Question Three: On Contumely

S. Th. II-II, q. 72; q. 73, a. 1; q. 75 and 76; q. 103, a. 1.

435. Notions. - Just as reputation is injured by detraction, so honor is injured by contumely (beleediging). Honor is the external testimony of another's excellence, made by words or equivalent signs. It can be done by laudatory words which pronounce another's excellence, by calling him, for example, lord, eminent, most wise, - by deeds or actions such as inclination, going to meet him, yielding place, - or by exterior things, such as gifts, the erection of a statue, the setting up of an image, etc.; all these are employed from the intention of the one honoring, to signify another's excellence or his superiority in regard to oneself, under some respect, or in regard to others.

The foundation of honor is qualities or gifts, of whatever kind, internal and external, natural or supernatural, by which someone excels, especially virtue, which is the true excellence of man.

Honor proceeds as from its first motive from reverence, insofar as someone, from the reverence which he has toward another, honors him; and at the same time it tends to reverence as to an end, insofar as he honors him so that he may be held in reverence by others. But its effect is glory, which is clear knowledge of excellence among others. It differs from good reputation: a) reputation chiefly consists in the internal opinion of many, honor in external testimony; b) reputation is borne concerning one absent, honor is shown to one present, either through himself, or through another which represents him, such as an ambassador or image; c) reputation concerns a certain perfection simply, but honor concerns excellence or superiority in perfection.

436. Definition of contumely. - Contumely is directly opposed to honor; whence it is the unjust dishonoring of a present person. It is said:

1° dishonoring, i.e., not only the negative absence of honor even when due, but a positive contrary act which expresses contempt, which is chiefly done by words uttered or written, also by deeds insofar as they are equivalent signs which have the force of words, for example, by a contemptuous look or gesture, by an infamous picture, by a slap inflicted, by the breaking of an image or defacing of a door. Whence the privative omission of due honor is not contumely, unless because of special circumstances it is equivalent to a positive act of contempt, as if, all being greeted, one is deliberately neglected;

2° unjust, because it could also be a just punishment of a delict;

3° of a present person, at least in some way, whether through himself, or in an ambassador or in an image, or in such a way that the injury is made known to him through a messenger or through letters. For "he who utters words against someone in secret, seems to fear him rather than to despise him, whence he does not directly bring detriment to honor" q. 73, a. 1. Hence for contumely it is not necessary that it be done before others; for "if someone says his defect to someone... to him alone, it can be contumely insofar as he who speaks acts unjustly against the reverence of the hearer" q. 72, a. 1, ad 1.

437. Contumely is made from the intention of dishonoring and by this differs from other sins. - Its end is externally to manifest contempt toward the man to be dishonored; therefore:

1. It differs really from detraction a) by reason of the object or end, because it directly injures honor, not reputation; b) by reason of the mode, because it is done to one present, while detraction of itself is done concerning one absent. But if contumely is done before others in such a way that a delict, whether false or unknown, is imputed to another while he himself is present, then it is joined with detraction but formally is contumely.

Let St. Thomas be heard, q. 73, a. 1: "Just as by deed someone harms another in two ways: openly indeed as in robbery,... but secretly as in theft...; so also by word someone injures another in two ways: in one way openly, and this is done by contumely,... in another way secretly, and this is done by detraction. But from this, that someone openly utters words against another, he seems to despise him; whence from this very fact he is dishonored, and therefore contumely brings detriment to the honor of him against whom it is uttered. But he who utters words against someone in secret seems to fear him rather than to despise him; whence he does not directly bring detriment to honor, but to reputation, insofar as one uttering such words secretly, as far as in him lies, makes those who hear have an evil opinion of him against whom he speaks: for the detractor seems to intend this, and strives for this, that credence be given to his words. Whence it is clear that detraction differs from contumely in two ways: in one way as to the mode of proposing words, because namely the contumelious man speaks openly against someone (i.e., to his face), but the detractor secretly; in another way as to the end, or as to the harm inflicted, because namely the contumelious man derogates from honor, the detractor from reputation."

2. It also differs really from mockery or jeering, by which the defects of one's neighbor are turned into laughter, whether by words, or by gestures such as with wrinkled nose, or by deeds, to his illegitimate blushing, disturbance, and confusion. Therefore mockery has an end diverse from contumely: to procure blushing, which is not dishonoring but fear of dishonoring (q. 75, a. 1).

3. It differs also under some respect from abusive speech and reproach (versmading), by which generally any vice whatsoever, or defect of fault or penalty or merely natural defect, is disgracefully objected to someone to the detriment of honor, or a lessening or need, while contumely strictly so called objects fault (q. 72, a. 1, ad 3).

438. Principle. Contumely is a sin against justice, grave from its genus. - For it takes away from one's neighbor a notable good which is usually esteemed more than riches, indeed in external goods it holds the first place, "both because it is very near to virtue, as being a certain testimony existing concerning someone's virtue; and also because it is shown to God and to the best; and also because men set aside all things for obtaining honor and avoiding blame" (q. 129, a. 1). But to take away such a good is against justice, because it is done while one's neighbor is unwilling, who has a right to it because of natural or supernatural qualities and gifts, especially because of honesty and virtue.

Whence Christ, Mt. V, 22: "But he who shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be liable to the council: but he who shall say, Thou fool (i.e., madman), shall be liable to the hell of fire." And the Apostle admonishes Christians that they be "anticipating one another with honor" (Rom. XII, 10), and "in humility judging one another superior to themselves" (Phil. II, 3).

Nevertheless it can be venial a) on the part of the agent, if it is done from inadvertence, lack of deliberation, sudden anger, or from an intention of not gravely injuring honor, as if someone speaks in jest or not so seriously;

b) on the part of the matter, if there is no grave injury of honor. Whence contumelious words which are uttered by parents against children, and abusive speeches by which men of the lowest condition or quarrelling women attack one another and vomit forth whatever occurs, are easily excused from grave sin, because they are usually considered as of lesser moment or are even not seriously uttered.

439. The gravity of the sin of contumely is to be weighed not only absolutely from the thing itself or the contumely uttered according to itself, but also respectively

1° to the dignity of the person offended: for injury is measured from the dignity of the person offended to whom it is terminated; whence the same contumely brought upon a father, bishop, or king is much graver than if it is brought upon an equal;

2° also to the offending person and his dispositions: thus an offense which arises from hatred, envy, or contempt is graver than that which arises from anger or lightness; greater if it is uttered by a person of great authority than by a man of lower condition;

3° to the effects to follow from it: the sin is greater if it is done before several persons or before those who from this receive scandal, or if quarrels, contentions, enmities are foreseen.

440. Mockery (beschimping, bespotting) agrees with contumely in matter; but it differs in mode and end, and consequently is of a diverse species; for it is had when someone objects to another a defect or fault in a joking manner, so that the other blushes or is ashamed (Mt. XXVII, 41-44; Lk. XXIII, 36). It is called jeering when someone is exposed to ridicule not by words but by gestures or movements of the body (Mt. XXVII, 40). It is called derision when the same is done by means of some deception (Mt. XXVI, 68; XXVII, 29; Lk. XXII, 63). Cf. St. Thomas, q. 75.

The gravest sin is mockery of God and of those things which are of God (Is. XXXVII, 23), because it is also blasphemy against religion; the second place is held by mockery of parents because it is also against piety (Prov. XXX, 17); in the third place derision of the just is grave insofar as the virtue and simplicity of the just man is derided (Job XII, 4), which derision is very harmful because through this men are impeded from acting well. Besides, derision will be a grave sin against justice if it notably offends and shames one's neighbor, or causes grave damages and sins (Prov. XXII, 10).

But derision concerning a light evil or defect, or one not sufficiently deliberate, is a venial sin, indeed none, if it is done moderately and with a just cause, for example, so that the one derided may abstain from a defect or sin, or that honest recreation may be fostered. Nevertheless, even friends should deride soberly, prudently, and not too long, especially if the neighbor is foreseen to be not lightly moved by this; wherefore St. Thomas wisely admonishes (q. 72, a. 2, ad 1): "It pertains to eutrapelia to say some light abusive speech, not for the dishonoring or saddening of him against whom it is said, but rather for the sake of delight and jest; this can be without sin, if due circumstances are observed. But if someone does not fear to sadden him against whom a joking abusive speech of this kind is uttered, provided he excites laughter in others, this is vicious."

441. Cursing, concerning which St. Thomas treats after derision (q. 76), can be understood in three ways:

1° one is merely enunciative, by which someone reports the evil of another, and this is nothing but detraction;

2° another is causative or imperative, by which someone moves others by command to bringing evil upon another; and this is the first of the nine modes of cooperation, concerning which we spoke above (n. 309);

3° another is optative, by which someone expresses an evil affection or desire and wishes evil to another (verwensching). This can be defined: a dishonoring by which someone imprecates evil upon someone insofar as it is evil, and thus it is against justice; besides, it contains the sin of hatred against charity, if evil is wished from the heart.

Optative cursing, just like imperative cursing, is a sin if someone intends the evil of another insofar as it is evil; but it is not a sin if someone intends the evil of another under the aspect of good, because then the intention of the one speaking is not referred to evil but to good, whether because it is just (for example, to desire just punishment), or because it is useful (for example, for correction). This however is to be understood, provided it is done according to the order of charity: thus he would sin who wished the death of his father because of the inheritance.

Cursing is a mortal sin from its genus, because it is against charity; nevertheless it can be venial either because of the smallness of the evil which one wishes to another, or because of the imperfection of the affection, because it is not done from the heart but from lack of deliberation or without the mind of one desiring, for example, from a sudden movement of anger or from custom. And nevertheless curses even light of themselves can from circumstances be mortal, whether by reason of the person against whom they are made, for example, if they are made against God, against parents, against superiors especially present, or by reason of scandal.

It is a sin so much graver according as we ought more to love and reverence the person whom we curse and according as we wish graver evils. Whence

1. it is gravest to curse God, which is also blasphemy against religion;

2. then to curse parents, which is also against piety;

3. then to curse superiors, which is also against observance;

4. then against other neighbors according to the gravity of the evil wished; but if by a simple evil affection diverse things are also wished under the general aspect of evil, because they are evil, the sin is against charity insofar as evil is desired, and against justice insofar as, by uttering it, one's neighbor is dishonored; but if by an efficacious desire someone desires to inflict diverse evils upon another, the sins are diverse in species against justice according to the diverse evils wished;

5. to curse irrational creatures: a) if they are regarded according to themselves, it is not a mortal sin, because they are not a subject of right and injury, but it is idle and vain, and therefore venial; b) insofar as they have a relation to evil, there is no sin because it is to curse evil itself; c) insofar as they are creatures of God, it is blasphemy against God; d) insofar as they are useful to man, it is the same as to curse man.

Concerning the comparative gravity of detraction and cursing, St. Thomas teaches, q. 76, a. 4 [Original misprint: q. 77]: "The enunciation of fault is a sin, insofar as some harm is thereby brought upon one's neighbor; but to bring harm is graver than to desire harm, other things being equal. Whence detraction according to the common account is a graver sin than cursing expressing simple desire. - But cursing which is done by way of command, since it has the account of a cause, can be graver than detraction, if it brings greater harm than the denigration of reputation; or lighter, if less."

442. Remark: On patience in tolerating contumelies. - From patience we are bound to endure contumelies in preparation of soul, but not always to do this in act. As St. Thomas clearly explains, q. 72, a. 3: "It is the precept of the Lord: if someone has struck you on one cheek, offer him also the other, namely, so that a man be prepared to do this if there is need; nevertheless he is not always bound to do this in act, because neither did the Lord himself do this, but when he had received a slap, he said: Why do you strike me?... Sometimes it is necessary that we repel an inflicted contumely, especially for two reasons: 1) because of the good of him who brings the contumely, so that his audacity may be repressed, and he may not attempt such things thereafter; 2) in another way because of the good of many, whose progress is impeded because of contumelies inflicted upon us. Whence Gregory says: those whose life has been placed as an example for imitation ought, if they can, to restrain the words of those detracting from them."