Derision

(St. Thomas, II-II, q. 75.)

I. Notion. Derision occurs when someone, by jesting, objects something vicious to another, for this end, that he blush or be confounded; by jesting, i.e. by turning someone's defect into laughter.

Derision differs from insult, detraction, and whispering, because derision intends someone's blushing; insult, the injury of honor; detraction, the injury of reputation; whispering, the dissolution of friendship.

"Sins of words," says St. Thomas, "are principally to be weighed according to the intention of the one uttering them; and therefore sins of this sort are distinguished according to the diverse things which someone intends when speaking against another. For just as someone by abusing intends to depress the honor of the one abused, and by detracting to diminish reputation, and by whispering to take away friendship, so also by mocking someone intends that he who is mocked should blush; and because this end is distinct from the others, therefore also the sin of derision is distinguished from the aforementioned sins" (II-II, q. 75, a. 1).

II. Modes of deriding. Derision can be done: 1° by the mouth, namely by words and laughter, and it is called mockery; 2° by wrinkling the nose, sticking out the tongue, etc., and it is called scoffing; 3° by deeds, for example by bending the knee, etc., and it is called ridicule. But the aforesaid modes, as is clear, do not differ in species.

III. Morality. 1. Derision is a grave sin when someone's defect grave in itself is turned into laughter; for true or grave contempt is had in this, that someone is so little esteemed and held so base that his grave defects are turned into sport, as if they were the defects of a child or a fool (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 75, a. 2). But if a defect slight in itself is turned into laughter, there is not true or grave contempt, and therefore only a slight sin.

2. Derision "is a sin so much the graver, as greater reverence is owed to the person who is mocked" (St. Thomas, loc. cit.).

"Whence it is most grave to mock God and the things which are God's, according to that saying of Isaiah 37: Whom have you reproached? and whom have you blasphemed? and against whom have you exalted your voice? and afterwards it is added: Against the Holy One of Israel. Next place is held by mockery of parents; whence it is said in Proverbs 30: The eye that mocks his father and despises the birth of his mother, let the ravens of the torrents pluck it out and the young of the eagle eat it. Next, the derision of the just is grave; because honor is the reward of virtue, and against this it is said in Job 12: The simplicity of the just is derided; and this derision indeed is very harmful, because through this men are impeded from doing well" (St. Thomas, loc. cit.).

3. Derision is free from fault: 1° if it is done so that the one derided may recover from sin; 2° if friends, without danger of offense, for the sake of recreation, jokingly object certain slight things to one another.

Derision.—Derision is a jest that reproaches another with some defect or evil in order to put him to confusion.

(a) It is a jest, that is, it is spoken in fun and consists in making the defects of another person the object of laughter or amusement. Thus, it differs in manner from contumely, detraction and whispering, which are spoken seriously.

(b) Its purpose is the confusion of the person ridiculed, that is, it intends to take from him the good opinion that he is entitled to have of himself and the peace of conscience that he enjoys. Thus, it differs in object and purpose from the other injurious words hitherto considered (see 2009). The intention to put another person out of countenance by ridicule is either formal or material, according as the purpose before the mind is to disconcert that person, or only to have one’s joke, though one sees that this will mean shame and suffering for the victim of the joke.

Distinction between Derision and Jesting.—Moderate jesting at another’s expense is not derision, nor sinful, if it is justified by a reasonable motive. (a) Thus, a serious motive for jesting at another is fraternal correction. To ridicule a person who is making a fool of himself is often the best way to correct him, for many persons are less moved at being called wicked than at being called absurd. Similarly, a satirical rebuke sometimes serves to abash a person who has an exalted opinion of himself. In such cases a truth spoken in jest is an act of charity to a sinner. (b) A playful motive for jesting at another is recreation. The good-natured exchange of banter about trivial defects between persons who enjoy this give and take is a reasonable form of amusement in itself; indeed, it pertains to the virtue known as eutrapelia. But some persons who enjoy a jest at the expense of another are extremely sensitive to ridicule and fly into a rage if fun is poked at themselves, or even if they suspect that someone is laughing at them.

Even jesting whose purpose is good may be sinful on account of the offensive or immoderate way in which it is conducted (see 2010). There are three general forms of jest, but they do not constitute distinct species of sin when jest is unlawful, since the difference between them is accidental as far as morality is concerned.

(a) Thus, jest of the mouth is one that is made by words or laughter.

(b) A jest of the face is made by the expression of the countenance (e.g., by wrinkling up the nose, sticking out the tongue).

(c) A jest of act, or practical joke, is some trick played on another, horseplay, and the like.

The Sinfulness of Derision.—(a) When the derider makes light of a grave evil, he commits a mortal sin, for he shows grave contempt towards the person derided, treating the latter as if he were entirely worthless—one whose misfortunes were matters for joke. Indeed, derision is a more serious injury than contumely, for the contumelious person treats the evil of his neighbor as something serious, whereas the derider makes sport of it and is thus more insulting. In Scripture grave punishment is threatened to deriders: “God shall scorn the scorners” (Prov., iii. 34). But if an evil grave in itself is commonly looked upon as light on account of the inferior condition of the person who has the defect (viz., because he is an infant or an idiot), there is no grave sin of contempt.

(b) When the derider makes light of an evil that is really light, there is no contempt shown, but there may be serious embarrassment caused to the person derided. For the peace of a good conscience is a great blessing (“Our glory is this, the testimony of our conscience,” II Cor., i. 12; “A secure mind is like a continual feast,” Prov., xv. 15), and that which disturbs it can be a serious distress and harm. If the butt of the joke does not take the matter much to heart, the sin is venial. But should he suffer great mental pain or disturbance on account of the ridicule, the quality of the sin is disputed. Some think that mortal sin is committed, if the derider foresees the serious evil that will ensue; but others hold that the sin is venial, since it is the over-sensitiveness of the person derided that accounts for his great discomfiture of mind.

The gravity of the sin of derision is increased by the object against whom it is directed; for the greater the reverence due a person, the greater the injury shown by making a mockery of him.

(a) Thus, the worst form of derision is that which is directed against God, and it is not distinct from blasphemy. Hence, Isaias (IV Kings, xix. 6) calls the deriders of the God of Israel blasphemers, and St. Luke (xxii. 64, 65) says that the soldiers who gave Our Lord a mock coronation spoke in blasphemy.

(b) Next in gravity is derision of parents, and Scripture declares the special horror of this sin: “The eye that mocketh at his father, let the ravens of the brooks pick it out and the young eagles eat it” (Prov., xxx, 17).

(c) Finally, there is a special enormity in derision of saintly persons, for virtue deserves honor, and those who dishonor it deter men, as far as in them lies, from cultivating or esteeming it.

What is contumely, how manyfold is it, and what kind of sin is it? Contumely is: the unjust violation of the honor of a present person. Therefore contumely differs from detraction first in this, that detraction directly injures reputation, or the internal estimation which others have of neighbor; but contumely directly injures honor, or the external attestation of such estimation, whether it is done by words or deeds. Secondly, contumely differs from detraction in this, that detraction is done secretly and in the absence of the other; but contumely is done openly and in the presence of the other, through contempt of him, whether in himself, who is present, or in another, e.g., in his legate or statue; for contumely is so called from contemning. Nevertheless, as honor can be shown to an absent person, e.g., by a laudatory oration before many, so also contumely can be done to an absent person by an atrocious injury before many, because namely it is foreseen at least confusedly that the offended person will find it out. L. 1. 3, n. 334.

Contumely is done in three ways, namely by word, writing, and deed. Moreover, under contumely which is done by word are comprehended reviling, reproach, opprobrium, and curse. Under contumely which is done by writing from the mind of defaming another is comprehended a defamatory libel. And finally under contumely which is done by deed are comprehended mockery, derision, and scoffing. "Meanwhile, however, these species of contumely in the theological forum are only material; for formally all pertain to the unjust injury of another's honor." Struggl 33. But from St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 75, a. 1, "derision is a special sin." For "just as someone by reviling intends to depress the honor of the one reviled... so also by mocking someone intends that the one mocked blush." Hence derision, which is done by mouth, word, and laughter, and scoffing, which is done by wrinkled nose, "differ from contumely as shame differs from dishonoring: for shame is fear of dishonoring." St. Thomas ibid. ad 1. Indeed, "from a virtuous work someone merits among others both reverence and reputation, and within himself the glory of a good conscience; according to that saying, 2 Cor. 1:12, this is our glory, the testimony of our conscience." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 75, a. 1 ad 2. Hence conversely "from a base or vicious act, a man's honor and reputation are taken away among others; and to this end the contumelious man and the detractor say base things about another; but within himself, through the base things which are said, someone loses the glory of conscience through a certain confusion and shame, and to this end the mocker says base things." Now security of conscience and its quiet is a great good. "And therefore he who disquiets someone's conscience by confounding him inflicts on him some special harm." Injury of due honor is not only against charity, but also against justice; for individuals have a right to a certain honor, and not to be held in contempt. Yet greater honor and a certain quasi-worship is owed to Prelates and persons excellent in dignity, and to parents; which in the former belongs to observance, in the latter to piety. But any injury of honor, if only that is considered and not other extrinsic effects, is of the same lowest species, except that which is against parents and which also violates observance or piety. Lugo de Poenit., d. 16, n. 265.

St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 72, a. 1.; q. 73, a. 3.; q. 75.; q. 103, a. 1, 2.; L. 966.; Struggl 23-27.; Ithur. Cas. 30, n. 5.

S. Th. II-II, q. 72; q. 73, a. 1; q. 75 and 76; q. 103, a. 1.

435. Notions. - Just as reputation is injured by detraction, so honor is injured by contumely (beleediging). Honor is the external testimony of another's excellence, made by words or equivalent signs. It can be done by laudatory words which pronounce another's excellence, by calling him, for example, lord, eminent, most wise, - by deeds or actions such as inclination, going to meet him, yielding place, - or by exterior things, such as gifts, the erection of a statue, the setting up of an image, etc.; all these are employed from the intention of the one honoring, to signify another's excellence or his superiority in regard to oneself, under some respect, or in regard to others.

The foundation of honor is qualities or gifts, of whatever kind, internal and external, natural or supernatural, by which someone excels, especially virtue, which is the true excellence of man.

Honor proceeds as from its first motive from reverence, insofar as someone, from the reverence which he has toward another, honors him; and at the same time it tends to reverence as to an end, insofar as he honors him so that he may be held in reverence by others. But its effect is glory, which is clear knowledge of excellence among others. It differs from good reputation: a) reputation chiefly consists in the internal opinion of many, honor in external testimony; b) reputation is borne concerning one absent, honor is shown to one present, either through himself, or through another which represents him, such as an ambassador or image; c) reputation concerns a certain perfection simply, but honor concerns excellence or superiority in perfection.

436. Definition of contumely. - Contumely is directly opposed to honor; whence it is the unjust dishonoring of a present person. It is said:

1° dishonoring, i.e., not only the negative absence of honor even when due, but a positive contrary act which expresses contempt, which is chiefly done by words uttered or written, also by deeds insofar as they are equivalent signs which have the force of words, for example, by a contemptuous look or gesture, by an infamous picture, by a slap inflicted, by the breaking of an image or defacing of a door. Whence the privative omission of due honor is not contumely, unless because of special circumstances it is equivalent to a positive act of contempt, as if, all being greeted, one is deliberately neglected;

2° unjust, because it could also be a just punishment of a delict;

3° of a present person, at least in some way, whether through himself, or in an ambassador or in an image, or in such a way that the injury is made known to him through a messenger or through letters. For "he who utters words against someone in secret, seems to fear him rather than to despise him, whence he does not directly bring detriment to honor" q. 73, a. 1. Hence for contumely it is not necessary that it be done before others; for "if someone says his defect to someone... to him alone, it can be contumely insofar as he who speaks acts unjustly against the reverence of the hearer" q. 72, a. 1, ad 1.

437. Contumely is made from the intention of dishonoring and by this differs from other sins. - Its end is externally to manifest contempt toward the man to be dishonored; therefore:

1. It differs really from detraction a) by reason of the object or end, because it directly injures honor, not reputation; b) by reason of the mode, because it is done to one present, while detraction of itself is done concerning one absent. But if contumely is done before others in such a way that a delict, whether false or unknown, is imputed to another while he himself is present, then it is joined with detraction but formally is contumely.

Let St. Thomas be heard, q. 73, a. 1: "Just as by deed someone harms another in two ways: openly indeed as in robbery,... but secretly as in theft...; so also by word someone injures another in two ways: in one way openly, and this is done by contumely,... in another way secretly, and this is done by detraction. But from this, that someone openly utters words against another, he seems to despise him; whence from this very fact he is dishonored, and therefore contumely brings detriment to the honor of him against whom it is uttered. But he who utters words against someone in secret seems to fear him rather than to despise him; whence he does not directly bring detriment to honor, but to reputation, insofar as one uttering such words secretly, as far as in him lies, makes those who hear have an evil opinion of him against whom he speaks: for the detractor seems to intend this, and strives for this, that credence be given to his words. Whence it is clear that detraction differs from contumely in two ways: in one way as to the mode of proposing words, because namely the contumelious man speaks openly against someone (i.e., to his face), but the detractor secretly; in another way as to the end, or as to the harm inflicted, because namely the contumelious man derogates from honor, the detractor from reputation."

2. It also differs really from mockery or jeering, by which the defects of one's neighbor are turned into laughter, whether by words, or by gestures such as with wrinkled nose, or by deeds, to his illegitimate blushing, disturbance, and confusion. Therefore mockery has an end diverse from contumely: to procure blushing, which is not dishonoring but fear of dishonoring (q. 75, a. 1).

3. It differs also under some respect from abusive speech and reproach (versmading), by which generally any vice whatsoever, or defect of fault or penalty or merely natural defect, is disgracefully objected to someone to the detriment of honor, or a lessening or need, while contumely strictly so called objects fault (q. 72, a. 1, ad 3).

438. Principle. Contumely is a sin against justice, grave from its genus. - For it takes away from one's neighbor a notable good which is usually esteemed more than riches, indeed in external goods it holds the first place, "both because it is very near to virtue, as being a certain testimony existing concerning someone's virtue; and also because it is shown to God and to the best; and also because men set aside all things for obtaining honor and avoiding blame" (q. 129, a. 1). But to take away such a good is against justice, because it is done while one's neighbor is unwilling, who has a right to it because of natural or supernatural qualities and gifts, especially because of honesty and virtue.

Whence Christ, Mt. V, 22: "But he who shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be liable to the council: but he who shall say, Thou fool (i.e., madman), shall be liable to the hell of fire." And the Apostle admonishes Christians that they be "anticipating one another with honor" (Rom. XII, 10), and "in humility judging one another superior to themselves" (Phil. II, 3).

Nevertheless it can be venial a) on the part of the agent, if it is done from inadvertence, lack of deliberation, sudden anger, or from an intention of not gravely injuring honor, as if someone speaks in jest or not so seriously;

b) on the part of the matter, if there is no grave injury of honor. Whence contumelious words which are uttered by parents against children, and abusive speeches by which men of the lowest condition or quarrelling women attack one another and vomit forth whatever occurs, are easily excused from grave sin, because they are usually considered as of lesser moment or are even not seriously uttered.

439. The gravity of the sin of contumely is to be weighed not only absolutely from the thing itself or the contumely uttered according to itself, but also respectively

1° to the dignity of the person offended: for injury is measured from the dignity of the person offended to whom it is terminated; whence the same contumely brought upon a father, bishop, or king is much graver than if it is brought upon an equal;

2° also to the offending person and his dispositions: thus an offense which arises from hatred, envy, or contempt is graver than that which arises from anger or lightness; greater if it is uttered by a person of great authority than by a man of lower condition;

3° to the effects to follow from it: the sin is greater if it is done before several persons or before those who from this receive scandal, or if quarrels, contentions, enmities are foreseen.

440. Mockery (beschimping, bespotting) agrees with contumely in matter; but it differs in mode and end, and consequently is of a diverse species; for it is had when someone objects to another a defect or fault in a joking manner, so that the other blushes or is ashamed (Mt. XXVII, 41-44; Lk. XXIII, 36). It is called jeering when someone is exposed to ridicule not by words but by gestures or movements of the body (Mt. XXVII, 40). It is called derision when the same is done by means of some deception (Mt. XXVI, 68; XXVII, 29; Lk. XXII, 63). Cf. St. Thomas, q. 75.

The gravest sin is mockery of God and of those things which are of God (Is. XXXVII, 23), because it is also blasphemy against religion; the second place is held by mockery of parents because it is also against piety (Prov. XXX, 17); in the third place derision of the just is grave insofar as the virtue and simplicity of the just man is derided (Job XII, 4), which derision is very harmful because through this men are impeded from acting well. Besides, derision will be a grave sin against justice if it notably offends and shames one's neighbor, or causes grave damages and sins (Prov. XXII, 10).

But derision concerning a light evil or defect, or one not sufficiently deliberate, is a venial sin, indeed none, if it is done moderately and with a just cause, for example, so that the one derided may abstain from a defect or sin, or that honest recreation may be fostered. Nevertheless, even friends should deride soberly, prudently, and not too long, especially if the neighbor is foreseen to be not lightly moved by this; wherefore St. Thomas wisely admonishes (q. 72, a. 2, ad 1): "It pertains to eutrapelia to say some light abusive speech, not for the dishonoring or saddening of him against whom it is said, but rather for the sake of delight and jest; this can be without sin, if due circumstances are observed. But if someone does not fear to sadden him against whom a joking abusive speech of this kind is uttered, provided he excites laughter in others, this is vicious."

441. Cursing, concerning which St. Thomas treats after derision (q. 76), can be understood in three ways:

1° one is merely enunciative, by which someone reports the evil of another, and this is nothing but detraction;

2° another is causative or imperative, by which someone moves others by command to bringing evil upon another; and this is the first of the nine modes of cooperation, concerning which we spoke above (n. 309);

3° another is optative, by which someone expresses an evil affection or desire and wishes evil to another (verwensching). This can be defined: a dishonoring by which someone imprecates evil upon someone insofar as it is evil, and thus it is against justice; besides, it contains the sin of hatred against charity, if evil is wished from the heart.

Optative cursing, just like imperative cursing, is a sin if someone intends the evil of another insofar as it is evil; but it is not a sin if someone intends the evil of another under the aspect of good, because then the intention of the one speaking is not referred to evil but to good, whether because it is just (for example, to desire just punishment), or because it is useful (for example, for correction). This however is to be understood, provided it is done according to the order of charity: thus he would sin who wished the death of his father because of the inheritance.

Cursing is a mortal sin from its genus, because it is against charity; nevertheless it can be venial either because of the smallness of the evil which one wishes to another, or because of the imperfection of the affection, because it is not done from the heart but from lack of deliberation or without the mind of one desiring, for example, from a sudden movement of anger or from custom. And nevertheless curses even light of themselves can from circumstances be mortal, whether by reason of the person against whom they are made, for example, if they are made against God, against parents, against superiors especially present, or by reason of scandal.

It is a sin so much graver according as we ought more to love and reverence the person whom we curse and according as we wish graver evils. Whence

1. it is gravest to curse God, which is also blasphemy against religion;

2. then to curse parents, which is also against piety;

3. then to curse superiors, which is also against observance;

4. then against other neighbors according to the gravity of the evil wished; but if by a simple evil affection diverse things are also wished under the general aspect of evil, because they are evil, the sin is against charity insofar as evil is desired, and against justice insofar as, by uttering it, one's neighbor is dishonored; but if by an efficacious desire someone desires to inflict diverse evils upon another, the sins are diverse in species against justice according to the diverse evils wished;

5. to curse irrational creatures: a) if they are regarded according to themselves, it is not a mortal sin, because they are not a subject of right and injury, but it is idle and vain, and therefore venial; b) insofar as they have a relation to evil, there is no sin because it is to curse evil itself; c) insofar as they are creatures of God, it is blasphemy against God; d) insofar as they are useful to man, it is the same as to curse man.

Concerning the comparative gravity of detraction and cursing, St. Thomas teaches, q. 76, a. 4 [Original misprint: q. 77]: "The enunciation of fault is a sin, insofar as some harm is thereby brought upon one's neighbor; but to bring harm is graver than to desire harm, other things being equal. Whence detraction according to the common account is a graver sin than cursing expressing simple desire. - But cursing which is done by way of command, since it has the account of a cause, can be graver than detraction, if it brings greater harm than the denigration of reputation; or lighter, if less."

442. Remark: On patience in tolerating contumelies. - From patience we are bound to endure contumelies in preparation of soul, but not always to do this in act. As St. Thomas clearly explains, q. 72, a. 3: "It is the precept of the Lord: if someone has struck you on one cheek, offer him also the other, namely, so that a man be prepared to do this if there is need; nevertheless he is not always bound to do this in act, because neither did the Lord himself do this, but when he had received a slap, he said: Why do you strike me?... Sometimes it is necessary that we repel an inflicted contumely, especially for two reasons: 1) because of the good of him who brings the contumely, so that his audacity may be repressed, and he may not attempt such things thereafter; 2) in another way because of the good of many, whose progress is impeded because of contumelies inflicted upon us. Whence Gregory says: those whose life has been placed as an example for imitation ought, if they can, to restrain the words of those detracting from them."

MOCKERY (irrisio) is a vice of the tongue, which tends to the neighbor's blushing, and consequently deprives the neighbor of peace and serenity of conscience. Thus St. Thomas, art. 1.; Cajetan, and commonly the Thomists, and other interpreters: St. Bonaventure, l. 3. Pharetrae cap. 3. §. de derisione, where he adduces the charming saying of St. Gregory, l. 25. Moral. cap. 8.: It must be feared, lest when we ourselves fall, he rise again whom we mocked while we stood, though he now knows not how to stand who knew how to mock one standing. Where he seems to indicate that to mock gravely is a mortal sin.

He PROVES it in the Bible of the Poor, cap. 70., from punishments. For thus Judges 8.: the men of Sochoth mocked Gedeon, and were condemned to a hard death. Michol, 2 Kings 6., because she mocked David, was made barren by God. The children who mocked Eliseus, 4 Kings 2., were by God's command torn by bears.

But the holy Doctor ADMONSISHES in the Speculum animae, cap. 1. §. second branch of pride, and cap. 4. §. ex contemptu proximi that mockeries, ironies, and scoffings mostly arise from pride and contempt, and are mortal against charity; but with contempt excluded, it will not be mortal, because mockery is opposed to defects in the manner of light ones, so that it suffuses [the victim] with blushing. Thus also St. Thomas, art. 2., where Cajetan, Soto, l. 5. quaest. 11. art. 1.; Filliucius, Tract. 40. cap. 5. num. 143.; Valencia, quaest. 18. p. 2.; Sayrus, l. 12. cap. 5.; Fagundez, l. 8. cap. 12. num. 11.; Tanner, disp. 4. quaest. 8. num 159.

IF, however, you judge that he will be most gravely moved, it will be mortal, thus Soto, loc. cit. art. 2. concl. 2.; Filliucius, loc. cit.; St. Thomas with Cajetan and the others above.

LIKEWISE, if someone should mark out a fool by irony or mockery, then he would sin more gravely than if he hurled an insult. The reason is, because it adds contempt, as St. Thomas argues.

But St. Bonaventure WARNS, cap. 1. of the Speculum, loc. cit., that subsannatio is by gesture, but irrisio by voice. Thus also Tanner with St. Thomas, quaest. 75. art. 1.

But the mocking of Parents is a grave sin, whence Genesis 7.[9:25]: Chanaan was cursed, as St. Thomas, Cajetan, and Soto note. Therefore Proverbs 30.: The eye that mocks a father, and despises the bearing of his mother, let the ravens of the torrents pick it out, and the sons of the eagle eat it.

Tanner, in 4., and Valencia ADD that sometimes it is not a sin, if done for correction, or for suitable recreation, but they enjoin diligent caution.