a rather long time after contrition has been elicited and confession instituted will commonly repeat both contrition and, at least in some way, confession before absolution.
Question. Whether a new absolution requires a new act of contrition, so that one who, after receiving absolution, declares a sin inculpably omitted, or again confesses sins already declared, must, I say, in order to be absolved again, elicit a new act of sorrow.
Response. Most more recent authors, against St. Alphonsus (VI, 448) and others, hold the negative opinion as morally certain; but undeservedly. The reason for doubting is this: just as a new act of confessing is required for a new judgment, so also, at least probably, a new act of contrition is required. Nevertheless, commonly there is no obligation of imposing a new penance; but it suffices that the imposed penance, insofar as it regards sins previously declared, be commuted, and insofar as it ought to regard the sins now declared, be left unchanged.
Objection. Even if a new act of contrition is not elicited, all things necessary for the sacrament are had, namely absolution, confession, and contrition morally persevering.
Response. It is doubtful whether contrition morally persevering suffices; since probably, as we have proved, a new act of contrition is required.
For the rest, the controversy seems less practical, because the penitent, by confessing the omitted sin or by again confessing sins already declared, commonly, at least in act exercised, will elicit a new act of contrition.
1 Some older authors taught the contrary, relying on nearly these reasons:
Contrition must be manifested through confession, and therefore must be prior to it. Response: contrition can also be manifested in other ways, for instance by oral recitation. Besides, contrition elicited after confession is well manifested through confession, insofar as this morally perseveres, or at least through the petition or expectation of absolution.
Confession must not be a mere narration of sins, but a sacramental accusation; hence let it be informed by sorrow. Response: besides the fact that confession, insofar as it morally perseveres after contrition has been elicited, is informed by sorrow, it becomes sacramental by the fact that it is instituted in order to absolution.
2 Session 14, on Penance, chapter 4.