Curiosity and Negligence

The Vices Opposed to Studiousness.—(a) The vice of excess is called curiosity. It is a desire of knowledge that is inordinate on account of the motive (e.g., when one is curious about the doings of others because one wishes to injure them, when one gazes about to satisfy impure desire) or on account of its circumstances (e.g., a curiosity about the latest news or rumors that keeps one from duty or more important matters, a curiosity that consults fortune-tellers, a curiosity that tries to peer into the inscrutable mysteries of God, Ecclus., iii. 22).

(b) The vice opposed to studiousness by defect is negligence, which is a voluntary omission of study of those matters one is bound to know, as when a schoolboy wastes his time in play and idleness. Curiosity and negligence are usually found in the same person (e.g., those who pry into the affairs of others without reason, do not, as a rule, mind their own business well).

The Malice of the Sins against Studiousness.—(a) Curiosity in itself is venial, for it does not seem a serious offense to busy oneself with things superfluous. But circumstances sometimes make it mortal. Thus, the subject-matter may make it serious, as when one is curious about obscene books, or has a prurient desire to gaze on unbecoming pictures or plays, or tries to fish out of others sacramental or other confidential secrets; or the purpose may make it serious as when one is inquisitive or spying because one wishes to blacken a neighbor (Prov., xxiv. 15), or the means may make it mortal as when recourse is had to calumny, fraud, reading private papers, etc., in order to get information.

(b) Negligence is mortal or venial according to the gravity of the duty of knowledge. Thus, if a lawyer gave no study at all to a case and thereby inflicted a grave loss on his client, the negligence would be a mortal sin.

S. Th. II-II, q. 166-167.

1052. Studiosity (from study, that is, vehement application of the mind; weetgierigheid) is the virtue moderating the appetite and study of truth to be known according to the rules of right reason. It is subjected principally in the will for intellectual cognition, but secondarily in the concupiscible appetite for sensitive cognition.

The proximate matter of this virtue is not cognition itself of truth, which, speaking per se, is good (nor does it need a moral virtue), but the appetite of truth to be known, which can be good or evil. For on the part of the soul man is inclined to desire for cognition; on the part of the body he is inclined to avoid the labor of seeking knowledge. Hence a virtue is required, which contains each inclination within the limits of reason, lest there be excess toward cognition or the defect of sloth. Insofar as it restrains the immoderate appetite of knowing, lest someone wish to know more and higher things than befits his capacity, nor make knowledge more than truth, it is a potential part of temperance; insofar as it impels to study notwithstanding labor, it rather pertains to fortitude. From this second element it obtained its name, but the first is more essential, for the appetite of knowing per se regards the cognition to which studiosity is ordered; the labor of learning is regarded only per accidens, insofar as it is an impediment of cognition which must be removed. And therefore studiosity rather and simply pertains to temperance.

1053. Curiosity is opposed to studiosity primarily and by excess. - This generally signifies every superfluous care about useless things in clothing, furniture, speech, art, exterior things; properly it imports superfluous diligence in knowing things which either do not pertain to us at all or exceed our grasp, precisely with this mind, that we may know and discern, or from the affection of cognition alone: for if it were done for another end, and not from the delectation of cognition, it is not formal curiosity but material curiosity. Hence it can be defined: the inordinate appetite of knowing.

Vicious curiosity is concerned:

A. About intellective cognition in two general ways: a) per accidens, on the part of the end, namely if knowledge is sought for an evil end, for example, for becoming proud or for harming others, and this is material curiosity; b) per se from the very inordinate mode of seeking knowledge, if it is formal curiosity, and this in four ways: 1. insofar as through less useful study we are withdrawn from necessary study; 2. if someone studies to learn something from him from whom it is not lawful, as from a demon or from magicians or spiritists; 3. if he seeks to know the truth concerning creatures without referring it to the due end (directly or indirectly), namely to the knowledge of God; 4. if he studies to know truth above the faculty of his own talent, because through this men easily slide into errors (Sir. 3:22, 26; Prov. 25:27).

B. Similarly, vicious curiosity is concerned with sensitive cognition in a twofold way: 1. in one way, negatively, if sensitive cognition is not ordered to something useful, but rather turns man away from some useful consideration; 2. in another way, positively, insofar as sensitive cognition is ordered to something harmful: as the curious looking at a woman is ordered to concupiscence, and diligent inquiry concerning the deeds of others is ordered to detraction.

Yet if someone is intent upon cognition of sensible things in an ordered way because of the necessity of sustaining nature, or because of the study of understanding truth, there is virtuous studiosity about sensible cognition.

1054. Curiosity (nieuwsgierigheid) according to itself is a venial sin; because it does not seem a great inordination that man should apply superfluous care in knowing things which do not pertain to him: for it is nothing but an excessive affection and use of a good thing, namely cognition. Yet it can become mortal in many ways per accidens from circumstances:

1. By reason of matter or effect, if from an inordinate desire of knowing someone transgresses a positive law or exposes himself to grave danger: thus they sin mortally who read prohibited books, or amorous books with danger of consent; who from curiosity look for a long time at the dishonorable parts of the other sex; who attempt by the powers of nature to know the mysteries of faith; or intend to know the secret of confession; who watch duels by their own effort, etc.

2. By reason of the end, as if you attempt to know something for gravely harming your neighbor.

3. By reason of the means, as if by magical art, or by inducing someone into mortal sin, you wish to know something, or you open letters in order to read them (n. 856).

1055. Negligence is opposed to studiosity by defect and secondarily. - It is the voluntary omission of knowing those things which someone is bound to learn or know for his state and condition. It is mortal or venial according as the obligation of knowing and the negligence is grave or light, for example, a judge neglecting the study necessary for prudently settling a case.

Negligence here is taken for the appetite of neglecting study and is the root of negligence of the intellect. Namely that negligence contrary to studiosity is the cause of negligence against prudence.

1056. Remarks. - 1. Luxury and gluttony are about pleasures which are in the use of tangible things; but curiosity is about the pleasure of cognition of all the senses and is called the concupiscence of the eyes. Hence merely sensible pleasure sought without reason pertains to curiosity, because it is to experience in order to experience, to know by sense in order to know (a. 2, ad 1).

2. Let the words of St. Thomas, q. 167, a. 2, ad 3, be noted: "To look upon the deeds of others, or to inquire with a good mind, or for one's own utility, namely that from the good works of neighbor man may be provoked to better things, or also for the utility of that person, namely that he may be corrected if anything is done viciously by him, according to the rule of charity and due office, is praiseworthy (Heb. 10:24)... But that someone intends to consider the vices of neighbors, for contemning or detracting, or at least for inquiring uselessly, is vicious" (Prov. 24:15).

AMONG these vices curiosity first presents itself, which can be taken broadly or strictly; taken broadly it stands for an immoderate eagerness for trying novelties in any way whatever; thus the Holy Doctor takes it in his exposition on the Psalter, Psalm 13, where he sets out four things by which a Christian man is most corrupted; and he puts Curiosity first among them, saying: there are four things that corrupt, Curiosity, loquacity, cruelty, and pleasure.

And since the experience of novelties is perceived chiefly by sight, therefore the Holy Doctor in the place cited ascribes Curiosity to the eyes; for these, while the mind within is distracted through negligence, run about and wander abroad among various objects; whence a multitude of thoughts, creeping into the mind in a throng, empties piety, and by degrees drives the soul on to graver sins.

The Holy Doctor also elegantly sets forth another, more physical reason, in the place cited above: why the eyes are seduced by curiosity more than the other senses? For since the four elements flourish especially in four parts of man, fire shines forth most of all in the eyes, and therefore by nature, being remote from the center, it strives to burst forth in every direction and to course about, and scarcely allows the visual rays to be fixed long on one object; hence the young are more curious than the old, since in the latter that fire lies almost extinct and languishes, while in the former, being more lively, it distracts: The other parts, in which the remaining elements flourish, are the hands, in which, because of the predominance of earth, there is touch; the tongue, in which the air forms the voice; and the genitals, in which the watery humor serves generation: And these parts (the Holy Doctor subjoins) the aforesaid four vices, like a fourfold pestilence, destroy — the eyes namely curiosity, the tongue loquacity, the hands cruelty, and the genitals pleasure. I relate this because those vices oppose that temperance in a special manner, of which more fully elsewhere.

STRICTLY speaking, however, curiosity taken thus is opposed to studiousness by excess, and consists in the desire and immoderate eagerness to know and to be wise, not unto sobriety, but to satisfy the lust of the mind.

Hence this curiosity is very well defined by the Holy Doctor in his exposition on Ecclesiastes on the words I saw all things that are done. It is the lustful prostitution of the human understanding, embracing any truth whatsoever everywhere and committing adultery with it: The reason for this definition is given in the same place by the Seraphic Doctor, because the first Truth is the bride, whose faith the human understanding in a certain way breaks, while it curiously explores other truths and places its satiety, or happiness, in them; And since curiosity advances thus far, it is without doubt deadly, when it turns the soul wholly away from the first Truth.

That this immoderate desire of knowing can occur in four ways is taught by St. Thomas, q. 167, and St. Bonaventure in the mirror of the soul, chap. 1.

FIRST on the part of the end, if he ordains knowledge to an evil end, or does not refer it to God as he ought, as St. Augustine says book on true religion, chap. 29, and book on the morals of the Church, chap. 21, in Valencia's collection.

SECOND on the part of the learner, if by means of it he is hindered from satisfying his duty. On this ground St. Jerome in the epistle to Damasus, on the prodigal son, rebukes Priests, who, setting aside the Gospels and the Prophets, read comedies and love poems, and sing the words of bucolic verses.

THIRD on the part of the one from whom knowledge is sought, as if it be sought from a demon, as I said concerning Superstition and Adjuration, Treatise on Religion.

FOURTH on the part of the thing whose knowledge is sought, if it be above nature. Therefore Ecclesiasticus 3: Seek not the things that are too high for thee.

THE EXCESS of games is opposed to Eutrapelia, as I said when treating of Games and Jests. See St. Thomas question 178, article 3.

And indeed it will be mortal, if the manner of playing is disgraceful and obscene, or pernicious to one's neighbor through mingled frauds: Or if anyone so gives himself to play that he neglects the commandments of God or of the Church, and indeed places in it his ultimate end, as St. Bonaventure teaches in the mirror of the soul, chap. 2, §. The fifth fruit of rapine is the game of dice. Hence some say of this that it is a mortal sin, because it is against Canonical and Civil law. And what is gained from play is possessed by no good title, nor can it be retained, but ought to be distributed to the poor. For since he who gains in play gains unjustly, and he who loses loses justly, therefore he who gains is not bound to restore to him from whom he gains, unless perhaps he led him into playing. And since play seems to have sufficiently from its root the character of mortal sin, because it seems to proceed from avarice, and because many sins are communicated in play — namely fraud, lying, perjury, blasphemy, scandal, loss of time, and anger — therefore this seems to be the reason for the prohibition of play. When one plays for the sake of recreation, the sins said above being excluded, it does not seem to have the character of mortal sin. Thus the Seraphic Doctor.

And chap. 3, §. On dishonesty in gesture, he strikes the same note.

From these gather, first, that the game of dice is not forbidden by the natural law. So Molina Volume 2, on Justice, question 510. Stephanus Costa, Treatise on Play, article 4, number 5. Diana part one, treatise 15, resolution 65, against Scacchius treatise on commerce, §. 1, question 1, number 104.

GATHER, second, that the civil and canonical laws prohibiting these games do not of themselves bind under mortal sin, as the Holy Doctor says, but only by reason of the sins that follow; and that the civil laws have been abrogated by custom, as taught by Homobonus on the examination of churches, part 2, treatise 9, chap. 24, question 25. Regius in the resolution of cases, case 23. Salas treatise on play, disputation 3. Lessius book 2, chap. 26, doubt 1. Filliucius volume 2, treatise 38, chap. 4, number 58. Diana in the place cited, who with others infer that, by force of the said laws, other circumstances set aside, there is not even sin.

THERE is, moreover, the question whether the keepers of houses for these games sin gravely.

THE NEGATIVE opinion is upheld by Vincentius Iustinianus, a Dominican, cited by Lopez, to be quoted below; for by the authority of St. Thomas 1. 2. question 169, article 2, ad 4, and by the examples adduced after Sanchez by Bonacina, Treatise on laws, disputation 2, question 4, point 2, it is lawful to minister and sell indifferent things, even with knowledge of their wicked abuse: And such are these games.

THAT it is nevertheless unlawful St. Bonaventure teaches in the place cited of the mirror, chap. 2, for there those grave sins are perpetrated which the Holy Doctor enumerates, as tearful experience teaches.

He has been followed by Suarez, treatise on Charity, disputation 10, section 4. Sanchez, Volume 1, book 1, chap. 7, number 39. Sylvester, under the word Ludus, question 15. Navarrus, Manual, chap. 19. Comitolus, book 3, question 7. Zanardus, in the Directory, part 2, precept 3, chap. 28. John de la Cruz, in the Directory, part 1, precept 7, article 5, doubt 13. Valencia, volume 2, disputation 5, question 6, point 5, §. 2. Molina, Volume 2, on Justice, disputation 516, and many others among these, with whom Diana subscribes above, referring to others.

It is proved by the argument of St. Bonaventure: Those things from which grave sins follow are gravely forbidden: such are these gatherings of houses, or conventicles: Therefore. The minor is proved from St. Bernard sermon 33, where he enumerates twelve sins. What is Barattry but a betting-house, in which by blasphemies the limbs are cut down of him who redeemed us with his own blood, and of his sweetest Mother, and of all the Saints, as Bellochius says in practice, part 2, question 4, from number 492 to 504, who says it is the seed-bed of all vices, of which St. Antoninus enumerates twenty-one part 2, title 1, chap. 23, §. 6. Wherefore he beseeches Princes, in the bowels of Christ, to root out this most foul pestilence.

Bellochus number 466 infers, and Diana in the place cited and others, that the patrons of these conventicles, should the principal players default, step in and are bound in restitution.

Diana infers, second, that Princes cannot grant a license for exposing a house for play.

From what has been said the adverse argument is answered: it is not lawful to minister things to wicked uses when the wicked use is exercised in the very exhibition itself; and thus dice, dice-games, and candles are exercised while men are actually blaspheming, as Diana notes with Lorca 2. 2, question 10, article 9. Nor does Diana rightly concede in his first answer that these things are indifferent, since on the very fact they are wicked and morally ordered to this.

THE DEFECT opposed to Eutrapelia at the other extreme remains, and is called Rusticity, as Aristotle teaches Nicomachean Ethics 2, chap. 7, and book 4, chap. 8, and St. Thomas question 168, article 4, and St. Bonaventure in the places adduced, and it occurs when a man is so boorish as to make himself burdensome to all, hindering honest recreations, either by not cooperating in them or by biting, carping, and embittering them out of a certain unurbanity which I call Saturnine, which very many hunt after, especially spiritual Cydonians, and by which they vex others.

To Titius, who applies himself to the study of moral theology, knowledge seems to be good, and therefore the desire for it seems unable to be bad. Theologians, however, seem to teach otherwise when they hand down that curiosity is sinful. Thus, according to them, the reading of an indecent book, inquiry by young people about sexual matters, and an indecent look are sins, at least venial, if they proceed from curiosity; but to inquire of the dead about truth out of curiosity is mortal. In order that he may resolve these difficulties, Titius asks:

1. What is curiosity, and in what does its malice consist?

2. Is the desire or pursuit of a good object always good?

3. Let satisfaction be given to Titius and his difficulties.

1. What is curiosity and in what does its malice consist ?

Curiosity, in the sense in which the word is used by theologians, is an inordinate desire of knowledge. As St. Thomas teaches (II-II, question 167, article 1), knowledge is good in itself, but it may be bad incidentally, as when it is the cause of pride. And although knowledge is good, yet the desire of knowledge may be inordinate and vicious. The desire of knowledge becomes vicious if the end for which it is sought is bad, as if one studies medicine in order to poison an enemy. Moreover, all knowledge is not equally important, and so a desire of knowing what is less useful is inordinate if it stands in the way of acquiring knowledge which is necessary. A law student who requires all his time to qualify for his examinations would do wrong if he spent two hours daily in learning Chinese. If the means taken to acquire knowledge are bad, the desire becomes inordinate. Thus, as St. Thomas says, it is unlawful to seek to know the future from demons. Fourthly, a desire of knowledge is inordinate if it leads one to try to learn what surpasses his powers.

2. Is the desire or pursuit of a good object always good?

No; in order that an action may be good, not only the object, but the end and all the circumstances must be good — good arises from an integral cause, evil from any defect whatsoever. The answer, too, is clear from what was said above.

3. The case. Titius, a theological student, thinks that as knowledge is good the desire of it can not be evil. This difficulty has been met already. It is clear that the desire of knowledge can be inordinate, and if it is inordinate, it is sinful. Theologians are right when they teach that curiosity is at least a venial sin and that it may be mortal. Thus the reading of an improper book out of curiosity, where there is not proximate danger of consenting to evil, is a venial sin; if the book is indecent and there is proximate danger of consenting to evil, it is mortal. Before the proper time youths should not think or talk about sexual matters, as thought and talk about such matters before the time leads to impurity. Hence to indulge curiosity about them in talk, look, or reading, is at least a venial sin, and it becomes mortal if the danger of consent be proximate. To seek to know occult matters by calling up the dead is specially forbidden in Holy Scripture, and is mortally sinful.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 218; Lessius, De Justitia, lib. iv, c. 4, n. 84.